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Abstract 
This thesis examines South Africa' s foreign relations, viewed from a South African perspec-
tive, with the black African countries beyond southern Africa from 1961 to 1994. These rela-
tions were determined by the conflict between Pretoria's apartheid ideology on the one hand, 
and African continental rejection of South Africa's race discrimination policies and its exclu-
sion from the community of African states on the other. 
The documentary material used primarily stems from the Department of Foreign Affairs 
archive in Pretoria, supplemented by research conducted in other archives. Furthermore, we 
conducted interviews and correspondence, and consulted the relevant primary and secondary 
literature. Given the main source of information, we chose to make this work a case study in 
Diplomatic History. In consequence, and constituting the core of the study, Chapters 3 to 6 
explore the interaction between South Africa and the black African states in a chronological 
order. At the same time, we draw on the analytical concepts from the academic disciplines of 
Political Science and its derivative, International Relations, to comprehend developments 
more fully. We discuss the significance of the approaches from these two disciplines in both 
the Introduction and Chapter 2. In particular, we emphasise that this study is about Pretoria' s 
foreign policy, involving state and non-state actors, and we suggest that the unequal status 
between South Africa and the other African states constitutes an inherent factor in the rela-
tionship between them. 
The Conclusion examines the role of the state and non-state actors in determining Preto-
ria's foreign relations and the relevance of the structural imbalance between South Africa and 
the black African states in this context. 
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Head of the Department of Political Science at the University of Pretoria, for allowing me the 
use of an office and of the infrastructure at the Department during the three months I was 
based in Pretoria. 
In July 2001, I transferred my PhD registration to the Department of Political Studies at 
Rhodes University in Grahamstown, South Africa, for the final preparation of the study. 
However, given his departure for Pretoria soon after my arrival, Professor Roger Southall's 
supervision was minimal. This was partly compensated by the critical viewpoints generously 
given by Doctor Ivor Sarakinsky, also from the Department. During many late afternoon 
walks, we exchanged insights on a number of issues important to the study, particularly the 
transition period from 1990 to 1994 and the role of business. Academic input also came from 
Professors James Barber, Research Fellow at the South African Institute of International Af-
fairs in Johannesburg and Member of the Centre of International Studies at Cambridge Uni-
versity, and Deon Geldenhuys at the Department of Political Studies of Rand Afrikaans Uni-
versity in Johannesburg. I thank them for their time and helpful comments on earlier drafts. 
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fessor Peter Vale, whom I cannot thank enough for his excellent assistance as the supervisor 
of this thesis during the revision process after August 2002. Even though he had many other 
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Southern African Studies (CSAS) at the University of the Western Cape and accepting the 
appointment as the Nelson Mandela Professor of Politics at Rhodes University from 2003. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
Aim and Scope 
South Africa's foreign relations with the black African countries beyond southern Africa, 
viewed from a South African perspective, constitute the principal focus of this study. This 
relationship was determined by the inherent conflict between Pretoria's apartheid ideology 
and its ambition to be accepted as a fellow African state on the one hand, and African conti-
nental rejection of South Africa's race discrimination policies and the consequent exclusion 
from the community of African states on the other. Furthermore, African diplomatic activities 
against apartheid significantly contributed to South Africa's increasing international isolation. 
It was therefore generally recognised that the road to international acceptance was contingent 
on the normalisation of relations with the African states. ' Primarily guided by information 
derived from research in the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) archive in Pretoria, this 
thesis examines the resulting South African ambitions to end its pariah status by way of im-
pressing on African leaders that there was more to gain from co-operation and dialogue than 
from a resolute anti-apartheid posture. 
The geographic area of interest to us encompasses the thirty-nine African states between 
southern and North Africa.' The South African approach to this region differed significantly 
from that towards the other two. Due to their geographical proximity, economic dependence 
and vulnerability to Pretoria' s military might, and once independent, the countries in southern 
Africa - Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia,' Swaziland, Zambia and Zim-
I Geldenhuys, Deon Johannes. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making. Jo-
hannesburg: Macmillan South Africa for the South African Institute ofInternational Affairs: 187; Olivier, Gerrit 
Cornelius. 1982. South Africa's Relations with Africa, in Robert Arthur Schrire, ed. South Africa: Public Policy 
Perspectives. Cape Town: Juta: 269; Venter, Denis. 1980. South Africa and Black Africa: Some Problem Areas 
and Prospects for Rapprochement. Pretoria: Africa Institute: 3. 
, Including the islands of Cape Verde, the Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Reunion, Sao Tome and Prin-
cipe and the Seychelles. 
3 Prior to its independence in 1990, the South African government referred to it as South West Africa 
(S.W.A.). In 1966, the United Nations General Assembly named it Namibia (Resolution 2145 (XXI)). The term 
S.W.A./Namibia is used when making reference to the legal case, while Namibia is used in all other cases. 
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babwe' - effectively constituted South Africa's backyard, allowing it to enforce its interests 
through the means of power. The secondary literature has extensively covered South Africa's 
role as a "regional superpower", or "regional great power", in its immediate neighbourhood,' 
and military maps of the mid-1970s from the Department of Defence archive show that all of 
the above countries lay within reach of its fighter planes.- As this criterion was not applicable 
to Malawi, it is not considered as part of southern Africa for purposes of this study, despite its 
relatively strong economic dependence on South Africa. The North African countries - Alge-
ria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Western Sahara - are excluded from this study because 
the OF A organigrams reveal that they were dealt with separately, attributing them to the 
European and Middle Eastern spheres of influence.' 
The study begins in 1961, when South Africa attained the status ofa Republic, independ-
ent from the British Commonwealth while, concurrently, a wave of independence was sweep-
ing across the continent. In 1963, the newly independent African states formed the Organisa-
tion of African Unity (OAU) that had as its main aim the liberation of the African continent 
from colonial rule. ' In South Africa, a unique form of legally entrenched white minority rule 
held sway, with the OAU equating the struggle for decolonisation with that against apartheid! 
African states mobilised international opposition against the apartheid state through the OAU 
and at the United Nations (UN), and thus meaningfully contributed to Pretoria's pariah status 
within the international community. Support was also given to both of South Africa's princi-
4 Prior to its independence in 1980, it was called Rhodesia. 
, See, for example, Albright, David E. 1991. South Africa in Southern Africa, in David J. Myers, ed. Re-
gional Hegemons: Threat Perception and Strategic Response. Boulder, CO: Westview Press: 97-159; Bach, 
Daniel C. 1991. L' Afrique du Sud puissance regionale, Defense nationale 47, 10: 63-74; Bowman, Larry Wells. 
1968. The Subordinate State System of Southern Africa, International Studies Quarterly 12, 3: 231-261; Butts, 
Kent Hughes, Paul R. Thomas. 1986. The Geopolitics of Southern Africa: South Africa as Regional Superpower. 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press; Chan, Stephen. 1990. Exporting Apartheid: Foreign Policies in Southern Africa, 
1978-1988. London: Macmillan; Falk, Pamela S. 1986. The Geopolitics of Southern Africa: South Africa as 
Regional Superpower. Boulder, CO: Westview Press; Makinda, Samuel M. 1992. South Africa as a Regional 
Great Power, in Iver B. Neumarm, ed. Regional Great Powers in International Politics. Basingstoke: Macmillan: 
151-178; Olivier, Gerrit Cornelius. 1988 . South Africa as a Regional Power, in Daniel Jacobus 'Daan' van 
Vuuren, et aI. , eds. South Africa: The Challenge of Reform. Pinetown: Burgess: 551-565; Price, Robert Morris. 
1984. Pretoria' s Southern African Strategy, African Affairs 83, 330: 11-32; Southall, Roger Jonathan. 1982. 
Southern Africa: Regional Sub-System or Sub-Imperial Complex?, African Review: A Journal of African Poli-
tics, Development and International Affairs 9, 2: 36-61. 
_ Department of Defence Archive, HS/ ll1I12/6, Vol. 30. 
, See the Foreign Affairs List (Pretoria: Department of Extemal AffairslDFA) for the period under review. 
, Charter of the OAU, Art. IL1.d. Naldi, Gino J. 1992. Documents of the Organisation of African Unity. Lon-
don: Cassell: 4. See Stremlau, John Julius. 1982. The Foreign Policies of Developing Countries in the 1980s, in 
John Julius Stremlau, ed. The Foreign Policy Priorities of Third World States. Boulder, CO: Westview: 7. 
9 For example OAU Resolutions CM/St. 2 (XII) of 1969 and CMlRes. 209 (XIV) of 1970. See Stober, Horst, 
compo 1983. Organisation der Afrikanischen Einheit (OAU) : Resolutionen und Erkliirungen, 1963-1981. Berlin: 
Staatsverlag der DDR: 64, 71; Venter, Denis. 1980. Black Africa and the Apartheid Issue: A South African Re-
sponse, Journal of Contemporary African Studies I, 1: 82-85. 
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pal liberation movements, the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Con-
gress (PAC). 
The first democratic elections in April 1994 mark the end of the study, as this historical 
event finally removed the divisive issue between South Africa and African states. However, 
the political reforms initiated by South African President Frederik Willem de Klerk four years 
earlier, had already sounded the death knell for apartheid. Thereafter, Pretoria' s ambition in 
the African countries of interest to this study no longer concentrated on acceptance as a white 
African state, but rather aimed at obtaining their recognition for the reforms that had been 
instituted. This would allow it to fashion the post-apartheid order by wresting from the ANC 
as many concessions as possible for the white minority during the negotiation process. Yet, on 
the night of 17/18 June 1992 forty-six people died in the township of Boipatong, south of Jo-
hannesburg, and this undermined the South African government's strategy. The ANC accused 
Pretoria of being the main culprit for the massacre and, at its request, the OAU called on the 
UN Security Council to discuss South Africa's political crisis. Subsequent meetings held in 
July and August led to the deployment of a UN and other observer missions to South Africa, 
finally ending Pretoria' s ambitions in Africa. It will be argued that this seminal event in South 
Africa's political transition from 1990 to 1994 has not been given enough attention in the sec-
ondary literature and that the importance of the African dimension at that particular moment 
has been neglected. 
Regarding this study's structure, Chapter 2 on South Africa's Foreign Policy System, a 
term derived from Deon Geldenhuys' standard work on South Africa's apartheid foreign pol-
icy,'O presents the various state and non-state actors relevant to this thesis, placing an empha-
sis on the structures and personalities involved. For easy reference, Table 1 on page twenty-
two depicts the country's executives, the key government departments and the names of their 
ministers and administrative heads, while the Appendixes A and E contain comprehensive 
biographies of a number of DF A officials and the exchange rate between the South African 
Rand and the United States Dollar respectively. The years under review in this study saw the 
rule of four South African executives, each of whom left his specific imprint on domestic and 
foreign policy, including Pretoria's approach towards Africa. It is therefore appropriate to 
organise the evidence on South Africa's foreign relations with those states in four main chap-
ters following these periods, detailing in a chronological order the interaction between South 
Africa and the relevant African states. 
LO Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.l. 
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Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework encompasses aspects from the academic disciplines of History, 
Political Science and its derivative, International Relations (IR). While the differences be-
tween them are usually emphasised, significant voices from all sides propagate a conversation 
across the demarcations, arguing that this would add value to their research. 11 As IR scholar 
Scott Burchill remarked about his own heterogeneous discipline: "truth is not an attribute of 
anyone tradition, but of the dialogue between them"." While the present work is an example 
of such "cross-fertilization"" between various academic fields of study, it is best categorised 
as Diplomatic History. Claimed by both historians and international relations scholars to be a 
sub-field of their discipline," Diplomatic History in this thesis is understood in broad terms, 
as set out in the journal of the same name that is devoted to the study of Washington's foreign 
relations: "Diplomatic History should be a forum for discussion of many aspects of the dip-
lomatic, economic, intellectual, and cultural relations of the United States"." Let us now turn 
to the various disciplinary components indicated above and their contribution to the present 
subject of investigation. 
This study is a historical one, one of the recent past, certainly, and for this reason the main 
thrust of evidence follows a chronology. It entails the principal ingredients of what a histo-
rian's profession is generally said to be about, namely a "commitment to uncovering an objec-
tively knowable past", the description of a particular event rather than classes of events in a 
"narrative-based rather than theory-based" way, coupled with an acceptance of multi-causal 
over mono-causal explanations. In addition, and of great importance in this work, historians 
insist on the use of archival sources. 16 The single most innovative aspect resulting from their 
approach is that it allows a revisionist assessment of IR and Political Science hypothesis: "At 
11 Craig, Gordon A. 1983. The Historian and the Study of International Relations, American Historical Re-
view 88, I: I-II; Elman, Colin, Miriam Fendius Elman, eds. 2001. Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Politi-
cal Scientists, and the Study of International Relations. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Gaddis, John Lewis. 1990. 
New Conceptual Approaches to the Study of American Foreign Relations: Interdisciplinary Approaches, Diplo-
matic History 14, 3: 403-425; Holsti, Ole R. 1991. International Relations Models, in Michael J. Hogan, Thomas 
G. Paterson, eds. Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press: 57-88. 
" Burchill, Scott. 1996. Introduction, in Scott Burchill, et a!. Theories of International Relations. New York: 
St. Martin's Press: 23. 
" Elman, Colin, Miriam Fendius Elman. 1997. Diplomatic History and International Relations Theory: Re-
specting Differences and Crossing Boundaries, International Security 22, I: 5. 
14 Evans, Graham, Jeffrey Newnham. 1998. The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations. London: 
Penguin: 274£; McMahon, Robert J. 1991. The Study of American Foreign Relations: National History or Inter-
national History?, in Michael J. Hogan, Thomas G. Paterson, eds. Explaining the Histo/y of American Foreign 
Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 20£ 
"Holbo, Paul S. 1977. Editor'S Note, Diplomatic History I, I: vi. 
16 Elman and Fendius Elman. 1997. Diplomatic History and International Relations Theory, pp.7-11. 
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the very least political scientists could learn a great deal about the validity of their own mod-
els if historians would use them and offer critical assessments of their strengths and limita-
tions".17 The findings in this study, for example, vitiate the claim that South Africa's foreign 
relations with African states beyond the immediate neighbourhood were an expression of the 
country's political economy, as will be discussed below. 
As much as IR scholars and political scientists were, and still are, suspicious of History, 
the reverse situation did, and still does, hold true. Noting in 1982 that "[ e lven the best of the 
older diplomatic histories tended to be descriptive rather than analytical", the President of the 
American Historical Association urged his fellow colleagues interested in the study of inter-
national relations to cross boundaries and use the insights gained by scholars in both IR and 
Political Science: "we may gain in analytical sophistication if we overcome our congenital 
distrust of theory and our insistence upon the uniqueness of the historical event". 18 This study 
attempts to do precisely this, using IR and Political Science concepts that provide a helpful 
conceptual framework for the historian's narration. 
As regards the input from the former, International Relations has been circumscribed as a 
"generic concept for a vast array of activities, ideas and goods that do or can cross national 
boundaries" and that "embraces social, cultural, economic, and political exchanges that occur 
in ad hoc as well as institutionalized efforts"." Among its many aims, this discipline tried "to 
explain the relationships between power, stability and order" in the international system 
dominated by the Cold War, in the context of which the term hegemony was coined.'o Being a 
contested concept, it has been altered and enlarged, and the concept of preponderance, of 
which political scientist Hedley Bull distinguishes three sub-forms, is useful for our purposes: 
Dominance: "characterised by the habitual use of force by a great power against the lesser 
states comprising its hinterland" 
Hegemony: "The great power prefers to rely upon instruments other than the direct use or 
threat of force, and will employ the latter only in situations of extremity" 
Primacy/Leadership: "A great power' s preponderance in relation to a group of lesser 
states takes the form of primacy when it is achieved without any resort to force or the 
threat of force ( ... ). The position of primacy or leadership which the great power en-
joys is freely conceded by the lesser states within the group concerned"" 
'7 Holsti. 1991 . International Relations Models, p.88. 
18 Craig. 1983. The Historian and the Study ofIntemational Relations, p.9. 
,. Rosenau, James N. 2001. International Relations, in Joel Krieger, ed. The Oxford Companion to Politics of 
the World. New York: Oxford University Press: 424. 
'0 Gill, Stephen. 2001. Hegemony, in Joel Krieger, ed. The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World. New 
York: Oxford University Press: 354. 
21 Bull, Hedley. 1977. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. Basingstoke: Macmillan: 
2l4f. 
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In this study, sub-Saharan Africa is viewed as a "sub-system" in international relations," with 
South Africa as the most powerful nation in terms of economic development, technological 
superiority and military capacity. The above categorisation thus helps to describe its ability in 
bringing stability and order to this part of the world. Pretoria's behaviour in the immediate 
neighbourhood is suitably described as dominance, while its approach beyond southern Africa 
varied between hegemony and primacy. If a certain country was prepared to accept South 
Africa's predominant position, the relationship was closer to primacy, but nearer to hegemony 
in the other cases. Naturally, in its own view, Pretoria always presented itself as a leader on 
the continent, stressing "that it desired 'leadership through service' in its relations with Af-
rica"" by generously offering economic, technical and other assistance. It had difficulty in 
understanding that, because of its apartheid policy, the majority ofless developed black Afri-
can countries beyond southern Africa refused to accept what it was offering and did not want 
to become appreciative followers. 
We can contrast this situation with the constructive leader-and-follower situation that 
emerged after World War II in the relations between the United States and Europe. The for-
mer provided the war-tom continent with material and normative, or moral, resources. Its in-
ternational relations value system of a world order "that stressed openness, nondiscrimination, 
and greater prospects for joint gains" was shared by, and found followers among, European 
states." This did not apply to South Africa's position in black Africa, as its apartheid ideology 
in no way matched the moral and political objective of pan-Africanism. Consequently, Preto-
ria could not even become a member of continental or regional bodies, such as the OAU and 
the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). In fact, the very 
purpose for the latter's establishment in 1980 was to reduce the economic dependency of 
member states on South Africa. In comparison to that, again taking Europe's position vis-a-
vis the great powers during the Cold War as an example, the provision of material and moral 
resources made the United States an attractive partner for multilateral arrangements, like the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Compared to that, the Soviet Union acted on a 
22 Mathews, Kay. 1989. The Organisation of African Unity in World Politics, in Ralph Iheanyi Onwuka, 
Timothy Milton Shaw, eds. Africa in World Politics: Into the I990s. Basingstoke: Macmillan: 36f.; Shaw, Timo-
thy Milton. 1979. The Actors in African International Politics, in Timothy Milton Shaw, Kenneth Alfred Heard, 
eds. Th e Politics of Africa: Dependence and Development. London: Longman: 370; Zartman, Ira William. 1967. 
Africa as a Subordinate State System in International Relations, International Organization 21, 3: 545-564. 
23 Muller, Marie ElOise. 1996. South Africa's Changing External Relations, in Murray Faure, Jan-Erik Lane, 
eds. South Africa: Designing New Political Institutions. London: Sage: 126. 
"Ruggie, John Gerald. 1996. Winning the Peace: America and World Order in the New Era. New York: Co-
lumbia University Press: 48. Also Kupchan, Charles A. 1998. After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional 
Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Muitipolarity, International Security 23, 2: 42f., 46f. ; Borchert, Heiko. 
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bilateral basis, trying to establish "an East European security system based on country-by-
country dyadic ties to Moscow"." This corresponds to South Africa's ambitions in Africa 
beyond southern Africa, interacting with the relevant states on a bilateral basis and applying 
economic and politico-military incentives as "bargaining chips"'· for them to deviate from 
their anti-apartheid stance and to establish contact with Pretoria. 
Apart from IR insight, we also draw on Political Science, particularly the study of foreign 
policy for which the following definition finds application in this thesis: "Foreign policy, 
then, can be said to be the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent ac-
tor (usually a state) in international relations"." The only reservation relates to "official", as 
much of South Africa's foreign policy of interest here was conducted in secrecy. Based on 
this definition, Chapter 2 presents the state and non-state actors involved, making the case for 
a bureaucratic politics model that rejects the notion of the state being a homogeneous unit. 
This study further subscribes to an understanding of foreign policy being determined by do-
mestic and external factors," with the latter distinguishing between regional, continental and 
international influence. On the domestic front, the system of apartheid discriminated and seg-
regated peoples along racial lines; the minority was the beneficiary, holding the political, 
military and economic power. Acknowledging that foreign policy is conducted in pursuit of a 
country's national interest, the relevant secondary literature agrees that the survival of apart-
heid was the cornerstone of South Africa's foreign policy: 
The oveniding aim of South African governments in this period was the preservation of a 
white controlled state, although the means employed to maintain white power and iden-
tity changed as the challenges increased. That aim shaped and dominated domestic and 
foreign policy as Pretoria fought to ensure the security, status and legitimacy of the state 
within the international community." 
1999. Europas Sicherheitsarchitektur: Erfolgsfaktoren - Bestandesaufnahme - Handlungsbedarf. Baden-Baden: 
Nomos: 119-132. 
2' Ruggie. 1996. Winning the Peace, p.48. 
,. Neack, Laura, Jeanne A.K. Hey, Patrick J. Haney. 1995. Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change 
in Its Second Generation. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall: 210. 
" Hill, Christopher R. 2001. Foreign Policy, in Joel Krieger, ed. The Oxford Companion to Politics of the 
World. New York: Oxford University Press: 290. 
28 Rosenau, James N. 1987. New Directions and Recurrent Questions in the Comparative Study of Foreign 
Policy, in Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley Jr., James N. Rosenau, eds. New Directions in the Study of 
Foreign Policy. London: Allen & Unwin: 3; Seidelmann, Reimund. 1994. Aussenpolitik, in Andreas Boeckh, 
Hrsg. Internationale Beziehungen. MUnchen: C.H. Beck: 43; Neack, Hey and Haney. 1995. Foreign Policy 
Analysis, p.9. 
'9 Barber, James, John Barratt. 1990. South Africa's Foreign Policy: The Search for Status and Security, 
1945-1988. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Johannesburg: South African Institute of International 
Affairs: I. Also De SI. Jorre, John. 1977. South Africa: Up Against the World, Foreign Policy 28: 53; Jaster, 
Robert Scott. 1988. The Defence of White Power: South African Foreign Policy Under Pressure. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan; London: International Institute for Strategic Studies: xiii; Legum, Colin. 1980. South Africa in the 
Contemporary World, in Robert Morris Price, Carl Gustaf Rosberg, eds. The Apartheid Regime: Political Power 
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The developments in South Africa's immediate neighbourhood and Pretoria's role in this re-
gard are understood as the regional environment, which significantly impacted on the coun-
try's foreign relations with the countries further north from the mid-1 970s. In fact, they 
proved to be largely interdependent. As long as South Africa's neighbouring countries were 
controlled by the colonial powers, Portugal and Great Britain, the white minority had a feeling 
of security. To sustain this situation, Pretoria maintained its presence in Namibia and, after 
Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration ofIndependence (UD!) from London in late 1965, assisted 
the white Rhodesian government for a number of years. In addition, after the independence of 
both Angola and Mozambique from Portugal during 1974175, Pretoria saw itself increasingly 
surrounded by hostile governments and consequently supported Western-oriented rebel 
groups in the two countries. Over time, the South African government made some compro-
mise in southern Africa, such as the withdrawal of support for the Smith regime, to improve 
its relations with the rest of black Africa. Yet, Pretoria could not achieve acceptance as a fel-
low African state as long as its own black community was deprived of the vote (Chapter 4). 
The continental factor comprised, first, the condemnation of and struggle against apartheid 
by the relevant countries. Second, black Africa as a sub-system was generally composed of 
politically and economically weak states." In view of South Africa's comparatively strong 
position, Pretoria's bargaining chips therefore stood some chance of achieving the desired 
results. Third, dealing with these African states involved taking into account certain character-
istics relevant to their foreign policy making, particularly the dominant role played by the 
head of state or government." This was important to the extent that advantages resulting from 
and Racial Domination. Cape Town: David Philip; Berkeley, CA: University of California, Institute ofInterna-
tional Studies: 281-296; Pottinger, Brian. 1988. The Imperial Presidency: P. w: Sotha, the First 10 Years. Johan-
nesburg: Southern Book Publishers: 200; Schrire, Robert Arthur, Donald Silke. 1997. Foreign Policy: The Do-
mestic Context, in Walter Carlsnaes, Marie Eloise Muller, eds. Change and South African External Relations. 
Halfway House: International Thomson Publishing (Southern Africa): 3; Spence, John Edward ' Jack' . 1965. 
Republic Under Pressure: A Study of South African Foreign Policy. London: Oxford University Press: 3f., 15-
23; Van Wyk, Koos. 1991. Foreign Policy Orientations of the P.W. Botha Regime: Changing Perceptions of 
State Elites in South Africa, Journal of Contemporary African Studies 10, I: 45-65; Venter. 1980. Black Africa 
and the Apartheid Issue, p.98; Mills, Gregory John Barrington 'Greg', Simon Baynham. 1994. South African 
Foreign Policy, 1945-1990, in Gregory John Barrington 'Greg ' Mills, ed. From Pariah to Participant: South 
Africa's Evolving Foreign Relations, 1990-1994. Johannesburg: South African Institute ofInternational Affairs: 
28. 
30 Neack, Hey and Haney. 1995. Foreign Policy Analysis, pp.203f.; Clapham, Christopher. 1977. Sub-
Saharao Africa, in Christopher Clapham, ed. Foreign Policy Making in Developing States: A Comparative Ap-
proach. London: Saxon House: 98; Shaw, Timothy Milton. 1987. Foreword, in Olajide AJuko, ed. Africa and the 
Great Powers in the 1980s. Lanham, MD: University Press of America: viii; Aluko, Olajide. 1977. The Deter-
minants of the Foreign Policies of African States, in Olajide AJuko, ed. The Foreign Policies of African States. 
London: Hodder & Stoughton: I f. One exception to this generalisation was Nigeria, at least during certain peri-
ods of its history after 1960. 
" Clapham, Christopher. 1988. Third World Politics: An Introduction. London: Routledge: 124f.; Schraeder, 
Peter J. 1996. African International Relations, in April A. Gordon, Donald L. Gordon, eds. Understanding Con-
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economic co-operation with South Africa were thought to persuade them to take Pretoria's 
side. The attitude prevailed in Pretoria, whose own foreign policy making was highly person-
alised in the Prime Minister, later State President, and his entourage, that an exchange with 
African countries on a presidential level signified "that you could trust the other side", as 
phrased by a former DFA official.32 
While shaped by its position in southern Africa and on the continent, South Africa's for-
eign relations with the countries of interest here were embedded and influenced by develop-
ments in international politics. Three factors stand out in this regard. First, and as has been 
mentioned, the African community of states used the United Nations to put pressure on Preto-
ria so that it abandoned apartheid. Direct anti-apartheid lobbying aside, their activities in this 
forum changed norms in international law, most notably that colonialism and racial discrimi-
nation became unacceptable." Second, in its undertakings in the former French colonies, the 
Pretoria government had to acknowledge the continuously strong influence of Paris. Until the 
rnid-1970s, the South African government greatly benefited from this factor, but the increas-
ingly hostile French attitude towards apartheid during the 1980s then posed a stumbling 
block, developments that are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. Third, from the 1970s onwards, 
parts of the African continent became hot spots of the Cold War between the United States 
and the Soviet Union, as will be primarily seen in the same two chapters. 
In the context of South Africa's foreign policy toward Africa, it is also necessary to dis-
cuss the thesis that it had been the expression of the country's political economy, foremost in 
the early 1970s. The study of political economy is concerned with the "interaction of the state 
and the market as the embodiment of politics and economics in the modem world"," while 
three fundamentally different perspectives exist: economic liberalism, economic nationalism 
and Marxism. The Marxist view interests us here. Without going into all its details, it stressed 
"the primacy of economics, seeing all else as derivative, as epiphenomena, the superstructure 
upon an economic base"." It further argued that the capitalist economy had a tendency to 
overproduce particular types of goods due to insufficient domestic demand. As a result, and 
taking into account the uneven development among nations, capitalist economies were forced 
temporary Africa. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner: 131; Tordoff, William. 1984. Government and Politics in Af 
rica. Basingstoke: Macmillan: Sf. 
32 Interview with Paul Runge, 7 April 1999. See Appendix A for his biography. 
33 Klotz, Audie Jeanne. 1995. Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press. 
34 Gilpin, Robert. 1987. The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer-
sity Press: 9. 
35 Gourevitch, Peter A. 1993. Political Economy, in Joel Krieger, ed. The Oxford Companion to Politics of 
the World. New York: Oxford University Press: 716. 
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to look for new markets. Accordingly, this explained colonialism and imperialism: "The ac-
quisition of colonies had enabled the capitalist economies to dispose of their unconsumed 
goods, to acquire cheap resources, and to vent their surplus capital".'· 
Two political scientists, Timothy Shaw and Roger Southall, used the Marxist view of po-
litical economy to explain South Africa' s drive into Africa in the early 1970s as part ofthe so-
called 'Outward-Looking Policy' (Chapter 4). Their argument was based on South Africa's 
economic development in the 1960s, which is now briefly outlined. Throughout this decade, 
the country's domestic economy had significantly expanded, with growth rates of more than 
7% on average, resulting in increased import while export stagnated. Pretoria' s subsequent 
import substitution policy to counteract this trade imbalance proved not to be entirely success-
ful. As a result, a commission of inquiry was established, and in 1972, the Reynders Commis-
sion presented its report, highlighting the need for export promotion.J7 Its recommendations 
led to the formation of both the Private Sector Export Advisory Committee in 1972" and the 
Interdepartmental Committee for Exports in 1974," composed of representatives from the 
Departments of Economics, Commerce and Industries, as well as the principal business asso-
ciations.40 Prior to this, Pretoria had been served solely by the Export Trade Advisory Com-
mittee from the late 1950s to 1967 and thereafter by its successor, the Export Promotion 
Council. In the second half of the 1960s, and parallel to the growth of South Africa' s domes-
tic economy, Pretoria fostered plans for a 'Greater South Africa' and a 'Southern African 
Common Market' (Chapter 3). These twin concepts aimed at consolidating and extending 
Pretoria's powerful economic position in the immediate neighbourhood, thereby strengthen-
ing its political role as a "sub-imperial" power. Against this background, Shaw and Southall 
argued that Pretoria' s drive into Africa was "an expression of the dynamics of South African 
political economy"'1 Even though not denying that the Outward-Looking Policy had "major 
,. Gilpin. 1987. The Political Economy of International Relations, p.38. 
J7 Fine, Ben S., Zavareh Rustomjee. 1996. Th e Political Economy of South Africa: From Minerals-Energy 
Complex to Industrialisation. London: Hurst: 193-198; Holden, Merle. 1989. Trade Policy Debate: Im-
portlExport Trends, 1957-1987, Indicator SA 6, 3: 31-36; Holden, Merle. 1990. The Growth of Exports and 
Manufacturing in South Africa from 1947 to 1987, Development Southern Africa 7, 3: 363-366; Houghton, D. 
Hobart. 1976. The South African Economy. Cape Town: Oxford University Press: 21 2f., 218f. , 233; Jones, Stu-
art, Andre Muller. 1992. The South African Economy, 1910-90. New York: St Martin 's Press: 341f. ; Moll, 
Terence. 1990. From Booster to Brake? Apartheid and Economic Growth in Comparative Perspective, in Nicoli 
Jean Nattrass, Elisabeth Ardington, eds. The Political Economy of South Africa. Cape Town: Oxford University 
Press: 78f. 
"'Report of the Private Sector Export Advisory Committee for the period 1972-1974', 10 July 1975, p.l 
(DFA, 3412, Vol. 5). 
'9 DFA, 3412, AJ 1974 and Vols. 4, 5. 
40 DFA, 34/2, Vols. 2, 3. 
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political-diplomatic and military-strategic objectives", they emphasised the "underlying mate-
rial basis in the requirement of South African-based capital for increased resources, larger 
markets, expanding spheres for investment and maintenance of the existing supply of foreign 
migrant labour". 42 
The accuracy of their interpretation can now be assessed, by analysing the hitherto un-
available statistical evidence on South Africa's trade with sub-Saharan Africa. In 1962, the 
Department of Customs and Excise ceased publishing trade figures with Africa on a country-
to-country basis," probably to prevent unnecessary embarrassment for those countries that 
were engaged in trade with the Republic despite their verbal anti-apartheid stance. In 1995, 
the Cabinet decided to still treat these figures as confidential, suggesting that the post-
apartheid government was guided by similar considerations.« This situation notwithstanding, 
the African country files in the DFA archive contained that data, evidently provided by its 
sister department. The statistical information compiled in Appendixes B and C present a com-
prehensive picture of South Africa's trade with all black African countries. Although the ab-
solute accuracy of the figures cannot be guaranteed due to "backdoor trade" through third-
party countries, double-invoicing, clandestine trade and private businesses seemingly holding 
back relevant information from the Department of Customs of Excise," they permit one to 
draw two important conclusions. First, the countries in South Africa's immediate neighbour-
hood constituted its main trading area on the African continent.'6 Second, trade relations were 
.1 Shaw, Timothy Milton. 1977. Kenya and South Africa: "Subimperialist States, Orbis 21 , 2: 375-394; 
Southall, Roger Jonathan. 1984. South Africa, in Timothy Milton Shaw, Olajide Aluko, eds. The Political Econ-
omy of African Foreign Policy: Comparative Analysis. Aldershot: Gower: 221. He takes up the same argument 
again later: Southall, Roger Jonathan. 1999. South Africa in Africa: Foreign Policy-Making During the Apart-
heid Era. Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue. Both Shaw and Southall were based in Canada at the time 
of writing their original contribution; Shaw was Assistant Professor of Political Science at Dalhousie University, 
Halifax, while Southall was Visiting Professor at the Institute for International Development and Cooperation, 
University of Ottawa. 
42 Southall. 1984. South Africa, p.233. 
4J Decter, Moshe. 1976. South Africa and Black Africa: A Report on Growing Trade Relations. New York: 
American Jewish Congress: 3; Guelke, Adrian Blanchard. 1974. Africa as a Market for South African Goods, 
Journal of Modern African Studies 12, I: 72f. ; Holtes, Willem Bernard 'Wim' . 1983. The Future of Trade be-
tween the Republic of South Africa and Black Africa. Pretoria: University of Pretoria, Institute for Strategic Stud-
ies: 2; Olivier. 1982. South Africa's Relations with Africa, p.292. 
«Telephone interview with Trevor van Heerden, 8 March 1999. 
45 Interview with Wim Holtes, 31 March 1999; Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical 
Series 16, 3, 15 March-14 April 1979: 5048; Legum. 1980. South Africa in the Contemporary World, p.286; 
SAFTO & the State of SA Trade: A Corporate Report. 1984. Johannesburg: Financial Mail: 21 ; ' What's in a 
figure ', Finance Week 20-26 June 1991, p.24. 
46 This has previously been suggested in the secondary literature: Chettle, John H. 1984. Economic Relations 
between South Africa and Black Africa, SAiS Review 4, 2: 121-133; Esterhuysen, Pieter, ed. , Denis Fair, 
Gerhard Max Erich Leistner. 1994. South Africa in Sub-Equatorial Africa: Economic Interaction. Pretoria: Af-
rica Institute: 65; Kerdellonton, Christine. 1989. Afrique: les bonnes affaires de Pretoria, Jeune Afrique 1465, I 
February: 48; Thomas, Wolfgang H. 1979. South Africa and Black Africa: The Future Economic Interaction, 
Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies 6, 2: 103, 114. 
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maintained with all sub-Saharan African countries, though some were at a very low level, 
with Pretoria usually exporting more than importing from each country on an individual basis. 
Yet, compared with southern Africa, the trade volume with the black African countries further 
north was insignificant." This becomes even more evident when compared to global trade 
figures. In addition to this data, the ambitions of the principal export promotion organisations 
that will be introduced in Chapter 2 reveal that the area between southern and North Africa 
was not considered to be of major economic interest during the Outward-Looking Policy pe-
riod. This influenced the discussions at the Export Promotion Council's Sub-Committee for 
Africa, whose meetings during 1969, for example, focused solely on southern Africa." 
In conclusion, we find Shaw's and Southall's view that the Outward-Looking Policy in 
southern Africa was motivated primarily by economic considerations to be valid. However, 
we do not agree with their thesis that Pretoria pursued the same goals further north, namely 
that it was "an attempt to divide the continent' s opponents of apartheid by establishing coop-
erative relations with willing black African states"." Rather, the now available statistical evi-
dence validates the opinion of another political scientist, Adrian Guelke, who suggested in 
1974: 
I am not arguing that she [Republic of South Africa] has no economic ambitions outside 
Southern Africa, or that her industrial and commercial interest groups have not played a 
part in promoting an expansionist foreign policy towards Africa. But outside Southern 
Africa at least, the Republic's political objectives - notably, the neutralisation of African-
sponsored campaigns in the U.N. against apartheid - clearly enjoy the highest priority in 
the formation of her outward-looking policy." 
Clearly, organised business and private enterprises were part of Pretoria' s Outward-Looking 
Policy in Africa, as we shall see in Chapter 4, but trade and other economic activities were not 
the ultimate aim, rather one of the levers utilised to convince the relevant African countries to 
enter into contact with Pretoria. 
47 Thus confirming what had been said by Meinardus, Ronald. 1980. Die Afrikapolitik der Republik 
Sudafrika: von der Outward-Looking Policy bis zur Gegenwart. Bonn: Informationsstelle Siidliches Afrika: 
203ff 
48 See the minutes in DF A, 34/2, Vol. 4. 
49 Southall. 1999. South Africa, p.12; Southall. 1984. South Africa, p.235. 
'0 Guelke. 1974. Africa as a Market for South African Goods, pp .87f. At the time of writing his article, 
Guelke was a Graduate Student in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Sci-
ence. In 1975, he became Lecturer and later Professor in the Department of Politics at Queen' s University, Bel-
fast. 
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Sources and Literature 
The prime motivation for this study lay in the fact that our topic has been relatively neglected 
in the secondary literature. To our knowledge, no source-based study on this particular aspect 
of South Africa's foreign policy has been produced to date. The little published material that 
exists is often based on assumptions, resulting in erroneous conclusions. The main fault of 
authors such as Willie Breytenbach and John Spicer was to reduce the focus of Pretoria's Af-
rica policy on southern Africa, despite their claim to examine its relations with the entire con-
tinent. 51 In an attempt to fill the gap in this under-researched topic, in 1999 and again in 2000 
research was conducted in six South African archives considered to house relevant documen-
tation. Regarding the non-governmental archives, unrestricted access was gained to the Ar-
chive for Contemporary Affairs (ARCA) at the then University of the Orange Free State in 
Bloemfontein" and to the ANC Archive at the University of Fort Hare in Alice, Eastern 
Cape. S3 The former has existed for a long time and houses, inter alia, collections obtained 
from politicians, foreign service officials, economists and cultural and economic bodies. Since 
the individuals and organisations themselves selected what to donate, the well-preserved files 
are not very substantial. Nonetheless, the consulted documents gave an insight into the think-
ing and world views of several relevant personalities from politics and the economy, and pro-
vided especially relevant information on one organised Afrikaner business association, the 
Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut. The ANC Archive, open to the public since 1996, stores the 
documents from twenty-two of the forty-three ANC Exile Missions. Due to a lack of finance 
and expertise, the material is not adequately looked after and yielded meagre results for the 
purposes of this study. It has been included in our recent article on the ANC's exile diplo-
macy in Africa" and some of its results are used in this study. A final note needs to be made 
on the use of documents from the Africa Institute in Pretoria, which will be introduced in 
Chapter 2. This think tank does not have an archive per se, but a number of in-house reports, 
such as commissioned work, were kept separately from the library, as they were not for the 
eyes of outsiders. Two of these reports, dated of the mid-1970s, were relevant to this study 
(Chapter 4), and we could access them with the assistance of the librarian, Amanda Wortman. 
'I Breytenbach, Wilhelmus Josephus 'Willie ' . 1978. South Africa·s Involvement in Africa. Pretoria: Africa 
Institute; Spicer, John. 1968. South Africa ' s Sphere of Influence: The Whites Discover Black Africa, The Round 
Table 58, 231: 306-310. 
" <http://www.uovs.ac.zailib/arcaidefault.asp>. It was previously named Institute for Contemporary History. 
The word Orange has since been dropped from both the name of the province and the university. 
S3 <http://www.ufc.ac.zaicollections/anc.htm>. 
" Pfister, Roger. 2003. Gateway to International Victory: The Diplomacy of the African National Congress 
in Africa, 1960-1994, Journal of Modern African Studies 41, 1: 51-73. 
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The sources are referenced, but not listed in the Bibliography. Apart from these three ar-
chives, no other what could be tenned 'private body' opened its doors to their documents. The 
archive of the multinational Anglo American Corporation, in particular, would undoubtedly 
have provided a mine of infonnation. However, as experienced by other researchers," it is 
practically inaccessible, more than likely because this private company tries to prevent embar-
rassing infonnation about collaboration with the apartheid regime to come into the open. 
Generally speaking, at the time of research for this study, there was no obligation on the part 
of the private sector to lay bare the past. This might change with the Promotion of Infonna-
tion Access Act (No 2 of 2000) that came into force in 2001, legislating the constitutional 
right of access to the records of 'private bodies'." 
Due to the post-1994 political dispensation, a different situation prevailed with regard to 
the use of government archives. Most importantly, the National Archives Act (No 43 of 1996) 
replaced the Archives of South Africa Act (No 6 of 1962) on 1 January 1997, reducing the 
closed access period applied to material in state archives from the previous thirty to twenty 
years. During his stay in South Africa in 1999, the author of this study therefore had the right 
to access material up to and including 1979. In spite of this liberal legislation, the state of af-
fairs of archival management in South Africa necessitates critical comments relating to the 
substance of and the practical access to the material. Both questions are of great significance 
to a study such as this, where primary sources are supposed to uncover an "objectively know-
able past", as has been argued earlier. A general answer is not possible and the four govern-
ment archives in question are now dealt with separately, beginning with the National Ar-
chives. 
Although its custodial mandate embraced the archives of central and regional government 
offices, the National Archives" did not have much power to enforce its brief and several gov-
ernment departments refused to subject their records to archival appraisal or transfer them into 
its custody. Amongst them were the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of De-
fence and national intelligence, all of which are examined below. The only remaining collec-
tions accessible in tenns of the legislation and of potential interest for this study therefore 
came from the Prime Minister (1910-84) and his Private Secretary (1966-78), the Private Sec-
retary to the Minister ofInfonnation (1966-78) and the Department ofInfonnation (1971-80). 
55 Carstens, Peter. 2001. In the Company of Diamonds: De Beers, Kleinzee, and Control of a Town. Athens, 
OH: Ohio University Press. 
" Harris, Verne Sheldon. 2002. The Archival Sliver: A Perspective on the Construction of Social Memory in 
Archives and the Transition from Apartheid to Democracy, in Carolyn Hamilton, et a!. Refiguring the Archive. 
Dordrecht: Kluwer: 135-160. 
"State Archives Service from its inception in 1922 to 1996. <http ://www.national.archives.gov.za>. 
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Printed finding aids existed for the last three collections, revealing some interesting files, 
whereas a computer search on the Prime Minister's records did not produce any worthwhile 
hits. This dearth in material can be explained by Pretoria's manipulation of social memory. 
South African archivist Verne Harris has rightly suggested that secrecy and an authoritarian 
management ethos were the modus operandi of the government, including the National Ar-
chives. Transparency was not the order of the day, with serious implications for the collection 
and preservation of archival documentation necessary for the redrawing of history." This 
statement most clearly applied to the security apparatus, as we will show below. 
In contrast, we gained the impression that the Department of Foreign Affairs is a special 
case in this regard. As mentioned, its records have not been transferred to the National Ar-
chives on a permanent basis. In consequence, only a small section that dates from the early 
1960s is stored there, whereas the bulk of material is housed in the basement at the Union 
Buildings in Pretoria, the seat of both the State President and the DFA. In general, the De-
partment's lower-ranking civil servants appear to have followed a rather legalistic policy re-
garding the collection of records. Furthermore, and unlike in the case of Pretoria'S security 
establishment, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) only mentions one case of 
record destruction in this department prior to the 1994 elections." However, one qualification 
regarding the DFA's files comprehensiveness needs to be made in reference to correspon-
dence with Andre J aquet, who held various diplomatic posts in the period under review and 
currently is the High Commissioner to Canada.60 He commented on the working ethos of 
Roelof Frederik 'Pik' Botha, the Minister of Foreign Affairs (1977-94), and two several sen-
ior civil servants of importance in this study, namely DF A Director-General Bernardus 
Gerhardus 'Brand' Fourie (1966-82) and Peter Rae Killen, Deputy Secretary (1974-77), Dep-
uty Director-General (1980-84) and Director-General (1985-87): "both the Minister and 
Brand Fourie had their own extensive files. ( .. ) Rae Killen had three safes and a few filing 
cabinets in his office which were crammed full of files, some of which eventually went to 
Registry and most of which were probably shredded. ( ... ) I believe that Pik Botha also took a 
large number of files to his small holding in Pretoria North when he left office"." Jaquet's 
assessment finds evidence in this thesis with regard to South Africa's relationship with Sene-
gal in the mid-1970s (Chapter 4), while it is possible that we did not discover other instances 
" Harris. 2002. The Archival Sliver, pp.138f. 
S9 Truth and Reconciliation Commission o/South Africa Report. Vol. 1: The Commission. 1999. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan: 233. 
60 See Appendix A for his biography. 
" Correspondence with Andre Jaquet, December 2002. 
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precisely because the documents no longer exist. Regarding the research in the those files that 
were available in the Union Buildings, this was greatly facilitated by the archive's organisa-
tion, with finding aids available in both print and electronic form. The collections consulted 
were well organised, comprehensive and substantial, sometimes containing documents from 
other government agencies. The pages were numbered at the time of transfer from the various 
offices to the archive, and there was only the occasional gap. An essential prerequisite for 
productive research in this archive was the knowledge of both, Afrikaans and French, the lin-
guafranca of the diplomats. Access to the DFA archive was not arbitrary, such as seems to 
have been the case during apartheid." Prior to our arrival, we had established contact with the 
person in charge, Neels Muller, and his assistance proved to be incredibly helpful. For reasons 
that are unclear to date, he originally granted access to the files up to April 1994. However, 
after more than a month of research in early 1999 the situation was suddenly reversed at the 
beginning of March; access was curtailed as provided for in the Archives Act and the so-
called 'Pink Files', considered "Top Secret", were no longer made available for consultation. 
The only plausible explanation for this change in attitude was the arrest of a Swiss journalist 
in Cape Town on 5 March 1999 during his investigations into Swiss military and intelligence 
contacts with Wouter Basson, the head of South Africa' s apartheid chemical weapon pro-
gramme. The journalist was accused for having been in the illegal possession of a military 
document, but was released three days later as the allegation could not be substantiated." The 
result was that research in the DF A files now became limited to 1979 in the case of sixteen 
countries, as opposed to access up to or beyond 1991 for fifteen countries.64 Nonetheless, 
there is enough justification for defining the time framework for this study as encompassing 
the period from 1961 to 1994. In particular, access to the files on relations with Nigeria and 
Uganda, key countries post-1990, was granted for the entire period under review. 
A different situation was given regarding the Department of Defence and national intelli-
gence. Both state actors were involved in human rights violations and therefore had a keen 
62 Brits, Jacob P. 1995. The Historian and the Arcrnves: A 1995 South African Perspective, Historia: Official 
Organ of the Historical Association of South Africa 40, 1: 70. 
63 Pfister, Roger. 2000. Die Schweiz und Sudafrika wiihrend der Apartheid: Kontroverse und "Agenda-
Setting " nach 1998. Zurich: ETH Zurich, Forschungsstelle fur Internationale Beziehungen: 16f. 
64 The files of the following countries were consulted up to and including 1979: Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Congolese Republic, Djibouti, Gabon, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Reunion, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Togo and Zaire. The files of other countries were consulted as fol-
lows: Seychelles (April 1980), Comoros (November 1980), Equatorial Guinea (February 1984), Somalia (Au-
gust 1984), Tanzania (May 1985), Burkina Faso (July 1987), Mali (September 1987), Gambia (November 1988), 
Guinea Bissau (May 1991), Cameroon (July 1992), Ethiopia (February 1993), Sudan (September 1993), Burundi 
(October 1993), Rwanda (November 1993), Nigeria (January 1994), Benin, Chad, Ghana, Liberia, Mauritania, 
Niger, Sierra Leone, Uganda (all until April 1994). 
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interest in preventing their records from falling into the hands of a post-apartheid government. 
In its findings, the TRC concluded:6' 
The tragedy is that the former government deliberately and systematically destroyed a 
huge body of state records and documentation in an attempt to remove incriminating evi-
dence and thereby sanitise the history of oppressive rule. C ••. ) the urge to destroy gained 
momentum in the 1980s and widened into a co-ordinated endeavour, sanctioned by the 
Cabinet and designed to deny the new democratic government access to the secrets of the 
former state. By May 1994, a massive deletion of state documentary memory within the 
security establishment had been achieved66 
Regarding the national intelligence agency, it does not appear to have kept an archive and 
records seem to have been destroyed on a regular basis since at least 1982.67 Only a meagre 
number of photocopies was obtained from the Minister's Office. The few noteworthy docu-
ments are referenced in this work, but not listed in the Bibliography. 
The Department of Defence has its own archival repository in Pretoria, staffed by military 
personnel." In principle, access was granted subject to the National Archives Act regulations, 
but most of the documents that could be consulted date back to the early 1960s. Staff short-
ages are possibly to blame for the slow declassification process, as claimed by archive per-
sonnel. However, and probably more importantly, there seems to be no desire on the part of 
the still largely white-controlled department to disclose its apartheid activities:' as underlined 
by a personal anecdote. Having requested photocopies of material contained in a box dated 
1970 and declared "Top Secret", we were summoned by Military Intelligence staff, and dur-
ing the course of the interview, it became clear that this box had been erroneously declassi-
fied. Furthermore, members of staff mentioned that higher-ranking military officials had re-
moved a large amount of material from the archive prior to the 1994 elections and the TRC 
hearings, as confirmed in the TRC's final report: 
in mid-1993, the Cabinet-approved guidelines for the disposal of 'state sensitive docu-
mentation' were received. The Chief of the SADF [South African Defence Force 1 ordered 
their immediate implementation C ... ). Two joint teams, consisting of inspector general and 
counter intelligence personnel, were appointed to visit all units and to identify records for 
destruction. A countrywide destruction exercise followed. C ... ) Several processes sus-
tained the disposal of SADF records outside the ambit of archival legislation. Not men-
tioned above, and impossible to quantify, were the unauthorised ad hoc removals and de-
6S Its mandate was to analyse and describe the causes, nature and extent of gross violations of human rights 
that occurred from I March 1960 to 10 May 1994. Hearings and investigations took place from 1994 to 1999. 
66 TRC of South Africa Report. Vol. 1. 1999. pp.201 , 229. Also Harris, Verne Sheldon. 2000. 'They Should 
Have Destroyed More ' : The Destruction of Public Records by the South African State in the Final Years of 
Apartheid, 1990-94, Transformation 42: 30, 38-41, 55 (note 2). 
67 TRC of South Africa Report. Vol. 1. 1999.p.219. 
68 TRC of South Africa Report. Vol. 1. 1999. p.222. 
6' Harris. 2000. 'They Should Have Destroyed More', pp.34, 37. 
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struction undertaken by individuals. Assessing the overall impact of these processes was 
beyond the joint investigative team's capacity.70 
18 
Recent revelations in the South African press suggest that Defence and Military Intelligence 
documents could be released in the future, and these might shed more light on hitherto un-
known activities.7l 
In order to supplement the patchwork of archival evidence and the examination of the ex-
isting literature, interviews were conducted with academics, former DFA officials, politicians, 
as well as representatives from private and state companies. The Bibliography contains the list 
of all interviewed people, together with their biographical background. The most insightful 
interviews were those with Pik Botha, who agreed after having pestered three times on the 
phone, and Neil Peter van Heerden, DFA Director-General from 1987 to 1992. On the other 
hand, several other sources of oral history remained inaccessible. Brand Fourie, a potentially 
rich source of information, declined to make any statements. Regarding access to Lukas 
Daniel 'Niel' Barnard, the administrative head of the national intelligence agency during the 
1980s, different avenues were pursued. However, neither his last employer, the Western Cape 
Provincial Administration, nor several relevant academics and journalists had Barnard's con-
tact details, while his brother at the University of the Free State, Schalk Leopold Barnard, 
bluntly refused to divulge them. Finally, several other people of importance in this study and 
who could have been helpful, such as Prime Minister Balthazar Johannes 'John' Vorster, 
Minister Cornelius Petrus 'Connie' Mulder and Secretary Eschel Mostert Rhoodie from the 
Department ofInformation, or Niel Barnard's predecessor, Hendrik Johannes van den Bergh, 
are no longer alive. 
70 TRC of South Africa Report. Vol. 1. 1999. p.223. 
7l 'Army file shock for the TRC', Mail & Guardian 12-18 October; 'Lekota to probe what is fact and fic-
tion', Mail & Guardian 19-25 October 2001. 
CHAPTER TWO 
South Africa's Foreign Policy System 
Introduction 
Given that this thesis is also about Pretoria's foreign policy towards the black African states 
beyond southern Africa, this chapter provides the setting necessary to the understanding of the 
key players who determined the course of events in the period under review. In doing so, a 
distinction is drawn between state and non-state actors, acknowledging that "states are defi-
nitely not the only significant actors in international relations". ' While pursuing individual 
interests, what could be called a "policy coalition'" existed between the different state and 
non-state actors, guided by the advancement of the interests of the white minority. Ofsignifi-
cance in several instances in this study is an actual network of both private and official links 
that existed between the two groups of actors. In this context, we refer to the Policy Network 
approach, a lose politico-sociological description for such contacts in pursuit of powerful in-
terests. A suitable definition of this phenomena for this study is the following: 
'Networking' is a skill in developing a pattern of human relationships. Political scientists 
have found the study of networks useful in identifying structures of power within local 
communities. Within society at large and within the nation the significant factor may be 
the linkages between different organization though, again, these will be conducted by in-
dividuals. The approach is helpful in understanding the nature of power. For example ( ... ) 
without which people may be powerless. People in networks are thus strategically placed 
to exert power ( ... ).' 
We now discuss the issues pertaining to the state as an actor, subsequently turning our atten-
tion to the non-state actors. Of crucial relevance to our work, the state as a foreign policy ac-
tor is not considered as a homogeneous monolith. Rather, and adding a factor to the domestic 
, Vale, Peter, Chisepo James Jorothan Mphaisha. 1999. Analysing and Evaluating Foreign Policy, in Philip 
Nel, Patrick Jude McGowan, eds. Power, Wealth and Global Order: An International Relations Textbook for 
Africa. Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press: 89f.; McGowan, Patrick Jude, Philip Ne!. 1999. The Study 
of International Relations, in Philip Nel, Patrick Jude McGowan, eds. Power, Wealth and Global Order: An 
International Relations Textbookfor Africa. Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press: IOf. 
'Neack, Hey and Haney. 1995. Foreign Policy Analysis, pp.123f. 
3 Bealey, Frank. 1999. The Blackwell Dictionary of Political Science: A User's Guide to Its Terms. Oxford: 
Blackwell: 222£ Also Dowding, Keith. 1995. Model or Metapher? A Critical Review of the Policy Network 
Approach, Political Studies 43 , I: 136-158. 
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and external environment that shape a country's foreign policy, the "agency-based perspec-
tive" serves our purposes. While recognising that a country's executive "is formally the key 
figure in all foreign policy decisions",' this approach emphasises the role of bureaucracy and 
its public servants within the state' Within this perspective, the "bureaucratic politics model" 
and the "psychological model" are of relevance to this study in Diplomatic History. They help 
to explain the course of events in South Africa's foreign policy towards black Africa, since it 
is not sufficient to take an event as the "natural outcome of a sequence", as is the case in most 
historical works.' In contrast, Diplomatic History does not simply happen, but it is fashioned 
by individuals. Based on an analysis of Washington's foreign policy decision mechanisms 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the proponents of the bureaucratic politics model 
stipulate that "the foreign policy decisions and actions of a government do not represent the 
intent of anyone figure, but rather are the unintended result of bargaining, pulling, hauling, 
and tugging by bureaucratic competition in their ceaseless quest for more funds, resources, 
and influence".' The model's confrontational aspect, due to "different conceptions of national, 
organisational and personal goals", is usually emphasised, but Vale and Mphaisha have 
rightly suggested that it can also be about "the building of coalitions between the competitors" 
and about "doing ' deals' with their bureaucratic opponents".' The material provided in this 
study illustrates that both versions are possible. Although the "primary locus of expertise in 
and implementation of foreign policy'" is ascribed to the Department of Foreign Affairs, the 
military, the Department of Information and national intelligence challenged its position re-
peatedly between 1961 and 1994.'0 Consequently, we will encounter several instances of in-
4 Said, Abdul Aziz, Charles O. Lersche Jr., Charles O. Lersche III. 1995. Concepts of International Relations 
in Global Perspective. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall: 39. 
5 Carlsnaes, Walter. 2002. Foreign Policy, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, Beth A. Simmons, eds. Hand-
book of International Relations. London: Sage: 337ff. 
, Kiser, Edgar, Michael Hechter. 1991. The Role of General Theory in Comparative Historical Sociology, 
American Journal of Sociology 97, 1: 2. 
, Art, Robert J. 1993. Bureaucratic Politics, in Joel Krieger, ed. The Oxford Companion to Politics of tlze 
World. New York: Oxford University Press: 99f. (on 99). This model was developed by Graham Allison. See 
Allison, Graham T., Morton H. Halperin. 1996. Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy, in John A. 
Vasquez, ed. Classics of International Relations. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall: 172-178. 
8 Vale and Mphaisha. 1999. Analysing and Evaluating Foreign Policy, p.97. 
9 Le Pere, Garth, Anthoni van Nieuwkerk. 1999. Making Foreign Policy in South Africa, in Philip Nel, Pat-
rick Jude McGowan, eds. Power, Wealth and Global Order: An International Relations Textbook for Africa. 
Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press: 202. 
10 This has been emphasised by Frankel, Philip Harry. 1984. Pretoria's Praetorians: Civil-Military Relations 
in South Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 106f., 148ff.; Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of 
Isolation; Geldenhuys, Deon Johannes. 1994. The Head of Government and South Africa ' s Foreign Relations, in 
Robert Arthur Schrire, ed. Malan to de Klerk: Leadership in the Apartheid State. New York: St. Martin's Press; 
London: Hurst: 276; Hamann, Hilton. 2001. Days of the Generals. Cape Town: Zebra Press: 62; Jaster. 1988. 
The Defence of White Power, pp.25f.; McCarthy, Shaun. 1996. Challenges for the South African Intelligence 
Community, in William Frank Gutteridge, ed. South Africa 's Defence and Security Into the 21st Century. Alder-
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terdepartmental feuds, jealousy and tensions in this thesis. On the other hand, several exam-
ples of co-operation among them will be noted, with the current executive's background and 
preferences decisively impacting on the balance of power (Figure 1). It is against this back-
ground that South African scholars in the field used the description of a "village council run-
ning a foreign policy"," leading to "haphazard"l2 policy formulation. Greg Mills aptly re-
jected the idea of South Africa' s foreign policy being a "concerted, well-organised, well-
thought out, unified, homogenous, linear-directional policy", and instead suggested that "it is 
characterised by great struggles between government departments"." 
Figure 1: Environments of South African Foreign Policy Making 
International Environment 
Locus of Decision-Making 
Department of 
Foreign Affairs 
ligence Service 
The second model within the agency-based perspective, the psychological approach, exam-
ines the foreign policy bureaucracies at a micro-level, stressing the role played by the individ-
ual public servant. In contrast to the rational actor model, according to which actors pursue set 
goals by making rational choices between competing alternatives, it emphasises that different 
shot: Dartmouth: 65f.; Olivier. 1982. South Africa's Relations with Africa, pp.283f. ; Seegers, Annette. 1996. 
The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa. London: LB. Tauris: 130ff., 153f. , 162f., 238, 272f., 304f. 
11 Interview with Richard Cornwell, 19 February 1999. 
12 Interview with Maxi van Aardt, 1 March 1999. 
" Interview with Greg Mills, 3 March 1999. 
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people react differently when confronted with one and the same situation: "It is individuals 
( .. . ) who define and interpret the concept of national interest, who plan strategies, who per-
ceive issues, who make decisions to act, and who evaluate actions undertaken. As a result, 
psychological factors are crucial in the decision process, since individuals tend to act and re-
act differently to the same kind of stimuli".I' Adhering to this view, we put a relatively strong 
emphasis on the personalities of the relevant officials. In spite of the psychological model's 
explanatory value, the constraints imposed by the dictate of the agency for which an official 
works must not be neglected. This connection between an individual's belief system and his 
organisational position has been termed as "where you stand depends on where you sit".IS 
Table 1: State Actors Involved in Pretoria 's Foreign Policy Making Towards Black Africa 
Prime Minister / Department of Foreign Affairs Year State President Minister Secretary / Other Government Agencies Director-General 
1961 Hendrik Frensch Eric Hendrik Louw Gerhardus Petrus Verwoerd (January 1955 -
(September 1958 - December 1963) ' Gerhardt' Jooste (August 1956-September 1966) June 1966) 
1966 
Department of Defence 
Hilgard Muller 
(Pieter WiUern Botha) 
Military Intelligence (January 1964- IF.W. Loots. C.J. van 
1971 Balthazar Johannes March 1977) Bemardus Gerhardus Bureau for State Security 
' John ' Vorster 
(September 1966 - ' Brand ' Fourie (Hendrik Johannes van den Bergh) 
September 1978) (July 1966- Department of Information April 1982) (Cornelius Petrus 'Connie' Mulder, 
1976 Eschel Mostert Rhoodie) 
Department of Defence 
1981 (Magnus Andre de M. Malan) 
Pieter Willem Botha Johannes 'Hans' van Military Intelligence (September 1978 - Roelof Frederik Dalsen (May 1982-
August 1989) 'Pik' Botha March 1985) (Pieter Willern van der Westhui-
(April 1977 - Peter Rae Killen zen, Daniel ' Daan' S. Hamman) 
1986 Apri11994) (April 1985 - National Intelligence Service 
March 1987) (Lukas Dani~l 'Niel' Barnard) 
Neil Peter van 
Heerden (Apri11987 
Frederik Willem 
1991 de Klerk 
September 1992) National Intelligence Service 
(September 1989 - Leo Henry 
(Lukas Dani~l 'Niel' Barnard) 
May 1994) 'Rusty' Evans 1994 (October 1992 - ) 
I' Plano, Jack C., Roy Olton. 1988. The International Relations Dictionary. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO: 
13. 
IS Carlsnaes. 2002. Foreign Policy, pp.337f. 
\\ 
\ 
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Taking into account all of the above, the next four sections present the state actors, beginning 
with the Prime Minister, later State President, followed by the Department of Foreign Affairs, 
the military, the Department of Information and finally national intelligence. For easy refer-
ence, Table I gives the names of the executives, the ministers and administrative heads in the 
DF A, and indicates the rival govemment entities with the names of the relevant officials that 
influenced South Africa's foreign policy relevant to this study. Thereafter, we provide profiles 
of the non-state actors. The impact of all these state and non-state actors on South Africa's 
foreign policy towards black Africa will be discussed in detail in Chapters 3 to 6. 
Prime Minister and State President 
Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd served as Prime Minister from 3 September 1958 to 6 September 
1966, when a parliamentary messenger stabbed him to death. During this period, in February 
1960, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan delivered his Wind of Change speech in Cape 
Town, heralding Great Britain's departure from Africa. This was a contributory factor that led 
to Pretoria' s withdrawal from the Commonwealth in March 1961; South Africa thus took pre-
ventive action before it could be excluded as a result of African and Asian opposition to its 
apartheid system." Another consideration was its move towards the attainment of republican 
status, as approved by the white population in a referendum in October 1960. Two months 
after its withdrawal from the Commonwealth, on 31 May 1961, Pretoria proclaimed the Re-
public of South Africa. That decision in South Africa's foreign relations was supplemented by 
Verwoerd's position in domestic politics as a stalwart of the ruling National Party (NP), de-
claring that the whites were going to stay in South Africa, and that he wanted to "maintain 
white supremacy for all time to come". L7 His stance reflected the laager mentality of the Afri-
kaner community. The term describes a defensive and isolationist frame of mind and origi-
nated from the closed defensive circle into which the Afrikaner settler ox-wagons moved 
when threatened by attacks from the blacks. It was further defined by the hostilities fanned by 
the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902). " This mentality also impacted on South Africa's foreign 
16 Davenport, Thomas Rodney Hope. 1977. South Africa: A Modern History. London: Macmillan: 288f 
17 Cited in Sale, Donald Bell. 1994. South African Foreign Policy Assumptions and Objectives from Hertzog 
to de K1erk, South African Journal of International Affairs 2, 1: 109. Also Geldenbuys. 1994. The Head of Gov-
ernment and South Africa 's Foreign Relations, p.260. 
" Barratt, John. 1972. South Africa's Outward Policy: From Isolation to Dialogue, in Nicolaas Johannes 
'N ic' Rhoodie, ed. South African Dialogue: Contrasts in South African Thinking on Basic Race Issues. Contrasts 
in South African Thinking on Basic Race Issues. Johannesburg: MacGraw-Hill: 546; Breitenbach, Johannes J. 
1974. South Africa in the Modern World (19/0-1970): A Contemporary History. Pieterroaritzburg: Shuter and 
Shooter: 511; Geldenbuys. 1994. The Head of Government and South Africa's Foreign Relations, p.263 ; Nolut-
shungu, Sam Clement. 1975. South Africa in Africa: A Study of Ideology and Foreign Policy. New York: Afri-
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policy post-Verwoerd, since all of the country's executives and most incumbents of the rele-
vant government departments were Afrikaners." Regarding foreign policy making, Verwoerd 
had no practical experience in this field20 and therefore tended, at least initially, to rely on his 
Minister of ExternallForeign Affairs. 
On 13 September 1966, John Vorster became South Africa's next Prime Minister. Com-
pared to Verwoerd, his leadership style was more relaxed and pragmatic. 21 He adhered to the 
basic principles of apartheid, but did not apply its laws as rigorously: "While Verwoerd basi-
cally wanted to adapt reality to his ideology, Vorster has tried to adapt the ideology to the 
demands of reality"." In trying to break South Africa's international isolation, he permitted a 
degree of racial interaction in sport and it was in 1971, during his premiership, that Malawi 
replaced its white ambassador to South Africa with a black one (Chapter 4). This pragmatism 
had repercussions on Vorster's foreign policy, particularly toward Africa, which became 
known as Outward-Looking Policy and was "marked by secrecy, ad hoc arrangements, and 
over-dependence on close confidants"." As a result, this study shows that, of the entire period 
under review, his premiership experienced the most serious inter-departmental fights over the 
leading role in this field; the Department of Foreign Affairs was put in the shade, first, by the 
men from the military, and then by Department of Information in conjunction with the na-
tional intelligence agency, Bureau for State Security (BOSS). Indeed, it can be argued that 
Vorster stumbled over his "serious lack of decisive leadership"". During 1977, South African 
newspapers brought to light some of the clandestine activities that the Department of Informa-
tion and BOSS, backed by Vorster, had pursued since 1972, resulting in the 'Information 
Scandal'. The picture presented was, in short, one of "corruption, mismanagement and politi-
cal misdirection"." The impression created was that taxpayers' money, worth millions of 
Rand, had been wasted on projects with little benefit. The appointed Commission of Enquiry, 
headed by Judge Rudolph Erasmus, found Prime Minister Vorster and his Information Minis-
cana Publishing; Manchester: Manchester University Press: 83 ; Olivier, Gerrit Cornelius. 1975. South African 
Foreign Policy, in Denis Worrall, ed. South Africa: Government and Politics. Pretoria: J.L. van Schaik: 293; 
Seiler, John. 1975. South African Perspectives and Responses to External Pressures, Journal of Modern African 
Studies 13,3: 447. 
19 Jaster. 1986. The Defence of White Power, pp.3-7. 
20 Born in 1901; emigration to South Africa (1903); lecturer and Professor at the University of Stell en bosch 
(1924-30); correspondent for the Afrikaans newspaper Transvaler in Johannesburg (1931); Senator (1948). 
21 Born in 1919; BA, University of Stellenbosch (1936); LLB (1938) and active as an advocate for many 
years; Deputy Minister for Education, Art and Science (23 October 1958 - 2 August 1961); Minister of Justice 
and Prisons (3 August 1961 - 17 September 1966); Minister of Police (9 April 1966 - 11 August 1968). 
" D'Oliveira, John. 1978. Vorster: The Man. Johannesburg: Ernest Stanton: 287. 
" Jaster. 1988. The Defence of White Power, p.26; Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, pp.74f. 
"Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.74. 
" Pottinger. 1988. The Imperial Presidency, p.7. 
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ter, Connie Mulder, to be the main offenders and responsible for the irregularities.26 Due to 
the mounting political pressure, Vorster resigned in September 1978. However, the Informa-
tion Scandal served as a smokescreen to hide a power struggle between two factions in the 
National Party for the leadership of the country." Jaster described this battle as "Byzantine 
political infighting", revolving around the bureaucratic and personal feuds that had developed 
during the 1970s.28 The military strongly resented both the Department of Information's and 
BOSS's dominant position within Vorster' s ambit, with divergent policy approaches, espe-
cially toward Africa, being at the centre of the conflict. Once Vorster had resigned, the race 
for the premiership began. The main competitors were the Ministers of Information and De-
fence, Mulder and Pieter Willem Botha, who were also the NP's Transvaal and Cape Province 
leaders respectively. The Information Scandal gave Botha the advantage and helped tip the 
balance in his favour, as it had exposed Vorster,s ad hoc policy that often circumvented Cabi-
net, whereas P.W. Botha was then known as an "organisation man", attributing Cabinet and 
bureaucracy more importance.29 The bitterly contested election took place on 28 September 
1978, and two rounds were needed for P.W. Botha to defeat Mulder. 
Botha was essentially a National Party man. At the early age of thirty, he was the party's 
national campaign organiser. During his steady rise through the ranks from 1946 to 1966, he 
was a Member of Parliament, Deputy Minister and Minister in various departments. During 
1966, he became the NP's leader in the Cape Province and, in April of that year, the Minister 
of Defence, a post he held until October 1980.'0 P.W. Botha was thus experienced in both 
domestic and foreign policy making,] 1 the latter being dominated by a realist world view 
whereby the "wise and efficient use of power by a state in pursuit of its national interest is ( .. ) 
the main ingredient of a successful foreign policy"." Following the collapse of the Portuguese 
colonies Angola and Mozambique in 1974/75, and Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, South 
Africa's regional security and the struggle against communism became P.W. Botha's overrid-
26 Rees, Mervyn, Chris Day. 1980. Muldergate: The Story of the Info Scandal. Johannesburg: Macmillan. 
"Pottinger. 1988. The Imperial Presidency, p.7; O'Meara, Dan. 1996. Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State 
and the Politics of the National Party, 1948-1994. Johannesburg: Ravan Press; Athens, OH: Ohio University 
Press: 210-219. Rhoodie presents his own views on what he calls a "coup d' etat" in The Real Information Scan-
dal (pretoria: Orbis SA, 1983) and inPW Botha: Th e Last Betrayal (Melville: S.A. Politics, 1989). 
28 Jaster. 1988. The Defence of White Power, p.34. 
29 Geldenbuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, pp.89ff.; Pottinger. 1988. The Imperial Presidency, p.12. 
]0 Born in 1916; organiser of the NP's countrywide campaign (1946-49) ; MP from 1946; Deputy Minister for 
Internal Affairs (October 1958 - August 1961); Minister for Coloured Affairs, Community Development (and 
Housing) (August 1961 - April 1966 (1961-64)), and Public Works (1964-66); Minister of Defence (Apri11966 
- October 1980); NP leader in the Cape Province (1966-78). See Barber and Barratt. 1990. South Africa's For-
eign Policy, pp.247f. 
] 1 Geldenbuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, pp.89f. 
" Plano and Olton. 1988. Th e International Relations Dictionmy, p.7. 
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ing issues in this realist approach, with his trusted men coming from the military. This re-
sulted, in the 1980s, in the formulation of a policy towards South Africa's neighbourhood that 
became known as "Destabilisation".33 The change in leadership from Vorster to P.W. Botha 
therefore "brought dramatic changes in personality, style and substance in the policy-making 
process"." Crucially, Botha established "the political dominance of the military ( ... ) in key 
decision-making"," and the State Security Council (SSC), established in 1972, but seldom 
used under Vorster, emerged "as the primary overall planning and decision-making body 
within the state"." Botha also streamlined the bureaucratic apparatus, reducing ministerial 
portfolios and departments and centralising planning and decision-making. In practice, he 
initiated a constitutional reform whereby, after 1984, the country' s executive was no longer 
referred to as Prime Minister, but as State President, while the formerly symbolic position of 
State President was abolished. The Department of Information was reintegrated into the De-
partment of Foreign Affairs in 1980, with the word Information being deleted from the de-
partment's name in December 1983. In 1980, after a brief spell, the Department of National 
Security was renamed the National Intelligence Service (NIS), and remained so until Novem-
ber 1994.37 Botha's tough and uncompromising policy came to an end in August 1989, when 
he was forced to resign due to illness and allegations of erratic behaviour. At the same time, 
the end of the Cold War made his military approach inappropriate in resolving South Africa's 
domestic and foreign policy problems. 
33 See, for example: Du Pisani, Andre. 1988. Beyond the Barracks: Reflections on the Role of the SADF in 
the Region. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs; Hanlon, Joseph. 1986. Apartheid's 
Second Front: South Africa's War Against Its Neighbours. Harmondsworth: Penguin; Jaster, Robert Scott. 1986. 
South Africa and Its Neighbours: The Dynamics of Regional Conflict. London: International Institute for Strate-
gic Studies; Johnson, Phyllis, David Martin. 1986. Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War. Harare: 
Zimbabwe Publishing House. 
" Jaster. 1988. The Defence oJ White Power, pp.28f. 
35 Pottinger. 1988. The Imperial Presidency, p.35. 
"O'Meara. 1996. Forty Lost Years, p.28!. The SSC generally comprised the Prime Minister (Chairman), the 
Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Justice, Law and Order. See Barber and Barratt. 1990. South 
Africa's Foreign Policy, pp.252ff.; Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy oj Isolation, p.95; Pottinger. 1988. The 
Imperial Presidency, pp.334f.; Van Nieuwkerk, Anthoni, Koos van Wyk. 1989. The Operational Code of PW 
Botha: Apartheid, Realism and Misperception, International Affairs Bulletin 13,3: 74f. 
37 Barber and Barratt. 1990. South Africa's Foreign Policy, pp.247-251; De Beer, Joban H. 1998. Integration 
of the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Information in 1980 and Adjustments up to 1993, in History oJthe 
Department oj Foreign Affairs. Vol. 111: Organization and Management of the Department oj External/Foreign 
Affairs. Pretoria: Department of Foreign Affairs: 116f.; Davies, Robert H. 1986. The Military and Foreign Policy 
in South Africa: Review Article, Journal oj Southern African Studies 12, 2: 310; Jaster. 1988. The Defence oj 
White Power, pp.29, 137; Muller, Marie ElOise. 1989. The Department of Foreign Affairs, in Albertus Johannes 
Venter, ed. South African Government and Politics: An Introduction to Its Institutions, Processes and Policies. 
Johannesburg: Southern Book Publishers: 245; Pottinger. 1988. The Imperial Presidency, pp.35-43; Seegers. 
1996. The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa, p.162; Van Wyk, K. 1991. Foreign Policy Orienta-
tions oftheP.W. Botha Regime, p.45. 
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With Frederik Willem de Klerk succeeding P.W. Botha, pragmatism returned to Pretoria 
and this time it was the NP leader of the Transvaal who won the race. De Klerk was born to a 
politically renowned family, with a father as Cabinet Minister and President of the Senate, 
and an uncle, Johannes Gerhardus Strijdom, as Prime Minister (1954-58). The Dutch Re-
formed Church and the Calvinist tradition upheld by his family formed his belief system. De 
Klerk studied law and worked as an attorney before entering politics at the age of thirty-six. 
From 1978 to 1989, he held a variety of ministerial portfolios. Parallel to his ascendancy in 
government, de Klerk rose within the NP ranks, becoming the party's Transvaal and national 
leader in 1982 and February 1989 respectively. Of relevance for this study, de Klerk was not 
experienced in foreign policy matters and, in stark contrast to his predecessor, none of de 
Klerk's ministerial portfolios had dealt directly with security matters." As a result of these 
two factors, the foreign service officials held a predominant position within Pretoria's foreign 
policy making. In domestic politics, de Klerk was not known as an advocator of reform dur-
ing his ministerial days, and so his speech at the opening of Parliament on 2 February 1990 
was particularly surprising. He lifted the thirty-year ban on the ANC and other black libera-
tion movements, and announced Nelson Mandela's release from prison that materialised nine 
days later; de Klerk had fundamentally broken with his party's apartheid orthodoxy." The 
suddenness of his actions gave rise to debate over whether de Klerk's initiatives were born of 
personal conviction or political necessity. We subscribe to the view of South African political 
scientists Deon Geldenhuys and Hennie Kotz!! who, in mid-1991, suggested that he did not 
come to question the philosophy behind apartheid, but found its practical application impossi-
ble to maintain: 
On the first view, De K1erk is a reluctant reformer who has been forced by circumstances 
beyond his control to adjust or abandon his true conservative political preferences. Some 
commentators would then depict his changes as evidence of pragmatism, whereas others 
would read opportunism into them. The alternative explanation would emphasise De 
Klerk's commitment to such values as justice ( ... ) inspired with a new mission, namely to 
create a just society in South Africa. The truth ( ... ) probably lies somewhere between 
" Born in 1936; elected MP for the National Party (1972); Information Officer for the NP in the Transvaal 
(1975); held the ministerial portfolios of Posts and Telecommunications, Social Welfare and Pensions, Sport and 
Recreation, Mining and the Environment, Mineral and Energy Affairs, Internal Affairs and the Civil Service 
from 1978 to 1984; Minister of National Education (1984-89); Chairman, Minister's Council, House of Assem-
bly (1985); Leader, House of Assembly (1986); Leader of the NP in the Transvaal (1982); National Leader of the 
NP (as of February 1989); State President (September 1989 - April 1994). Gastrow, Shelagh. 1992. Who's Who 
in South African Politics. Johannesburg: Ravan Press: 50-54. See also his autobiography The Last Trek: A New 
Beginning (London: Macmillan, 1998) and the biography written by his brother: De Klerk, Willem Johannes. 
1991. F. w: de Klerk: The Man in His Time. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball. 
" Arnold, Guy. 1992. South Africa: Crossing the Rubicon. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
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these two perspectives: elements of both necessity and choice explain De Klerk's behav-
iour. He might be depicted as something of a principled pragmatist.'· 
28 
This description also applied to de Klerk's foreign policy toward Africa when the Department 
of Foreign Affairs again rose to prominence, although in some competition with national in-
telligence, as will be indicated below. 
Department of Foreign Affairs 
The Department of External Affairs was established in 1927, but the executive was effectively 
in command of foreign policy until January 1955, when the department was separated from 
the Office of the Prime Minister. It subsequently enjoyed more influence and was renamed 
Department of Foreign Affairs in 1960.'1 The majority of the foreign service officials in this 
study, and therefore the department's foreign policy of interest here, were guided by idealist 
or liberal worldviews, with a belief in moral and democratic principles and the rule of law," 
rather than the use of force, guiding interaction between states. Two aspects were therefore 
central to the DFA's approach toward Africa. First, the non-interference in the domestic mat-
ters of another state was a sine qua non. Second, while Pretoria's foreign relations with black 
African countries beyond southern Africa were also military in nature, the foreign service 
officers restricted themselves to civil aspects, even if they had knowledge of the military's 
activities. As Pik Botha, the long-standing Minister of Foreign Affairs described the DFA's 
attitude toward their endeavours: "Do what you need to do, but don't let us know about it"." 
Within the DFA, the Africa Division as the bureaucratic section was instrumental in the 
formulation and implementation of Pretoria's Africa policy. Established in 1955 as Africa and 
International Organisations, it later changed its name to Africa Division (1957-78), to Interna-
tional Organisations, Central and North Africa (1979-80), to Africa Directorate (1981-87) and 
finally to the Africa Branch (1988-94)4' The one significant name change, that of 1979, can 
be seen as a result ofP.W. Botha's policy priorities in Africa. In particular, he put that part of 
,. Geldenhuys, Dean Johannes, Hermie Katz". 1991. FW de Klerk: A Study in Political Leadership, Poli-
tikon: South African Journal of Political Studies 19, I: 39, 32. 
41 Barber and Barratt. 1990. South Africa's Foreign Policy, pp.39f.; Muller, Christoffel Frederik Jacobus. 
1998. The Creation of the Department of External Affairs in 1927, in History of the Department of Foreign Af-
fairs. Vol. I: 1927-i948. Pretoria: Department of Foreign Affairs: 1-12; Muller, M.E. 1989. The Department of 
Foreign Affairs, p.243; Munger, Edwin Stanton 'Ned'. 1965. Notes on the Formation of South African Foreign 
Policy. Pasadena, CA: Dahlstrom: 28 . 
42 Evans and Newnham. 1998. The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, pp.304ff.; Plano and Ol-
ton. 1988. The international Relations Dictionary, p.7. 
43 Interview with Pik Botha, 20 April 1999. 
44 See the Foreign Affairs List (Pretoria: Department of External AffairsIDF A) for the period under review. 
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the African continent, in which he had a relatively minor interest, together with International 
Organisations. At the same time, a special Southern Africa Division was created, reflecting 
the military's focus of interest at the time. Despite the name changes, and for practical pur-
poses, reference will be made to the Africa Division throughout this study. In late 1954, the 
foreign affairs ministry launched the idea of an Interdepartmental Committee on African Af-
fairs," but this never became functional, and the Africa Division remained the most important 
unit in shaping the DFA's Africa approach.'· The superiors of the civil servants in this Divi-
sion were the Minister and the Secretary, Director-General after 1984. They proved to be 
relevant figures in this area of Pretoria's foreign policy making. 
This certainly applied, at least originally, to Eric Hendrik Louw, the Minister of External 
Affairs from 1955 to 1963.47 In his capacity as the Minister of Mining and Economic Devel-
opment (1948-49), and thereafter as Minister of Economics unti11954, his diplomatic experi-
ence was a valued attribute and appreciated by Prime Minister Daniel Francois Malan (1948-
54). Eric Louw also held an important position under Prime Minister Strijdom, who even en-
trusted him with the External Affairs portfolio in 1955.48 Given these credentials, he became 
Verwoerd's trusted man in the field. Foreign policy matters were primarily under Louw's 
guidance and he was responsible for most of the Prime Minister's relevant public statements. 
He made his influence felt in 1960 by insisting on the renaming of the Department of External 
Affairs to that of Foreign Affairs, possibly to prevent stronger intervention either by the Prime 
Minister or the Information service that itself was to become a separate department in 1961.49 
By 1955, Louw had already been instrumental in creating the Department's first geographical 
division, Africa and International Organisations. Under Louw, therefore, Africa was given 
special attention within Pretoria's foreign policy. In his approach toward that continent, he 
was known for having "no inhibitions about socialising with the leaders of other African 
countries".'· He attended Ghana' s independence celebration in 1957, had lunch with Prime 
Minister Kwame Nkrumah and attempted to negotiate the establishment of diplomatic rela-
45 Letter from Douglas David Forsyth (Secretary for External Affairs) to all heads of department, Pretoria, 14 
October 1954 (000, Group 5, KG/AOC/417, Vol. 22). 
46 This can be concluded from the fact that the relevant DFA file (1 /99/ 13) contains no material. 
47 See Appendix A for his biography. His private collection (PY.4) is housed at the ARCA. See also Van 
Wyk, Adam Johannes. 1998. Eric Louw: Pioneer Diplomat, 1925-1937, in History of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs. Vol. 1: 1927-1948. Pretoria: Department of Foreign Affairs: 13-32. 
48 Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation , pp.15, 20. 
49 Barratt, Joho. 1975. The Department of Foreign Affairs, in Denis Worrall, ed. South Africa: Government 
and Politics. Pretoria: J.L. van Schaik: 334; Muller, Marie Eloise. 1976. Suid-Afrika se buitelandes 
verteenwoordiging (1910-1972). Pretoria: J.L. van Schaik: 84; Muller, M.E. 1989. The Department of Foreign 
Affairs, p.246. 
,. Sole. 1994. South African Foreign Policy Assumptions and Objectives from Hertzog to de Klerk, p.108. 
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tions with this West African state.'1 However, Verwoerd's self-assurance in the field of for-
eign policy increased over the years, and Louw' s influence waned accordingly." This was 
also contingent on the strong personality of the Secretary, Gerhardus Petrus 'Gerhardt' Jooste, 
who held this position from 1956 to 1966. He had an impressive diplomatic record, with am-
bassadorial postings to Washington, to the UN and to London." However, it was his firm Na-
tional Party commitment that facilitated the development of a close relationship with Verwo-
erd, closer than one would normally expect between a Prime Minister and the administrative 
head of a department. Although being a NP stalwart, Louw "scrupulously upheld the principle 
of political impartiality" in his work, while Jooste had the reputation of having been "con-
cerned with political "reliability" of his officials". In consequence, Verwoerd on occasion 
either ignored Louw' s advice in favour of Jooste 's, or decided for himself." 
Jooste's power base also curtailed the influence of Hilgard Muller," Louw's successor 
from January 1964 to March 1977. Characterised as quiet, courteous, mild-mannered, self-
effacing, cautious, modestly and sparingly spoken, having little drive and being an implemen-
ter rather than an initiator, Muller carried little weight and played a fairly subordinate role 
under Verwoerd. '6 He rose in status under Vorster, but was increasingly by-passed by Brand 
Fourie, who succeeded Jooste in July 1966. This picture emerges from the memoirs of Donald 
Sole, a career foreign service officer with a keen respect for Muller: 
He [Muller] was a much more successful Ambassador than he was a Foreign Minister, 
mainly because his natural diffidence and his inclination not to push forward were quali-
ties which constitute a distinct handicap for any Foreign Minister. In Verwoerd 's time, as 
a Foreign Minister he was no more than a figurehead. Often Gerhardt Jooste would see 
the Prime Minister without the Foreign Minister being present. He developed more self 
confidence and initiative under Vorster but again it would happen that Brand Fourie saw 
the Prime Minister without Hilgard being present." 
Fourie held a long record as a professional foreign service officer" and, as a hard-working 
official with immense knowledge of international affairs, became a dominant figure in the 
'I Stevens, Richard P . 1970. South Aliica and Independent Black Africa, Africa Today 17, 3: 27. 
" Barber and Barratt. 1990. South Africa 's Foreign Policy, p.65; Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isola-
tion , pp.22f. ; Nolutshungu. 1975. South Africa in Africa, p.79. 
" See Appendix A for his biography. His memoirs as Secretary of External Affairs are to be found in his 
autobiography: Jooste, Gerhardus Petrus 'Gerhardt'. 1977. Diensherinneringe. Johannesburg: Perskor: 185-205. 
His private collection (PV.532) is housed at the ARCA. 
"Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, pp.15 , 27. Also Jooste. 1977. Diensherinneringe, p.187. 
" See Appendix A for his biography. 
'6 Barber and Barratt. 1990. SOllth Africa's Foreign Policy, p.65; Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isola-
tion, p.23; Munger. 1965. Notes on the Formation of South African Foreign Policy, pp.3If. See also his biogra-
phy: Meiring, Piet. c1985. Die lewe van Hilgard Muller. Silverton: Promedia Publikaries. 
" Sale, Donald Bell. 1989. "This Above All": Reminiscences of a South African Diplomat. Cape Town: 261. 
See Appendix A for his biography. 
" See Appendix A for his biography. His private collection (PV.854) is housed at the ARCA. 
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DF A during the next sixteen years. He was particularly close to Vorster, who consequently 
ignored Muller's advice on various occasions. l9 The personalities of Fourie and Muller sig-
nificantly impacted on Pretoria's relations with black African countries in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. In their intention to win them over, their thinking was based on the expectation 
that South Africa would benefit from its current status as the economically and technologi-
cally most advanced nation on the African continent. The key bargaining chips were the pro-
vision of technical assistance, as well as technological know-how and financing for the con-
struction of projects, in the context of which parastatal and private companies played a central 
role (Chapter 3). In the implementation of their policies, Fourie and Muller were assisted by 
able men from the Africa Division, responsible for sustaining the activities in Pretoria while 
occasionally travelling to black African countries. They were Robert Montgomery as Director 
(1969-71), the Deputy Secretaries Albertus 'Albie' Burger (1966-69) and Franyois Viljoen 
(1971 -72), as well as the Under-Secretaries Norman Best (1970-72), Johan Pretorius (1972-
75) and Hendrick 'Hennie' Geldenhuys (1972-74).60 Burger later carried a particularly heavy 
weight as Ambassador to Paris from October 1969 to 1974. As will be shown in Chapter 4, 
the close links with France played a crucial role in advancing Pretoria's ambitions in black 
Africa, with the South African Embassy in Paris becoming the co-ordination centre for its 
activities in Francophone Africa, the former French colonial territories.61 Burger played a pro-
active role in this context, accompanied or led several missions to these countries, and French 
political scientist Daniel Bach therefore described him as "one of the principal artisans of 
[South Africa's] opening towards the outside world"." 
Pik Botha replaced Muller as Minister of Foreign Affairs in April 1977. He had started his 
career in the DF A at the age of twenty-one, and subsequently interrupted it only once, as a 
Member of Parliament (1970-74). From 1963 to 1966, Botha held the important and prestig-
ious position as a member of South Africa's legal team in the S.W.A./Namibia case at the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). He subsequently made his way further up the ranks, fi-
nally becoming Ambassador to the United States and Permanent Representative to the UN 
(1974-77).63 In stark contrast to his predecessor, Pik Botha's character has been described as 
assertive, ambitious, flamboyant and ebullient, pursuing a highly visible style that was ad-
19 Barber and Barratt. 1990. Soulh Africa 's Foreign Policy, pp.l13, 182; Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy 
oJIsolation, pp.17, 123. 
60 See Appendix A for their biographies. 
61 Interview with Neil van Heerden and Paul Runge, 7 April 1999. 
62 Bach, Daniel C. 1990. Les initiatives franco-sud africains de «dialogue» avec I' Afrique francophone, in 
Daniel C. Bach, ed. La France et l'AJrique du Sud: hisloire, mYlhes el enjeux contemporains. Paris: Karthala; 
Nairobi: CREDU: 206 (translation from French). 
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mired by his colleagues. As a result, he became one of Pretoria's key foreign policy formula-
tors and it was probably due to his influential role that the budget for his department increased 
dramatically (Appendix D). In politics, he demonstrated a more liberal attitude than many of 
his staunchly conservative colleagues. While both P.W. and Pik Botha tried to sustain white 
minority rule, it was in their style that they differed." Asked about his relationship with P.W., 
Pik Botha acknowledged that life became difficult under this Prime Minister, later State 
President." Most importantly, the S.W.A./Namibia issue was not a non-negotiable theme for 
Pik Botha; this eventually led to Namibia's independence in 1990 and greatly improved both 
Pretoria's relations with black Africa and its standing in the international community. This 
was further facilitated by Pik Botha's personal approach; he has been described as an African-
ist, who felt at ease even in private discussions with black African counterparts66 Two senior 
DFA officials commented that "his chemistry with them [African politicians] ( ... ) was excel-
lent", "they walked arm in arm", and "he had a way of dealing with the black people which 
made them believe that he was absolutely not a racist. The colour of his skin didn't matter".67 
During his seventeen years as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pik Botha had the assistance of 
three consecutive administrative departmental heads. Following Brand Fourie, Johannes 
'Hans' van Dalsen held this post from May 1982 to March 1985, but did not have his prede-
cessor' s high profile. Although described as "a very competent and professional civil servant 
and diplomat"" he was low-profile; there is no reference to him in the literature and his name 
occurs in comparatively few of the primary documents examined in this study6 ' It is possible 
that the military's relatively dominant position in those days curtailed his influence. In con-
trast, Peter Rae Killen, Director-General from April 1985 to March 1987 and simply referred 
to as Rae, was a far more established and respected personality with significant influence. He 
had a particular interest in Africa, having headed the Africa Division from 1982 to 1984.70 
Former senior foreign service official Sole described Killen's work as a "sterling contribu-
63 See Appendix A for IDS biography. 
64 Shelton, Garth Lawrence. 1986. Theoretical Perspectives on South African Foreign Policy Making, Poli-
tikon: South African Journal of Political Studies 13, 1: 9. 
"Interview with Pik Botha, 20 Apri l 1999. 
66 Barber and Barratt. 1990. South Africa's Foreign Policy, pp.213f. ; Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of 
Isolation, p.98; Harber, Anton, Barbara Ludmann, eds. 1994. A-Z of South African Politics: The Essential Hand-
book, 1994. Harmondsworth: Penguin: 9f.; Pottinger. 1988. The Imperial Presidency, p.210. 
67 Interview with Neil van Heerden and Paul Runge, 7 April 1999. 
" Correspondence with John Barratt, 28 October 2002. 
69 See Appendix A for IDS biography. 
70 See Appendix A for his biography. 
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tion", laying "the groundwork for the improvement of relations with other African states".71 
The Minister and the Secretary/Director-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs were 
supported in their work by energetic civil servants in the Africa Division. Career foreign ser-
vice officer Carl von Hirschberg served as Deputy Secretary in the late 1970s, assisted by 
Under-Secretary Antonie 'Anton' Loubser who spoke French, a highly sought after attribute 
in the department. Glenn Babb played an influential role, especially as Deputy Director 
(1980-83), then Director (1984-85) and eventually Deputy Director-General (1987-89) of the 
Africa Division. Leo Henry 'Rusty' Evans was of significance as Minister Plenipotentiary" at 
the Embassy in London (1983-86) and as Head of the West Africa Section from October 
1986, before becoming Deputy Director-General for Africa in 1990. On a more junior level, 
Jan Wentzel and lohan Marx were Directors from 1981 to 1983 and from 1985 to 1987 re-
spectively. Finally, French-speaking Paul Runge was Third Secretary at the Embassy in Paris 
(1981-85), where he worked on Francophone Africa. He then was Project Liaison Officer in 
Gabon (1985-86) and Senior Officer in the West Africa Directorate (1988-89).73 
While the DFA's role as prime foreign policy actor had suffered under P.W. Botha, it 
again rose to prominence after the late 1980s. Seen against the end of the Cold War, both de 
Klerk and Pik Botha shared the conviction that South Africa's problems could only be solved 
through diplomacy and not by military force. Another momentum of importance was the 
strong team ofPik Botha and Neil van Heerden, DFA Director-General from April 1987 to 
September 1992, whom Pik Botha had favoured as a young official when they served in 
Washington in the mid-1970s. They subsequently worked together in the Namibia negotia-
tions that were close to Pik Botha's heart, realising that this issue was the stumbling block in 
preventing the normalisation of South Africa's relations with Africa and the world. In 1986, 
van Heerden was Deputy Director-General of the Africa Division and was duly appointed as 
its Director-General." Interviewed in early 1999, he emphasised his interest in Africa: "There 
was no other Division in the Department [of Foreign Affairs 1 which was more enthusiastic 
than the Africa Division. ( ... ) There were no other Divisions that worked under lousier condi-
71 Sole, Donald Bell. 1984. Review of "The Diplomacy ofisolation", by Deon Geldenbuys, In ternational Af-
fairs Bulletin 8, 1: 7lf. 
" The post of Minister Plenipotentiary was second to Ambassador, existed at the important embassies in 
Bonn, London, Paris, Vienna and Washinglon and was a diplomatic appointment, as opposed to the Ambassador, 
who was a political appointment. 
73 See Appendix A for their biographies. 
74 See Appendix A for his biography. Also Barber and Barratt. 1990. South Africa's Foreign Policy, p.214; 
Geldenbuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, p. I31; Murray, Hugh. 1989. The Quiet South African: An Inter-
view [with Neil Peter van Heerden], Leadership South Africa 8, I: 7- 10. 
CHAPTER TWO: SOUTH AFRICA' S FOREIGN POLICY SYSTEM 34 
tions ( ... ), [but people] were driven with a passion"." Van Heerden's crew consisted of several 
experienced officials who significantly contributed to the Africa Division's work, namely 
Deputy Director-Generals Derek Auret and Rusty Evans, Chief Director Christoffel 'Christo ' 
Prins, as well as Directors Justus de Goede and Colin Paterson. The consecutive Ambassadors 
to the United Nations, Jeremy Shearar and Vernon Steward, also played an important role.'· 
After this presentation of the two principal actors in the realm of Pretoria's foreign policy 
formulation and making, the three following sections introduce the state actors that chal-
lenged the DFA's presupposed dominant position, following a lose chronological order. 
Military 
The military was the first state actor to invade the Department of Foreign Affairs' terrain. 
Their influence on Pretoria's foreign policy making towards the countries beyond southern 
Africa was significant during two periods, both times related to P.W. Botha. The first refers to 
the late 1960s, during Botha's early days as Minister of Defence, and the second was the 
1980s, when he was the country's executive. The men from what is generally referred to as 
the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) played an important role in both phases, as will 
be detailed in Chapters 4 and 5. DMI was established in 1961 and underwent substantial ex-
pansion from the late 1970s, becoming the predominant intelligence-gathering agency. This is 
mirrored in Table 2 that lists the Directors of Military Intelligence, renamed Chief of Staff: 
Intelligence in 1974. Accordingly, holders of this post originally were rather low-ranking 
military, while during the period from July 1971 to March 1994, only two were not Lieuten-
ant Generals, the second highest rank in the military's hierarchy, below General. Frederik 
Wilhelm 'Fritz' Loots deserves special mention for the crucial role he played in the late 
1960s, when he served as P.W. Botha's personal envoy responsible for maintaining the link 
with the presidents of both the Ivory Coast and Gabon. Loots became Lieutenant in the South 
African Defence Force (SADF) in 1951, rising to the rank of Major eight years later. In 1964, 
he became Colonel and joined Military Intelligence. In 1966, he was promoted to the rank of 
Major General and became Director of Military Intelligence.77 Reflecting Loots' position as 
his close confidant, P.W. Botha later appointed him as Head of the General Officer Com-
manding Special Forces (1974-82). This military unit was "directly responsible to the Chief of 
" Interview with Neil van Heerden, 7 April 1999. 
,. See Appendix A for their biographies. 
77 Paratus: Official Magazine of the South African Defence Force 24,5; May 1973: 50. 
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the South African Defence Force, bypassing normal channels of command" and utilised in the 
destabilisation of south em African countries, P.W. Botha's central approach to the region." 
Table 2: Directors of Military Intelligence I Chiefs of Staff: Intelligence" 
February 1961 - December 1961 
December 1961 - January 1966 
January 1966 - July 1971 
July 197 1 - September 1977 
September 1977 - June 1978 
June 1978 - June 1985 
July 1985 - March 1989 
April 1989 - November 1991 
December 1991 - March 1994 
Colonel Matthys Johannes 'Thys' Uys 
Brigadier Pierre Marais Retief 
Major General Frederik Wilhelm ' Fritz' Loots 
Lieutenant General Hein de V. du Toit 
Major General I. Lemmer 
Lieutenant General Pieter Willem van der Westhuizen 
Vice Admiral Andries Petrus ' Dries' Putter 
Lieutenant General Rudolph ' Witkop ' Badenhorst 
Lieutenant General Christoffel Pieter 'Joffel' van der Westhuizen 
The military again relegated the foreign affairs ministry to the background during the 1980s, 
with P.W. Botha holding the political power. In reaction to the country's security situation 
after the mid-1970s, when the independence of the Portuguese colonies Angola and Mozam-
bique removed South Africa's cordon sanitaire (Chapters 4 and 5), the military applied their 
favoured policy, namely power and the use of force, to achieve their goals. Regarding their 
interest in Africa, the focus of activity lay in the immediate neighbourhood in order to ensure 
the Republic's security. Further north, we will only reveal selective activities. In this context, 
the Minister of Defence from 1980 to 1991, Magnus Andre de Merindo1 Malan, made an ap-
pearance on several occasions. He was the SADF's Commander-in-Chief from 1976 to 1980, 
a period during which he developed close ties with P.W. Botha, whose political and strategic 
views he shared. His rise in the military ranks has been explained by his senior position in the 
secretive Broederbond, an organisation that will be the subject later in this chapter. 80 Daniel S. 
'Daan' Hamman from Military Intelligence also played an important role. He was the Military 
Attache at the South African Embassies in London (1975-76) and Paris (1977-79),81 while 
holding the rank of Brigadier. He was promoted to Major General during the 1980s and it is 
78 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report. Vol. 2: Repression and Resistance. 1999. 
Basingstoke: Macmillan: l35. 
79 List provided by Ethel-Louise Mostert, Department of Defence Infonnation Centre, Pretoria, 5 April 2002. 
For biographical data on Badenborst, du Toit, Putter, Uys and P.W. van der Westhuizen, see: Frankel. 1984. 
Pretoria's Praetorians, p.43; Gastrow. 1987. Who's Who in South African Politics, pp.329-332; Geldenbuys. 
1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation , p.171; Hamann. 2001. Days of the Generals, pp.82, 162; Harber and Lud-
mann. 1994. A-Z of South African Polities, pp.148f.; TRC of South Africa Report. Vol. 2. 1999. p.320; Uys, Ian. 
1992. South African Military Who's Who, 1945-1992. Genniston: Fortress Publishers: 9f., 71, 192,244,249. 
80 Ellis. 1998. The Historical Significance of South Africa's Third Force, p.269; Geldenbuys. 1984. The Di-
plomacy of Isolation, pp.99f. His private collection (PV.634) is housed at the ARCA. 
81 Foreign Affairs List. Pretoria: DFA. (December 1975, September 1977, October 1979) 
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known from a secondary source that he was Head of the Directorate of Special Tasks within 
theDMI82 
Whether in the late 1960s or during the 1980s, and in line with its realist world view that 
power and force were the essential tools with which to conduct an effective foreign policy, the 
military also relied on power politics in its approach toward black Africa beyond southern 
Africa. This involved, inter alia, military co-operation with France and mercenaries, as well 
as armament sales. In this context, Deon Geldenhuys appropriately argued that the military 
"would typically be less concerned than the diplomats about potential international diplomatic 
repercussions flowing from the use of the military instrument offoreign policy".8J 
Department of Information 
In the first half of the 1970s, the Department of Foreign Affairs ' primacy was challenged by 
the Department of Information, in conjunction with the Bureau for State Security. Senior for-
eign service officials felt that Muller's relatively weak personality traits caused this intru-
sion,84 but the reasons for this are also to be found in personal connections between senior 
Department of Information and BOSS officials and Prime Minister Vorster. Vorster' s prag-
matism in politics allowed them to convince him of the validity of their approaches, outlined 
below, lying somewhere between the military's realist and the foreign service officer's ideal-
ist or liberal stance. 
The Department ofInformation judged Minister Muller's policy style as being too mild to 
successfully alleviate South Africa's international isolation. In their autobiographies, two of 
its senior officials argue that the DFA's low profile diplomacy "had got South Africa no-
where", Brand Fourie is described as an "old fashioned diplomat" and the Department of For-
eign Affairs colleagues as "stick-in-the-mud types with a mentality belonging to nineteenth-
century diplomacy" ." Those attempting to render Pretoria' s foreign policy more assertive and 
more successful were Connie Mulder, Minister of Information since 1968, Eschel Rhoodie as 
Secretary since September 1972 and Lourens Erasmus Smit 'Les' de Villiers, Deputy Secre-
tary since 1973. Mulder had an academic background and was a member of the Broederbond, 
82 TRC of South Africa Report. Vol. 2. 1999. p.321. 
8J Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, pp.99f. 
.4 Sale. 1989. "This Above All", p.262 . 
• 5 De Villiers, Laurens Erasmus Smit 'Les'. 1980. Secret Information. Cape Town: Tafelberg: 17; Rhoodie. 
1983. The Real Information Scandal, pp.23, 38, 58, 65. 
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the secretive organisation we introduce later in this chapter. 86 He had been active in local and 
national politics, and led the NP's country-wide information campaign" As Minister of In-
formation, he intensified the department's propaganda overseas activities, increased the num-
ber of offices abroad from four to nineteen, while the budget doubled from 1966 to 1971. 
During his student years, Rhoodie acted as an editorial staff member of an army magazine and 
a conservative South African daily. He subsequently served for many years as Press Attache 
and Information Officer at several important South African missions, was Deputy Editor of 
the Department of Information' s secretly funded magazine To the Point, before becoming 
Information Secretary." Les de Villiers had been active in South African journalism and was 
later involved in the Information section at the South African missions in Ottawa (1963-66) 
and New York (1967-72)." The bureaucratic vehicle used to impact on South Africa's foreign 
policy was the Department of Information that had been an integral part of the Department of 
External/Foreign Affairs since 1955 and only became a separate department in 1972.90 In 
Rhoodie 's and de Villiers' view, it had previously operated "more like a glorified post office 
or a tourist agency" . Together with Minister Mulder, they upgraded the Department of Infor-
mation and subsequently "embarked on a large-scale secret propaganda offensive", also in 
black African countries." It is worth quoting the section from Rhoodie ' s autobiography that 
sets out the Department's strategy: 
The objectives were obvious: To try to get to the opinion formers and the decision makers 
in the world, to influence their stand on South Africa, to create channels of communica-
tion through which South Africa could channel its messages so that, ostensibly, the mes-
sage or argument would be that of an independent individual organisation. Politicians, 
86 Wilkins, Ivor, Hans Strydom. 1980. The Super-Afrikaners. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball: A163 . 
87 Born in 1925; BA, Potchefstroom University of Christian Higher Education (1944); BA (Hons) and PhD, 
University of the Witwatersrand (1955, 1956); teacher (1946-58); Randfontein Town Councillor (1951-58); 
Mayor of Randfontein (1953-54, 57-58); MP for Randfontein (1958-75); Assistant Information Officer of the NP 
(1966); Chief Information Officer (1967); Minister ofinformation, Social Welfare and Pensions (1968-7 1). See 
De Villiers. 1980. Secret Information, p.119; Gastrow, Shelagh. 1985. Who's Who in South African Politics. 
Johannesburg: Ravan Press: 208ff. See also Mulder, Cornelius Petrus 'Connie'. 1970. Die "Uitwaartse 
Beweging" in perspektief, in Suid-Afrika in Uitwaartse Beweging: referate gelewer by geleentheid van die derde 
simposium oar die internasionale politiek, Potchefstroom, 22 Augustus 1969. Potchefstroom: Sentrum vir 
Internasionale Politiek, Potchefstroomse Universiteit vir Christelike Hoer Onderwys: 90-109; Starcke, Anna. 
1978. Survival: Taped Interviews with South Africa's Power Elite. Cape Town: Tafelberg: 132-147. 
" D.Phil., University of Pretoria (1964) ; Editorial staff member, Commando (1951-53) and Die Vaderland 
(1953-55); Press Attache and Information Officer, Canberra (1 957-60), Washington (1960-61), New York 
(1962-65) and The Hague (1967-71); Deputy Editor, To The Point (1971-72). 
89 De Villiers. 1980. Secret Information, p.22. 
90 Bureau for Information, part of the Department of External Affairs (193 9-45); State Information Office, 
belonging to the State Information Office before transferred to External Affairs (1946-55,1955-57); South Afri-
can Information Service as part of the Department of ExternallDFA (1957-1961); Department of Information 
after 1961. See Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, pp.16f.; Muller, M.E. 1989. The Department of 
Foreign Affairs, p.250. For an insider account of the early days of Information, see Meiring, Pie!. 1973. Inside 
Information. Cape Town: Howard Timmins. 
91 Geldenhuys. 1984. Th e Diplomacy of Isolation , pp.85, 108. 
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Members of Parliament, religious leaders, top business people, newspapers, individual 
newspapermen, the anti-apartheid organisations, labour unions, student leaders - these 
were the targets. So was the establishment of workable links with Black Africa for I be-
lieved, intensely, that acceptance by the moderate states in Africa was the key to accep-
tance by the rest of the world." 
38 
A vital element in the Department of Information's activities was the support of BOSS. We 
nOW examine the role of this national intelligence agency and that of its successors. 
National Intelligence 
The Bureau for State Security' s task was intelligence gathering in order to secure South Af-
rica's national security. Its forerunner was the Republican Intelligence CRI), launched in Janu-
ary 1963 as the "clandestine extension of the Security Police" that had been formed in 1947." 
As the RI had not been a legally constituted body, its existence only became public knowl-
edge in May 1969, when BOSS was established. Hendrik van den Bergh, who, because of his 
imposing height, was commonly known as Lang Hendrik, headed both RI and BOSS. His 
father, having fought against the British in the Anglo-Boer War, van den Bergh was brought 
up in a fiercely Afrikaner environment. Membership of the Broederbond and the 
Ossewabrandwag,94 a right-wing and anti-Semitic movement congruent with Hitler's ideas on 
racial purity, resulted in his internment during World War II. He was held in the same camp 
as John Vorster, a leading figure in the Ossewabrandwag," and a strong bond of friendship 
developed between them. During his days as Minister of Justice (1961 -66), Vorster promoted 
van den Bergh to the first head of the RI and of the Security Branch in the reorganised police 
force. As a team, they made a name for themselves in suppressing the wave of sabotage that 
swept across the Republic in the wake of the ANC's and PAC's banning." A previously un-
available primary document issued by Vorster confirms that BOSS became Pretoria's prime 
intelligence gathering body, intruding even the domain of military intelligence: 
92 Rhoodie. 1983. The Real Infonnation Scandal, pp.98, 123. Also Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Iso-
lation, pp.108f.; Jaster. 1988. The Defence of White Power, p.32. 
93 Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.147. 
94 Literally translated: Ox-wagon Guard. 
95 Terblanche, Hendrik Otto. 1983. John Vorster: OB-generaal en Afrikanervegter. Roodepoort: CUM-
Boeke; Marx, Christoph. 1994. The Ossewabrandwag as a Mass Movement, 1939-1941, Journal of Southern 
African Studies 20, 2: 195-219; Marx, Christoph. 1998. 1m Zeichen des Ochsenwagens: der radikale Afrikaaner-
Nationalismus in Sudafi'ika und die Geschichte der Ossewabrandwag. Miinster: LIT Verlag. 
96 De Villiers. 1980. Secret Information , p.119; D'Oliveira. 1978. Vorster, pp.84-87, 243f. ; Ellis, Stephen. 
1998. The Historical Significance of South Africa's Third Force, Journal of Southern African Studies 24, 2: 266; 
Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.147; Jaster. 1988. The Defence of White Power, p.25; Rhoodie. 
1983. The Real Infonnation Scandal, p. 71 ; Seegers. 1996. The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa, 
pp.127, 130f., 153f.; Wilkins and Strydom. 1980. The Super-Afrikaners, p.A239; Winter, Gordon. 1981. Inside 
BOSS: South Africa's Secret Police. Harmondsworth: Penguin: 19,34, 36, 38f., 42. 
CHAPTER TWO: SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY SYSTEM 
(c) In order to prevent confusion and overlapping and improve efficiency, the central in-
telligence organization, to be known as the Bureau for State Security, shall formulate 
the intelligence policy in regard to state security and by way of cOIl$ultation, co-ordinate 
the operations of departmental intelligence organizations within this framework. 
(d) Covert collection abroad shall be undertaken by the Bureau exclusively?' 
39 
According to the same source, van den Bergh had "unrestricted access" to the Prime Minis-
ter," and due to his influence on Vorster, he was accurately depicted in the secondary litera-
ture as being the "power behind the throne"." A particularly close relationship existed be-
tween van den Bergh and Rhoodie from the Department of Information 'oo and Deon Gelden-
huys makes reference to the "Mulder-Rho odie-Van den Bergh triumvirate, with De VilJiers 
close at hand".lOl With van den Bergh on board, the men from that department enjoyed direct 
access to and protection from Prime Minister Vorster. On the administrative side, BOSS fa-
cilitated the clandestine transfer of money to the Department of Information. This was impor-
tant, as only a small group of Cabinet members, let alone Parliament, were involved in its 
plans. In 1973, Vorster approved the Department of Information's first five-year plan and its 
budget mushroomed to 13 million Rand per year. After 1974, funds were first channelled 
through the Department of Defence, as its accounts were protected by law and could not be 
discussed in Parliament, and were then transferred to BOSS, which acted as "bankers for In-
formation".102 This put an additional strain on the already tense relationship between BOSS 
and Defence, with Les de Villiers citing Mulder and Rhoodie as having made the remark that 
"Defence Minister P W Botha was unhappy about his department being used to breast-feed 
Secret Information". 103 On a personal level, sharp clashes featured in the relationship between 
van den Bergh and P.W. Botha. It was van den Bergh, rather than Vorster or any other Cabi-
9' 'Instructions of the Prime Minister in Regard to the Intelligence Set-up for the Republic of South Africa', 
April 1969, p.2. Also letter from Hendrik van den Bergh to John Vorster with the attached document 
'Voorgestelde wetgewing ten opsigte van: (1) Staatsveiligheidsraad, (2) Bura vir Staaatsveiligheid', Paragraph 
B.l.b, p.7, Pretoria, IS November 1971 ; Potgieter-verslag. 1971. Verslag van die Kommissie van Ondersoek na 
Aangeleenthede betreffende die Veiligheid van die Staat, pp.258ff. (RP 102/197 1). All documents obtained from 
the National Intelligence Agency, Pretoria. 
98 'Instructions of the Prime Minister in Regard to the Intelligence Set-up for the Republic of South Africa', 
Pretoria, April 1969, p.4. Document obtained from the National Intelligence Agency, Pretoria. 
99 Barber and Barratt. 1990. SOllth Africa's Foreign Policy, p.116. Also De Villiers. 1980. Secret Informa-
tion, pp.76f.; Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.147; Rhoodie. 1983. The Real Information Scan-
dal, p.71; Uys, Stanley. 1969. South Africa's New Gestapo, New Statesman 8 August: 167f.; Winter. 1981. In-
side BOSS, p.213. 
100 De Villiers. 1980. Secret Information, pp.62, 148f.; Rhoodie. 1983. The Real Information Scandal, p.74. 
101 Ge1denhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolalion, pp.87, 148. 
102 Rhoodie. 1983. The Real Information Scandal, pp.84, 99f.; Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isola-
tion , p.148. 
103 De Villiers. 1980. Secret Information, p.149. 
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net member, who challenged the headstrong Minister of Defence and Botha consequently 
regarded him as an enemy. 104 
Like the DFA and the military, BOSS and the Department of Information benefited from 
the close links with France for their activities in Francophone Africa. In particular, Albertus 
'Albie' B. Geldenhuys was an important figure in the behind-the-scenes contacts with the 
Ivory Coast. According to the DFA's Foreign Affairs List, he was employed as a Technical 
Adviser at the Paris Embassy, but in reality he was an under-cover BOSS agent. He reached 
this position because his father, Mike Geldenhuys, was van den Bergh's personal friend, and 
because he spoke fluent French. In 1966, Mike Geldenhuys succeeded van den Bergh as Chief 
of the Security Branch and was number four at BOSS headquarters in Pretoria during the 
1970s, controlling its overseas agents. 10' 
The Department ofinformation' s and BOSS's foreign policy ventures came to an end with 
the Information Scandal. The political decks were cleared with Vorster's resignation, Mulder 
became Minister for Plural Relations and Development (February-November 1978),106 the 
political careers of both Rhoodie and de Villiers ended in 1977, and van den Bergh resigned 
on the very day P.W. Botha was elected Prime Minister in September 1978. During the two 
years that followed, the military undertook to bring the activities of the national intelligence 
agency in line with its own to prevent renewed clashes between the two state actors whose 
briefs were overlapping. Of crucial importance, and in addition to holding the premiership 
and remaining the Minister of Defence until 1980, P.W. Botha, in November 1978, took over 
the ministerial portfolio in what now became the Department of National Security.l07 Fur-
thermore, P.W. Botha made Hendrick Jacobus 'Kobie ' Coetsee the Deputy Minister in both 
the Department of Defence and the Department of National Security. 108 Holding a Law degree 
from the then University of the Orange Free State, Coetsee was a National Party Member of 
Parliament for Bloemfontein West, the capital of that province, from 1968 to 1994. As an 
indication of his influential position in party politics, he was also the NP leader in the Orange 
Free State. Finally, and reflecting his interest in security matters, Coetsee chaired the National 
1M Barber and Barratt. 1990. South Africa'S Foreign Policy, pp.249ff.; Ellis. 1998. The Historical Signifi-
cance of South Africa's Third Force, pp.266, 269; Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, pp.120, 147; 
Jaster. 1988. The Defence of White Power, pp.33f. ; Pottinger. 1988. The Imperial Presidency , p.45. 
10' De Villiers. 1980. Secret Information, pp.94f.; D'Oliveira. 1978. Vorster, p.194 (note 10); Rhoodie. 1983. 
The Real Information Scandal, p.71; Winter. 1981. Inside BOSS, pp.45, 4 16. 
106 Parliamentary Register, 1910-1984. 1991. Cape Town: Government Printer: 30. 
107 Parliamentary Register. 1991. p.5. On the Department of National Security, see Ellis. 1998. The Histori-
cal Significance of South Africa's Third Force, p.270; Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, pp.36, 
149; Pottinger. 1988. The Imperial Presidency, pp.12, 14,21; Winter. 1981. Inside BOSS, p.225. 
108 Gastrow. 1992. Who 's Who in South African Politics, pp.37ff. 
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Party's Study Group on Defence from 1978. <09 That Group was one of twenty-four such study 
groups and gave the parliamentarians from the ruling party the possibility "to familiarise 
themselves with the various aspects of the ministerial portfolio with which a particular group 
corresponded".IIO In returning to P.W. Botha and Coetsee as the Minister and Deputy Minister 
in the Department of National Security respectively, they cemented their grip on the national 
intelligence's work by making Alec van Wyk the administrative head of this department. Sig-
nificantly, he did not have van den Bergh' s assertive profile and van Wyk is barely mentioned 
in the secondary literature. 11I Accordingly, this study demonstrates that the Department of 
National Security only played a minor role in Pretoria's foreign policy making towards Af-
nca. 
A new chapter in the history of the national intelligence agency began in 1979, linked to 
the person of Lukas Daniel 'Niel' Barnard. In November of that year, P.W. Botha appointed 
the thirty year old Political Science Professor from the University of the Orange Free State to 
the post of Secretary in the Department of National Security. 1I2 Botha had made his choice 
without consulting the government's Public Service Commission, a procedure usually applied 
when outsiders are nominated for top public servant posts. 113 Consequently, the country's cur-
rent press expressed their astonishment. One newspaper wrote: "His appointment from out-
side the ranks of the Public Service has been one of the most surprising made so far by the 
Prime Minister"ll4 However, it was only in June 1980, seven months after his appointment, 
that Barnard assumed his post in what now was renamed National Intelligence Service. This 
delay is an indication that P.W. Botha's choice was met by some resistance from those who 
were not consulted, probably the national intelligence officials and possibly also the parlia-
109 Gastrow. 1992. Who's Who in South African Politics, pp.37ff.; 'Wily lawyer who won Madiba's trust: 
Former champion of apartheid dies with integrity intact', Sunday Times 30 July 2000; 
<http ://www.anc.org.zaianc/newsbriefJ 1994/news0520>. 
110 Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, pp.60-66, 165. 
III Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.149; Gastrow. 1992. Who's Who in South African Poli-
tics, p.? 
112 Barnard did both his MA in 1973 on "Moderne teoretiese benaderings van intemasionale verhoudinge" 
(Modem Theoretical Approaches of International Relations) and his D. Phil. in 1975 on "Die magsfaktor in 
internasionale verhoudinge" (The Power Factor in International Relations) at the University of the Orange Free 
State. During his studies, he was first Junior Lecturer and then Head of the Department of Political Science at the 
same academic institution. On Barnard, see Gastrow, Shelagh. 1987. Who's Who in South African Politics. Jo-
hannesburg: Ravan Press: 16f. ; Kotz,;, Hennie, Anneke Greyling. 1994. Political Organisations in South Africa. 
Cape Town: Tafelberg: 288; Seegers. 1996. The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa, p.248. 
11 3 'Botha' s cloak and dagger man: criticism over young academic' s top security post', The Daily News 21 
November 1979. Newspaper clipping provided by courtesy of Hester van der Berg, SA Media, University of the 
Free State. 
114 'Barnard takes over today', The Friend 2 June 1980. Also 'Botha's cloak and dagger man: criticism over 
young academic's top security post' , The Daily News 21 November 1979, p.9; 'Intelligence takes new direction' , 
The Star 2 June 1980. Newspaper clippings provided by courtesy of Hester van der Berg, SA Media, University 
of the Free State. 
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mentarians that did not approve of this fait accompli. In any event, Botha's appointment 
clearly bore the handwriting of the national intelligence Deputy Minister Coetsee, given his 
political power base in the Orange Free State and his close links as an Alumni of the univer-
sity of this province. I IS As a South African daily commented in November 1979: 
Professor Barnard ( ... ) is believed to have been hand-picked by the Deputy Minister of 
National Security ( ... ) Mr. Coetsee, a fellow Bloemfonteiner, would have been aware of 
and impressed by Professor Barnard's studies of strategic matters at the University of the 
Free State. It is likely that the Prime Minister, on the recommendations of Mr Coetsee 
and his Defence Force advisers, chose Professor Barnard on the strength of his conserva-
tive, orthodox attitudes to security questions linked with his knowledge of the threats as 
seen by the Govenunent.116 
Indeed, and Coetsee 's apparent role apart, Niel Barnard' s academic profile legitimised P.W. 
Botha to make him the national intelligence head, thereby avoiding confrontation between 
national intelligence and the military such as had occurred during van den Bergh's days. In 
fact, Barnard's doctoral thesis on The Power Factor in International Relations and other pub-
1icationsl17 were testimony "to a close correspondence between his views and those of Prime 
Minister P W Botha on the need for a comprehensive strategy for securing South Africa's 
interests in an alien environment", as a magazine commented in June 1980.118 The same 
source quotes from Barnard 's press conference that month: "What we face today is a total 
politico-ideological war C ... ); a total onslaught also involves diplomacy, propaganda, educa-
tion, sport and, above all, the economy. A counter-strategy cannot therefore be based on the 
military aspect alone".119 With hindsight, later secondary sources suggest that under Barnard 
the NIS consequently "co-operated closely with military intelligence". 120 
We reveal in this study that the National Intelligence Service remained an important actor, 
at least initially, even after P.W. Botha's presidency had ended in 1989. The intelligence 
agency's influence on Pretoria' s foreign policy under de Klerk, and in spite of the DFA's re-
surgent predominant position in the early 1990s, is likely to be explained with the powerful 
position it had built up during the 1980s. This finds confirmation in reading de Klerk's auto-
biography, describing Barnard as follows : "Another key figure was the enigmatic Dr Niel 
[sic] Barnard C ... ). Barnard had built the service into an effective organization which had a 
liS <http://www.anc.org.za/anc/newsbrief71994/news0520> . 
116 'Botha's cloak and dagger man: criticism over young academic 's top security post', Th e Daily News 21 
November 1979, p.9. 
117 For example Barnard, Lukas Daniel 'Niel ' . 1977. Angola in die intemasionale magskonstellasie, Journal 
for Contemporary History and International Relations 2, I: 66-86. 
118 'NIS supremo says he'll 'keep it clean", To the Point 13 June 1980, p.19. 
119 'NIS supremo says he' ll 'keep it clean", To the Point 13 June 1980, p.19. 
120 Gastrow. 1992. Who's Who in South African Politics, p.7. Also Geldenbuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Iso-
lation , p.149. 
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reputation for professionalism and for playing by the rules. He was quiet, reserved and 
thoughtful ( ... )."121 It is therefore justified to argue that Barnard held such a strong position 
that the foreign service officials and de Klerk were not in a position to curtail his influence. 
This led to competition with the Department of Foreign Affairs, led by Pik Botha and Neil 
van Heerden, as will be revealed in the context of Pretoria's contact with Uganda and Nigeria 
between 1990 and 1992. However, in February 1992, de Klerk made Barnard the Director-
General of Constitutional Development Services, engaging him more closely in the negotia-
tions with the ANC, thus removing him from the foreign policy making scene. Significantly, 
and supporting the argument that Bamard interfered with the DFA' s work, de Klerk cynically 
explained the move by saying: "so that we would be able to make fuller use of his abilities in 
the negotiating process". J22 
This concludes our discussion of the different state actors of relevance in this study. We 
stated at the outset of this chapter that non-state actors also played a role. In describing their 
significance, we have organised them in six main categories (Table 3) and the subsequent 
sections follow this order. As illustrated in Figure I above, non-state actors played a periph-
eral role in Pretoria' s foreign relations with the African states. Our current interest, therefore, 
is to provide their profiles in order to then, in Chapters 3 to 6, examine their position vis-a-vis 
what Figure 1 depicted as the locus of decision-making. 
Table 3: Non-State Actors in the Realm of South Africa 's Foreign Relations with Black Africa 
Political Parties Progressive Party 
Civil Society Broederbond 
Think Tanks Afiica Institute; South African Institute of International Affairs 
Media Rand Daily Mail 
Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut; Durban Chamber of Commerce; South Africa Organised Business 
Foundation; South African Foreign Trade Organisation 
Companies 
Parastatal Industrial Development Corporation 
Anglo American Corporation; Bessemer Steel Construction; Brian Colqu-
Private houn Hugh O'Donnell and Partners; Credit Guarantee Insurance Corpora-
tion; LTA; Roberts Construction; Safair; Southern Sun 
Political Parties 
South Africa' s foreign policy was only seldom discussed in Parliament, which was, in any 
case, dominated by the ruling National Party. The most significant opposition came from the 
121 De Klerk. 199B. Th e Last Trek, p. II B. 
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Progressive Party. Fonned in 1959, it changed its name to Progressive Refonn Party (PRP) in 
1974, to Progressive Federal Party (PFP) in 1977 and to Democratic Party (DP) in 1989. 123 
Being in opposition to the NP and relying largely on financial support from the Anglo Ameri-
can Corporation, discussed below, it criticised the government for not going far enough in 
introducing domestic refonns to improve South Africa's international standing. 124 Three of its 
prominent politicians, Colin Wells Eglin, Helen Suzman and Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, paid 
visits to several black African countries beyond southern Africa. Eglin was the party's prolific 
leader from 1971 to 1978, contributing to its parliamentary breakthrough by winning six seats 
in the 1974 elections,'" and it was during his tenure that the party was particularly active in 
Africa. He briefly held this post again from 1986 to 1988. 126 Suzman, a well-respected politi-
cal figure and one of the earliest female parliamentarians, held the Progressive Party seat in 
Parliament from 1961. 127 Slabbert had a strong academic background, with a doctoral degree 
in Sociology, a discipline in which he subsequently lectured at various South African univer-
sities. '28 As a result, he never became a party-man. In his memoirs, Slabbert indicates that he 
was not specifically imbued with an ambition to become a career politician: "I suppose noth-
ing could have prepared me adequately for the world I was about to enter. I stumbled into it 
almost by accident. ( ... ) I enjoyed lecturing but did not have enough time to do research and 
read ( ... ). I suppose I was ripe to consider alternatives". '29 Similarly, Slabbert describes his 
feelings on becoming the party's leader in September 1979: "I did so reluctantly and with 
apprehension. ( ... ) I definitely did not want to spend the rest of my productive days in the 
South African Parliament".'lO In February 1986, in a move of surprise, even shock, to white 
South Africans, Slabbert resigned as Leader of the Progressive Federal Party and from Par-
liament because, as he put it: "Obviously after twelve years in Parliament ( ... ) I had a very real 
122 De Klerk. 1998. The Last Trek, p.118. 
12) Rackland, Brian. 1984. The Progressive Party of South Africa. 1959-1981: Political Responses to Struc-
tural Changes and Class Struggle. PhD, Oxford University; Rackland, Brian. 1987. Incorporationist Ideology as 
a Response to Political Struggle: The Progressive Party of South Aliica, 1960-1980, in Shula Marks, Stanley 
Trapido, eds. The Politics of Race, Class, and Nationalism in Twentieth-Century South Africa. New York: 
Longman: 366-388. 
124 Williams, Gwyneth, Brian Rackland. 1988. The Dictionary of Contemporary Politics of Southern Africa. 
London: Routledge: 2lOff 
125 Gastrow. 1987. Who 's Who in South African Politics, pp.85-89. 
126 The section Correspondence in the Bibliography contains more information on his biography. 
127 Gastrow. 1987. Who 's Who in South African Politics, pp.302-305. The section Correspondence in the Bib-
liography contains more information on her biography. 
128 The section Correspondence in the Bibliography contains more information on his biography. 
129 Slabber!, Frederik van Zyl. 1987. The Last White Parliament: The Struggle for South Africa by the Leader 
of the White Opposition. New York: SI. Martin 's Press: 5. 
130 Siabbert. 1987. The Last White Parliament, p.53. On Siabbert, see also Gastrow. 1987. Who's Who in 
South African Politics, pp.292-295. 
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sense of 'having had enough', especially as 'things' had worsened and not improved".'" The 
South African political scientists Hennie Kotze and Anneke Greyling suggest that Slabbert 
was frustrated that "white politics was stagnating and that a search for extra-parliamentary 
options was needed to break the political stalemate". '" After his resignation, and of relevance 
to this study, Slabbert established the Cape Town-based Institute for a Democratic Alternative 
for South Africa (IDASA).133 
The activities of this relatively liberal party in Africa are almost entirely ignored by the 
secondary literature. In this study, we are in a position to shed some light on the party's strat-
egy by using the material in the DF A files, supplemented by correspondence with the above-
mentioned politicians. 
Civil Society 
In his seminal study, Deon Geldenhuys names several actors within what he calls the "organ-
ised public" that influenced Pretoria's apartheid foreign policy, 1>' but among them only the 
Broederbond'" is of significance to this study. The only restriction regarding its status as a 
civil society actor is its male exclusivity.'36 Established in 1918, the Broederbond was preoc-
cupied with the survival of the Afrikaner yolk and "played a crucial role in creating, legitimis-
ing and maintaining the system of apartheid" until the mid-I 980s. 1l7 It not only had ministers, 
politicians and civil servants among its members, but also thousands of 'average' Afrikaner 
citizens.''' There were, however, splits within the brotherhood between the verligte (enlight-
ened) and verkrampte (constricted) elements. This was a contributing factor to factional 
struggles within the National Party, exemplified by the formation of the Herstigte Nasionale 
Party (HNP) in 1969 and the Information Scandal imbroglio in 1977/78, both of which are 
given prominence Chapter 4.' 39 With regard to the Broederbond's involvement in Pretoria's 
1>, Slabber!. 1987. The Last White Parliament, p.I77. 
'" Kotz" and Greyling. 1994. Political Organisations in South Africa, pp.304f. 
133 <http://www.idasa.org.za>. 
1>, Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, pp. I 59-204. 
I3S Literally translated: Brotherhood Union. 
1>. Williams, Paul D. 2001. Intellectuals and the End of Apartheid: Critical Security Studies and the South 
African Transition. PhD, University of Wales, Aberystwyth: 96. 
Il7 Williams. 200 I. Intellectuals and the End of Apartheid, p.86. 
'" The long list of members is contained in Wilkins and Strydom. 1980. The Super-Afrikaners. In 1977, it 
counted 11,910 members. Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.ln. Also Williams. 2001. Intellec-
tuals and the End of Apartheid, p.99. 
'39 An uncritical insider perspective of the Broederbond is provided by Pelzer, Adriaan Nicolaas. 1970. Die 
Afrikaner-Broederbond: eerste 50 jaar. Cape Town: Tafelberg. For more critical approaches, see O' Meara. 
1996. Forty Lost Years, pp.43-48; Serfontein, Jan Hendrik Philippus 'Hennie'. 1979. Brotherhood of Power: An 
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Africa policy, it disposed of a task group called the 'Africa Committee' in the mid-1960s. It 
was chaired by Paul Friedrich Detlev Weiss, the then Director of the Africa Institute, and 
Petrus Johannes 'Pie!' Cillie, the editor of the Afrikaans daily Die Burger (1954-77) with close 
ties to the National Party, was a member. 140 Resting on the assumption that the Afrikaners 
were a chosen people, the aim of the Africa Committee was to christianise and civilise Africa 
and to keep up the struggle against communism. Thus, Broederbond Chairman Pieter Johan-
nes 'Pie!' Meyer (1960-72) suggested that it was their mission to "carry the light and spirit of 
Christianity into Africa from the South to the North".'41 
Regarding the Broederbond's influence on Pretoria ' s policy decisions, it effectively con-
stituted the unofficial decision-making centre of the ruling National Party, aptly described by 
Hennie Serfontein: "One thing should be clear. The Broederbond does not dictate as such to 
the various bodies in government C ... ). There is, rather, direct interaction between the Bond 
and these bodies C ... ). The key people with whom the Broederbond discusses matters of the 
day are all Broeders anyway".''' In the period under consideration, only two Cabinet Minis-
ters were not Broederbond members, namely Eric Louw and Finance Minister Nicolaas Chris-
tiaan 'Klaas' Havenga (1924-39, 1948-54),143 with Louw's above-mentioned non-political 
attitude probably accounting for his non-membership.1« Thus, there can be little doubt that the 
belief system prevalent amongst Broederbond members also became imprinted on Pretoria's 
foreign policy generally, and its Africa policy in particular,l45 making reference to the strongly 
held Afrikaner belief that the whites were superior to the blacks, and to the assumption that 
they had the right and mission to both dominate and civilise Africa. This formed the underly-
ing basis of South Africa's policy toward Africa for much of the period under consideration. 
Apart from that general observation, the Broederbond's input into Pretoria's foreign policy 
making was considerable during Vorster's 'Detente', the S.W.A./Namibia issue and South 
Expose of the Secret Afrikaner Broederbond. London: Rex Collings; Wilkins and Strydom. 1980. The Super-
Afrikaners. 
140 Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, pp.31, 172f., 187; Pottinger. 1988. The Imperial Presi-
dency, p.402; Serfontein. 1979. Brotherhood of Power, p.149; Wilkins and Strydom. 1980. The Super-
Afrikaners, p.A33; Williams. 2001. Intellectuals and the End of Apartheid, pp.95f. See also the biography on 
Cillie: Steyn, Jacobus Cornelius' Jaap' . 2002. Penvegter: Piet Gillie van Die Burger. Cape Town: Tafelberg. 
141 Cited in Williams. 2001. Intellectuals and the End of Apartheid, p.120. 
142 Serfontein. 1979. Brotherhood of Power, p.145. Also Williams. 2001. Intellectuals and the End of Apart-
heid, p.94. 
143 Parliamentary Register, 1910-1984. 1991. p.14. 
1« Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation , p.31. 
145 Chan, Stephen. 1990. Foreign Policies in Southern Africa: The History of an Epoch, 1978-88, in Stephen 
Chan, ed. Exporting Apartheid: Foreign Policies in Southern Africa, 1978-1988. London: Macmillan: 10-13; De 
St. Jorre, John. 1976. Inside the Laager: White Power in South Africa, Foreign Affairs 55, I: 174ff.; Pretorius, 
Louwrens. 1994. The Head of Government and Organised Business, in Robert Arthur Schrire, ed. Malan to de 
Klerk: Leadership in the Apartheid State. New York: St. Martin's Press; London: Hurst: 215. 
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Africa's relations with Rhodesia. In contrast, and although a Broeder, Prime Minister and 
State President P.W. kept the secret organisation at some distance and "it was clear that he 
wanted to make sure the Bond knew its place".146 Towards the end ofP.W. Botha' s rule, coin-
ciding with the end of the Cold War, the Broederbond came to realise that the means of power 
were no longer useful to ensure Afrikaner security, but inclusive negotiations. In fact, de 
Klerk himself suggests that he would not have undertaken the reforms he did after February 
1990, if the Broderbond had not identified the need for change. 147 
Think Tanks 
We now discuss the two think tanks that made an appearance within Pretoria's foreign rela-
tions with black African states. For the purpose of this study, we apply to them Diane Stone' s 
recent definition of think tanks: 
Research institutes and think tanks are relatively autonomous organizations engaged in 
the research and analysis of contemporary issues independently of government, political 
parties, and pressure groups. They are relatively autonomous, although they are often in 
resource-dependent relationships with these organizations, funding may come from gov-
ernment sources, but institutes attempt to maintain their research freedom and usually 
claim not to be beholden to specific interests. Think tanks attempt to influence or infOlTIl 
policy through intellectual argument and analysis rather than direct lobbying ( .. . ). Think 
tanks collect, synthesize and create a range of information products, often directed to-
wards a political or bureaucratic audience, but also for the benefit of the media, civil soci-
ety groups, and the general public. I48 
As Deon Geldenhuys aptly noted, "South Africa did not have anything like a foreign policy 
community found in countries such as Britain and the United States",149 with two institutions 
dominating, namely the Africa Institute in Pretoria and the South African Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs in Johannesburg. They were engaged in researching aspects of the South Afri-
can foreign relations investigated in this study. We present them henceforth in alphabetical 
order. 
The Africa Institute was established by parliamentary statute in 1960, financed by the 
South African government from the Department of Education's budget. Its governing body, 
the Council, was dominated by Broederbond members . In the period from 1980 to 1984, for 
146 Williams. 2001. Intellectuals and the End of Apartheid, p.113. Also Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of 
Isolation, pp.l72ff. 
147 De Klerk. 1998. Th e Last Trek, pp.42f.; Williams. 2001. Intellectuals and the End of Apartheid, p.1l6, 
145, 156. 
148 Stone, Diane. 200 I. Think Tanks, in Neil Joseph Smelser, Paul B. Bates, eds. International Encyclopedia 
of the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Vol. 23. Amsterdam: Elsevier: 15668[. 
149 Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation , p.25 . Also Munger. 1965. Notes on the Formation of 
South African Foreign Policy, p.51. 
CHAPTER TWO: SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY SYSTEM 48 
example, eight of the eighteen Council members belonged to that secretive Afrikaner organi-
sation. I'. In spite of this organisational framework, the Africa Institute was not a front organi-
sation of the government. As agreed upon in the secondary literature, its work was primarily 
"fact-producing and not policy-making".I'1 In particular, mention must be made of their two 
journals, South African Journal of African Affairs (1971-79), continued by Africa Insight from 
1980, and the Africa Institue Bulletin, published since 1960, as well as a wide range of 
monographs, many of which are referenced in this study. Having said this, though, we will 
reveal in Chapter 4 that both the Africa Institute's Director and Vice-Director at the time, 
Joseph Hulme Moolman (1971-77) and Gerhard Max Erich Leistner (1973-77), simply 
referred to as Erich, became drawn into Pretoria's Africa ventures in the mid-1 970s. 
Established in 1934 in Cape Town as South Africa's version of the London-based Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, the South African Institute of International Affairs was com-
pletely different in nature. The ideological and social base of this independent research body 
has been characterised as "upper-class, English-oriented and liberal" .152 Reflecting this de-
scription, the Institute has been located in J an Smuts House on the campus of the University 
of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg since 1960; as South African Prime Minister (1919-24, 
1939-48), Smuts supported the British at the outset of World War II. Even more significantly, 
the Institute's funding came primarily from the English-speaking business community, espe-
cially the mining sector. Crucially, Harry Frederick Oppenheimer, Chairman of the mining 
giant Anglo American Corporation from 1957 to 1982, described below, was its National 
Chairman from 1980 to 1990.153 The Institute was well-respected, due mostly to its publica-
tions, its high public profile in the form of conferences and media presence. I" Former foreign 
service officer John Barratt,I SS who came from an English-speaking background, was its Di-
rector from 1967 to 1994 and significantly boosted the Institute's stature, also internation-
ally.lso He published extensively on South Africa's foreign policy in Africa during the Out-
I'. Africa Institute: Annual Report, 1985, p.35. For Broederbond membership, see Wilkins and Strydom. 
1980. The Super-Afrikaners . 
1'1 Munger. 1965. Notes on the Formation of South African Foreign Policy, p.53. Also Geldenhuys. 1984. 
The Diplomacy of Isolation, pp.17, 30, 170; Nolutshungu. 1975. South Africa in Africa, p.72. 
152 Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.170. Also Munger. 1965. Notes on the Formation of 
South African Foreign Policy, p.52. 
153 Williams. 2001. Intellectuals and the End of Apartheid, pp.190, 203. 
154 Williams. 2001. Intellectuals and the End of Apartheid, p.180. 
I" Cadet, DFA (1954-57); Third Secretary, Permanent Mission UN New York (1958-66). See 'Profile: John 
Barratt', Optima 33, 3,1985: 141ff., and his interview in Starcke. 1978. Survival, pp.47-55. 
ISO Williams. 2001. Intellectuals and the End of Apartheid, pp.184, 19lf. Also Bostock, Arthur Leslie. 1984. 
A Short History of the South African Institute of International Affairs, 1934-1984. Johannesburg: South African 
Institute ofIntemational Affairs; Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, pp.30, 170. 
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ward-Looking Policy. Despite Barratt's suggestion that the Institute should "provide a link of 
bridge between the academic world and those in politics and government",' 51 it was relatively 
removed from foreign policy making circles dominated by members of the Afrikaner commu-
nity,' 58 primarily to be explained with its liberal academic outlook and the financing from 
English-speaking business. Thus, it was a matter of formality only that the Minister of For-
eign Affairs ranked as one of its honorary presidents. Consequently, and in comparison to the 
Africa Institute, contact between the Institute and the South African government related to 
this study was low key (Chapter 4). 
Media 
The Rand Daily Mail, a white South African English-speaking newspaper, was significantly 
critical of Pretoria's apartheid policy during the period under review. Established in 1902 in 
the then gold-rush boom town of Johannesburg, it began as "a businessman's paper, devoted 
to the mining interests and to the white mineworkers"l59 Originally, its style of reporting was 
acceptable to the South African government, but this changed when the National Party came 
to power in 1948. This event marked the beginning "of the long war of attrition between gov-
ernment and the English newspapers", among them the Rand Daily Mail. l60 Over time, the 
daily took a more radical, in South African terms, political stance in response to the growing 
government pressure in the form oflimitations to press freedom. In particular, it began to side 
with the Progressive Party, for example in the early 1960s, when it supported the party's 
stance against the imposition of apartheid laws, such as detention without trial. This change 
was also linked to the personality of Laurence Gandar, Editor from 1957 and Editor-in-Chief 
after 1966. He had previously worked as public relations adviser to Anglo American's Harry 
Oppenheimer. By arguing, in an attempt to make a positive contribution to the country's de-
velopment, that the full racial integration in South African society was inevitable, he took an 
extremely radical stance in the South Africa of 1964.161 
Some of its more prominent journalists, for example Allister Sparks, sustained the paper's 
liberal tradition. Sparks had joined the Rand Daily Mail in 1958 and, after holding several 
assistant positions, became its Editor (1977-81). In 1966, whilst he was the political corre-
151 The South African Institute of International Affairs: Past, Present and Future. 1984. Johannesburg: South 
African Institute ofIntemational Affairs: 5. 
158 Williams. 2001. Intellectuals and the End of Apartheid, pp.226f. 
159 Walker, Martin. 1982. Powers of the Press: The World's Great Newspapers. London: Quartet Books: 314. 
160 Walker. 1982. Powers of the Press, p.321. 
161 Walker. 1982. Powers of the Press, pp.322f 
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spondent, the daily won a World Press Achievement Reward for its exposure of apartheid 
injustices and the maltreatment of prisoners, especially blacks, in the country's prisons. 
Sparks also authored several books denouncing the apartheid system, some of which were 
widely acclaimed. I62 Two other journalists of note were Benjamin Pogrund and Anton Harber. 
Pogrund worked with the paper from 1958 as "African affairs reporter"163 covering the activi-
ties of the ANC and black leaders such as Nelson Mandela and PAC leader Robert Sobukwe, 
both of whom became Pogrund's lifelong friends. He rose to eventually become the paper's 
Deputy Editor and served in this capacity until his resignation in 1984. 164 It was during these 
days that the Rand Daily Mail published the revelations that led to the Information Scandal 
and to Prime Minister Vorster's resignation in 1978. The Rand Daily Mail also proved to be a 
thorn in the flesh of the next government and this led to its closure in 1985. 16' Anton Harber, 
with the paper since 1981 and political reporter at the time, reacted to this as a "blow against 
the liberal press"166 and launched The Weekly Mail to uphold a critical voice against the gov-
ernment. Subtitled The Paper for a Changing South Africa, it became an integral part of 
South Africa's 'alternative press', "the only significant media voices not controlled by either 
the government or big capital",167 therefore giving it more freedom in its reporting. Reflecting 
its co-operation with the British daily The Guardian, it was renamed Weekly Mail & Guard-
ian in 1993 and Mail & Guardian in 1995, under which name it is still published today. I6' 
The Rand Daily Mail and The Weekly Mail covered South Africa' s Africa policy fairly 
extensively, as is evidenced by many of the DFA files containing clippings from that newspa-
per, publishing several reports critical toward, or revealing elements of Pretoria's initiatives. 
162 For example, Sparks, Allister. 1981. The Voice of Dissent. Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press; 
Sparks, Allister. 1990. The Mind of South Africa. London: Heinemann. 
163 Sampson, Anthony. 1999. Mandela: The Authorised Biography . London: Harper Collins, p.147. 
164 Pogrund, Benjamin. 2000. War of Words: Memoirs of a South African Journalist. New York: Seven Sto-
ries Press. 
16' Walker. 1982. Powers of the Press, pp.3\3-335. 
166 Tomaselli, Ruth, Keyan G. Tomaselli. 1989. The Political Economy of the South African Press, in Keyan 
G. Tomaselli, Ruth Tomaselli, Johan Muller, eds. The Press in South Africa. Bellville: Anthropos; New York: 
St. Martin's Press: 83. 
167 Frederikse, Julie. 1987. South Africa's Media: The Commercial Press and the Seedlings of the Future, 
Third World Quarterly 9, 2: 642; Louw, Eric P. 1993. The Growth of Monopoly Control of the South African 
Press, in Keyan G. Tomaselli, Eric P. Louw, eds. South African Media Policy: Debates of the 1990s. Bellville: 
Anthropos: 176f.; Merrett, Christopher, Christopher Saunders. 2000. The Weekly Mail, in Les Switzer, Mo-
hamed Adhikari, eds. South Africa's Resistance Press: Alternative Voices in the Last Generation under Apart-
heid. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press: 458-486. 
16. Manoim, Irwin, ed. 1996. "You Have Been Warned": The First Ten Years of the Mail & Guardian. Lon-
don: Viking. 
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Organised Business 
In this and in the following section, we detail the profiles of the organised business entities, as 
well as of the relevant private and parastatal companies. Regarding the latter, this is defined a 
firm "at least 50 per cent owned by the state". I. ' Before proceeding, however, a few general 
remarks are necessary concerning the relationship between the business sector and the gov-
ernment. While we have already vitiated the argument that South Africa' s Africa policy was 
the expression of the country's political economy (Chapter I), we now need to discuss two 
other issues of significance in this study, namely the relationship between business and apart-
heid politics, as well as the division between Afrikaner and English-speaking business. They 
are important issues in this study and help us to analyse the role of the business sector in 
South Africa's foreign relations with black Africa. 
Business activity during the apartheid period became a matter of intense academic contro-
versy from the 1970s. 170 The central question in the debate has been whether business was 
against or supportive of the apartheid system. The significance of this issue was highlighted 
by the Carlton Conference in Johannesburg (November 1979) and the Good Hope Conference 
in Cape Town (November 1981), when Prime Minister P.W. Botha attempted to draw busi-
ness into the realm of politics and to form a new partnership.l7l On both occasions, "the list of 
names from the private sector read like a Who ' s Who of South African business".112 In a nut-
shell, the viewpoints of the two main schools of thought, the liberal and the Marxist, also re-
ferred to as revisionist, have been summarised as follows: "the revisionists emphasise the 
compatibility of apartheid with capitalism whereas the liberals view apartheid as alien to it". 173 
The domestic South African context has usually been the focus of investigation, for example 
with regard to the mining companies' influence on labour regulations. In this study, the piv-
otal question is whether business activities coincided with, maybe even furthered, Pretoria's 
foreign policy towards Africa, or whether they were in conflict with one another. In trying to 
1.9 Rutherford, Donald. 1992. Dictionary of Economics. London: Routledge: 342. 
170 See, for example, Lipton, Merle. 1986. Capitalism and Apartheid: South Africa, 1910-86. Aldershot: 
Wildwood House; Nattrass, Nicoli Jean. 1991. Controversies about Capitalism and Apartheid in South Africa: 
An Economic Perspective, Journal of Southern African Studies 17, 4: 654-677; Sampson, Anthony. 1987. Black 
and Gold: Tycoons, Revolutionaries and Apartheid. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 
171 Barber and Barratt. 1990. South Africa 'S Foreign Policy, pp.257, 287; Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy 
of Isolation, pp.161-165; Pottinger. 1988. The Imperial Presidency, p.117. 
112 Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.161. 
I7J Fine and Rustomjee. 1996. The Political Economy of South Africa, p.63. Also Dollery, Brian E. 1989. 
Capital, Labour and State: A General Equilibrium Perspective on Liberal and Revisionist Approaches to South 
African Political Economy, South African Journal of Economics 57, 2: 124-136. 
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establish an answer, we approach the matter on the basis that business-government interaction 
in South Africa cannot be generalised, and needs to be individually assessed. l74 
Regarding the second issue, the disjuncture between Afrikaner and English-speaking busi-
ness, it must generally be said that South Africa's white population could not be regarded as a 
homogeneous unit, neither in political nor in economic terms. Until the end of the 1940s, 
"government power was dominated by Afrikaner coalitions, while economic hegemony was 
held by imperial [British] capital".17S Traditionally, Afrikaner economic activity was largely 
restricted to farming, while British capital was strong in mining and in the industrial sector: 
"The Afrikaners gradually became involved in small-scale industry but not a single large fac-
tory was in Afrikaner ownership in 1930. By 1960 Afrikaners still owned only a few major 
industrial undertakings". 176 Harry Oppenheimer, long-time Chairman of the mining giant An-
glo American Corporation, personified English-speaking big capital. Notable exceptions 
among Afrikaner business were Jan S. Marais, whom we will discuss later in this chapter and 
in Chapter 4, and Anton Edward Rupert, whose Rembrandt Group, a tobacco empire, started 
in 1948, bought out Rothmans in Great Britain and was involved in other sectors of the South 
African economy.177 In geographic terms, Pretoria was associated with Afrikanerdom and po-
litical power, while Johannesburg represented economic influence by a predominantly Eng-
lish-speaking upmarket social class. 
By 1940, the Nationalist government had attempted to promote Afrikaner economic and 
social advance with the establishment of the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) that 
was to finance new industries. After the assumption of political power in 1948, the National 
Party' s initiatives intensified; state-owned industries and nationalised services were estab-
lished to give employment to the Afrikaner community. Prime examples were the state Iron 
and Steel Corporation (Is cor), the Electricity Supply Commission (Eskom), South African 
Railways, the South African Broadcasting Corporation and the state oil and gas company, 
Sasol. l78 Over time, the disjuncture between Afrikaner and English-speaking organised busi-
ness became eroded in many areas, but the latter' s stronghold in diamond and gold mining 
174 In line with, for example, Pretorius. 1994. The Head of Govemment and Organised Business, pp.209f. 
17S Singer, Paul. 2000. The Foreign Economic Policy of South Africa, in Samuel Pinheiro Guimariies, ed. 
Brazilian Views on South African Foreign Policy. Brasilia: International Relations Research Institute: 179. 
176 Jones and Muller. 1992. The South African Economy, 1910-90, p.l79. 
177 Esterhuyse, Willie Pieter. 1986. AnIOn Rupert: Advocate of Hope. Cape Town: Tafelberg; Kemp, Pieter. 
1999. Anton Edward Rupert, in They Shaped Our Century: The Most Influential South Africans of the Twentieth 
Century. Cape Town: Human and Rousseau: 50-54; Murray, Hugh. 1986. Anton Rupert, Leadership South Af 
rica 5, 4: 10ff., 14. Rupert's private collection (PY.206) is held at the ARCA. 
178 Sampson. 1987. Black and Gold, pp.129ff. 
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remained relatively untouched. l79 By the late 1970s, this process had developed to such a de-
gree that P.W. Botha attempted to co-ordinate industrial policies and integrate Afrikaner and 
English-speaking business, for example, at the 1979 Carlton Conference - symbolically held 
in Johannesburg - with representation from both camps, such as Oppenheimer and Rupert. lso 
The division between the two business groups is also mirrored in this study. Economic inter-
action between the Republic and the African countries of interest throughout the period under 
review was primarily initiated by English-speaking business. Individual Afrikaner companies 
and organised Afrikaner business did not show much interest, with the exception of a brief 
spell of activity in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
Now turning to the role of the organised business sector, four organisations playa relevant 
role in this study, namely the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (AHI), the Durban Chamber of 
Commerce, the South Africa Foundation and the South African Foreign Trade Organisation 
(SAFTO). With the exception of the South Africa Foundation, they were all engaged in the 
promotion of South African external trade. The profiles of these four actors are examined in-
dividually and in alphabetical order, again with an emphasis on the personalities involved. 
The Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut l81 was established in August 1942 with the purpose of 
"promoting the Afrikaner's economic interests and establishing the Afrikaner in the business 
world". I" It was an early expression of Pretoria's intention of challenging the dominance of 
the organised English-speaking business community. Its organisational and ideological links 
with the government and its influence on the country's economic policy were manifold: the 
Broederbond was crucial in establishing the Handelsinstituut to promote the economic inter-
ests of the Afrikaner community; after coming to power in 1948, the Nationalist government 
recognised the AHI as the official representative of Afrikaner business interests; in 1960, the 
AHI helped lay the foundations for the establishment of and was subsequently well repre-
sented on the Prime Minister's Economic Advisory Council; it was on both the government's 
Export Trade Advisory Committee and the Export Promotion Council; 183 finally, and unlike 
most private companies and business associations, the AHI chose Pretoria, and not Johannes-
179 Fine and Rustomjee. 1996. The Political Economy of South Africa, pp.149-174; O'Meara, Dan. 1983. 
Volkskapitalisme: Class, Capital and Ideology in the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism, 1934-1948. Johan-
nesburg: Ravan Press: 250; Terreblanche, Sampie, Nicoli Jean Nattrass. 1990. A Periodization of the Political 
Economy from 1910, in Nicoli Jean Nattrass, Elisabeth Ardington, eds. The Political Economy of South Africa. 
Cape Town: Oxford University Press: 14-17. 
180 Botha's speech and the list of business representatives is contained at the ARCA, PV.203, File PS 5/ 111. 
181 Literally translated: Afrikaner Commercial Institute. 
182 Kotze and Greyling. 1994. Political Organisations in South Africa, p.114. 
183 DFA, 3412, Vols. 2, 3. 
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burg, as its base. 18' Reflecting all this, the AHI made final reports of its missions available to 
the relevant government departments. For example, a report on the Angola mission in 1968 
was sent to the Departments of Commerce, Economic Affairs, Defence, Foreign Affairs and 
to the Office of the Prime Minister. In tum, government officials, such as Brand Fourie, grate-
fully acknowledged receipt of the documentation. I8l The DF A established a special file for 
correspondence with the AHI,186 something it did not do for the English-speaking counterpart, 
SAFTO. 
Similar to the process of South Africa's foreign policy formulation, a relatively small 
number of individuals were influential in the AHI and in Afrikaner business generally. The 
names of three men are significant in this context. Frederick Franyois de Wit Stockenstr6m 
dominated the AHI's activities from 1966 to 1984 as its Executive Director. In the 1970s, he 
was also a member of the Economic Advisory Council. I87 An important figure in Afrikaner as 
well as English-speaking business was Paul Kruger Hoogendyk, referred to as a "successful 
independent businessman" by the Financial Mail, South Africa's leading business maga-
zine. lss Within the AHI, he was a Board Member (1961-68), Vice-President (1969-72) and 
President (1973-74). He was also the director of the parastatals IDC, Iscor and Xhosa Devel-
opment Corporation (XDC), as well as private companies,189 SAFTO Chairman in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, a South Africa Foundation Trustee (1974-92) and, in the 1970s, a 
member of the Prime Minister's Economic Advisory Board. I90 In the sphere of politics, he 
appears to have supported many aspects of Pretoria's apartheid ideology. First, he was rela-
tively close to the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA), a product of Broeder-
bond inspiration in 1948 with obvious connections to the ruling Nationalist government. I9I 
18' On the above, see Geldenbuys. 1984. The Diplomacy 0/ Isolation, p.163; Kotz" and Greyling. 1994. Po-
litical Organisations in South A/rica, p.117; O'Meara. 1983. Volkskapitalisme, pp.143-148; Pretorius. 1994. The 
Head of Government and Organised Business, pp.214f., 243; Sadie, Yolanda A. 1991. Regerings-elite persepsies 
oor die rol van belangegroepe in openbare beleidsfonnulering in Suid-Afrika, Politikon: South African Journal 
a/Political Studies 17,2: 88f. 
185 ARCA, PV.799, File S33114/3/C(2). 
186 DFA, 34/314. 
187 Who's Who a/Southern Africa. 1985, p.492. His private collection (PV.782) is held at the ARCA. 
188 SAFTO & the State a/SA Trade. 1984. p.17. 
189 Bessemer Steel Construction, Nedbank Group, South African Breweries, South African Timber and Join-
ery Works, Volkswagen South Africa. 
190 AHl: Kongresagenda (1961-94), AHl: Jaarverslag (1961 /62-93/94); IDC: Annual Report and Accounts 
(1961-63; 1967-83), IDC: Directors ' Report and Accounts (1964-66), and IDC: Annual Report (1985-94); An-
nual Report a/the South A/rica Foundation (1961-94); Xhosa Development Corporation: Annual Report. 1973, 
p.2; Who 's Who a/Southern Africa. 1979, p.315; Who's Who a/Southern A/rica, 1989-90, p.266. 
191 On SABRA, see Lazar, John. 1993. Verwoerd versus the 'Visionaries': The South African Bureau ofRa-
cial Affairs (Sabra) and Apartheid, 1948-1962, in Philip Bonner, Peter Delius, Deborah Posel, eds. Apartheid's 
Genesis, 1935-1962. Johannesburg: Ravan Press; Witwatersrand University Press: 362-392; Posel, Deborah. 
1987. The Meaning of Apartheid before 1948: Conflicting Interests and Forces within the Afrikaner Nationalist 
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Second, from 1972 to 1977, he was Chairman of the XDC, an institution established in 1965 
as a by-product of Pretoria's homelands policy.192 The XDC aimed at promoting the economic 
development of both the Transkei and Ciskei, a view shared by SABRA; this objective was 
pursued with the purpose of making these homelands self-sufficient economic units, thereby 
preventing the need for black migrant labour to enter white South African territory.I93 The 
third man of relevance was Jan S. Marais who held various positions within the AHI and 
gradually rose from Deputy Chairman in 1961 to President during 1967/68. He was also on 
the IDC Board of Directors (1968-77), a member of the Prime Minister's Economic Advisory 
Council (1967-68) and Member of Parliament for the National Party (1977-81).194 
The AHI involved itself in export only at a relatively late stage, becoming active in the 
promotion of overseas trade towards the end of the 1960s with trade missions to Europe (Bel-
gium, France), the Far East (Hong Kong) and the Middle East (Israel, Iran). I" In Africa, the 
focus was on southern Africa. Trade delegations visited Mozambique in July 1967, Angola in 
June 1968 and Rhodesia in August 1970, 196 and in March 1970 the South Africa-Angola-
Mo<;:ambique Economic Promotion Committee was established. I97 The drive into Africa fur-
ther north was limited to Malawi, the destination of an AHI trade delegation, led by 
Hoogendyk and Stockenstrom, in August 1969 (Chapter 4). 
Regarding the Durban Chamber of Commerce, this was South Africa's largest chamber of 
commerce. According to Geoffrey Winston Tyler, the Chamber's Chief Executive from 1985 
to 1999, it was active world-wide, mounting economic missions to the United States, South 
America, Australia, Japan and Europe. I9' On the African continent, such missions were des-
patched to countries both in southern Africa and beyond from the mid-1960s through the 
1970s. In particular, Trade Missions were undertaken to Rhodesia (1969) and Angola (1970). 
Alliance, Journal of Southern African Studies 14, 1: 126. In 1974, Hoogendyk spoke to SABRA's Twenty-First 
General Congress (Opleiding van die Bantoe in die nywerheid, handel and dienste, veral in blanke gebiede. 
Pretoria: SABRA.) and in 1982, he published in SABRA's in-house magazines (Selfbeskikking vir die volke van 
Suider-Afrika ten opsigte van ontwikkeling in die nasionale state, Tydskrifvir Rasse-Aangeleenthede 33, 4: 101-
106; Geldreuse doen te min, SABRA Nuusbrief31: 3). 
192 Xhosa Development Corporation: Annual Report, 1973-1977. 
19) See Budlender, Deborah, et a!. 1976. Transkei Independence: Report of the Transkei Study Project. Jo-
hannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand, Wages and Economics Commission: 37; Horton, Stephen. 1987. 
Implementation and Plarming: The Case for Theory, Journal of Contemporary African Studies 6, 1/2: 79; Lazar. 
1993. Verwoerd versus the 'Visionaries', pp.376f.; Pose!. 1987. The Meaning of Apartheid before 1948, p.128 . 
194 AHI: Kongresagenda (1961-94); AHI: Jaarverslag (1961 /62-93/94); IDC: Annual Report and Accounts 
(1961-63; 1967-83); IDC: Directors' Report and Accounts (1964-66); IDC: Annual Report (1985-94) . Also 
Who's Who of Southern Africa, 1981, pp.442f.; Who's Who of Southern Africa, 1989-90, pp.339f. 
195 AReA, PV.799, File S33/14/3/A(I). 
196 AReA, PV.799, Files S33114/31B(1), S33/14/3/A(I). 
197 AReA, PV.799, File S33/ 14/3/A( I). 
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Further north, the emphasis was on Malawi and the western Indian Ocean islands (Chapter 
4).!99 
The Anglo American Corporation has been mentioned previously. In 1959, its Chairman, 
Harry Oppenheimer, together with Anton Rupert, established the important South Africa 
Foundation to make the interests of the organised business heard, and this must be seen 
against the background of the potential imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa 
at the time. The Foundation's main purpose, therefore, was "to sponsor visits to this country 
[South Africa 1 by important and influential businessmen and opinion makers"2°O to improve 
South Africa's image overseas so as to prevent possible such punitive measures.20! Mirroring 
the relatively little economic interaction between South Africa and the African countries of 
interest in this study, these countries did not figure prominently on the list of the Foundation's 
target areas. In line with the proposition that the Foundation's input into Pretoria's foreign 
policy making came "not so much from the Foundation as an organisation, but rather from 
prominent individuals associated with it",202 the DFA files record activities by the Founda-
tion's representatives Christian Neethling 'Chris' Barnard, Basil Edward Hersov and James 
de Lacy 'Peter' Sorour. Barnard's position as a Trustee (1970-92)203 was related to his being a 
Professor at Cape Town's Groote Schuur Hospital, becoming internationally famous by per-
forming the world's first heart transplant in 1967.204 Hersov had joined the Foundation as a 
Trustee in 1970, rising in importance thereafter,205 reflecting his positions as the Chairman and 
Managing Director of Anglovaal, a very large company involved in mining, financial and 
industrial enterprises, and chair of a number of other important firms. Hersov could therefore 
be rated as one of South Africa's most important representatives of English-speaking busi-
198 Correspondence with Geoffrey Tyler, 26 February 2002. On Tyler, see Who's Who of Southern Africa. 
1988-89, p.507. 
199 The reports of these trade missions were provided by courtesy of Sheila de Villiers from the Chamber's 
head office in Durban. 
200 Meiring. 1973. Inside Information, p.141. 
201 The following National Archives files contain evidence of that activity: MNL, INIOI I , 2; MNL, INL22, 
7417; MNL, INL261l, 76; INL, 161l /2/A, Vols. 112/26, 112127/2, 112/27/3. Also Fine and Rustomjee. 1996. The 
Political Economy of South Africa, p.153; Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, pp.30, 175f.; Munger. 
1965. Notes on the Formation of South African Foreign Policy, pp.56f.; Sampson. 1987. Black and Gold, p.119; 
<http://www.safoundation.org.za>. 
202 Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.176. 
203 See the relevant Annual Report of the South Africa Foundation. 
204 Hudson, Marl. 1999. Christian Neethling Barnard, in They Shaped Our Century: The Most Influential 
South Africans of the Twentieth Century. Cape Town: Human and Rousseau: 27-31. 
205 Trustee (1970-73), Member of the Council (1973-1976), Deputy President (1976-77), President (1977-
79), and Honorary President (1979-96). Information provided by courtesy of Rose Fitzpatrick, South Africa 
Foundation, January 2002. 
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ness, second only to Harry Oppenheimer of Anglo American. Z06 Peter Sorour, finally, had no 
positions of specific importance, therefore only holding more administrative Foundation 
posts.Z01 Probably the most important South Africa Foundation Trustee was Harry Oppen-
heimer (1970-92), but it was not in this position that he played a role within South Africa's 
foreign relations with African countries. His company, Anglo American, was much more 
powerful than the Foundation; it was therefore more effective for him to use the lever of his 
company to achieve political ends, such as we will illustrate in Chapter 4. 
Established in 1963, more than two decades after the AHI, the South African Foreign 
Trade Organisation was engaged solely in the promotion of external trade and composed al-
most exclusively of English-speaking companies. In July 1995, SAFTO was integrated into 
the parastatal IDC. 20S In 1984, Willem Bernard 'Wim' Holtes, SAFTO's Chief Executive from 
1963 to 1992,209 described SAFTO's raison d 'etre: 
We have always seen our role as making the SA businessman more aware of his export 
potential and the need for him to become more internationally orientated in his outlook. 
The rest of the world is a large, untapped market and he should be looking to establish his 
place there. There are many reasons for this. There is the national need, of course, but 
there are also very real, straightforward business reasons why we should expand into 
world markets.2I o 
To live up to this mission, SAFTO provided its membership, which increased from 130 com-
panies in 1963 to peak at 1,443 in 1987/88,211 with an information database and a number of 
export focused publications.'" Other services rendered were the provision of SAFTO execu-
tives for specific assignments such as market surveys, the organisation of export marketing, 
and the running of export seminars and workshops. At a later stage, in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, so-called special "area services" or "business groups" with a geographical focus 
were established.2Il 
Z06 Who's Who of Southern Africa, 1990-91, pp.260, 262; Sampson. 1987. Black and Gold, pp.91, lIS; 
<http://www.mbendi.co.zalvpsabeh.htm>. 
Z07 Membership Campaign Manager (1962-65); Deputy Director (1966-67); Financial Director (1968-72); 
Director General (1973-87). Information provided by courtesy of Rose Fitzpatrick, South Africa Foundation, 
January 2002. See also Who's Who of Southern Africa. 1983, p.599. 
Z08 SAFTO: Annual Report. 1994/95, p.3. 
209 '30 Years of Exports: Wim Holtes Reflects ', SAFTO Exporter 29, 4, April 1992: 1. 
210 SAFTO & the State of SA Trade. 1984. p.9. 
211 SAFTO & the State of SA Trade. 1984. p.ll; SAFTO: Annual Report. 1987/88, p.2. 
'" SAITO publications: the annual South African Exporters ' Directory, Export Practice Handbook, Export 
Marketing Handbook, and the monthly magazine SAFTO Exporter. See SAFTO & the State of SA Trade. 1984. 
p.11. 
ZI3 SAFTO & the State of SA Trade. 1984. p.9; several SAFTO: Annual Report; interview with Wim Holtes, 
3 I March 1999. 
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SAFTO's relations with the government must be differentiated, depending on the time 
period, and the personality factor once again played an important role. In contrast to the Afri-
kaanse Handelsinstituut, SAFTO was based in Johannesburg, and not in Pretoria. Yet, it was 
also represented on the government's Export Trade Advisory Committee and the Export Pro-
motion Council.2L4 In addition, and although nominally a private sector organisation, it re-
ceived financial support from the government, accounting for 18% of SAFTO's revenue in 
the early days, decreasing to 12% by the early 1980s.215 However, the board of directors was 
composed of representatives from private business only.2I6 Then again, in 1963, SAFTO de-
clared, in what could be called its White Paper: "It will be an important part of SAFTO's 
work to maintain close liaison with the Government, official export trade services, national 
bodies such as ( ... ) [Afrikaanse] Handelsinstituut, as well as organised mining and agriculture, 
which are actively interested in the economic development of South Africa."217 Interaction 
between SAFTO and the government also took place on an official level. For example, we 
know that the Minister of Mines and Planning (1964-67) and of Economic Affairs (1967-70), 
Jan Friedrich Wilhelm Haak, addressed SAFTO in 1965 and 1968.218 On a personal level, dur-
ing his Chairmanship from 1981/82 to 1985/86, Paul Hoogendyk established a particularly 
close liaison between SAFTO and the government,219 which seems to have caused some fric-
tion with those running SAFTO on a day-to-day basis. Thus, speaking about Hoogendyk, 
former Chief Executive Holtes commented somewhat disparagingly that he "was a great sup-
porter of government, that's for sure".220 Talking about the relationship between the foreign 
affairs ministry and SAFTO in the late 1980s, Paul Runge, who had worked for both of them 
during the 1980s, explained in 1999: "The relation between SAFTO and Foreign Affairs was 
a particularly good one. There was a lot of interaction. ( ... ) It was a quite natural thing to 
move from the Department of Foreign Affairs into SAFTO. It was all very well received". '" 
2'4 DFA, 3412, Vols. 2, 3. 
215 Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of/solation, pp.163f.; SAFTO & the State of SA Trade. 1984. pp.16f. 
216 Interview with Wim Holtes, 31 March 1999. 
217 'Policy and Initial Operations Plan', 1963, pp.lf. (ARC A, PV.799, File S33/ 14/1312(1)). The need for co-
operation with the AHI and the government are emphasised in SAFTO Annual Report, 1967168, p.5; 1968/69, 
p.4; 1970171 , p.4; 1976177, p.6; 1977178, p.6; 1984185, p.5; 1986187, p.5; 1987188, pp.6f. 
218 Address Delivered at the 2nd Annual General Meeting of the South African Foreign Trade Organisation, 
November 10th, 1965 (ARCA, PV.118, File 3/2/6); Address Delivered at the Banquet to Commemorate the 5th 
Anniversary ofSAFTO, Johannesburg, 29th August 1968 (ARCA, PV.118, File 31219). 
219 SAFTO & the State of SA Trade. 1984. p.17. Hoogendyk was also member of SAFTO's Board of Direc-
tors (1969170-76177, 1986/87-89/90) and its Vice-Chairman (1977178-80/81). See SAFTO: Annual Report for the 
years 1967/68-94/95 . 
220 Interview with Wim Holtes, 31 March 1999. 
22 1 Interview with Paul Runge, 7 April 1999. Also SAFTO: Annual Report, 1987188, p.6. 
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By promoting South Africa's export industry, SAFTO inevitably supported the policy 
goals of the South African government in Africa. Only a fine line existed between rejecting 
apartheid whilst, simultaneously, pursuing export promotion that was in line with the policies 
of the government that maintained this very system. Asked about this inherent dilemma in his 
work, Holtes commented in 1999: "We did a lot of things which perhaps should not be done 
by a trade organisation, but our attitude was always in the broad support of trade ( ... ). And if 
we could help any of these companies to find a market ( ... ), we did it. ( ... ) [business] is sup-
portive of anything that ensures stability". Holtes further agreed that while there were 
"clashes" of interest, business and politics also went "hand in hand", depending on the period 
and area under consideration. Regarding the former, he made particular reference to the mili-
tary's involvement in Angola and Mozambique as being "counterproductive to business inter-
ests", as South Africa's involvement in the war there hampered economic interaction with 
these countries of potential interest given their mineral and other resources.'" 
Concerning SAFTO's activities in black Africa beyond southern Africa, a harmonious 
picture prevailed. In terms of export promotion in those countries, SAFTO gained much more 
significance than its Afrikaner counterpart, while a reading of SAFTO's annual reports and its 
monthly SAFTO Exporter magazine reveals that they only became an area of intense interest 
from the mid-1980s. Until a decade earlier, SAFTO's principal focus was on South America, 
Europe, the Middle and Far East. In Africa, and like its counterparts, southern Africa was 
given preference in the second half of the 1960s, with Angola being considered to hold great 
potential because of its oil reserves and other resources.'" Outside this area, it restrained itself 
to the not too far distant countries, namely Malawi and the western Indian Ocean islands. At a 
meeting of the Export Promotion Council's Sub-Committee for Africa in early 1969, SAFTO 
Managing Director, James J. Williams, explained: "South Africa should in the first instance 
concentrate on the development of trade with those countries which were favourably situated 
from a geographical point of view".224 Trade opportunities further north were acknowledged 
prior to the early 1980s, but caution was advised: 
222 Interview with Wim Holtes, 31 March 1999. Also his interview in SAFTO & the Slate of SA Trade. 1984. 
p.9. 
223 'Angola Floating Exhibition' (10-27 May 1969) on a ship that sailed from Durban to Luanda (ARCA, 
PV.799, File S33/14/3/C(2); SAFTO Newsletter 5, I, January 1969); ' Angola: Explosion on Our Doorstep. An 
Export Seminar', 3 December 1969, Johannesburg (ARCA, PV.799, File S33/14/13/2(2)); 'Angola: Rich, Natu-
ral Market on South Africa 's Doorstep' , SAFTO Exporter 5, 9, September 1968: 1, 3ff. 
224 ' Afrika Subkomitee', Annexure 3(C), from the Department of Commerce, 16 May 1969, p.4 (DFA, 34/2, 
Vol. 4). 
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Annual Report, 1974175: As far as Africa is concerned, I would warn exporters not to ex-
pect moves towards detente in Africa in themselves to bring about a sudden and mean-
ingful increase in trade between South Africa and the rest of the continent.225 
Annual Report, 1980181: Economic and financial factors place strict limits on the import 
capacity of most African states.226 
Parastatal and Private Companies 
60 
Given South Africa's economic strength and technological expertise, one of Pretoria's bar-
gaining chips used to achieve its ambitions was the provision of technical assistance and capi-
tal goods to establish a wide range of projects beneficial to individual countries. While the 
projects in the engineering, hotel, housing, mining and transport sectors could be considered 
as South African development aid to the continent, this assistance was not provided without 
self-interest. Compared with technical assistance, they were financed and executed by one 
South African parastatal and several private enterprises with a primary interest in economic 
profit from these investments. In this context, it is important to examine which private com-
panies were involved in these development/investment projects, as they reveal the nature of 
the government's relationship with the business community in furthering its interests beyond 
southern Africa. This section provides relevant background information on both the parastatai 
and the principal private companies involved, beginning with the former and presenting the 
latter in alphabetical order, with no indication of their importance. Due to the restrictions re-
garding access to archives of 'private bodies' , most likely imposed for fear of evidence about 
corporate complicity in apartheid coming to the fore, this is based on freely available annual 
reports and other in-house publications of these companies, as well as on secondary literature. 
Interviews or correspondence with informed people in the relevant companies could be con-
ducted in only a few cases, due to staff turnover, death of the incumbent or because the com-
pany had ceased to exist. The overview presented will assist in the clarification, in Chapter 7, 
of the two issues elaborated upon at the beginning of the previous section, namely the rela-
tionship between government and business and the division between Afrikaner and English-
speaking business. 
The parastatal Industrial Development Corporation was established in 1940 as Pretoria's 
early attempt to support Afrikaner economic activity, leading Anthony Sampson to refer to it 
225 SAFTO: Annual Report, 1974175, p.3. 
226 SAFTO: Annual Report, 1980181, p.ll. Also SAFTO: Annual Report, 1976177, p.5 ; 1977/78, p.5; 1978179, 
p.IO; 1979180, p.2. 
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as a "bulwark against the Anglo-American Corporation" .'" Constituted in terms of the Indus-
trial Development Act (No 22 of 1940), its general objective was defined as: 
to promote industrial development, by assisting the private sector in the financing of new 
industries or schemes for the expansion or rationalisation of industries, by initiating de-
velopment projects preferably in partnership with either local or overseas interests ( ... ), 
and by establishing new industrial undertakings, if so directed by the Government ."8 
In 1960, in a move away from merely promoting new industries with the purpose of import 
substitution, the IDC launched an Export Finance Scheme to finance the export of South Afri-
can capital goods and services.229 Its main facility to this effect was, and still is, the provision 
of credits for periods from two to ten years at attractive interest rates, contingent on export 
credit insurance cover from South Africa's Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation.230 Ac-
cording to its own presentation, the IDC "operates on normal commercial considerations", but 
although its Directors came, and still come, from the private sector, they were nonetheless 
government-appointed.'" This inevitably impacted on its business practice, as will be shown 
in case studies in this thesis . The personality factor again played an important role, with the 
names of IDC Managing Directors and Chairmen throughout the period under review reveal-
ing the influence of Afrikanerdom on this parastatal. Paul Hoogendyk and Jan S. Marais, 
members of the Board of Directors from 1958 to 1968 and from 1968 to 1977 respectively, 
deserve special mention.232 They were well-established Afrikaner businessmen, involved in 
the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut and ideologically close to Pretoria's apartheid policies. Also 
of note is Petrus Solomon 'Piet' Rautenbach, Manager of the IDC textiles section from 1967 
to 1974, Director of the parastatal Xhosa Development Corporation in 1971 and Prime Minis-
'" Sampson. 1987. Black and Gold, p.82. 
228 IDC: Annual Report, 1980, p.2. See Clark, Nancy L. 1994. Manufacturing Apartheid: State Corporations 
in South Africa. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press: 108, l30ff., 160, 208 (note 80); Fine and Rustomjee. 
1996. The Political Economy of South Africa, pp.159, 179; Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa 
Ltd. 1992. The Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd, in Hans B. Falkena, W.J. Kok, Ernest 
John van der Merwe, eds. Financial Institutions. Halfway House: Southern Book Publishers: 150; Rosenthal, 
Eric. 1960. Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Limited, 1940-1960: The Story of the First 
Twenty Years. Johannesburg: Industrial Development Corporation; <http://www.idc.co.za>. 
229 Clark. 1994. Manufacturing Apartheid, p.166. 
230 IDC of South Africa Ltd. 1992. The Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd, p.151; Ex-
port Finance: Financing Support for Exporters of Capital Goods and Services. 1998. Johannesburg: Industrial 
Development Corporation: 2f.; A Kaleidoscope of Facilities: Focusing on Industrial Development. 1998. Johan-
nesburg: Industrial Development Corporation: 3. 
231 IDC of South Africa Ltd. 1992. The Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd, p.152. 
232 IDC: Annual Report and Accounts, 1961-63; 1967-77; IDC: Directors' Report and Accounts, 1964-66. 
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ter Vorster's Planning Adviser during 1969.233 In the latter capacity he was involved in estab-
lishing contact with both Madagascar and Malawi (Chapter 4). 
In terms of financing the export of capital goods to African countries, the IDC was "very 
active", according to SAFTO's Holtes.234 In the 1960s and early 1970s, it appears that the 
IDC's engagement outside South Africa focused on the immediate neighbourhood, for exam-
ple with the financing of two massive South African projects with major political implica-
tions, namely the Cahora Bassa Hydroelectric Scheme in Mozambique and the Cunene River 
Dam on the Angola-Namibia border.'" 
Among the private companies of significance in this study, the Anglo American Corpora-
tion, commonly known as Anglo American, was undoubtedly the largest, the most powerful 
and influential. It has been mentioned as the financial backer of the Progressive Party and as 
one of the two founding organisations of the South Africa Foundation, and its long-term 
Chairman, Harry Oppenheimer, has been referred to as the personification of English-
speaking capital in South Africa. This represents only a minor portion of Anglo American's 
many activities and different facets. Industrial sociologist Duncan Innes aptly described its 
overall significance in the South African context as follows: 
the Anglo American Group of companies is a maj or force in the economic, political and 
social life in South Africa. In virtually every major sphere of mining, financial and indus-
trial activity in the country the name of Anglo crops up either as the dominant authority, 
such as in gold and diamond mining, or at least as an important influence. Overall, the 
consolidated valued of the Group's investments makes it easily the largest single com-
pany in the country.236 
Founded in 1917 by Ernest Oppenheimer, Anglo American soon expanded its diamond and 
mining activities throughout southern Africa. Over time, it developed into South Africa's 
leading private enterprise with world-wide financial connections. It is a typical example of a 
Multinational Company (MNC), "privately owned business enterprises organised in one soci-
ety with activities in another growing out of direct investment" that, in order to secure their 
233 See Rautenbach, Petrus Solomon 'Piet'. 1970. Industrial Decentralisation in South Africa. Paper deliv-
ered at the SAIRR Fortieth Annual Council Meeting, Cape Town, 27-30 January. Johannesburg: South African 
Institute of Race Relations. 
234 Interview with Wim Holtes, 31 March 1999. 
'" Middlemas, Keith. 1975. Cabora Bassa: Engineering and Politics in Southern Africa. London: Wei-
denfeld and Nicolson; Ollivier, Claire. 1988. La colosse para1ysee, Politique africaine 29: 51-57; Mitchell, M. 
Paul. 1976. The Politics of Water: The Significance of Dams and River Valley Development Projects in the Po-
litical and Economic History of Southern Africa, with Particular Reference to the Cunene River Schemes. BPhil, 
University of York, Heslington; Meinardus. 1980. Die Afrikapolitik der Republik Siidafrika, pp.351 ff. 
236 Innes, Duncan. 1984. Anglo American and the Rise of Modern South Africa. Johannesburg: Ravan Press: 
13 . 
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investments, "have an interest in both economic and political stability".'" On the African con-
tinent, its investment was concentrated in southern Africa, but it also had a stake in several 
countries further north. By the mid-I 970s, Anglo American was said to own more than half of 
the shares traded on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and to control a network of more than 
one hundred and fifty different holding and operating companies. The most important of these 
was De Beers Consolidated Mines, the leading global diamond producer. This aside, Anglo 
American held top positions in all of South Africa's economic sectors - mining, manufactur-
ing, industry, property management, finance, life assurance, short-term insurance - except 
agriculture. In the period under review, the Oppenheimer family controlled Anglo American 
through a highly complicated labyrinth of cross-holdings in the persons of Chairmen Ernest 
Oppenheimer (1917-57), his son Harry (1957-82), Gavin Reily (1983-90), Julian Ogilvie 
Thompson (1990-2002) and currently Tony Trahar.238 
Besides being the "octogenarian patriarch of South African business",'" Harry Oppen-
heimer was active in South African domestic politics. Immediately after World War II, he was 
a Member of Parliament for the United Party - the then opposition to the ruling National 
Party - while during the second half of the 1950s, he became the financier of the opposing 
Progressive Party. Significantly, he was the first and only businessman whom Nelson Man-
dela wanted to meet before his imprisonment in 1962.'40 Interviewed in 1999, Anglo Ameri-
can Executive Director, Michael Spicer, spoke of "overt hostility" between the multinational 
company and the government in the 1960s, mentioning that Harry Oppenheimer was not ac-
corded a meeting with the Prime Minister outside of Parliament until 1981.241 In spite of this, 
we agree with the suggestion in the secondary literature that "there can scarcely be constant 
war between Anglo American and the government. Their economic embrace may be devoid 
of love, but is nonetheless muscular".242 In the mid-1970s, for example, Harry Oppenheimer 
openly supported Pretoria's Detente policy in southern Africa,243 and at the Carlton Confer-
'" Vincent, Louise. 1999. Non-State Actors in International Relations, in Philip Nel, Patrick Jude McGowan, 
eds. Power, Wealth and Global Order: An International Relations Textbook for Africa. Cape Town: University 
of Cape Town Press: 128. 
238 The Giants: Who Owns Them, Who They Own . 1991. Johannesburg: Financial Mail: 6, 12, 41; Fine and 
Rustomjee. 1996. The Political Economy of South Africa, pp.IO, 143; Innes. 1984. Anglo American and the Rise 
of Modern South Africa, pp.204, 221 , 229, 231 f. , 234, 274; Sampson. 1987. Black and Gold, pp.30, 251. 
239 Waldmeir. 1997. Anatomy of a Miracle, p.29. 
240 Sampson. 1999. Mandela, p.141. Also Harry Oppenheimer's interview in Starcke. 1978. Survival, pp.148-
159. 
241 Interview with Michael Spicer, 7 April 1999. 
242 Munger. 1965. Notes on the Formation of South African Foreign Policy, p.62. 
243 'Oppenheimer on benefits of detente ' , Argus 15 May 1975 (ARCA, PV.59, File 43/311 ); 'Detente a boon 
[sic] - Oppenheimer', The Star IS May 1975 (ARCA, PV.451, File 1/90/ 112). Also Legum, Colin. 1976. Vor-
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ence in 1979 he spoke of "the beginning of a new relationship between the state and private 
business in South Africa" .244 In view of this uneasy relationship between Anglo American and 
the government in domestic and regional politics, it will be particularly interesting to observe 
how the company's leadership interacted with Pretoria in the other parts of Africa. 
The privately-owned and non-registered company Bessemer Steel Construction was estab-
lished by Afrikaner businessman Paul Hoogendyk, whom we have met before, in 1952, pri-
marily to serve the agricultural industry. Since then, its main activity has been "the design, 
manufacture and the erection of steel silos for the storage of bulk grain".'" The South African 
homelands, southern Africa and the United States were the main markets,"6 while minor ac-
tivity also took place in black African countries further afield. 
The engineering company Brian Colquhoun Hugh 0 'Donnell and Partners was estab-
lished in Rhodesia in 1948 as a regional practice of Brian Colquhoun and Partners, Consulting 
Engineers, London, with the primary objective of providing a comprehensive consultancy 
service for building and civil engineering projects in Africa. It provided expertise in housing, 
hotels, airports, mining, bridges, railways and other projects. Its core area of interest in Africa 
was in southern Africa, with offices in Botswana, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zim-
babwe. 2" 
In 1956, South Africa's leading banks, insurers and financial institutions established the 
Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation. This took place in response to a discussion held 
during the I 950s, a forerunner to the export debate during the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
whereby there was a "growing feeling among South African exporters [that they] were at a 
definite competitive disadvantage, because they didn't feel secure in offering long-term credit 
facilities".'" In the sphere of external business, Credit Guarantee's objective was the provi-
sion of insurance for the export of capital goods as distinct from commodity exports, namely 
cover against the risk of non-payment by a foreign buyer. Designed to promote South Africa's 
sler's Gamble/or A/rica: How Ihe Search/or Peace Failed. London: Rex Collings: 22; Meinardus. 1980. Die 
A/rikapolilik der Republik Suda/rika, pp.366-369. 
"4 The Star 22 November 1979, cited in Shelton. 1986. Theoretical Perspectives on South African Foreign 
Policy Making, p.l1. 
245 <http://www.bessemer.co.za>. 
246 'Bessemer Steel Construction Penetrates Export Market', SAFTO Exporler 24,7, July 1987: 1. 
"7 'Profile of the Firm of BCHOD Consulting Engineers (Brian Colquhoun Hugh O'Donnell and Partners)" 
dated September 200 1. This and the following unpublished documents were provided by courtesy of Tim Ash-
ford from the company's South Africa office in Johannesburg: ' Statement of Experience in Building Projects', 
'Statement of Experience in Housing and Township Projects', 'Statement of Experience for the Associated Infra-
structure in the Mining and Processing Sector', ' Statement of Experience in Project Management", 'Statement of 
Experience in Major Road Work Projects' , 'Statement of Experience in Water and Waste Water Engineering 
Projects'. Also <http://users.iafrica.comlbibcibchodjhb/profile.htrn>. 
'" SAFTO & the State a/Trade. 1984. p.43. 
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export trade, any contract submitted for consideration to Credit Guarantee had to have at least 
a 70% local content, that is contract value, spent on South African goods and services. In 
1957, Pretoria passed the Export Credit Insurance Act (No 78) and, in June 1958, entered into 
a long-term contract with Credit Guarantee. According to this agreement, the South African 
government provided the firm with reinsurance cover, particularly in the case of political risks 
that could not normally be covered by the South African private insurance market.'" In Af-
rica, and as we shall see in later chapters, it was common practice for the IDC to finance a 
long-term contract and act as an "export bank", whilst Credit Guarantee acted as insurer.2So 
Over the years, Credit Guarantee became an important financial institution, growing from 
thirty-eight employees and an insured value of 212 million Rand in 1966 to 372 employees 
and an insured value of 18.5 billion Rand in 1991.251 African countries beyond southern Af-
rica did not feature prominently in terms of geographical distribution of insurance cover for 
the export of capital goods. In correspondence with Credit Guarantee Managing Director 
Christoph Theodor Lutz Leisewitz in 1999, he refers to the business involving these countries 
as being "of minor importance".'" This finds confirmation in a 1991 Financial Mail corporate 
report that presents the following picture of business activities according to geographic area: 
Italy 35%, Netherlands 14%, Belgium and Germany 13% each, Great Britain 8%, rest of 
Europe 6%, southern Africa 5%, rest of the world 6%.''' 
Regarding the company's relationship with the government, a look at the personalities 
involved is once again useful in understanding its significance within the context of Pretoria's 
foreign relations of interest to us. Klaus Oppenheimer was Credit Guarantee's General Man-
ager from 1956 to 1965, the company's representative on the government's Export Trade Ad-
visory Committee and the Export Promotion Council,2S4 and he co-authored a book on the 
firm's early history.'" A relatively close link to Pretoria can be attributed to Johannes Jeremia 
' Jan' Bouwer, who held various positions since 1959, eventually becoming Managing Direc-
tor (1982-88). Prior to that, from 1952 to 1959, he worked for Pretoria's Department of 
249 Export Project Insurance. c1998. Johannesburg: Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation: 2f., 5f., 9, 11 , 
13f. Also Credit Guarantee: A Corporate Report. 1991. Johannesburg: Financial Mail: 3f., 7, 27, 45 ; 
<http://www.creditguarantee.co.za>. 
250 Interview with Wim Holtes, 31 March 1999; Meinardus. 1980. Die Afrikapolitik der Republik Siidafrika, 
pp.351-355. 
2Sl Credit Guarantee. 1991. p.3. 
", Correspondence with Christoph Leisewitz, 27 May 1999. 
253 Credit Guarantee. 1991. p.7. 
254 DFA, 34/2, Vols. 2, 3. 
'" Oppenheimer, Klaus, Stoffel Mynhardt. 1996. Make the World Your Market: An Account of the Early His-
tory of Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation of Africa Limited, 1956-1965. Randburg: Credit Guarantee 
Insurance Corporation. 
I 
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Commerce and Industries. At a later stage, he was on SAFTO's Board of Directors (1974-88) 
and became its Vice-Chairman (1987-88).256 This flirtation with English-speaking organised 
business notwithstanding, Wim Holtes described Bouwer as a "firm Afrikaner"'" and it is 
therefore no surprise to see his name among the list of participants at the Carlton Conference 
in 1979.258 Furthermore, in 1989, President P.W. Botha awarded him with the Order for Meri-
torious Services.25' Lastly, mention must be made of German-born Christoph Leisewitz, who 
does not seem to have had any particular connection with the government, but who was a 
driving force in Credit Guarantee's activities in black Africa beyond southern Africa. He 
joined the firm in 1965 as a Trainee and worked his way up to Senior General Manager 
(1982-86), Executive Director (1986-88) and finally Managing Director, a position he held 
until February 2002. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, underlining his significance, he was 
also on SAFTO's Board of Directors.260 
The construction company LTA came into existence in 1965 as a result of the merger of 
four companies within the building, contracting and civil engineering sectors, namely Lewis 
Construction, Janes Thompson, Steeledale Reinforcing and Trading Company and Anglo 
American Corporation Construction. Anglo American's dominant influence over L TA was a 
constant factor in the company's financial structure. It held a direct 28% share in LTA, with 
an indirect participation of 35% through the Anglo American Industrial Corporation.'61 On a 
personal level, Zacharias Johannes 'Zach' de Beer was LTA Chairman (1975-88), while con-
currently on Anglo American's Board of Directors (1982_88).262 De Beer was also actively 
involved in politics as a Member of Parliament for the Progressive Federal Party (1977-80) 
and a key player in the formation of the Democratic Party that succeeded the PFP in 1989.263 
Anglo American's stronghold on LTA only came to an end in July 2000, when the company 
was acquired by the construction group Aveng in a transaction valued at over 1.3 billion 
256 Who 's Who 0/ Southern Aji-ica, 1979, p.133; Oppenheimer and Mynhardt. 1996. Make the World Your 
Market, pp.45ff.; relevant SAFTO annual reports. Also Bouwer, Johannes Jeremia ' Jan '. 1988. Trade Credit and 
Trade Credit Insurance, in Gerhard Max Erich Leistner, Pieter Esterhuysen, eds. South Africa in Southern A/rica: 
Economic Interaction. Pretoria: Africa Institute 0/ South A/rica: 90-103 . 
'" Interview with Wim Holtes, 31 March 1999. 
258 ARCA, PV.203, File PS 5/ 1/1. 
2S' Oppenheimer and Mynhardt. 1996. Make the World Your Market, pp.46f. 
260 Correspondence with Christoph Leisewitz, 27 May 1999; Who's Who 0/ Southern A/rica, 1999, p.273; 
SAFTO: Annual Report for the years 1989/90-94/95. 
261 Innes. 1984. Anglo American and the Rise 0/ Modern South Africa, p.204; Anglo American Corporation: 
Annual Report, 1965-94; LTA Limited: Centenary Review, 1889-1989. 1989. Jobannesburg: LTA Limited: 1,19; 
LTA Limited: Annual Report, 1965/66-94. 
262 LTA Limited. 1989. pp.19f., 25; Anglo American Corporation: Annual Report, 1982-88. 
263 Gastrow. 1992. Who's Who in South A/rican Politics, pp.47ff; Harber and Ludmann. 1994. A-Z a/South 
A/rican Politics, p.23. 
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Rand.'" Together with Murray & Roberts, LTA dominated, and still dominates, South Af-
rica's construction sector. It has been involved in some of the key infrastructure installations 
in South and southern Africa, namely the Orange Fish River Tunnel, the Carlton Centre in 
Johannesburg and the international concourse of the city's then Jan Smuts Airport,'65 the 
Groote Schuur Hospital in and the Koeberg nuclear power station near Cape Town, as well as 
the Cahora Bassa Hydroelectric Scheme in Mozambique.'66 The last two projects, in particu-
lar, entailed great hitting power and were of importance within South Africa's foreign policy. 
Roberts Construction was part of the civil engineering and building construction firm 
Murray & Roberts, the other principal company in that field besides LT A. Murray & Roberts 
came into being in 1967, result from the merger between Murray & Stewart, founded in Cape 
Town in 1902, and Roberts Construction, established in Johannesburg in 1934. Murray & 
Roberts subsequently acted as an umbrella organisation and grew in terms of financial assets 
and number. Following a gentleman's agreement between owners Douglas Murray and Doug-
las Roberts at the time of the merger, Murray & Roberts concentrated on the Cape Province 
and Namibia, while Roberts Construction serviced South Africa's three remaining prov-
inces.'61 As a result of that arrangement, only Roberts Construction was active in black Africa. 
Its interest in this area was significant throughout the period under review, exemplified by the 
1991Annual Report: "Murray & Roberts' heart is in Africa".'68 The ties to the DFA were par-
ticularly close. According to Paul Runge, "there was a lot of interaction. I WOUld, at Foreign 
Affairs, receive Murray & Roberts and people like thaC,'·' indicating that they had the ear of 
this department and that there was an attempt to co-ordinate activities in the relevant African 
countries. This close interaction was most probably brought about by the personality factor, as 
is so often seen in this study. Greek-born Stephen Alexander Boyazoglou held various posi-
tions within Murray & Roberts from 1954 to 1979, most importantly that of Deputy Manag-
ing Director since 1970.'70 Significantly for this study, he was the cousin of Jan George Boya-
zoglou, the Agricultural Counsellor at the South African Embassy in Paris from 1969 to 1985 
'64 Business Day II July 2000; <http://www.lta.co.za>. 
265 Now known as the Jobannesburg International Airport. 
266 Innes. 1984. Anglo American and the Rise of Modern South Africa, p.204; LTA Limited. 1989. pp.20ff., 
24f. 
" 7 Murray & Roberts: People & Performers. 1976. Johannesburg: Financial Mail: 19, 21 , 23 ; ' Murray & 
Roberts: Constructing a Success' , Financial Mail 27 July 1984; Murray & Roberts: Annual Report, 1968-90; 
<http://www.murrob.com>. 
' 68 Cited in Ryan, Ciaran. 1991. Trade Roots, Leadership South Africa 10, 5: 57. Also 'Murray & Roberts op-
timistic about Africa', Business Day 7 October 1992. 
269 Interview with Paul Runge, 7 April 1999. 
270 Who 's Who of Southern Africa, 1979, p.133 . Also his interview in Murray & Roberts. 1976. p.70; Murray 
& Roberts: Annual Report, 1968-79. 
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who made a "positively brilliant" contribution, as described by former Ambassador Donald 
Sole.271 In this capacity, Jan Boyazoglou was closely involved in an important technical assis-
tance project in Gabon, and it cannot be a coincidence that Roberts Construction was particu-
larly active in Gabon and other Francophone African countries. In 1976, Murray & Roberts' 
Managing Director John Edgar Dale 'Bill' Bramwell openly declared: "we are also doing a 
fair amount of work in what used to be called French Africa. The only country I dare mention 
here is the Ivory Coast but we are working in others too. We think this whole area has great 
prospects for us". 272 
The company profile of Sa/air has aptly been summarised as "an airline with strong gov-
ernmental connection [and it] is one of the world's busiest all-cargo fleets and an essential 
link in South Africa's "Africa connection", the semi-secret ( ... ) trade with ( ... ) black African 
nations".'" The company came into existence in 1969/70 as a wholly owned subsidiary of the 
South African Marine Corporation (Safrnarine), South Africa's national shipping line, the 
foundation for which was laid in 1946. Safrnarine had been established by Anglo American' s 
Ernest Oppenheimer and the parastatal companies IDC, Eskom and Iscor, in recognition of 
the need for a South African ocean freight company. By 1951, Anglo American disposed of 
its shareholding and Safmarine fell into the hands of US interests until 1959, when South Af-
rica had the opportunity to take over. Given the magnitude of a deal involving several million 
Rand, the IDC proved to be the only financially viable buyer and Safrnarine remained in 
South African hands in the period under review.'" Despite the IDC' s involvement in the pur-
chase of Safrnarine from American business interests, Safrnarine remained a public company 
listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. In 1984, it merged with the tourism company 
Rennies Holdings to form the Safren holding. Other companies in the leisure business, such as 
Sun International, also became part of the Safren group.'" The IDC subsequently withdrew 
from Safrnarine.276 
271 Sole. 1989. "This Above All", p.314. See Appendix A for his biography, while his full CV is in DFA, 
11178/3, Vol. 5. Aliki Boyazoglou (Johannesburg) provided the information on Stephen Alexander and Jan 
Boyazoglou' s relat ionship during a telephone interview on 21 April 1999. 
272 Murray & Roberts. 1976. p.48. 
273 Africa Research Bulletin: Economic. Financial and Technical Series 16, 3, 15 March-14 April 1979: 
5048. 
274 Clark. 1994. Manufacturing Apartheid, p.149; Safmarine: 30 Years of Service. 1976. Johannesburg: 
Thomson Publishers: 18-21; Stuttaford, Michael. 1986. Safmarine. 1946-1986. Cape Town: Bowford Publica-
tions; <http://mysaf.safmarine.com>. 
'" Ingpen, Brian Desmond, Willie Ie Roux. 1996. Safmarine 50, 1946-1996. Vlaeberg, Cape Town: Fern-
wood Press: 159; Safren: Annual Rapport, 1996, inside cover, p.4; Safren: Corporale Report. 1991. Johannes-
burg: Financial Mail; The Giants. 1991. p.30. 
276 Interview with Pieter van Aswegen, 2 November 200 I. 
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Safmarine's interests in the airline companies Air Cape, Namib Air, Trek Airways, Luxa-
via and Aviation Technical and Terminal Services were co-ordinated and rationalised by Sa-
fair. Significantly, and an early indication of the nature of Safair's links with Pretoria, Luxa-
via flew from Johannesburg to Luxembourg. Although a South African-financed firm, Luxa-
via's registration in Luxembourg allowed it to fly directly to the heart of Europe across the 
African continent.277 It thus undercut the air sanctions imposed against the national airline 
South African Airways (SAA) that resulted in enormous costs for the South African govern-
ment. Pretoria's activities in obtaining both landing and overflying rights from African coun-
tries became an important aspect in South Africa' s foreign relations with them, an issue that 
will surface in Chapters 4 to 6. Safair's specialisation was the provision of technical mainte-
nance to other airlines and transport of all kinds of cargo. It was only in the early 1990s, with 
the deregulation of South Africa's domestic airline routes, that Safair became interested in the 
domestic passenger service.278 The business of providing technical assistance to African air-
lines grew during the 1980s. In southern Africa, Linhas Aereas de Angola, Air Botswana, 
Lesotho Airways, Linhas Aereas de Mozambique, Royal Swazi and Air Swazi Cargo were 
among its customers. Further afield, it serviced Shabair in Zaire, Air Malawi and Air Tran-
safrik in Sao Tome and Principe.27' The DFA files also reveal that Safair carried out the re-
pairs for the private aeroplane of Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko in 1976 in Swaziland at 
the cost of 1.5 million Rand.280 
This study focuses on Safair's cargo transport activities in Africa. For that purpose, it util-
ised its Lockheed-built Hercules fleet that, at the height of Safair's expansion in the 1980s, 
consisted of eight L1 00 aircraft. They formed the basis of what Braam Loots, Safair Manag-
ing Director from 1981 to 1993, called "our total Africa strategy. ( ... ) These aircraft are ideal 
for remote areas. They can move bulk and require little ground infrastructure".281 Jacobus 
Pieter van Aswegen, Safair Managing Director from 1993 to 1999, referred to them as "Land 
277 Meredith, Tom. 1995. Sky Trek: Pioneering Days of Low-fare, Air Travel between South Africa and 
Europe. Johannesburg: Tom Meredith. 
278 'Airlines face licence delay', Business Day 3 August 1989; 'Safair withdraws bid to fly passenger routes ', 
Business Day 20 July; 'Way opens for Trek challenge' , Business Day 2 December 1990. 
279 Dodgen, Sam. 1991. The Sky is Open, Prisma 6, 4: 13; Ryan. 1991. Trade Roots, p.58; Safren: Corporate 
Report. 1991. p.IO; Uys, Freddie. 1993. Airlines of Africa: SAFAJR, World Airnews 21 , 5: 23; 
<http://www.safair.co.za>. 
280 'Note', from Rae Killen, Pretoria, 10 November 1976 (DFA, 111 1213, Vol. 8). 
281 His interview in Sa/rene Corporate Report. 1991. p.34. AJso Dodgen. 1991. The Sky is Open, p.12; Ing-
pen and Ie Raux. 1996. Safmarine 50, pp.106f., 157; 'Safair: African to Its Roots' , in Products of Southern Af-
rica: A Visual Guide on the Products, Raw Materials, Minerals and Services Available from Southern Africa. 
Pretoria: New World International, 1993: 7; 'Safair prepares', Financial Mail 13 May 1988, p.84; Stuttaford. 
1986. Safmarine, 1946-1986, pp.55( 
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Rovers of the sky" .'" Safair only began to acquire Boeing aircraft in the early 1990s.'83 Not 
being allowed to offer scheduled freight service and compete with South Africa's national 
airline, SAA, Safair resorted to a pragmatic solution and leased out its planes. Due to the im-
position of the 1977 mandatory UN arms embargo and given South Africa's involvement in 
several military conflicts in the region until the late 1980s, the South African Defence Force 
became Safair's most important client. After 1977, the SADF no longer received spare parts 
for its own Lockheed-built C-130 aircraft, and to avoid the unnecessary wear and tear on 
these planes, it leased Safair's civilian Hercules planes to transport personnel, ammunition, 
logistical material and other items.''' In 1988, for example, Safair transported between 
250,000 and 300,000 troops plus their families and friends. '" According to van Aswegen, 
business with the SADF formed the "backbone" of the company, and "if it were not for them, 
it would have been difficult". The Department of Foreign Affairs was also a Safair customer, 
but one of little significance in comparison with the SADF."6 
One of South Africa's leading hotel resort chains during the period under review, South-
ern Sun, was established in 1969 to counteract the dearth of tourist hotel facilities. The impe-
tus came from South African Breweries, South Africa's leading brewery which was partly 
owned by Anglo American, in order to rationalise its hotels and licensed house interests. '87 
Solomon ' Sol' Kerzner, another major shareholder in South African Breweries, became 
Southern Sun's Chairman and influenced the fate of this and other companies in the same 
field during the following two decades. Southern Sun greatly expanded its presence in South 
Africa in the 1970s and early 1980s, and began to hold a dominant position in the country's 
luxury tourist and business hotel trade. It also operated five casino resorts in two of the South 
African homelands, the flagship of which was Sun City in the homeland of Bophutatswana. 
Of relevance to our study, Kerzner participated in two companies that became involved in the 
western Indian Ocean islands of the Comoros and Mauritius. However, no primary informa-
tion could be obtained on these matters for reasons discussed in a moment and because finan-
cial data on the firms involved was not available. Regarding the Comoros, we will see in 
Chapter 5 that, from the 1980s, a company called World Leisure Group Limited undertook the 
development and management of two resort and casino properties. Kerzner had established 
282 Interview with Pieter van Aswegen, 2 November 200 I. 
28] See the current composition of its fleet at <http://www.safair.co.za>. 
284 Interview with Pieter van Aswegen, 2 November 200 1. 
'" 'Safair prepares ', Financial MaUl3 May 1988, pp.84, 86. 
286 Interview with Pieter van Aswegen, 2 November 200 1. 
"7 The Giants. 1991. p.28 ; Innes. 1984. Anglo American and the Rise 0/ Modern South A/rica, p.221 ; 
<http://www.sab.co.za>. 
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this company on the British Virgin Islands in the Caribbean, a tax heaven, and subsequently 
acted as its Chairman.2" World Leisure Group Limited was also one of three shareholders of 
Sun International Investments Limited, which, in tum, was the majority shareholder of Sun 
International Hotels Limited, a company engaged in luxury hotels and the casino resort indus-
try.289 Sol Kerzner had formed the latter in 1983 and subsequently was one of its Directors and 
Chairman until 1989.290 A different situation applied to Mauritius, where local shareholders 
owned the relevant hotels, while the management was in the hands of companies in which 
Kerzner again participated, namely the Mauritius Southern Sun Hotels Limited and Sun Re-
sorts Limited.291 Their involvement on Mauritius dates from the mid-1970s, developments we 
will discuss in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Kerzner's interaction with the South African government is of a special interest, given the 
allegations made in the second half of the 1990s accusing him of dubious dealings with Preto-
ria in other matters. A few words therefore are necessary about Sol Kerzner. Born in 1935 in 
Johannesburg as the son of a Jewish-Russian immigrant family, he worked his way up to be-
come "one of the most successful entrepreneurs in the entertainment business".'" Described 
as "flamboyant"293 and as a "man who achieves what he sets out to do - usually ahead of 
schedule",294 his importance in the South African business community was reflected in him 
becoming a South Africa Foundation Trustee (1980-92).295 However, since the 1994 elections, 
numerous newspaper reports have suggested that Kerzner did not hesitate to use his financial 
means to gamer political support for his business plans. In 1999, he was accused of having 
bribed the prime minister of the Transkei to obtain gambling rights in that fOimer homeland.296 
The media had highlighted his business practices already in July and August 1996 by publish-
288 <http://www.forbes.com>. 
289 'Sun International Announces Majority Shareholder Restructuring', press report of3 July 2001, hosted by 
<http://www.cghub.co.zaiart2.htm>; <http: //www.suninternational.com>; <http://www.sun-intemational.com>; 
<http://www.suninternational.co.za> . 
290 Crush, Jonathan, Paul Wellings. 1983. The Southern African Pleasure Periphery, 1966-83, Journal of 
Modern African Studies 21, 4: 693, 697; Rogerson, Christian Myles. 1990. Sun International: The Making of a 
South African Tourismus Multinational, GeoJournal 22, 3: 346, 349f.; Sun lnternational: A Corporate Report. 
1985. Johannesburg: Financial Mail: 13 , 16f.; 'Sol Kerzner quits three top posts', Business Day 9 February 1989. 
291 <http://www.semdex.com/companyyrofile/sun.htm>. 
292 Hall, Martin. 1995. The Legend of the Lost City: Or, the Man with Golden Balls, Journal of Southern Af-
rican Studies 21, 2: 196. 
293 Rogerson. 1990. Sun International, p.346. 
294 Sun lnternational. 1985. p.ll. 
295 Who 's Who of Southern Africa. 1985, p.299; Annual Report of the South Africa Foundation for that pe-
riod; Silber, Gus. 1999. Solomon Kerzner, in They Shaped Our Century: The Most lrifluential South Africans of 
the Twentieth Century. Cape Town: Human and Rousseau: 275-278. 
296 'R2m Kerzner pay-out next on SIU agenda', Daily Dispatch 3 February 1999. According to apartheid leg-
islation, casinos were only allowed in the' independent' homelands and not on South African territory. 
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ing allegations that Kerzner had financed both the ANC and the NP 1994 election campaigns. 
After the ANC's original rejection of the media reports, Nelson Mandela later confirmed their 
validity, while the NP neither confirmed nor rejected the claim.'97 Finally, in 1997 and again 
in 2002, Kerzner's lawyers succeeded in preventing the sale of the book entitled Kerzner Un-
authorised, written by journalist Allan Greenblo and published by Jonathan Ball in Johannes-
burg. '98 This action certainly did not help in silencing those critics who accused him of being a 
businessman with shady dealings. 
The information contained in this chapter served to introduce the state and non-state actors of 
relevance to this study, providing necessary background with which to contextualise their role 
within South Africa's foreign relations with the black African countries beyond the country's 
immediate neighbourhood. Their activities will be of particular importance in Chapters 4 and 
5. 
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too ', Mail & Guardian I3 September 1996. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Wind of Change: 
Prime Minister Verwoerd, 1958-66 
African Independence 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine Pretoria's foreign relations with black Africa under 
Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd. His term as the country's executive coincided with the 
wave of independence that swept across the African continent, with more than half of all the 
African countries gaining their freedom from colonial rule during the first half of the 1960s. 
An event in South African history that has become closely tied to these events was the Wind 
of Change speech by the British Prime Minister, Macmillan, in Cape Town in February 1960, 
heralding Britain's departure from Africa. As has been explained in Chapter I, this was a con-
tributory factor leading to Pretoria's decision to withdraw from the Commonwealth and to 
pursue its new political status as a Republic. In pursuing the goal of pan-Africanism, the 
newly independent states declared the eradication of colonialism as their primary goal. South 
Africa became their target due to its domestic apartheid policy, I including the implications 
such as its occupation of South West AfricalNamibia and its support for the white regime in 
Rhodesia. The anti-apartheid struggle took place at the UN, co-ordinated through the 'African 
Group', the largest caucusing group, and through the OAU. African initiatives to isolate South 
Africa at the UN Security Council were generally met with resistance by the Western perma-
nent members, but stood a better chance of eliciting sufficient support in the General Assem-
bly due to Africa's numerical majority in that forum. ' This resulted in the establishment of the 
I Pondi, Jean-Emmanuel. 1986. Political Rhetoric and Economic Reality in A/dean International Relations: 
A Systems Analysis of the Relationship Between the OAU and South Africa. PhD, Pennsylvania State University: 
76ff. 
, Barratt, John. 1985. South African Diplomacy at the UN, in Geoffrey R. Berridge, Anthony Jennings, eds. 
Diplomacy at the UN. Basingstoke: Macmillan: 192; Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation , p.263 ; 
Mathews, Kay. 1988. The African Group at the UN as an Instrument of African Diplomacy, Nigerian Journal of 
International Affairs 14, 1: 227-236; Venter. 1980. Black Africa and the Apartheid Issue, p.88. 
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Special Committee against Apartheid' in 1962 and the Centre against Apartheid,' attached to 
the UN Secretariat, in 1966.' 
In 1960, the machinery of the African Group was exposed to its first test after the South 
African police killed sixty-nine blacks during protests in the township of Sharpeville on 21 
March.6 On 25 March, eight African and twenty-one Asian states took action and pressed for 
the denunciation of Pretoria's apartheid policy. They demanded a Security Council meeting, 
drafting a resolution that declared the situation in South Africa, if it continued, to be "one that 
might endanger international peace and security". 7 It did not call for action under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter, providing for the imposition of mandatory sanctions, but it sent a warning 
to Pretoria that this might be a future option. On I April, the draft document was adopted as 
Resolution 134.' France and Great Britain abstained from voting, as they did not wish to un-
necessarily alienate a partner on the African continent, where they both still possessed colo-
nial territories. Three years later, on 7 August 1963, African pressure resulted in Security 
Council Resolution 181 that imposed a voluntary arms embargo on South Africa.' 
Appeasement'O 
Such developments had hitherto been unthinkable for white South Africa and, as it was rela-
tively unprepared for them, coming to terms with this new condition proved to be a difficult 
task. Not only did it "not at first realise the full impact of the changing political climate"," but 
the wave of African independence must have been a "traumatic event"" for both the govern-
ment and the white populace. Foreign Minister Eric Louw had established the Africa and In-
'Temporarily called Special Committee on Apartheid from 1971 to 1974. 
4 Known as the Unit on Apartheid from 1966 to 1975. 
, Bissell, Richard E. 1977. Apartheid and International Organizations. Boulder, CO: Westview Press; Booyse, 
Wim 1. 1986. International Isolation of South Africa: The Role of the "Special Committee against Apartheid" 
(SCM), ISSUP Strategic Review October: 25f; Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. 1994. Introduction, in United Nations and 
Apartheid, 1948-1994. New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information: 8, 18. 
6 Frankel, Philip Harry. 2001. An Ordinary Atrocity: Sharpeville and Its Massacre. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press. 
7 UN documents S/4279 and Add. 1 (25 March), S/4299 and S/4300 (I April 1960). 
, Andemicael, Berhanykun. 1976. The OAU and the UN: Relations between the Organization of African 
Unity and the United Nations. New York: Africana Publishing: 134; Boutros-Ghali. 1994. Introduction, pp.40f; 
Kay, David Allen. 1970. The New Nations in the United Nations: 1960-1967. New York: Columbia University 
Press: 25f., 66; Klotz. 1995. Norms in International RelatiOns, p.46. 
9 S/5348 (11 July 1963), S/5386 (7 August 1963). 
10 Term borrowed from Olivier, Gerrit Cornelius. 1973. Die grondslae van Suid-Afrika se buitelandse beleid. 
PhD, University of Pretoria: 239. 
"Breitenbach. 1974. South Africa in the Modern World (1910-1970), p.512. 
"Nolutshungu. 1975. South Africa in Africa, p.102 . 
CHAPTER THREE: PRIME MINISTER VERWOERD, 1958-66 75 
ternational Organisations Division within the DFA as far back as 1955. Yet, this was most 
certainly not intended to deal with independent African states, but rather with the European 
colonial powers. As late as 1959, Louw referred to the African independence movements as 
"disturbing, and indeed, alarming events". He acknowledged the right of African states to 
"eventually grow to nationhood and independence", while arguing that this process should not 
take place in an "unduly hastened" manner. 13 According to his view, African independence 
should only come about in the far distant future, if at all, with nothing to perturb the present. 
Yet, the new political dispensation on the African continent now required a different strategy 
for deflecting the disquieting and ever-increasing African attacks on South Africa at the UN. 
As indicated in the previous chapter, Minister Louw and Secretary Gerhardt Jooste 
strongly influenced Verwoerd's foreign policy making at the time, and actively pursued their 
proposal of further providing African states with technical and other forms of assistance. I' 
Since their establishment in the early 1950s, Pretoria had been a fully functional member of 
the following four organisations concerned with co-operation in the fields of science and 
technology: the Inter-African Bureau of Soil Conservation and Land Utilisation (BIS), the 
Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa (CCT A), the Scientific Council for Africa 
(CSA), and the Foundation for Mutual Assistance in Africa (FAMA).IS Through these agen-
cies, Pretoria's primary motivation during the last decade of the colonial period was to assist 
the poorer African nations, and thereby portraying itself as both developed and superior. 
South Africa even rendered assistance to non-African countries such as Poland, Romania and 
Thailand as late as 1963, further demonstrating the validity of this line of argument. 16 lmme-
diately after African independence, the original motivation for Pretoria to provide assistance 
was supplemented by its aim of presenting itself as a trustworthy partner. By showing its in-
terest in fostering friendly relations, Pretoria hoped to appease the African states seeking 
South Africa's international isolation. In that context, the "friendship criterion"17 was of sig-
nificance, meaning that assistance was only rendered to those African countries whose stance 
13 Louw, Eric Hendrik. 1959. The Union and the Emergent States of Africa. Speech at the Opening of the 
South African Bureau of Racial Affairs SABRA, Durban, 31 March. Johannesburg: South African Bureau of 
Racial Affairs: 3, 7. Also Louw, Eric Hendrik. 1957. Union's Africa Policy. Pretoria: State Infonnation Office. 
14 Biennann, Hugo Hendrik Hertzog, comp., ed. 1963. The Case for South Africa, as Put Forth in the Public 
Statements of Eric H. Louw, Foreign Minister of South Africa. New York: MacFadden-Bartell: 86; Jooste. 1977. 
Diensherinneringe, pp.210-215 ; Sole. 1994. South African Foreign Policy Assumptions and Objectives from 
Hertzog to de Klerk, p.108 . 
IS CCTA: Commission pour la cooperation technique en Afrique; CSA: Conseil scientifique pour I' Afrique; 
BIS: Bureau interafricain pour la conservation de la terre et l'utilisation du sol; F AMA: Fondation pour 
I' assistance mutuelle en Afrique. 
16 NAT.ARC., BTS 102/38/4, Vol. 2. 
17 Olivier. 1982. South Africa's Relations with Africa, p.278. 
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toward South Africa was positive. The implications of this are reflected in a report by Robert 
Jones, DFA Under-Secretary for Africa, in 1960: "The question of policy involved is whether, 
in the light of Nigeria's attitude towards South Africa, the Union Government is prepared to 
allow that country to benefit from the results of research carried out in the Union, even 
against payment for the material made available" .18 
However, appeasement was not a successful policy, because Pretoria "seriously underes-
timated African hostility towards apartheid"19 after the SharpeviUe massacre. As a result, by 
1963, South Africa was excluded from the OAU, CCTA, CSA, BIS and FAMA, while Afri-
can pressure had resulted in its expulsion from the International Labour Organisation (ILO), 
the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the UN Economic Commission for Africa 
(ECA)." South Africa's diplomatic representation on the continent was also severely affected. 
In July 1957, it had maintained offices in Angola, the Belgian Congo, Congo-Brazzaville, 
British East Africa, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Madagascar, Mauritius and 
Mozambique. Seven years later, its presence was limited to those countries that were still un-
der colonial rule, namely Angola, Mauritius, Mozambique and Rhodesia.21 
Even if Pretoria' s appeasement intentions had been successful, the establishment of equi-
table relations between South Africa and black African states would have remained impossi-
ble due to the intricacies of apartheid. For ideological reasons, treatment of any black in South 
Africa, including an ambassador from a black African state, on a par with a white person was 
unimaginable to the proponents of apartheid. For example, Verwoerd described Nigeria's 
head of state as a "fanatic" in an internal DFA document of April 1962," because Abubakar 
Balewa proposed an exchange of diplomats between their two countries. This incident took 
place at a Commonwealth press conference in London, and after a meeting with Verwoerd 
there." On a practical level, the mere presence of a black ambassador in South Africa would 
have meant his exposure to the apartheid legislation applied to any black South African, 
something that was obviously in conflict with the international conventions on diplomatic 
immunity. The question of black diplomats in South Africa also touched the country's politi-
cal nerve, as shown in this article that appeared in the widely read daily The Star in 1958: 
18 NAT.ARC., BTS 102/281212, Vol. 1. 
19 Spence. 1965. Republic Under Pressure, p.73. 
20 Barratt. 1972. South Africa's Outward Policy, pp.546f. ; Muller, M.E. 1976. Suid-Afrika se buitelandes 
verteenwoordiging (1910-1972), pp.137, 143f.; N6tWing, Frederik Jacobus. 1998. South Africa and Africa, in 
History of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Vol. II: 1948-1966. Pretoria: Department of Foreign Affairs: 38-
51. 
21 Foreign Affairs List. Pretoria: Department of External AffairsIDFA. (July 1957, June 1964) 
22 DFA, 11 129/3, Vol. 2. 
"'I would send an ambassador', The Star 27 April 1962 (DFA, 11129/3, Vol. 2). 
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But the Government have, thus far, dared to do nothing actively to seek the friendship of 
independent Black Africa for the reason that it has been impossible to overcome the po-
litical problems which would be posed by the presence of Black diplomats in the Union. 
( ... ) If the Government were to welcome Black diplomats in the Union it would involve 
not only organization, but a major change of heart within the Nationalist Party. African 
diplomats would enjoy diplomatic status and immunity. They would have to be invited to 
official functions . The social colour bar would have to be relaxed completely for them. 
There could be a major international rumpus if a policeman had, for instance, to ask a 
Black diplomat from an African state for his pass." 
77 
This situation persisted throughout the 1960s, as illustrated in a report by Colin Vale, Second 
Secretary at the South African Mission in Stockholm, dated 1969, on a meeting with an 
Ethiopian diplomat: "I explained as clearly as I could that, although black diplomats in South 
Africa were accorded all the courtesies, privileges and immunities accorded to any other dip-
lomat in South Africa, no diplomat could ever expect to be above the law and certainly no 
diplomat would ever behave in a manner which was out of tune with the accepted social cus-
toms of the country in which he was stationed"." In attempting to find a solution to the prob-
lem, Pretoria came up with the plan to establish diplomatic suburbs for black ambassadors 
outside Cape Town and Pretoria, but this did not eventuate as Verwoerd probably found that 
dealing with black African counterparts on South African territory was still too risky." As an 
alternative, he favoured the idea of a "roving ambassador", a white ambassador touring Af-
rica' s capitals, thus avoiding the posting of black ambassadors to South Africa. This proposal 
found governmental acceptance, but was only introduced on an ad hoc basis, with the Head of 
the Africa Division usually acting in this capacity." As a compromise, the construction of a 
multiracial hotel at Jan Smuts Airport, where diplomats could meet, became a reality." Yet, 
the issue of black diplomats in South Africa continued to be a sensitive one even a decade 
after the inception of African independence, as revealed in a letter by Under-Secretary Albie 
Burger: 
The Hotel will not provide facilities such as swimming pools, dancing areas, games 
rooms, etc. , which could lead to social mixing between whites and non-whites staying at 
the hotel. The purpose of the Hotel may have to be carefully explained to the public by 
24 'Nat. M.P. touches sore spot in Africa policy: black diplomats or more isolation the choice', The Star 4 
November 1958 (ARCA, PV.93, File 11912/1). 
"Report from Colin Vale to Pretoria, Stockholm, 14 November 1969, pp.3f. (DFA, 1179/3, Vol. I). See Ap-
pendix A for his biography. 
" Barber and Barratt. 1990. South Africa's Foreign Policy, p.77. 
"Cockram, Gail-Maryse. 1970. Vorster 's Foreign Policy. Pretoria: Academica: 134; Geldenbuys. 1984. The 
Diplomacy of Isolation , p.14. 
" Cockram. 1970. Vorster's Foreign Policy, p.133; Olivier. 1973. Die grandslae van Suid-Afrika se 
buitelandse beleid, p.224. 
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means of advance publicity so that it will be understood to whom the facilities of the Ho-
tel will be available." 
78 
The hotel was eventually built in the early 1970s as a Holiday Inn,30 while the choice of this 
American brand-name reflected Pretoria' s intention to make it sound as non-South African as 
possible and to therefore dissociate it from its locale. 
In the same context, it was only in December 1967, under Prime Minister Vorster, that 
Malawi became the first black African state to establish a diplomatic mission in Pretoria. Al-
though The Star hailed this as the "start of a new era in South Africa' s foreign relations"," the 
government did not dare to take it to its fullest conclusion; the appointed ambassador was 
white and only the Charge d' Affaires was black. It took another four years for Malawi to ap-
point a black ambassador (Chapter 4).32 
Congo Crisis 
While the previous section focused on the foreign ministry's attempts to deal with the conse-
quences of African independence during Verwoerd's premiership, this section separately ex-
amines the military centred approach to this situation, as it differed significantly. The military 
became involved in the context of the deteriorating political situation in the Republic of 
Congo after its independence from Belgium in June 1960. Within a week after that event, an 
army mutiny threw the third largest African country into turmoil , the events of which are now 
outlined briefly to provide the background for South Africa' s subsequent initiatives. As a re-
sult of the political problems, Belgium decided to send troops to its former colony, but fol-
lowing accusations that it wished to reoccupy the country, they were replaced by a UN peace 
force. JJ Yet, neither that UN force nor the armed forces, led by Joseph-Desire Mobutu, could 
prevent MOIse Tshombe, with strong mercenary assistance, from declaring the southern and 
copper-rich Katanga province as independent from the rest of the country in July 1960. In 
August, Albert Kalonji followed this example with the diamond-rich Kasai province, north of 
Katanga, and early in the following month, the central government collapsed and Prime Min-
ister Patrice Lumumba resigned. After Lunmmba' s death in detention in January 1961, under 
29 Letter from Albie Burger to the Department of Transport, accompanied by 'Comments of the Department 
of Foreign Affairs ' , Pretoria, 11 June 1968, pp.IE (DFA, 2211 2, Vols. 2, 3). 
30 DFA, 2211 2, Vols. 2, 3. 
31 'Start ofa new diplomatic era', The Star 12 December 1967 (DFA, 11158/3, Vol. 4). 
32 Barratt. 1972. South Africa 's Outward Policy, p.544; Barber and Barratt. 1990. South Africa's Foreign 
Policy, p.76; Cockram. 1970. Vorster 's Foreign Policy, p.140; Geldenhuys. 1984. Th e Diplomacy of Isolation, 
pp.13, 50. 
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suspicious circumstances," Mobutu intervened and his army subsequently administered the 
country. Despite the deployment, in February 1961, of a UN task force to Katanga to termi-
nate the secession, this only materialised in January 1963 when Tshombe, after months of 
hostilities and negotiations, went into exile. However, rebellions continued in the eastern parts 
of the country throughout 1964. Given the relative success of his troops and mercenaries dur-
ing Katanga's secession, Tshombe was invited home in July 1964 to bring stability to the 
country. Upon his return, he formed a new government, of which he became Prime Minister 
until October 1965, and renamed the country the Democratic Republic of Congo. Tshombe 
once again relied on mercenary help, but also called on Belgium and the US for assistance. 35 
Given the nature of these developments, Pretoria' s response was fashioned by the military, 
contextualised in its position during the colonial period, when Pretoria equalled its importance 
on the continent to that of the status enjoyed by the colonial powers. This found expression in 
1949 in the Africa Charter, conceived by Prime Minister Daniel Malan. It proposed co-
operation between the colonial powers and South Africa in an attempt to prolong Western 
control over Africa.36 Pretoria intended becoming the bridgehead of Western civilisation in 
Africa, defending the continent against communism and the Indian influence, and keeping it 
non-militarised.37 In line with this stance, the military took part in the conferences in Nairobi 
(1951) and Dakar (1954) that brought together the colonial powers to discuss the issue of "Af-
rican Defence".38 On the occasion of the Dakar conference in 1954, Francois Christiaan Eras-
mus, Minister of Defence from 1948 to 1959, indicated, according to the New York Times, 
"that South Africa' s participation in any defense of Africa would be with only limited man-
power. Vaguely, the suggestion has been made that South Africa could provide a small air 
force and a small armoured force. Her chief contribution would have to consist of war mate-
33 Abi-Saab, Georges. 1978. The United Nations Operation in the Congo, 1960-1964. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press. 
" Brassinne, Jacques. 1991. Qui a tue Patrice Lumumba? Paris: Duculot; De Witte, Ludo. 2002. The Assas-
sination ofLumumba. London: Verso. 
35 Basic historic and other facts about black African states are derived from Esterhuysen, Pieter, ed. 1998. Af-
rica A-Z: Continental and Country Profiles. Pretoria: Africa Instirute. 
36 Berridge, Geoffrey R. 1992. South Africa, the Colonial Powers and "African Defence": The Rise and Fall 
of the White Entente, 1948-60. London: Macmillan; New York: st. Martin's Press; Smit, Philipp. 1989. South 
Africa and Black Africa, Africa Insight 19,3: 125; N6thling. 1998. South Africa and Africa, pp.29-33. 
37 Barber and Barratt. 1990. South Africa's Foreign Policy, pp.35ff.; Barratt. 1975. The Department of For-
eign Affairs, pp.332-347; Berridge, Geoffrey R. 1991. The Diplomacy of the Veld: Charles te Water and the 
'Organic Approach' to South African Foreign Policy, International Relations 10, 1: 73-86; Nolutshungu. 1975. 
South Africa in Africa, pp.39-59; Olivier. 1973. Die grondslae van Suid-Afrika se buitelandse beleid, pp.213-
219; Olivier, Gerrit Cornelius. 1977. Suid-Afrika se buitelandse beleid. Pretoria: Academica: 126-133; Olivier. 
1982. South Africa's Relations with Africa, pp.269-285. 
38 DoD, Group 5, KG/GPWI21511 , Vol. 341; KG/GPW/2/512, Vols. 1-4, Vol. 342, KG/GPWI215/3, Vol. 342; 
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rial and general supplies".39 In its reaction to the Congo crisis, the military's room for ma-
noeuvre was apparently not much greater due to its limited capacity at the time. From the 
available evidence, it was only in 1963 that it became directly involved in the first phase of 
the crisis, although Jacobus Johannes ' Jim' Fouche, Minister of Defence from December 
1959 to April 1966, shared the principles of the Africa Charter.'o 
After pro-Western Tshombe had declared Katanga's independence in July 1960, we can 
safely assume that Pretoria sided with him for ideological reasons. In 1964, for example, 
Verwoerd stated: "South Africa is unequivocally the symbol of anti-Communism in Africa. 
Although often abused, we are also still a bastion in Africa for Christianity and the Western 
world".'1 Maybe being aware of Pretoria's position, two ministers from Katanga visited the 
Republic in August and September 1961, in an attempt to obtain assistance of any kind." Ac-
cording to Defence documents, the issue of armaments supplies to Tshombe was discussed at 
the highest level in the SADF during 1962." However, there is no indication that Pretoria did, 
in fact, provide him with military assistance in this phase, as has been alleged." Three argu-
ments can be used to sustain this. First, the DFA opposed military engagement in any African 
country to prevent damage of South Africa's diplomatic image. Due to the Louw-Jooste 
team's influence on Verwoerd, it is conceivable that they would have had the upper hand over 
Fouche, who had only just become Minister of Defence. Second, and following this argument, 
it is unlikely that Pretoria was going to engage itself directly on the side of a secessionist 
leader against a UN task force, risking another barrage of accusations from the international 
community. Third, the military's capacity to get involved in a relatively distant African war 
was arguably insufficient at the time. Its budget, contained in Appendix D, only began to 
grow exponentially after 1961, the figure tripling in the next two years alone. While direct 
military intervention is therefore improbable, Pretoria chose something of a middle road in 
that it approved of South African mercenaries fighting for Tshombe. In doing so, it avoided 
becoming directly involved in a military conflict, while still making a contribution in achiev-
ing the desired political aims. As different degrees of co-operation with mercenaries were 
39 'African Defense Perplexes Malan: Continental Parley at Dakar Poses Issue of Native Anny in Face ofRa-
cial Policy', New York Times 13 March 1954 (DoD, Group I, M.V/200, Vol. 149). 
40 Barber and Barratt. 1990. South Africa 's Foreign Policy, pp.IOOf. 
41 Verwoerd, Hendrik Frensch. 1964. I. Crisis in World Conscience; II. The Road to Freedom for Basuto/and, 
Bechuana/and, Swaziland. Pretoria: Department of Information: 4. See also Verwoerd's first interview after 
having taken office in the Rand Daily Mail 15 December 1958 (ARCA, PV.93, File 1/9/2/2). 
" NAT.ARC., BTS 22/ 1/112/1+PL, Vol. I. Also Guelke, Adrian Blanchard. 1972. South African Foreign 
Policy in Africa. MA, University of Cape Town: 218f. ; Meinardus. 1980. Die Afrikapolitik der Republik 
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important elements in South Africa's foreign relations with Africa at this time and during later 
instances, the following paragraphs introduce relevant personalities and pertinent aspects nec-
essary to the understanding of the mercenary ethos. 
A mercenary can be defined as a "hired professional soldier who fights for any state or 
nation"." Having its roots in the 18th century Europe, the period from 1960 to 1970 was a 
"Great Epoch" of mercenary activity on the African continent, when the 'soldiers of fortune', 
'frightful ones' or 'dogs of war' were used in several conflicts." Two mercenaries played a 
meaningful role in South Africa's foreign relations with Africa on several occasions. These 
two "colourful characters"" were Frenchman Pierre Robert 'Bob' Denard and the South Afri-
can-based 'Mad' Mike Hoare of Irish origin. While the evolution of international law at a 
later stage aimed at outlawing the use of mercenaries, it was an accepted international trend in 
the 1960s. This also applied to the position of mercenaries in South Afiican law. On reading 
section 121A of the Defence Act (No 44 of 1957), applicable in the period under review, it 
becomes clear that "being a mercenary is not per se an offence in terms of South African 
Prohibition of certain acts in connection with service as mercenaries 
(1) Any person who-
(a) is a member of the South African Defence Force or the Reserve or an auxiliary or 
voluntary nursing service established in terms of this Act and who binds himself 
to service or renders service as a mercenary; or 
(b) makes any utterance or performs any act or does anything with intent to advise, 
encourage, assist, incite, instigate, suggest to or otherwise persuade any member 
referred to in paragraph (a) to bind himself to serve or to render service as a 
mercenary, 
shall be guilty of an offence. 
Therefore, any South Afiican citizen who was not a member of either the SADF or the Re-
serve could become a mercenary. 
Both Bob Denard and Mike Hoare were amongst the Katanga mercenaries:' but only 
Hoare's role is of relevance here, as there is no evidence of contact between Pretoria and De-
4S Th e New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 8. 1986. Chicago, IL: Encyclopaedia Britannica: 27. 
46 Klen, Michel. 1999. Le retour des mercenaires, Etudes 391, 4: 319f., 323. 
"Brooks and Solomon. 2000. Editorial, p.l. 
48 Botha, Christo Beyers. 1993. Soldiers of Fortune or Whores of War? The Legal Position of Mercenaries 
with Specific Reference to South Africa, Strategic Review for Southern Africa 15. 2: 84. 
49 See their autobiographies and biographies: Hoare, Mike. 1967. Congo Mercenary. London: Robert Hale; 
Hoare, Mike. 1989. The Road to Kalamata: A Congo Mercenary's Personal Memoir. London: Cooper; Lunel, 
Pierre. 1991. Bob Denard: Ie roi defortune. Paris: Edition °1; Denard, Robert Pierre 'Bob'. 1998. Corsaire de 10 
nipublique. Paris: Robert Laffont. Also McNamara, Francis Terry. 1989. France in Black Africa. Washington, 
DC: National Defense University: 176ff.; Rogers, Anthony. 2000. Someone Else's War: Mercenariesfrom 1960 
to the Present. London: HarperCollins: 16-31; Weinberg, Samantha. 1994. Last of the Pirates: The Search for 
Bob Denard. London: Ionathan Cape: 64f. 
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nard on this occasion. As with previous actors appearing in South Africa's foreign relations 
with Africa, their background is also important to an understanding of their role. A description 
of Hoare follows now, while Denard will be introduced in Chapter 4. Hoare, whom The Star 
described as "no-nonsense commander",'· was born in India as son of Irish parents. After a 
childhood and education in Ireland and Britain, he served the British Army as an Officer in 
the Royal Tank Corps in India and Burma, leaving the service in the rank of Major. After 
World War II, he immigrated to South Africa, started a safari business and travelled exten-
sively on the African continent. In South Africa, he lived in Pietermaritzburg, near the Indian 
Ocean city of Durban." The question of his nationality defied final clarification, although this 
is an important aspect for an understanding of Pretoria's reaction to his mercenary activities. 
In 1964, The Star reported: "Although everyone here thinks that Maj. Mike Hoare is British, 
the Foreign Office told the Embassy here that he does not hold a British passport. This would 
indicate that he could be of South African nationality" .52 Circumstantial evidence supports the 
idea that he adopted South African citizenship after his emigration from Britain, reinforced by 
the fact that a South African court sentenced him to prison after the Seychelles coup in 1981 
and that Britain did not demand his extradition then (Chapter 5). 
In returning to the Congo crisis, the information gleaned from the DFA files on Hoare and 
his co-mercenaries in Katanga is cursory, but the documents suggest that Pretoria knew of 
Hoare and of about sixteen South African mercenaries supporting Tshombe. Despite the lack 
of clear evidence revealing direct collaboration with Pretoria's military, there can be only 
little doubt that their activities found tacit approval, at the least, because the mercenaries with 
South African nationality had to be given leave, either from the SADF or the Reserve, to pre-
vent legal action against them upon their return. While the respective numbers are not known, 
it is a reasonable assumption that the majority of mercenaries had been serving SADF sol-
diers, as their use in a war situation promised to be more effective than that of reservists. 
Whereas the military did not do anything to stop South African mercenaries fighting in Ka-
tanga, Brand Fourie, Permanent Representative to the UN at the time, warned Jooste that this 
might further worsen the country's international image, advising the government to take the 
necessary steps to stop mercenary involvement. With Louw certainly and Jooste possibly 
supporting the view that South African mercenary activity in Katanga could become another 
,. ' Leaders ofTshombe's "foreign legion" ', The Star 7 October 1964 (DFA, 11112/5/1, Vol. 3). 
51 Hoare. 1989. The Road /0 Kalamata. Also Hoare, Chris. 1986. Mad Mike's Own Story: Col. Hoare on War 
and Peace, Soldier of Fortune January: 44-47, 144. 
52 'Mercenaries into action: Congo still denies recruitment', The Star 25 August 1964 (DFA, 1/112/5/1, Vol. 3). 
CHAPTER THREE: PRIME MINISTER VERWOERD, 1958-66 83 
battlefield at the UN, Pretoria subsequently threatened that all future mercenaries would lose 
their passports." Whether this was translated into action by the military is uncertain, however. 
Still in the period 1960-63, but under different circumstances, two representatives from 
Kasai province, governed by Kalonji since August 1960, approached the South African gov-
ernment for military support. They had initially sought a meeting with Anglo American's 
Harry Oppenheimer in Johannesburg in September 1960 to obtain mining and military assis-
tance. For Kalonji's men to contact a mining company was an obvious route, as only an op-
erative mining industry in their province generated the income necessary to finance the war 
against the central government. That their choice specifically fell on Anglo American was no 
coincidence, because the Republic of Congo was probably the multinational company's larg-
est involvement in black Africa beyond southern Africa, with mining activities in the fields of 
copper, cobalt and diamonds. Dating from the 1920s, De Beers had considerable diamond 
mining interests in Mbuji-Mayi," capital of the central Kasai-Oriental province. Even though 
Oppenheimer was supportive of Kalonji's cause, hoping that he could create the necessary 
political stability for Anglo American to continue its diamond mining operations, he does not 
appear to have been in a position to assist as requested. However, and most significantly, he 
described the meeting in a written report to Prime Minister Verwoerd, hoping to receive assis-
tance from Pretoria, and linking both Anglo American' s economic and the government's po-
litical interests in the province: 
I understand that you are acting as Minister of External Affairs, and therefore I feel I 
should tell you that I have just received a visit from two Africans from the Congo ( ... J. 
They told me that their object in visiting the Union was to obtain a supply of arms for use 
against the troops of Lumumba who are invading the Kasai Province, and in particular 
they hope to obtain two Fighter Aircraft and numbers of machine guns. ( ... J They seemed 
to think that I would in some be in a position to assist them in their mission. I expressed 
sympathy with them in their opposition to Lumumba but explained that it was naturally 
quite impossible for any private individual in South Africa to obtain arms for them. ( ... J I 
felt it desirable that I should at once inform you of what had taken place." 
According to Verwoerd's instant reply, the two men consequently had a discussion with a 
DF A official on that matter, but the government could not assist them either: 
They were received by a member of the Department of External Affairs and treated with 
every courtesy. He informed them that having regard to all the circumstances, it would 
" Letter from Brand Fourie to Gerhardt Jooste, New York, 31 March 1961 (NAT.ARC., BTS 1/112/5/1, Vol. 
I); NAT.ARC., BTS 1/112/5/1, Vols. 1,2. 
"Hocking, Anthony. 1973. Oppenheimer and Son . Johannesburg: McGraw-Hill: 95, 119, 204; Jessup, Ed-
ward. 1979. Ernest Oppenheimer: A Study in Power. London: Rex Collings: 9, 132, 138f., 162, 177f., 191,227; 
Meinardus. 1980. Die Afrikapolitik der Republik Sudafrika, pp.363f.; Newbury, Colin. 1989. The Diamond Ring: 
Business, Politics, and Precious Stones in South Africa, 1867-1947. Oxford: Calendon Press: 240, 248, 250, 358. 
" Letter from Harry Oppenheimer to Hendrik Verwoerd, Johannesburg, 13 September 1960 (ARCA, PV.93, 
File 1/53/2/4). 
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not be possible to supply them with military equipment, but like any other buyer they 
would be able to purchase non-military equipment from private sources if they so de-
sired.56 
84 
Apart from the reasons that have been stated above, dissuading Pretoria from becoming di-
rectly involved in the Congo crisis, Verwoerd' s negative attitude may also have been moti-
vated by the government's unwillingness at the time to have any formal dealings with this key 
representative of English-speaking big capital. This, at least, has been suggested by Anglo 
American' s Executive Director, Michael Spicer, who argued during an interview in 1999: 
"There was this schizophrenic attitude; Anglo American was still seen as part of the whole 
Randlords[S71 phenomenon, the enemy. There was overt hostility"." Even though Spicer' s ar-
gument may have some validity, it would have to be probed more deeply, but this is not pos-
sible due to the unavailability of additional sources on Pretoria's relations with Anglo Ameri-
can at the time and later. 
In the second phase of the Congo crisis, during Tshombe's premiership from July 1964 to 
October 1965, Pretoria became comparatively more engaged. The issue at stake was again 
military support for Tshombe, this time to keep him in power. In particular, the press reported 
on the presence of South African mercenaries on the side of Tshombe," while DFA docu-
ments euphemistically refer to them as "white volunteers".60 Among the mercenaries was 
Hoare, who, as he later recounted in his memoirs, was the leader of the 5 Commando, with an 
education camp for some 350 to 400 mercenaries based in Kamina, in northern Katanga6 1 
Compared to Pretoria's earlier position, Verwoerd now openly approved South African mer-
cenary activity in the Democratic Republic of Congo. At the opening of the Cape Nationalist 
Congress on 26 August 1964, he argued that Pretoria saw no reason for action because: "We 
will not interfere if a legitimate government goes about this matter legitimately"'" Within 
days after that statement, possibly after the intervention of Pretoria's foreign service officials, 
fearing negative diplomatic implications, Verwoerd issued a press statement on 1 September, 
56 Letter from Hendrik Verwoerd to Harry Oppenheimer, Pretoria, 13 September 1960 (ARCA, PV.93, File 
1/53/2/4). 
57 On this issue, see Wheatcroft, Geoffrey. 1985. Th e Randlords. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 
58 Interview with Michael Spicer, 7 Apri11999. 
59 'Twelve more recruits go to Congo', The Star 19 October 1964 (DFA, 1/112/3, Vol. 4). 
60 'Huursoldate in die Kongo', from Tassie Taswell (Under-Secretary, Africa Division), Pretoria, 13 October 
1964; 'The Congolese Army and the white volunteers', from Albie Burger to Gerhardt Jooste, Brussels, 5 April 
1965 (DFA, 1/112/5/1 , Vol. 3). 
61 Hoare. 1967. Congo Mercenary. Also 'Mercenaries into action: Congo still denies recruitment', The Star 
25 August 1964 (DFA, 1/ 112/5/1, Vol. 3); Lune!. 1991. Bob Denard, pp.272, 275, 279; Rogers. 2000. Someone 
Else 's War, pp.31 -36. 
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in which he tried to dissimulate his earlier pronouncement: "When I said in Port Elizabeth 
that the Government of the Republic, like other governments, did not intend at the moment to 
interfere if there were people in South Africa who went to the Congo as volunteers to assist a 
legal and internationally recognised govemment, it was of course with the understanding that 
it would not affect South Africa's interests"." However, the reasons given for this attitude 
were not political or legal, but economic in nature. In Verwoerd's view, the departure of mer-
cenaries from South Africa might "disrupt the labour market", therefore adding to the "man-
power shortage which has to be filled at considerable cost by means of State aided immigra-
tion". Furthermore, it would be "undesirable that students who are being fitted for great tasks 
in the future should interrupt their study careers in this way"." These pronouncements were 
somewhat half hearted and it is doubtful how effectively Pretoria tried to halt further South 
African mercenary action, as the military had again been supportive of such moves. Accord-
ing to the recent work by diplomatic historian Piero Gleijeses, Lawrence Devlin, the Station 
Chief of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the Congo, reported to Washington: 
"many of the mercenaries arriving at Kamina are actually South African Army regulars placed 
on leave status for six months". On 22 August 1964, Gleijeses further states, Pretoria' s mili-
tary even despatched a C-130, a Hercules-built military cargo plane, "with what is obviously 
military equipment" to Tshombe. However, and as Gleijeses indicates, Pretoria's confidence 
did not go as far as sending military forces, even though it had apparently been asked for 
them." 
The above suggests that Defence Minister Fouche's and the military's influence on Ver-
woerd, compared to the first phase of the Congo crisis, had become somewhat stronger vis-a-
vis the foreign service corps. The reasons for this were, first, the military's strongly increased 
capacity since 1961, with France as main armaments supplier in spite of the UN's voluntary 
arms embargo of 1963; this aspect will be dealt with in detail in Chapter 4. Second, Verwo-
erd's above-cited statement of 26 August indicates that he felt more confident as Tshombe 
was the country's legitimate leader and, crucially, he was also supported by the US. Referring 
back to Malan's Africa Charter of 1949, this latter aspect may have raised earlier hopes of 
62 'Die Republiek se verhoudings met Afrika in die algemeen en met die Demokratiese Republiek van die 
Kongo in die besonder', 3 September 1964, contains a summary ofVerwoerd's speech. Also 'Verwoerd reveals: 
we gave aid to Tshombe', Rand Daily Mail 27 August 1964 (DFA, 11112/3, Vol. 4). 
63 'Press statement by the Hon. the Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa' , issued by the Depart-
ment ofInformation, Pretoria, 1 September 1964 (DFA, 11112/3, Vol. 4) . 
64 'Press statement by the Hon. the Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa', issued by the Depart-
ment ofInformation, Pretoria, 1 September 1964 (DFA, 11112/3, Vol. 4). 
65 Gleijeses, Piero. 2001. Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976. Chapel Hill, 
NC: University of North Carolina Press: 126. 
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South Africa achieving an equal footing with other important nations intervening in Africa 
and this made military involvement more acceptable, even though Washington preferred not 
to be seen together with Pretoria." Third, and although the two countries did not share a bor-
der, South Africa had an economic interest in the political stability of the Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo. In particular, the hope was for its inclusion in a "Greater South Africa", an idea 
proposed by Verwoerd and Jan Haak, then Deputy Minister of Planning, Economic Affairs 
and Mines (1961-64) (Chapter 2), and comprising the plan for a "Southern African Common 
Market". With South Africa as the core country, it would have embraced Southern and North-
ern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe, Zambia), Nyasaland (Malawi), the Portuguese territories of Angola 
and Mozambique, the High Commission Territories Bechuanaland (Botswana), Basutoland 
(Lesotho) and Swaziland (BLS) and the Democratic Republic of Congo as the only independ-
ent African nation among them. This would have resulted in a greatly extended Customs Un-
ion, initially enacted in 1910 between the Union of South Africa and the BLS countries, and 
would therefore have enlarged Pretoria's economic influence in these countries." Overall, 
Pretoria thus had three motives to support pro-Western Tshombe. 
Yet, the stability brought about by Tshombe was not long-lasting. Due to a deadlock that 
threatened to paralyse the government, the Chief of Staff, Joseph-Desire Mobutu, and his 
troops intervened in November 1965 and ruled the country with an iron fist until 1997. He 
renamed the country Republic of Zaire in 1971 and himself Mobutu Sese Seko in 1972. Ac-
cording to DFA documents of the early I 970s, Mobutu's "attitude towards the Republic" was 
considered to be "unfriendly" and he tended towards communist support." Thus, with 
Tshombe, Pretoria had lost a potential political partner in a country with great economic po-
tential. As late as August 1974, Rae Killen noted: "Our present day relations with Zaire are 
limited to our mutual trade which, apart from our immediate neighbours, is the highest for the 
"Gleijeses. 2001. Conflicting Missions, pp.126f. 
" Barratt, John. 1971. Dialogue in Africa. Johannesburg: South African Instirute of International Affairs: 
10 I; Breytenbach, Wilhelmus Josephus ' Willie ' . 1977. South Africa Looks to Africa. Sandton: Southern African 
Freedom Foundation: I; Chenu. 1972. Perspectives et Iimites du dialogue avec l'Afrique du Sud, p.34 ; Guelke. 
1972. South African Foreign Policy in Africa, p.222; Johns, Sheridan. 1971. South Africa 's Diplomatic Opening 
to the North, Europa Archiv 26, 22: 784f.; Johns, Sheridan. 1973. The Thrust of Pretoria's African Policy of 
Dialogue, South Atlantic Quarterly 72,2: 180f.; Molteno, Robert. 1971. South Africa 's Forward Policy in Af-
rica: Milestones on the Great North Road, The Round Table 61, 243: 342; Von der Ropp, Klaus. 1971. Chancen 
eines Dialoges zwischen der Republik Siidafrika und dem schwarzen Afrika, Internationales Afrikaforum 7, 12: 
732; Woldring, Klaas. 1975. South Africa 's Africa Policy Reconsidered, African Review: A Journal of African 
Politics, Development and International Affairs 5, I: 84f. 
68 'Attitude of Zaire towards the Republic ', from Johan Pretorius, Pretoria, 16 January 1973, p.l ; ' President 
Mobutu's change of attitude towards the Western world', ca. March 1973, pA (DFA, III 12/3, Vol. 5) (emphasis 
in the original). 
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rest of Africa"·' Mobutu's hostile stance only changed towards the end of 1974, in the con-
text of the Angolan war, and this will be examined in Chapter 4. 
Isolation 
Toward the mid-I 960s, South Africa thus found itself completely isolated on the African con-
tinent and increasingly so within the international community. The DFA's approach of win-
ning over those black African states that were amenable to contact with Pretoria through the 
provision of technical assistance did not result in any tangible results, and the military' s 
Congo excursion also fell short of establishing a Pretoria-friendly government. These devel-
opments were an important factor in causing the Afrikaner community to retreat into the laa-
ger. Piet Cilli6, whose role as the editor of Die Burger, Broederbond membership and close links 
with the National Party have been mentioned in Chapter 2, described the prevailing sentiments: 
We have scarcely had time to digest these radical changes in our destiny; but we certainly 
are groping our way to a new sense of purpose, and we are trying to define our proper 
role in the brave new circumstances ( ... ). ( ... ) Thus the events of 1960 and its aftermath 
threw South Africa into a fiercely patriotic and defensive mood which to a large extent 
still persists ( ... ). The early sixties, then, were dominated by a defensive, an often aggres-
sively defensive mentality and a sense of isolation, which ( ... ) did generate patriotic ener-
gies which have served South Africa extremely well." 
Even though isolation was dominant, this was not the complete picture as far as Pretoria' s 
position in Africa was concerned. According to the mainstream secondary literature, the Out-
ward-Looking Policy on the African continent only began under Vorster in 1967, with both 
Lesotho and Malawi as the initial successes. Yet, cognisance is not taken of the fact that sev-
eral significant developments in this direction had already taken place under Verwoerd, lead-
ing Deon Geldenhuys to attribute to him "a commendable degree of flexibility in foreign pol-
icy matters".71 In particular, reference is made to Verwoerd's meeting with Leabua Jonathan, 
the Prime Minister of soon-to-be independent Lesotho, on 2 September 1966 in Pretoria. Be-
ing the first open top-level encounter between the South African executive and a foreign black 
leader, it was a great diplomatic success for Pretoria. However, the meeting took place in 
complete secrecy for fear of repercussions among the conservative elements in response to 
Verwoerd's breaking ofa racial taboo. The meeting specifically took place in Pretoria, as Par-
liament was debating in Cape Town, and Verwoerd apparently did not even lunch with Jona-
69 'ZaYre: technical assistance in the atomic energy field', from Rae Killen, Pretoria, 15 August 1974, p.1 
(DFA, 11112/3, Vol. 6). 
70 CilIie, Petrus Johannes 'Piet'. 1968. Outwards: An Afrikaner View of Africa Policy, Perspective 6, 3: 8. 
71 Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy a/Isolation, p.26. 
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than, but sent a retired top official instead." Four days after this encounter, a messenger, who 
was later declared to have been mentally unsound, assassinated Verwoerd in Parliament under 
circumstances that have never been clarified. 
Already in April of that year, and as revealed by the research presented in the following 
chapter, the Malawi Labour Representative in Johannesburg who represented the Malawi 
mine workers, had approached DFA Deputy Secretary Burger to extend an invitation to three 
government officials to attend Malawi's independence celebrations in July. This came to frui-
tion, and Burger led the three man group to Malawi. We therefore argue that the Department 
of Foreign Affairs, with Muller as Minister since January 1964, was responsible for Verwo-
erd's surprising openness and flexibility regarding contact with both Lesotho and Malawi. 
While not intending to stretch the importance of personalities and make undue connections 
between historical dates, it is nevertheless significant to note that Verwoerd 's meeting with 
Jonathan took place roughly two months after the resignation of Secretary Jooste, who was 
said to be a staunchly committed NP follower in comparison to his successor, Eric Louw. 
This once again exemplifies the importance of the personality factor in South Africa' s foreign 
policy making. 
This chapter served the purpose of outlining the situation in which Verwoerd found himself 
during his premiership and to examine the inappropriate responses from both the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and the military in coming to terms with African independence. As a result 
of continuous African anti-apartheid activity, South Africa found itself increasingly isolated 
in the international arena. The following chapter examines the various Africa approaches the 
different state actors pursued during John Vorster's premiership from 1966 to 1978. 
n Geldenhuys. 1984 . The Diplomacy oJIsolation, pp.19, 256 (note 176). 
CHAPTER FOUR 
What Foreign Relations with Africa? 
Prime Minister Vorster, 1966-78 
Outward-Looking Policy 
John Vorster inherited Verwoerd's legacy of a South Africa that was an outcast on the Afri-
can continent and which was steadily attaining a pariah status within the international com-
munity. The government's attempts during Vorster's premiership to extricate itself from this 
isolated position can be succinctly summarised by the term Outward-Looking Policy, origi-
nating in a contribution to the magazine News/Check, edited by "a prominent and somewhat 
controversial Afrikaans journalist" and "forerunner of verligte thought" with "political views 
that were certainly well ahead of those of any other publication with pro-government sympa-
thies".' With the magazine' s primary focus on Africa, an article in the September 1965 issue 
was entitled "The Choice before South Africa: Look Inwards or Look Outwards",'. and the 
term subsequently entered the South African vocabulary.' While Verwoerd was somewhat 
taken aback by the sudden developments on the African continent, only reacting towards the 
end of his premiership, Vorster's position was different in that his foreign policy was based 
on a deeper appreciation of the new situation South Africa found itself in. This did not, how-
ever, result in a consistent strategy, as we will see. 
The basis for Pretoria's Outward-Looking Policy was its regained mood of confidence in 
the political, economic and military spheres. First, the ruling NP strengthened its position dur-
ing elections in both 1965 and 1966. Second, right-wing splinter groups were defeated, de-
spite their criticism of the NP's policy to grant sectors of the black popUlation a degree of 
self-autonomy in the form of ' homelands' , an aspect of apartheid ideology that is examined 
more closely in the later section on Secret Diplomacy; the chances of a right-wing backlash 
'Ge1denhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.192. 
, N<rWs/Check4, 6, 24 September 1965: 32f., 35, 37. 
, Vorster, Balthazar JohaMes 'John '. 1970. South Africa's Outward Policy. One of a Series of Lectures de-
livered at Annual General Meeting of the Suid-Afrikaanse Akademie vir Westenskap en Kuns on the Subject 
"South Africa in the World", Pretoria, July 1969. Cape Town: Tafe1berg. 
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on Pretoria as a result of establishing open relations with black African states further north, 
were therefore reduced. Third, in July 1966, the International Court of Justice found that 
Ethiopia and Liberia did not possess the locus standi in the S.W.A.!Namibia case to challenge 
South Africa's occupation' Although the decision was not in favour of Pretoria, it removed a 
serious problem that had occupied the foreign affairs ministry's work for six years. Finally, 
South Africa was experiencing an economic boom and the country 's defence capacity was 
steadily strengthened. 5 
The Outward-Looking Policy resulted in the establishment of closer contacts with both 
Latin America and Australasia, but this thesis agrees with the secondary literature' that its 
principal aim was to bring about a modus vivendi with independent African states, whose en-
deavours had mainly been responsible for South Africa's isolation. In a speech of August 
1967, Minister Muller expressed Pretoria's willingness to pursue a policy of "friendly co-
existence and fruitful co-operation with countries in Africa"' : 
South Africa is in a unique position to make a real contribution to the development of the 
continent. We are in a position to help other countries in Africa with their problems in the 
scientific, technological, economic and numerous other spheres, because down the centu-
ries we have learnt to solve these problems. We are prepared to share our knowledge with 
the African states, and they are free to consult us and co-operate with us' 
This statement is reminiscent of the Department of Foreign Affairs' failed attempt to win the 
allegiance of African states by providing assistance to them in the early 1960s, through or-
ganisations such as the Inter-African Bureau of Soil Conservation and Land Utilisation, the 
Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa, the Scientific Council for Africa and the 
Foundation for Mutual Assistance in Africa (Chapter 3). The foreign service officers contin-
ued to believe that technical assistance was key in breaking South Africa's isolation. How-
ever, as indicated in Chapter 2, Vorster's foreign policy making towards Africa became 
dominated by interdepartmental rivalry between the DFA, the military, national intelligence 
4 Bishop, William W. 1967. South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa, Liberia v. South Africa): 
Second Phase, American Journal of International Law 61: 116-2 10; Flemming, Brian. 1967. South-West Africa 
Cases: Ethiopia v. South Africa, Liberia v. South Africa: Second Phase, Canadian Yearbook of International 
Law 5: 241-252. 
5 Barber and Barratt. 1990. South Africa's Foreign Policy, pp.143-150; Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of 
Isolation , pp.34-38 ; Geldenhuys. 1994. The Head of Government and South Africa's Foreign Relations, 
pp.268ff.; Gue1ke. 1972. South African Foreign Policy in Africa, pp.228f.; Meinardus. 1980. Die Afrikapolitik 
der Republik Siidafrika, pp.60-68. 
'Barratt, John. 1970. South Africa's Outward Movement, Modern Age 14, 2: 129ff.; Barratt. 1972. South Af-
rica's Outward Policy, pp.549ff.; Breitenbach. 1974. South Africa in the Modern World (1910-1970), pp.511f.; 
D'Oliveira. 1978. Vorster, pp.218f.; Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.34; Gue1ke. 1972. South 
African Foreign Policy in Africa, p.270; Meinardus. 1980. Die Afrikapolitik der Republik Siidafrika, pp.55f.; 
Nolutshungu. 1975. South Africa in Africa, p.114; Swanepoe1, Johannes Jacobus. 1982. Die diplomasie van Adv. 
BJ. Vorster. PhD, University of the Orange Free State: 252. 
, Legum, Colin. 1972. Dialogue: The Great Debate, Africa Contemporary Record, 1971-72: A67 . 
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and the Department of Information over the route to be followed. The main theme in Preto-
ria's foreign relations with Africa was a struggle over how these should be conducted. While 
being interrelated and often running parallel, the conflicting strategies towards different coun-
tries can be broadly categorised into the four phases Outward Movement, Dialogue, Secret 
Diplomacy and Detente. This periodisation is based on the insights gained from research in 
the primary sources located in the Department of Foreign Affairs archive and thereby en-
hances the proposals in the secondary literature.' Roughly speaking, the Outward Movement 
describes the DFA's activities aimed at establishing contact with black African states imme-
diately beyond southern Africa after 1967. Dialogue was initiated by the military, beginning 
in late 1966, and refers to interaction with countries further afield, namely in Francophone 
Africa. Secret Diplomacy, practised by the Department of Information and the intelligence 
agency, BOSS, began after 1972 and peaked in Vorster's visit to the Ivory Coast in Septem-
ber 1974. Detente, finally, describes the strategies of the Departments of Foreign Affairs and 
Information, as well as BOSS, during the mid-1970s in seeking a lasting and peaceful solution 
to both the S.W.A.lNamibia and Rhodesian issues. These phases are now analysed in turn. 
Outward Movement 
In pursuing his Africa policy, Vorster initially followed in Verwoerd's footsteps by meeting 
with Lesotho's Prime Minister, Leabua Jonathan, on 10 January 1967. It is probable that this 
meeting took place on the advice of Foreign Minister Muller, since we argued in Chapter 3 
that he held a relatively influential position vis-a-vis the Prime Minister at that point in time. 
Given Lesotho's geographical position as a mountainous and landlocked country, with an 
almost complete dependence on its all-surrounding neighbour, it was easy for Vorster to find 
Jonathan willing to interact with Pretoria despite its apartheid policies. It is thus not surprising 
that the final communique after their meeting emphasised the importance of Pretoria's eco-
nomic assistance, one of its key levers at the time, to Lesotho.lO 
The Department of Foreign Affairs, equally, utilised South Africa's economic strength and 
the country's advanced technical standards in impressing the black African countries further 
north. This was applied through the provision of technical assistance and the expertise and 
8 Muller, Hilgard. 1967. South Africa in Today's Africa, Africa Institute Bullelin 5, 10: 304. 
9 For example, Barber and Barratt. 1990. South Africa's Foreign Policy; Barratt, John. 1973. Southern Af-
rica: Intra-Regional and International Relations. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs; 
Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation; Meinardus. 1980. Die Afrikapolitik der Republik Siidafrika. 
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finance for developmenUinvestment projects, in the context of which parastatal and private 
companies played a central role. This must be seen in the wider context of the developed 
Western nations providing development assistance to the underdeveloped parts of this world 
during the Cold War, "motivated by the need to maintain a presence in the Third World and to 
facilitate the fight against the spread of communism, which the West feared might get new 
impetus from the rapid industrialization of the Soviet Union".11 The report by Deputy Secre-
tary Killen, justifying technical assistance to the Comoros in the mid-1970s, examined in the 
later section on Secret Diplomacy, provides a nice illustration of the current thinking: "The 
Comores [sic] are desperately poor and undeveloped, and any well-directed technical assis-
tance which would assist in raising the standard of living and create employment prospects 
would serve our interests in helping to keep out alien philosophies and hostile influences".12 
South African technical assistance to African countries had its roots in the 1950s, when South 
Africa was still a member of the BIS, CCTA, CSA and FAMA. After Pretoria's exclusion 
from these bodies, it offered the same kind of assistance on a government-to-government ba-
sis, with the DFA co-ordinating the activities. 13 Given the diversity of projects, these were 
undertaken in co-operation with other governmental agencies, foremost with the Department 
of Agricultural Technical Services CATS).I' The Department of Foreign Affairs also co-
operated with the private and parastatal companies, presented in Chapter 2, in the establish-
ment of development/investment projects. It usually supported those projects or provided 
technical assistance in areas that were meaningful to the leaders of target states as the key 
figures in shaping foreign policy. By appealing to them in this way, the foreign service offi-
cials hoped to significantly alter their foreign policy to South Africa's advantage. This moti-
vation remained throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s, as evidenced in a report of Decem-
ber 1979 from Deputy Secretary Carl von Hirschberg, indicating where the priorities lay re-
garding the provision of technical assistance to the Comoros: "projects which are closest to 
the heart ofthe President and therefore likely to appeal to him. This is politically important". ls 
10 D'Oliveira. 1978. Vorster, pp.175, 214; Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.19; Guelke. 
1972. South African Foreign Policy in Africa, p.252; Swanepoel. 1982. Die diplomasie van Adv. B1 Vorster, 
p.160. Also Vorster's private collection (PV.206) at the ARCA. 
11 Ake, Claude. 2001. Development and Underdevelopment, in Joel Krieger, ed. The Oxford Companion to 
Politics of the World. New York: Oxford University Press: 218; Rist, Gilbert. 2003. The History of Develop-
ment: From Western Origins to Global Faith. London: Zed Books. 
12 'Visit of technical mission to Comoros: 18-23 July 1974. Diplomatic significance of visit', from Rae Kil-
len, I August 1974,p.1 (DFA, 11203/3, Vol. 1). 
13 Interview with Neil van Heerden, 7 April 1999. 
I. Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.l30. 
IS 'Visit to the Comoros Islands, 4-7 December 1979 ' , from Carl von Hirschberg to Brand Fourie, Pretoria, I 
May 1980, p.4 (DFA, 11203/3, Vol. 4). 
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The economic component and the related ambitions were crucial in the DFA's activities in 
both Malawi and Madagascar, the key countries in its Outward Movement, as we shall pres-
ently see. 
Malawi 
It seems likely that the Department of Foreign Affairs primarily targeted Malawi, a British 
colony until July 1964, due to its propinquity as an independent black African country situ-
ated close to South Africa's borders. Furthennore, President Hastings Kamuzu Banda ruled 
Malawi with a strong hand, and his conservative and western-oriented politico-ideological 
style made him a promising partner for Pretoria. In addition, and although outside of Preto-
ria's immediate sphere of influence, Malawi was strongly dependent on South Africa in tenns 
of trade, investment and employment for migrant mine workers. 16 The latter was pivotal for 
the promotion of close contact between the two countries after 1966. In April 1966, and as 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the Malawi Labour Representative in Johannesburg invited 
Under-Secretary Albie Burger and two other South African government officials to attend 
Malawi's July independence celebrations. This should only be "in their private capacity"", 
however, still reflecting some caution on Banda's part as his endeavour entailed the risk of a 
backlash from other African leaders. In accepting the offer, Burger was accompanied by a 
member of the Board of Trade and Industries, a Mr Kruger, and the Chief of the SADF, 
Werndly Renaut van der Riet." The reasons for the presence of the latter are uncertain, but it 
substantiates suggestions in the secondary literature that Pretoria gave Banda military support 
in return for a friendly position towards South Africa. 19 This initial contact appears to have 
been fruitful to both sides, as Burger subsequently, from 4 to 10 December 1966, led a trade 
mission to Malawi." In the decade that followed, more than a dozen official delegations, 
mainly composed of representatives from the departments involved in trade, finance, com-
merce, industry and development, paid reciprocal visits, of which only the most significant 
16 Chirwa, Wiseman Chijere. 1996. The Malawi Government and South African Labour Recruiters, 1974-92, 
Journal of Modern flj'rican Studies 34, 4: 623-642; Christiansen, Robert E., Jonathan G. Kydd. 1983. The Return 
of Malawian Labour from South Africa and Zimbabwe, Journal of Modern African Studies 21, 2: 311-326; 
Coleman, Audrey. 1972. International Labour Migration from Malawi, 1875-1966, Journal of Social Science 2: 
31-46; Hughes, Anthony. 1973. Malawi and South Africa' s Co-prosperity Sphere, in Zdenek Cervenka, ed. 
Land-Locked Countries of Africa. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies: 212-232. 
17 'Initial contact between South AfriCa/Malawi' , 22 September 1976, pp.6f. (DFA, 11158/3, Vol. 14). 
18 'Initial contact between South AfricalMalawi', 22 September 1976, pp.6f (DFA, 11158/3, Vol. 14). Also 
letter from Hastings Kamuzu Banda to Albie Burger, 15 June 1966; letter from Hastings Kamuzu Banda to Albie 
Burger,4 July 1966 (DFA, 11158/3, Vol. 8). On van der Riet, see Uys. 1992. South African Military Who's Who, 
1945-1992, p.247. 
19 Guelke. 1972. South African Foreign Policy in Africa, p.266. 
20 DFA, 11158/3, 2PL. 
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are mentioned now." From 12 to 19 March 1967, the Malawi Ministers of Natural Resources, 
Development and Planning, as well as Trade and Industry, visited South Africa to sign a trade 
agreement that sparked off increased economic interaction (Appendixes B and C). It was only 
at this stage that the close contact with Malawi became public knowledge,22 revealing the 
DFA's caution in only admitting such interaction once the practical and beneficial results to 
South Africa could be presented to the conservative Afrikaner whites critical of Pretoria's 
outreach into Africa. 
After the signing of the trade agreement, Banda wrote to Pretoria that he was confident 
that "there will now be increased opportunities for co-operation in various spheres"." Indeed, 
in order to facilitate communication between Malawi and South Africa, missions were opened 
in the country's capitals in September 1967 and diplomatic relations on an ambassadorial 
level were established. Further substantiating indications of military support for Banda, a 
Military Attache was also accredited at the South African Mission in Malawi." Yet, again 
reflecting Pretoria's fear of a white backlash, Malawi's first ambassador was of white skin 
colour. Subsequently, from 27 to 29 August 1968, Minister Muller met Banda in Malawi and 
discussed the possibility of a follow-up visit by Vorster. This proposal materialised in May 
1970, with Vorster being accompanied by Muller. At this stage, Vorster was confident enough 
to undertake such a step despite a possible rejection from conservative white voters. He was 
probably reassured by the inroads Pretoria had simultaneously made into more distant and 
more important black African countries, as will be shown in the following section on Dia-
logue. As the first visit of a South African executive to this independent black African state, 
Malawi, it was hailed as an "historic breakthrough" for the Outward Movement." However, 
the credit for this cannot entirely be attributed to the Department of Foreign Affairs alone. In 
particular, but for reasons that could not be clearly established, Piet Rautenbach, Vorster's 
Planning Adviser, was an important figure in maintaining contact between the two countries 
during 1969 and probably was responsible for arranging Vorster's eventual visit." A possible 
21 'Malawi' , pp.4-11, 14 (DFA, 11158/3, AJ 1979). 
22 'Malawians in white hotels', Rand Daily Mail 8 March 1967 (DFA, 11158/3, Vol. 2). 
23 Letter from Hastings Kamuzu Banda to Charles Roberts Swart (South African State President), Zomba, 29 
April 1967 (DFA, 11158/3, Vol. 8). 
24 Foreign Affairs List. Pretoria: DFA. 
2' Newspaper reports on the above events and visits are contained in ARCA, PV.118, File 3/2/8, and DFA, 
11158/3, Vol. 4. Also Barratt. 1970. South Africa' s Outward Movement, pp.133f.; Barratt. 1973. Southern Af-
rica , p.12; D'Oliveira. 1978. Vorster, p.218; Guelke. 1972. South African Foreign Policy in Africa, p.263; Kal-
ley, Jacqueline Audrey. 2001. South Africa's Treaties in Theory and Practice. /806-/998. Lanham, MD: Scare-
crow Press: 527,545, 557; Swanepoel. 1982. Die diplomasie van Adv. B.J. Varster, pp.176-182. 
26 Letter from Piet Rautenbach to Hastings Kamuzu Banda, Pretoria, May 1969 (DFA, 11158/3, Vol. 5); letter 
from Hastings Kamuzu Banda to Piet Rautenbach, Blantyre, 3 June 1969 (DFA, 11158/3, Vol. 8; ARCA, 
PV.132, File 2/6/1/19). 
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explanation was Rautenbach's experience as a Manager in the Industrial Development Corpo-
ration, as indicated in Chapter 2. His parallel involvement in promoting Pretoria's contact 
with Madagascar, detailed later in this section, is an indication of Muller's increasingly weak 
position in Vorster' s foreign policy making towards Africa. Vorster's meeting with Banda in 
Malawi in May 1970 was reciprocated in August 1971 , when Banda visited South Africa at 
the invitation of its State President and former Minister of Defence, Jim Fouche. Even though 
the State President was only a representative figure at the time, the first visit by the head of 
state of an independent black African country was significant. As a direct result, both coun-
tries upgraded their missions to embassies, which continued through to 1994,27 while Fouche 
and Muller returned Banda's visit in March 1972. The close ties between the two countries 
were strengthened by the involvement of South African companies in two major develop-
ment/investment projects, namely the construction of the new capital, Lilongwe, and the rail-
way link from Malawi to the Mozambican seaport ofNacala. They are now discussed in some 
detail, providing answers to the question raised in Chapter 1, namely how politics and busi-
ness interacted in Africa. 
At the time of independence, the southern town of Zomba served as Malawi's capital. 
President Banda argued that, to attract capital investment that had so far been focused on the 
southern town of Blantyre, it should be situated in the country's centre. It has been convinc-
ingly suggested, however, that his personal interest in bringing the centre of political power 
closer to his home terrain was decisive." Banda originally approached the British government 
to finance the building of the new capital at Lilongwe, two hundred kilometres north of 
Zomba. However, in early 1966, London concluded that this was a waste of money, and 
therefore refused to participate. 29 Banda did not abandon his plans and asked South Africa for 
support, one of many examples of an African leader utilising Pretoria'S willingness to provide 
assistance for political gain, to the benefit of the country concerned and often to the advantage 
of the leader himself. South African private firms, together with Pretoria's financial support, 
subsequently participated in what became known as the Lilongwe Capital Project, and despite 
critical voices from Under-Secretary Burger. In mid-1967, he wrote to Banda that the World 
Bank would not continue to provide financial aid to Malawi if he pursued the plan and wasted 
money on transferring the capital. Disturbed by this, Banda directly complained to Minister 
Muller: 
27 Foreign Affairs Lisl. Pretoria: DFA. (December 1971, September 1986, September 1991) 
28 Potts, Deborah. 1985. Capital Relocation in Africa: The Case of Lilongwe in Malawi, Geographical Jour-
naI151 , 2: 188. 
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I have just recently received confirmation from the World Bank that they are prepared to 
assist us by way of loans ( ... ) with no mention of such loans being conditional upon my 
abandoning my plans for Lilongwe. As you will know from what I have already told Mr. 
Burger, I am fmnly convinced beyond any shadow of doubt that the move of our Capital 
to Lilongwe is not only in the best interests of Malawi but an essential pre-requisite to the 
full development of my country, and it is my earnest hope that one of the fruits of the 
friendship which is being established between Our countries may be that I may count 
upon your Government to assist me to the best of their ability in the task of finding the 
necessary finance for this project.JO 
96 
A later OF A report states that the building of the new capital was a "prestige project for Ma-
lawi", while emphasising the importance of the project for Banda.'1 In the end, political logic 
and the ambition of winning a friend in black Africa prevailed over doubts that the project 
would lead to the economic development of Malawi's centre. 
On 6 October 1966, the Malawi Development Corporation signed an agreement with the 
Johannesburg-based company Imex, which became responsible for both the planning and de-
sign of the new capita!.32 The costs involved could not be established, but referring to the de-
velopment cost of a complete city as a whole, an Imex spokesperson explained to the Rand 
Daily Mail: "you can work it out that it will run into millions"." Imex had only been estab-
lished one month prior to the signing of the above agreement, with Anglo American, the IDC 
and Union Acceptances Limited (UAL), Anglo American's private merchant bank, formed in 
1955,34 as main shareholders. Klaus Oppenheimer, related to the Oppenheimer family who 
owned Anglo American and former General Manager of Credit Guarantee, was Imex's Man-
aging Director." In spite of Klaus Oppenheimer' s claim, in correspondence with us, of having 
kept his distance from the Oppenheimer family of Anglo American,36 this points to the con-
trary and indicates a family strategy to further diversify their economic activities. The above 
arrangements suggest that the IDC provided the Malawi government with the necessary loan, 
insured by Credit Guarantee, to employ Imex as the planning firm. There is little doubt that 
29 Banda' s speech before Malawi' s House of Representatives, 29 January 1968 (ARCA, PY.377, File I /A1 , 
Vol. I). 
JO Lener from Hastings Kamuzu Banda to Hilgard Muller, 4 September 1967, p.2 (DFA, 11158/3, Vol. 2PL). 
,I 'Malawi ', p.15 (DFA, 11158/3, AJ 1979). 
32 'Malawi opens doors', Th e Star 22 November 1966 (ARCA, PV.59, File KN 59/AZ/3/ 1); 'S.A. Trade Pact 
- Malawi has no regrets ', The Star 31 May 1967 (ARCA, PV.59, File KN 59/AZ/312). 
33 ' Big Malawi job for S.A.: Jo ' burg fIrm will build new capital', Rand Daily Mail 7 October 1966 (DFA, 
11 158/3, Vol. 2) . 
34 Innes. 1984. Anglo American and the Rise of Modern South Africa, p.166; Jones, Stuart. 1992. Union Ac-
ceptances: The First Merchant Bank, 1955-73, in Stuart Jones, ed. Financial Enterprise in South Africa since 
1950. Basingstoke: Macmillan: 166-18\. 
" Biddlecombe, Peter. 1966. IMEX: International Supermarket, Perspective 4,3: 12f.; ' Imex furls its sails ', 
Financial Mail 19 January 1968, p.153. 
36 Correspondence with Klaus Oppenheimer, 26 March 2002. 
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Klaus Oppenheimer's influential position in both Credit Guarantee and Imex was crucial in 
obtaining financing through the IDe. In order to get the project off the ground, he also en-
gaged the Department of Foreign Affairs, including Minister Muller, and the Department of 
Commerce and Industries. The cordiality displayed by Oppenheimer in a letter to Albie Bur-
ger indicates a keen interest on his part to obtain Pretoria's financial support in the form of an 
IDC loan, economically lucrative for the newly founded Imex and financially risk free due to 
Credit Guarantee's cover: 
I am sorry that the very tight programme has delayed my thanks to you for the time 
placed at our disposal in Cape Town last week when you and Mr. Steyn [Under-
Secretary, Department of Commerce and Industries 1 were good enough to discuss the 
Malawi situation with me. C .. • ) If I may suggest this, and if it meets with your own ar-
rangements and convenience it will probably be useful if I meet with you and Mr. Steyn 
again before the intended meeting between the Han. The Minister [Muller 1 and my 
Chairman." 
After the completion of the planning process, the construction work began, with Pretoria and 
South African firms again playing important roles. Rumours to that effect began to circulate 
in the South African press during December 1967,38 prior to the announcement, on 4 May 
1968, that the South African government granted a loan of 8 million Rand at the interest rate 
of 4%.39 Deducing from the financing arrangements in the development/investment project 
analysed next, it is likely that the IDC again provided the finances, insured by Credit Guaran-
tee. Regarding the participation of South African firms, the only indication is a note stating 
that the loan was "expressly tied to the condition that maximum use was made of South Afri-
can contractors and of South African materials when materials need to be imported" .'· How-
ever, we could only ascertain the identity of one company, the Johannesburg-based firm Do-
minion Earth Works that won the contract worth 1.4 million Rand for the construction of 
some fifty kilometres of the road from Zomba to Lilongwe." Malawi's new capital was even-
tually inaugurated in 1975." 
The second development/investment project in Malawi in which South Africa was in-
volved, the railway line to Nacala, provided the landlocked country with rail access to the sea 
for both import and export, and this was essential for Malawi 's economic development. In 
l1 Letter from Klaus Oppenheimer to Albie Burger, Johannesburg, 7 February 1967, p.l (DFA, 11158/3, Vol. 
2). 
38 'Banda may seek loan in Pretoria', The Star 22 December 1967 (OF A, 1/158/3, Vol. 4). 
39 'R8-m. loan to Malawi from South Africa', Th e Star 4 May 1968 (ARCA, PV.59, File KN 59/A2/312); 
Cockram. 1970. Vorster's Foreign Policy, p.142; Guelke. 1972. South African Foreign Policy in A/rica, p.265 . 
•• Cockr.m. 1970. Vorster's Foreign Policy, p.143. 
41 'Rll m Malawi contract for S.A. concern', Rand Daily Mail 8 May 1968 (DFA, 11158/3, Vol. 4); Cockram. 
1970. Vorster's Foreign Policy, p.143 . 
42 Potts. 1985. Capital Relocation in Africa, p.183. 
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Banda's search for an alternative to the Mozambican seaport of Beira, through which trading 
was relatively costly and slow, Nacala seemed idea!." The aim was to link this Mozambican 
harbour with Liwonde near Blantyre, Malawi' s economic centre. Of the entire seven hundred 
kilometres distance to be covered by a railway line, approximately one hundred covered the 
Malawi section to the Mozambican border. Banda had already secured some financing from 
the Japanese government for the project, but for the rest, he expressed the hope to Minister 
Muller in September 1967 "that it may be possible to find this from South Africa; anything 
therefore that you can do to assist us in this too I should naturally very greatly appreciate"." 
This was another instance where Banda counted on Pretoria's ability and preparedness to help 
with the purpose of making political inroads into black Africa. Banda' s calculations proved 
correct, and a few months later he was provided with the necessary financing. On 7 May 
1968, only three days after the announcement of the Lilongwe Capital Project loan, the IDC 
granted the Malawi authorities a credit of II million Rand. The construction of the railway 
line, the provision of rolling stock, locomotives and the necessary ancillaries was awarded to 
the Malawi Railway Construction Company, created by South Africa's engineering firm Rob-
erts Construction and the British firm Dorman Long". The IDC acted as the financier and 
Credit Guarantee as the insurer with the provision that 60% of the material, and not 70% as 
stipulated in its business guidelines, had to be bought from South Africa." The successful 
completion of this railway project is a good example of how the South African government 
and the country's business sector co-operated to the benefit of each other. While it helped 
Pretoria to fulfil its political ambitions in Malawi, it allowed Roberts Construction to land a 
profitable and risk free order. It also gave the firm privileged access to the Malawi govern-
ment; a photograph taken during a Malawi export workshop in mid-1972 shows Managing 
Director Bramwell sitting next to Malawi's first black ambassador to Pretoria from August 
1971 , Joe Kachingwe.47 
South Africa's economic links with Malawi encouraged the country's trade promotion 
organisations to become active, which reinforced Pretoria's political ambitions. From 30 Sep-
tember to 5 October 1968, the Durban Chamber of Commerce undertook a Business and 
43 'S.A. Trade Pact - Malawi has no regrets' , The Star 31 May 1967 (ARCA, PV.59, File KN 59/A2/3/2). 
44 Letter from Hastings Kamuzu Banda to Hilgard Muller, 4 September 1967, p.3 (DFA, 1/158/3, Vol. 2PL). 
" <http://www.dormanlong.com>. 
46 'RII m Malawi contract for SA concern' , Rand Daily Mail 8 May 1968 (DFA, 11158/3, Vol. 4); Cockram. 
1970. Vorster's Foreign Policy, pp.141ff.; Guelke. 1972. South African Foreign Policy in A/rica, p.265; 'The 
Rail Deal: Supersell in Malawi', SAFTO Exporter 5, 6, June 1968: 4f. 
47 'Malawi Workshop' , SAFTO Exporter 9, 9, September 1972: 1,4. 
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Goodwill Mission to Malawi," while Hoogendyk and Stockenstrom led a trade delegation 
from the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut there from 12 to 15 August 1969." The former mission, 
the first such venture by South African organised business to an independent black African 
state, was undertaken as a direct result of the signing of the trade agreement between the two 
countries in March 1967. The mission's final report concludes: "South African exporters 
should not underestimate the value of the Malawi market. Although relatively small at the 
moment, it has significant potential for the future and is as well a bridge over which South 
Africa can reach adjacent markets"." This reflected the initial enthusiasm of South African 
business in tapping the unexplored African markets. For example, a businessman who went to 
Malawi in the early 1970s expressed that he was "very excited" about the opportunities in that 
"unknown country, far, far away"." Yet, after its second mission to Malawi in November 
1973, the Chamber concluded more realistically that trade between the two countries still had 
not taken off the ground. 52 Although further stating that "Malawi certainly holds promise for 
the future and that South African exporters should seriously consider this market"," this hope 
was once more in vain, as indicated in the final report on the Chamber's third mission to Ma-
lawi in AprillMay 1979: "it would seem prudent to point out that Malawi is not a captive 
market"" The Chamber's decision to send three missions to Malawi, despite that country's 
low rating, was more than likely linked to Kenneth William Hobson, the Chamber's General 
Manager from 1965 to 1984. He had good connections with and knowledge of Malawi, as he 
had been a civil servant in the Ministry of Finance in the Government of the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland prior to becoming General Manager of the Association of Chambers 
of Commerce of that Federation." The relevance of the personality factor in this instance can 
be underlined by comparing it with SAFTO's approach. The South African Foreign Trade 
Organisation also displayed a special interest in Malawi, but not enjoying any special access 
to that country, it did not undertake any particular activities until 1972.'6 
" Report of the 1968 Business & Goodwill Mission to Malawi. 1968. Durban: Durban Chamber of Com-
merce. 
" ARCA, PV.132, File 2/6/ l/23. Mentioned by Cocleram. 1970. Vorster 's Foreign Policy, p.144. 
so Report of the 1968 Business & Goodwill Mission to Malawi. 1968. p.14. This report is contained in ARCA, 
PV.799, File S33/ 14/3/D(I). 
"Interview with James Barber, 16 February 1999, who recalls such a meeting. 
52 Report of the 1973 Trade Mission to Malawi. 1973. Durban: Durban Chamber of Commerce: 5. 
" Report of the 1973 Trade Mission to Malawi. 1973. p.12. 
54 Reunion, Mauritius, Mal([lvi . .. Report of 1979 Trade Mission. 1979. Durban: Durban Chamber of Com-
merce: 17. 
" Correspondence with Geoffrey Tyler, 27 February 2002. Also Who's Who of Southern Africa, 1981, p.323. 
' 6 SAFTO: Annual Report 1967/68-72173; SAFTO Exporter Vol. 1, 1964 - Vol. 30, 1993; 'Malawi: Export 
Opportunities on Your Doorstep' , SAFTO Lunchtime Export Workshop, Johannesburg, 7 September 1972 
(ARCA PV.799, File S3311411312(2)). 
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Ideologically close to the goverrunent, the AHI saw its Africa excursions as economic 
supplement to Pretoria's political Outward Movement. Political scientist James Barber de-
scribed this interplay fairly appropriately: "You get a like-minded group - that' s an Afrikaner 
elite - that share many values, that the project into Africa is seen as for the good of everybody 
and to the defence of the country, for the trade of the country, for the diplomatic break-
throughs of the country. So, it's a combined effort"." This finds explicit expression in the 
AHI press statement issued on the occasion of the trade mission's departure to Malawi: 
Above all, the A.H.I. is fully aware of the fact that the Republic of South Africa is part 
and parcel of the [African 1 continent. We believe that we must develop means so that the 
people on this continent, and particularly on the sub-continent, can assist each other and 
help develop one another. For that reason, we are prepared to share our business acumen, 
technological knowledge and ingenuity with less developed areas." 
Yet, despite its close links with the goverrunent, this remained the AHI's only activity in Af-
rica beyond southern Africa, because it did not rate Malawi as an overtly interesting market 
and because preference was given to the development of Afrikaner business at home, as mir-
rored in the mission' s final report on the Malawi visit: "There is no doubt that the country has 
possibilities for sound and profitable capital investment, and also opportunities for profitable 
development. It should be pointed out, however, that investment possibilities in the Republic 
of South Africa are probably greater and more promising"." 
Access to the DFA's Malawi files was restricted to the end of 1979, but the department's 
support for the above-described two development/investment projects had won Pretoria a reli-
able partner in Africa. There is therefore no indication that the bilateral relations between the 
two countries suffered any serious setback in the remaining period under review. However, 
Malawi's importance in South Africa' s foreign relations with black African countries beyond 
southern Africa declined due to the shift in Pretoria's focus on the countries further north dur-
ing the Dialogue period, examined in the next section. 
Madagascar 
Turning to Madagascar, the second country of importance in the Outward Movement, it was 
presided over by Philibert Tsiranana since its independence from France in June 1960. In 
comparison to Pretoria's relationship with Malawi, the reasons for the establishment of con-
tact with this country are less evident. In particular, there is no indication that France played a 
role in bringing these two countries together, as was crucially the case in Pretoria' s Dialogue 
57 Interview with James Barber, 16 February 1999. 
" ARCA, PV.799, File S33 /14/31D(1) (translation from Afrikaans). 
" ARCA, PV.799, File S33 /14/31D(1), p.16. 
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contacts, examined in the next section, and the factor of economic dependence was not as 
important as in the case of Malawi, because Tsiranana maintained close political and eco-
nomic relations with the former colonial power. As a result, Pretoria does not, initially, seem 
to have considered Madagascar a worthwhile partner and, in consequence, it was Tsiranana 
who made the first step. In October 1965, possibly being aware of South Africa's consider-
able expertise in the mining sector, he invited a mission to conduct a general survey of his 
country's sizeable and hitherto non-exploited deposits of chrome, graphite, bauxite and gold, 
and to make suggestions for their exploitation. Seeing this as a possibility to make relatively 
easy inroads into another independent African country, the Department of Foreign Affairs 
approved. The mission it subsequently deployed comprised representatives of the IDC, the 
state-financed Southern Oil Exploration Corporation (Soekor),60 the Afrikaner investment and 
mining company General Mining and Finance Corporation," as well as the Chamber of 
Mines.62 While no follow-up initiatives to the above mission are evident from the available 
DFA files, economic interaction between the two countries entered a new phase when Albie 
Burger led a mission, mainly consisting ofrepresentatives from the Departments of Tourism, 
Commerce and Industries, to Madagascar from 19 to 26 July 1967.63 Presumably as a result of 
this visit, and an indication of Pretoria's attempt for closer co-operation in the tourism sector 
to their mutual benefit, the number of flights between the two countries was increased from 
one to two per week.64 
Peripheral to these official contacts, private companies also showed an interest in Mada-
gascar. In March 1968, a five-man Anglo American delegation was dispatched in an explora-
tory mission, facilitated by its Paris representative, Serge Combard, and thereby strongly re-
sembling the way in which Pretoria sustained its Dialogue with Francophone Africa. After the 
mission' s return, P. Commeny, Technical Adviser to President Tsiranana," and Combard 
called on Albie Burger "to inform the South African Governrnent about the investment plans 
of Anglo-American in Madagascar, and to enquire whether, in principle, the South African 
Governrnent approved", as the Under-Secretary reported. His report further reveals that Anglo 
American's interests embraced nickel, bauxite and uranium mining." Soon thereafter, in late 
60 Reuvid, Jonathan. 1995. The Petroleum Industry, in Jonathan Reuvid, ed. Doing Business in South Africa. 
London: Cogan Page: 232-235; <http://www.soekor.co.za>. 
6' O'Meara. 1983 . Volkskapitalisme. 
62 DFA, 11115/3, Vol. 2PL. 
63 DFA, 11115/3, Vol. IA. 
64 DFA, 11115/3, Vols. 1,5; DFA 1111514, Vol. 3. 
" ' Compte-rendu d' une visite it Madagascar' , from Piet Rautenbach, Pretoria, 19 Mach 1969, p.1 (DFA, 
1/ 11514, Vol. I). 
66 Letter from Albie Burger, Pretoria, 8 April 1968 (DFA, 1/115/3, Vol. 3). 
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April 1968, one Mr. Robb from Anglo American contacted Burger in connection with a tele-
gram that he had received from Combard, informing him about the visit of a Malagasy minis-
terial delegation to South Africa in May. According to Burger' s report to Brand Fourie, Robb 
had asked for confirmation of this visit as Anglo American "would very much like to extend 
some hospitality" due to their "own interest in the development of the Malagasy Republic "Y 
Indeed, the Malagasy Minister of Finance and Commerce, his Special Adviser and the Direc-
tor for Trade came to South Africa from 27 April to 2 May 1968 to discuss matters of techni-
cal assistance and economic co-operation." Whether Burger responded to Robb's request is 
not reported, but the features of that account show that Anglo American performed like a for-
eign policy actor. Whether, and to what extent, Anglo American became involved in Mada-
gascar's mining sector is not recorded in the files. The secondary literature suggests that the 
company mined the nickel deposits in the mid-l 970s," but Anglo American Executive Direc-
tor, Spicer, argued in 1999 that nothing came off the ground because of the government's "na-
tionalistic policies",70 referring to the Marxist orientation ofTsiranana's successor after 1972. 
Still on the economic supplement to the official Malagasy-South African contacts, Afri-
kaner business also displayed some activity. From 7 to 19 November 1968, four businessman 
from the Afrikaner insurance, investment and mining companies Sanlam, Federale Volks-
beleggings and again the General Mining and Finance Corporation71 visited the island. They 
briefed officials from the Departments of Foreign Affairs, Finance and Commerce before and 
after the mission, an indication of the interest in closer contact with Pretoria. Their report, 
made available to the DFA, suggested that the "political climate C ... ) is most favourable to 
South Africa, but could receive a severe setback if no action follows our visit"." Quite likely 
due to this closer liaison, Vorster took this up by sending Planning Adviser Rautenbach and 
another Department of Planning official on an extended visit to Madagascar from 27 February 
to 12 March 1969. They considered the development of Nosy Be island in the northern tip of 
Madagascar to be "a good investment", as it was "comparable to Tahiti", and that by "concen-
trating on that island, tourism, commerce and other activities will combine to give a maxi-
mum retum".7l In conclusion, they recommended the deployment of an official South African 
67 Letter from Albie Burger to Brand Fourie, Pretoria, 24 April 1968 (DFA, 1/115/3, Vol. 3). 
" DFA, 1/11513, Vols. 2, 3. 
" Innes. 1984. Anglo American and the Rise 0/ Modern South A/rica, p.234; Meinardus. 1980. Die 
Ajrikapolitik der Republik Suda/rika, p.360. 
70 Interview with Michael Spicer, 7 April 1999. 
71 O'Meara. 1983. Volhkapitalisme. 
" Report of that mission, pp.l , 9 (DFA, 1/ 115/3, Vol. 3). 
7l 'Compte-rendu d'une visite a Madagascar' , from Piet Rautenbach, Pretoria, 19 March 1969, pp.3 , 6f. 
(DFA, 11115/4, Vol. I). Also DFA, 1/115/3, Vols. 3, 4. 
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mission to Madagascar for further investigation of the project. Led by Deputy Secretary 
Robert Montgomery, that mission took place from 18 to 25 November 1969," concluding that 
a hotel project would be viable." 
Probably as a result of the Anglo American mission to Madagascar in March 1968, which 
had investigated various "investment plans", the hotel chain Southern Sun became involved in 
the hotel project. Despite Anglo American's focus on mining, tourism was "also involved", as 
Burger reported after the above meeting with Serge Combard and Tsiranana's Technical Ad-
viser.76 The multinational's interest in this sector must have been motivated by its participa-
tion in South Afiican Breweries, the major shareholder in Southern Sun, even though Anglo 
American Executive Director, Spicer, unconvincingly argued that this had always been "a 
minority indirect position" and that "it simply wouldn't register on our radar screen" how 
South African Breweries "handles its business".77 Yet, within only six months after Anglo 
American's mission to Madagascar, South African Breweries engaged itself in the project and 
the South Afiican press subsequently reported on the envisaged construction of a five-star 
hotel with costs of 2 million Rand." In December 1969, South Afiican Breweries presented 
its "preliminary thinking" to the Department of Foreign Affairs, proving another example of 
co-operation that served both Pretoria' s political ambitions and the company's profit-seeking 
interests. With its proposal, South African Breweries asked for Pretoria "to provide 70% of 
the capital costs of the hotel at an interest rate of 7% per annum", while Anglo American it-
self was going to "provide the remaining 30% ( ... ) in the form of equity capital". Repayment 
would start after ten years and take place over a period of fifteen years, while Pretoria was 
again "asked to guarantee the entire hotel project against nationalisation by the Malagasy 
Government"." Further developments reveal that the Department of Foreign Affairs adopted 
that proposal, thus providing South Afiican access to another black Afiican country for a rela-
tively small investment, in comparison to the 19 million loan made to Malawi. 
During the discussions with a Malagasy delegation that visited the Republic in late June 
1970, Pretoria proposed granting a "low-interest loan" of 2 million Rand to the Malagasy 
government "for the development of the Nossi Be infrastructure", "dependent upon the satis-
factory conclusion of detailed negotiations to be entered into by S.A. Breweries/Southern Sun 
Hotel Corporation group ( .. ) with the Malagasy Government". The proposal further reveals 
74 DFA, 11115/3, Vol. 5; 11115/411, Vol. l. 
75 DFA, 11115/4, Vol. 3; 1/115/411, Vol. l. 
76 Letter from Albie Burger, Pretoria, 8 April 1968 (DFA, 11115/3 , Vol. 3). 
77 Interview with Michael Spicer, 7 April 1999. 
7S ' S.A. Aid Offer to Madagascar ' , The Star 20 January 1970 (AReA, PV.451, File 111113511). 
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that Pretoria was prepared to offer South African Breweries a loan at even softer conditions 
than originally requested by them. The estimated cost of2.2 million Rand was to be shared, as 
suggested by South African Breweries, with the IDC providing and Credit Guarantee insuring 
a 1.5 million Rand loan to the Malagasy government at an interest rate of only 6% and for 
repayment in six-monthly instalments over ten years after the date of completion of the pro-
ject." From 15 to 25 August 1970, further discussions on the proposal took place between a 
visiting Malagasy delegation, Brand Fourie, two DF A officials from the Africa Division, Piet 
Rautenbach, the Deputy Secretary in the Department of Finance, an IDC representative and 
Jan Bouwer from Credit Guarantee." The composition of that delegation suggests, first, that 
the Department of Foreign Affairs did not accept Rautenbach's role as the sole mediator be-
tween the two countries, and the evidence presented here indicates, once again, the impor-
tance of the economic component within the Outward Movement. 
The hotel deal was finalised in the following months and signed by Minister Muller in 
Antananarivo during a visit to the island from 19 to 21 November 1970. On this occasion, he 
was accompanied by Brand Fourie, Counsellor Jeremy Shearar, Rautenbach, his Private Sec-
retary, two high-ranking representatives from the IDC, the Chairman and Managing Director 
of South African Breweries," as well as Southern Sun Directors Sol Kerzner and John Howell 
Ward." The agreement detailed the government-to-government loan of 2.32 million Rand at 
the interest rate of 4% to be repaid in six-monthly instalments only twelve years after comple-
tion of the project and over a period of ten years. This loan, for which Credit Guarantee pro-
vided insurance, was to be used for the improvement and upgrading of the infrastructure at 
Nosy Be, particularly water and electricity supplies, a tarred road to the hotel and the exten-
sion of the airfield to provide landing facilities for large aircraft the size of a Boeing 737."' In 
a separate agreement, the IDC granted the Malagasy government a credit of 1.5 million Rand 
to be used for the construction of the hotel. The facilities were an interest rate of 6%, credit 
repayment in six-monthly instalments after February 1983 and over a period often years, with 
79 'Hotel project - Nossi Be', Johannesburg, 8 December 1969, pp.lfI. (DFA, 11115/4/1, Vol. I). 
" 'Working paper: Nossi Be', Pretoria, 22 June 1970, pp.I-4 (DFA, 11115/4/ 1, Vol. 2; also Vol. 1) . 
81 DFA, 11115/4/1, Vol. 1. 
82 They were Frans Johannes Cornelius Cronje and Richard John 'Dick' Goss. See Who's Who of Southern 
Africa. 1970, pp.259, 403 . 
"DFA, 1/115/3, Vol. 6. On Howell, see Who's Who of Southern Africa, 1970, p.1034. 
84 'Loan Agreement entered into by and between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the 
Government of the Malagasy Republic ', signed by Hilgard Muller and Jacques-Felicien Rabemanajara (Mala-
gasy Vice-President and Minister for Foreign Social Affairs), Antananarivo, 20 November 1970, Articles II and 
III (DFA, 11115/411, Vol. 3). An earlier draft is contained inDFA, 11115/4/ 1, AJ 1969. 
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Credit Guarantee insuring the deal." Pretoria subsequently announced this in a press state-
ment." Compared with Credit Guarantee's and the IDC's normal business practices, the terms 
and conditions of the two agreements were particularly soft for the credit taker. This again 
illustrates that the economy served the interests of Pretoria's political ambitions, and not the 
opposite way, even though, of course, the involved companies benefited from such deals in 
financial terms. 
South Africa's initiative in upgrading the island's tourist infrastructure also received impe-
tus from Malawi's President Banda. In him, Pretoria had evidently found a reliable and sup-
portive partner who even tried to convince his fellow African statesmen to seek contact with 
South Africa. During Tsiranana's visit to Malawi in early April 1969, Banda proposed the 
idea to him," and they both subsequently agreed that tourism should be developed in southern 
Africa, including South Africa. Yet, Banda was not entirely successful, as Madagascar did not 
join the Southern African Regional Tourism Council (SARTOC), established in May 1971 by 
Malawi, South Africa and Swaziland" However, and in the context of the Banda-Tsiranana 
meeting, Pierre-Jerome Ullmann organised a tourism seminar that took place in Antananarivo 
in June 1969. Of subsequent importance, he was the director of both the management and 
industrial consulting firms Bedeaux Africa in Johannesburg and Inter-Afrique Services in 
Madagascar." The nature of his businesses could not be ascertained, but Ullman's presence in 
both countries seems to have been the reason for him to become, by the late 1960s, the DFA's 
middleman with Antananarivo. In particular, he was instrumental in interesting South Africa 
in the construction of a dry dock in northern Madagascar, as detailed in the following para-
graphs. 
The sea route around the Cape and through the Mozambique Channel was of strategic sig-
nificance for freight shipping after the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967 that resulted in in-
creased oil tankers traffic from the Persian Gulfto both Europe and North America, as will be 
discussed later in this chapter. As shipyards and dry docks with the depth to accommodate 
" 'Memorandum of Agreement entered into by and between the Government of the Malagasy Republic and 
la Societe Anonyme Malgache des Hotels "Southern Sun" and Southern Sun Hotel Corporation (Proprietary) 
Limited and the Export Finance Company of South Africa (Proprietary) Limited', pp.3f. (DFA, III 15/411, AJ 
1970); 
86 ' Press release: South AfricalMadagascar loan agreement - embargoed until 0100 hours Saturday 14th No-
vember, 1970', pp.lf. (DFA, 11115/411, Vol. 3); ' S.A. to assist tourism in Madagascar', Rand Daily Mail 14 
November 1970 (ARCA, PV.451 , File 1111135/1). Also Guelke. 1972. South African Foreign Policy in Africa, 
p.268. 
'7 Banda's speech on 9 April 1969 is contained in DFA, 1/ 115/3, Vol. 4. 
88 'South African Regional Tourism Council', Newsletter of the South African Institute of International Af-
fairs 3, August 1971 : 35; Kalley. 2001. South Africa 'S Treaties in Theory and Practice, 1806-1998, p.564. 
'9 DFA, 11115/3, Vols. 3, 4. On Ullmann, see Who's Who of Southern Africa, 1972, p.988. 
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these tankers were non-existent along most of the route at that time, Narinda Bay, situated in 
the upper region of Madagascar's west coast, was considered as a possibility to counter this 
lack. In 1969, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) granted credit of half a million Rand 
to the Malagasy government for the financing of a viability study. A French firm presented a 
preliminary study in 1970,90 concluding in April 1972 that the project was economically 
sound.'1 Pretoria was informed of this project during Muller' s visit to Madagascar in Novem-
ber 1970, while Ullmann further updated Muller and Fourie of developments in March 1971." 
In line with the approach of providing technical assistance and assisting in develop-
ment/investment projects to win over African friends, the foreign affairs ministry saw this as a 
unique opportunity to significantly expand and strengthen the bilateral contacts. However, 
Pretoria was faced with a dilemma; it had to decide between improving and extending the 
facilities in Cape Town or Richards Bay, north of Durban, to permit the docking of oil tankers 
and thereby contribute to the country's economy, and supporting the Narinda Bay project for 
political reasons." The financial and opportunity-cost implications of the Narinda Bay project 
complicated South Africa's participation. First, the original cost estimated 30 million Rand" 
rose to circa 50 million by June 1972." Second, the Industrial Development Corporation 
would normally have provided the loan, but by the nature of its status as a parastatal, was 
"bound to continue investigating the Cape Town project and the Minister [of Foreign Affairs] 
did not know how the Government would react when this scheme was finally put up to them 
for consideration", as a DF A report stated.96 While the political considerations spoke in favour 
ofthe Narinda Bay project, the financial aspects pointed towards the upgrading of either Cape 
Town or Richards Bay. 
After Ullmann's meeting with Muller and Fourie in March 1971, the Department of For-
eign Affairs pursued the Narinda Bay project more stringently to bolster the Outward Move-
ment. From June to August 1971, a number of delegations paid reciprocal visits to discuss the 
90 DFA, 1/115/4/2, All970 (two copies). 
91 DFA, 1/115/4/2, Vol. 2. 
92 'Summary of discussions in Cape Town on 1 March 1971 between the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Mr P.J. Ullmann, Inter-Afrique Advisory Services' , Cape Town, 3 March 1971 
(DFA, 11115/412, Vol. 1). 
9J 'The Narinda Bay project ', Cape Town, April 1971, p.5 (DFA, 11115/412). 
" 'Summary of discussions in Cape Town on 1 March 1971 between the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Mr P.J. Ullmann, Inter-Afrique Advisory Services', Cape Town, 3 March 
1971 , p.6 (DFA, 1/1151412 , Vol. I). 
os DFA, 111151412, Vol. 2. 
96 'Summary of discussions in Cape Town on 1 March 1971 between the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Mr P.J. Ullmann, Inter-Afrique Advisory Services', Cape Town, 3 March 
1971,p.8 (DFA, 1/ 115/412, Vol. 1). 
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details of South Africa' s participation." Most importantly, on 23 June 1971 , Pierre-Jerome 
Ullmann met Deputy Secretary John Montgomery, Under-Secretary Norman Best and Coun-
sellor Jeremy Shearar to report on the results of his contacts with South Africa's business sec-
tor since the March meeting. According to him, an IDC representative had expressed a clear 
preference for the upgrading of Cape Town harbour. Ullmann' s discussions with Basil Her-
sov, Managing Director of Anglovaal and a South Africa Foundation Trustee, were similarly 
not conducive to obtaining South African assistance. While the IDC's stance as a parastatal is 
understandable, Hersov' s attitude is surprising in the light of his position at the Foundation 
that had more than a little interest in improving South Africa' s image abroad. However, the 
benefit to his firm Anglovaal possibly becoming involved in improving and extending South 
African harbours appears to have outweighed the political incentives, thus not being compati-
ble with the DFA's view. Despite these sobering responses, but being aware of the DF A's 
stance and possibly pursuing his own business interests in the project, Ullmann tried to im-
press the foreign service officials by once again stressing "the political importance which the 
Malagasy Government attaches to the Narinda project" and that its abandonment "could seri-
ously affect the climate of relations between the two countries".98 In view of later develop-
ments and the fact that the DF A files contain no record of further activity on the Narinda Bay 
project, we argue that the Department of Foreign Affairs' standpoint could not compete with 
South Africa' s own economic interests. 
The DFA's policy of promoting development/investment projects in Madagascar for po-
litical gain was halted in June 1972, when Tsiranana was ousted in a coup d'etat led by Colo-
nel Didier Ratsiraka, a Marxist. In view of his political stance, Ratsiraka' s position vis-a-vis 
Pretoria was completely different to that of his predecessor. In an interview granted to a local 
newspaper on 24 June, he answered the question of whether the new government would 
abandon its official contacts with South Africa as follows: "Yes, because this policy has not 
given the expected results. We are therefore going to make a radical change"." His coming to 
power negatively affected the progress of South Africa' s development/investment projects in 
Madagascar. Even though the hotel project in Nosy Be had seen satisfactory development, 
Ratsiraka stated in the above interview that "the Malagasy government will take control of the 
realisation of the hotel at Nossi-Be".'oo South Africa's press instantly reported this and cited 
97 DFA, 111 15/3, Vol. 6, AJ 1971 ; DFA, 1/115/412. 
98 ' Relations with Madagascar: discussions with Mr PJ. Ullmann, Pretoria, 23 June 1971 ', Pretoria, June 
1971, pp.5, 2 (DFA, 1/1151412, Vol. I). 
99 Interview to Malin (Antananarivo) 24 June 1972 (DFA, 11115/4/2, Vol. 2). 
100 Interview to Malin (Antananarivo) 24 June 1972 (DFA, 11115/412, Vol. 2). 
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Southern Sun Chainnan Sol Kerzner who described Ratsiraka's decision to cancel the agree-
ment as "a great blow". '0' However, the South Africans did not lose all investment, as delega-
tions from both countries discussed the matter in Paris in December 1972 and the Malagasy 
government was prepared to honour the agreements. The People' s Republic of China, sym-
bolic of the island's new political orientation, granted Ratsiraka the necessary finances to re-
pay the 10ans.'02 The South African hotel project finally ended in March 1973, when the 
Malagasy government fully repaid both loans.103 In contrast to that, Ratsiraka did not express 
any intention of forcing the South Africans to withdraw from the Narinda Bay project, as this 
was probably more important for the country' s economic development. In the above inter-
view, for example, he argued that "Madagascar is not strong enough to prevent South Africa 
from doing this (pursue the Cape Town option]. If the country restarts its own project, things 
will be very clear: its decision to take an interest in Narinda will then have been tainted with a 
taste of imperialism". '04 In pursuit of its own economic interests, Pretoria did indeed disen-
gage from the project, and the IDC financed the construction of a 20 million Rand dry dock in 
Saldanha Bay, north of Cape Town. lOS In response to this, during his speech at the UN General 
Assembly in 1972, Ratsiraka accused South Africa of having withdrawn to punish his gov-
ernment for its political stance "by using measures of extortion such as sabotage or the aban-
donment of certain economic projects that might have been great sources of income for our 
country".IO' The Narinda Bay project received a final blow in September 1972, when the 
World Bank's International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) decided to 
construct a dry dock in Dakar, Senegal.'o, 
Lusaka Manifesto 
In assessing the progress of the Outward Movement since 1966, the DFA' s initiatives in Af-
rica only produced one tangible result, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Malawi 
and Banda's and Vorster's reciprocal visits. Yet, given Malawi's economic dependence from 
South Africa and its relative insignificance in continental matters, it was only a relative suc-
cess. Nonetheless, it had some impact on Africa's unified anti-apartheid position. In particu-
'0' ' Malagasy shock: S.A. may lose mi ll ions', Sunday Express 25 June 1972 (ARCA, PV.59, File KN 
59/ A2/5/3). 
,o' DFA,11l15/4/ I , Vol. 4. 
'03 DFA, 11115/4/1, Vol. 5; 11115/4/111 , Vol. 3. Also Rogerson. 1990. Sun International, pp.346f. 
'04 Interview to Matin (Antananarivo) 24 June 1972 (DF A, 11115/412, Vol. 2). 
'os Pretoria News 25 August 1972 (DFA, 11115/412, Vol. 2). 
'06 UN document AlPV.2055 (27): 43f. (DFA, 111/51412, Vol. 2). 
'0' Letter from Roger Chaufournier (Director, West Africa, IBRD) to Abdou Diouf (Prime Minister, Sene-
gal), 28 September 1972 (DFA, 1/115/412, Vol. 3). 
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lar, Malawi, together with South Africa and Portugal, the latter being befriended by Pretoria 
because of co-operation over Lisbon' s colonies Angola and Mozambique, abstained when the 
UN General Assembly voted on the so-called Lusaka Manifesto in November 1969,108 which 
became the guiding document for Africa's position vis-a-vis South Africa for the next twenty 
years. This document had previously been adopted by thirteen black African states lO9 at the 
Fifth Summit of Eastem and Central African States in the Zambian capital on 16 April 1969, 
and by the OAU in September of that year. As the first major assessment of African policy 
towards South Africa, the Lusaka Manifesto opened the door for some contact with Pretoria, 
giving room to those countries that later did establish such an exchange, and it therefore is of 
great significance to this study. The strategy document registered something of a retreat from 
the OAU's uncompromising stand towards South Africa, emphasising a preference for con-
ciliation and non-violent change, yet calling for the boycott and isolation of South Africa if it 
showed no signs of abandoning apartheid. Paragraph 12 stated: "On the objective of liberation 
as thus defined, we can neither surrender nor compromise. We have always preferred and we 
still prefer, to achieve it without physical violence. We would prefer to negotiate rather than 
destroy, to talk rather than kill". It was thus a compromise between those African states advo-
cating confrontation and those favouring contact with South Africa. It supported those Afri-
can countries that fundamentally rejected apartheid, but also legitimised those who interpreted 
it as allowing contact with Pretoria. llo Nevertheless, when comparing the pragmatic approach 
expressed in the Lusaka Manifesto with Pretoria's overall task of winning over black African 
states so that they would refrain from constantly attacking South Africa in diplomatic forums, 
the DFA's approach of utilising its economic levers fell short of achieving this aim. 
In addition to the Department of Foreign Affairs' policy not having achieved the desired 
political results, the contentious issue of black ambassadors in South Africa, raised in the con-
text of the Outward Movement, was a contributory factor that brought to the fore the struggle 
between the verligte (enlightened) and verkrampte (constricted) that eventually led to a split 
within the ruling National Party in 1969. Another reason for this break-up was Vorster's 
108 Reprinted in Africa Contemporary Record, 1969-70: C41-C45. 
109 Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Congolese Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia. 
11 0 Barber and Barratt. 1990. South Africa's Foreign Policy, pp.146f. ; Barratt. 1973. Southern A/rica, pp.14f.; 
Guelke. 1972. South A/rican Foreign Policy in A/rica, pp.270f.; Klotz. 1995. Norms in International Relations, 
p.76; Mugomba, Agrippah Tshabby. 1977. The Foreign Policy o/Despair: A/rica and the Sales 0/ Arms to South 
Africa. Kampala: East African Literature Bureau: 191. 
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mixed sports policy, allowing non-white teams to play in South Africa. lll Pretoria had persis-
tently tried to avoid such a split by mooting the idea of diplomatic suburbs for black African 
ambassadors, by allowing Malawi only to send a white ambassador in 1967, by Vorster and 
Muller trying to assure the electorate that relations would only be established with well-
disposed African states and by Muller emphasising that "nothing will be done that is not to 
South Africa's advantage".112 Yet, despite these reassurances, the ultraconservative section 
broke away from the NP and formed the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP).113 It understood 
Vorster' s mixed sports policy and the Outward Movement to be slow, but perceptible moves 
towards the dismantling of apartheid. It did not generate a large following, but was a constant 
reminder of the political divisions within Afrikanerdom and thereby weakened the Afrikaner-
dominated government. 114 Afrikaner conservatism was a factor that required consideration in 
the formulation of South Africa's foreign policy toward Africa. Any move that could be con-
strued as undermining the privileged status of these whites might have political repercussions 
at home. The HNP's mere existence curtailed Pretoria's visible endeavours in Africa. II ' 
This limitation did not apply so much to the military's Africa approach, one that resulted 
in the Dialogue policy and the subject of the next section. Even though it ran parallel to the 
DFA' s Outward Movement, the military's activities were not hampered, because, and in stark 
contrast to those of the Department of Foreign Affairs, they were not conducted in public. 
Furthermore, they took place in close co-operation with partner France and produced tangible 
results with the pro-Dialogue statement of Ivorian President Felix Houphouet-Boigny in No-
vember 1970 that proved to be of vital importance for Pretoria. 
Dialogue 
The purpose of this section is to examine the developments leading to the Dialogue strategy 
that dominated Pretoria's Africa policy from about 1969 to 1972173. Initially the military was 
the principal actor, heavily reliant on co-operation with France and two of its former key 
colonies in Francophone Africa, as well as engaging in rivalry with the foreign service offi-
III Serfontein, Jan Hendrik Philippus 'Hennie ' . 1970. Die verkramp!e aanslag. Kaapstad: Human & Rous-
seau: 110-116; Schoeman, Beaumont M. 1974. Vorster se 100 doe. Kaapstad: Human & Rousseau. Schoeman 
was a leading verkrampte journalist, and cruefpropagandist of the HNP. 
112 Muller. 1967. South Africa in Today' s Africa, p.305. 
113 Literally translated: Reconstituted National Party. 
114 Barratt. 1970. South Africa ' s Outward Movement, pp.138f. ; Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isola-
tion, p.34; Guelke. 1972. South African Foreign Policy in Africa, pp.275f.; Jaster. 1988. The Defence of White 
Power, pp.23, 46; Olivier. 1973. Die grondslae van Suid-Afrika se buitelandse beleid, p.249; Stevens. 1970. 
South Africa and Independent Black Africa, p.3l . 
115 De SI. JOITe. 1977. South Africa, pp.78ff. 
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cials who were bent on profiting from their efforts. We now analyse these features chrono-
logically. 
Originating in Malan' s Africa Charter of 1949, the military sought to playa continental 
role alongside the colonial powers, an ambition that remained even after African independ-
ence, as shown in the section on the Congo crisis in Chapter 3. While the military's relatively 
limited capacity to conduct war was the probable reason for it not to assume a more active 
role in this instance, the situation changed in the mid-1960s, with a significantly expanded 
arsenal due to arms deliveries, from France in particular. This also gave it necessary confi-
dence to playa more prominent role further north than the Congo, namely in the Nigerian 
Civil War from 1967 to 1970, the complexities of which will be outlined below. In fact, we 
argue that the military attempted to play the role of continental gendarme or African super-
power, the latter term being borrowed from ajournalistic account of the SADF's involvement 
in the Angolan war of the mid-1970s. II' While seemingly a contradiction to the DFA's Out-
ward Movement, the military saw its activities as compatible to, and within the ambit of, Pre-
toria' s stated policy objective of achieving acceptance by black African states. For example, a 
paper presented by a SADF Cornmandant at a South African conference on the Outward 
Movement in 1969 was entitled "The Military-strategic Aspect of the Outward Movement", 
part of which read: "Everything must thus be done to prevent isolation, and the most effective 
manner to achieve this is to undertake well thought-out and energetic activities to establish 
ever more ties of friendship and co-operation with other countries in as many fields as possi-
ble". To achieve this goal, the main emphasis was on South Africa's fight against the "com-
munist threat" and how this might appeal to other African states. 111 This aptly illustrates that 
the various departments involved, in their attempt to raise their status in government, pursued 
different approaches to appeal to African countries. These differing policies led to unequal 
successes, and resulted in interdepartmental jealousy. For example, Minister Muller later 
claimed that Dialogue was the result of the DFA's endeavours/IS even though, and as we will 
see shortly, it had been initiated by the military. Given the latter's co-operation with France 
over Dialogue,II' the following paragraphs examine the framework in which this took place, 
II' Moorcraft, Paul L. 1981. Africa's Super Power. Johannesburg: SygmaiCollins. 
117 Grobbelaar, D.B.H. 1970. Die militer-strategiese aspek van die Uitwaartse Beweging, in Suid-Afrika in 
Uitwaartse Beweging. Referate gelewer by geleentheid van die derde simposium oor die internasionale politiek, 
Potchefstroom, 22 Augustus 1969. Potchefstroom: Sentrum vir Internasionale Politiek, Potchefstroomse 
Universiteit vir Christel ike Hoer Onderwys: 60-65. 
11 8 Muller, H. 1967. South Africa in Today's Africa, p.305 . 
II' Daddieh, Cyril Kotie. 1984. Ivory Coast, in Timothy Milton Shaw, Olajide A1uko, eds. The Political 
Economy of African Foreign Policy: Comparative Analysis. A1dershot: Gower: 133, 136. Also Yao, Bernard K. 
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analysing France's Africa policy, followed by details on the bilateral Franco-South African 
relationship. 
Great Britain aside, France was the colonial power with the most territorial possessions on 
the African continent, located mainly in West and Central Africa. Although the decolonisation 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s removed its direct political control over these areas, France 
successfully managed to institutionalise and cement the political, economic, military and cul-
tural ties with its former African colonies, by means of defence agreements and the creation 
of a common CFA monetary area with a fixed exchange rate. While the majority of Franco-
phone African countries remained within the French sphere of influence, particularly close 
relations were maintained with an inner core group, namely and in order of importance, the 
Ivory Coast, Gabon, the Central African Republic (C.A.R.) and Senegal. With the exception 
of the latter, they all concluded defence and military assistance agreements with France im-
mediately after their independence. l20 Yet, the relations between Francophone African coun-
tries and their former colonial power were interdependent. While in need of French military 
support and economic assistance, most Francophone African leaders accepted, and even en-
joyed, being part of the French system. They continued to perceive themselves as belonging 
to the intellectual and political life of the former colonial power, and it accorded them a cer-
tain grandeur to be received by the French President on the same footing as the US President, 
for example. For France, on the other hand, the wielding of power in Francophone Africa was 
central to its ambition of becoming a global power in world politics, a situation that gave 
these countries some form of leverage. 121 This applied particularly to Ivorian President 
Houphouet-Boigny who influenced Paris to become involved in the Nigerian Civil War, as we 
will see below. 
Similar to Pretoria' s foreign policy making towards Africa, a small number of officials in 
Paris influenced France's foreign relations with South Africa and other African states. The 
1991 . Cote d'lvoire - Afrique du Sud: I'aboutissement du dialogue, Revue juridique et politique: independance 
et cooperation 45 , 2: 148. 
120 Hargreaves, John Desmond. 1995. Decolonisation: French and British Styles, in Anthony Kirk-Greene, 
Daniel C. Bach, eds. State and Society in Francophone Africa since Independence. New York: SI. Martin's 
Press: 3-15; Panter-Brick, Samuel Keith. 1988. Independence, French Style, in Prosser Gifford, and William 
Roger Louis, eds. Decolonization and African Independence: The Transfers of Power, 1960-1980. New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press: 73-104. 
121 Chafer, Tony. 2001. French African Policy in Historical Perspective, Journal of Contemporary African 
Studies 19, 2: 177. Also Chipman, John. 1985. French Military Policy and African Security. London: Institute 
for Strategic Studies: 25; Chipman, John. 1989. French Power in Africa. Oxford: Basil Blackwell: 8, 115f., 120, 
149, 227,232, 241 , 256; Harshe, Rajen. 1983. France, Francophone African States and South Africa: The Com-
plex Triangle and Apartheid, Alternatives 9, 1: 52; McNamara. 1989. France in Black Africa, pp.149, 210; 
Nwokedi, Emeka. 1989. France's Africa: A Struggle Between Exclusivity and Interdependence, in Ralph Iheanyi 
Onwuka, Timothy Milton Shaw, eds. Africa in World Politics: Into the 1990s. Basingstoke: Macmillan: 192f.; 
Renou, Xavier. 2002. A New French Policy for Africa?, Journal of Contemporary African Studies 20, I: 6f. 
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personalities now introduced are essential in understanding the modus operandi of the Paris-
Pretoria alliance in Francophone Africa in the late 1960s and early 1970s. A dominant role 
was played by Jacques Foccart who was instrumental in shaping Franco-African affairs and in 
maintaining the Paris-Pretoria alliance in Africa during that period. A quotation from the sec-
ondary literature aptly reflects this: "With the exception of [French President Charles] de 
Gaulle himself, no other Frenchman has left a greater imprint on France's relations with Fran-
cophone black Africa".''' Embodying French-Francophone African relations, Foccart's influ-
ence stemmed from an elaborate network of personal connections to the African political 
elite, the French military and intelligence, and it is probably no exaggeration to say that "little 
went on in Francophone Africa that Foccart was not quickly made aware of'l23 Foccart laid 
the foundation for his "bureaucratic predominance in all things African",'" as suggested by 
Francis Terry McNamara, US Ambassador to Gabon from 1981 to 1984, with the work in his 
family 's business of an import-export company that primarily traded with France's African 
colonies prior to World War II, and this resulted in Foccart making many important acquaint-
ances there. '" In France, Foccart's close contact with the politico-military and intelligence 
establishment was rooted in his involvement in the French Resistance during World War II, 
when he became a close confidant of General Charles de Gaulle. Foccart later assisted the 
General in establishing the future ruling Gaullist party and accompanied him on pre-
presidential visits, including Africa, during the 1950s. In 1961, two years after the assumption 
of the presidency, de Gaulle chose Foccart to serve as the first Secretary General in the Presi-
dency of the Republic for African and Malagasy Affairs, a position he held until May 1974.'26 
During de Gaulle's presidency, lasting from 1959 to April 1969, this agency was the key ve-
hicle in formulating French Africa policy. Consequently, Foccart "was at the elbow of his 
own president and in constant touch with African presidents and their important ministers".127 
De Gaulle's successor from July 1969 to April 1974, Georges Pompidou, was less interested 
122 Andereggen, Anton. 1994. France's Relationship with Subsaharan Africa. Westport, CT: Praeger: 77. 
Also Chipman. 1989. French Power in Africa, p.233. 
123 Andereggen. 1994. France's Relationship with Subsaharan Africa, p.77. 
124 McNamara. 1989. France in Black Africa, p.187. 
125 Faligot, Roger, Pascal Krop. 1985. La piscine: les services secretsfran,ais, 1944-1984. Paris: Editions du 
Seuil: 223. 
126 Faligot and Krop. 1985. La piscine, pp.11, 13, IS, 223ft: ; McNamara. 1989. France in Black Africa, 
p.190; Munzinger Archiv; Shennan, Andrew. 1993. De Gaulle. London: Longman: 78; Van Meter, Karl. 1980. 
The French Role in Africa, in Ellen Ray, et aI., eds. Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa. London: Zed Books; Se-
caucus, NJ: Lyle Stuart: 30f.; Who's Who in France, 1989-1990, p.678; Yao, Bernard K. 1996. Jacques Foccart: 
homme d'influence, acteur incontournable de la politique africaine de la France, Revue juridique et politique: 
independance et cooperation 50, I: 60-76. 
127 McNamara. 1989. France in Black Africa, p.187. Also Andereggen. 1994. France's Relationship with 
Subsaharan Africa, pp.76f. 
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in Afiican affairs, and so Foccart enjoyed an even more powerful position during that period. 
He resigned in May 1974, within weeks after Pompidou's departure from the presidency and 
returned to the import-export business until 1985. From March 1986 to April 1988, he once 
again appeared on the political scene, as adviser for Afiican affairs to Gaullist Prime Minister 
Jacques Chirac. 12' The bureaucratic politics model, introduced in Chapter 1, stipulates that it 
entails some danger to over-emphasise the importance of personalities due to the restraints 
imposed on them by the administrative framework within which they work, 129 but Foccart's 
network of contacts made him too influential to be ignored in France's Africa policy. 
As mentioned, his status was also based on close relations with the military and intelli-
gence. He was a "close friend" of Michel Debre,'30 minister in several important departments 
since 1958 and Minister of Defence from June 1969 to April 1973. IJI This connection was 
crucial in the context of French-South Afiican co-operation in the Nigerian Civil War, as will 
be shown in a moment. Foccart's involvement in the Resistance further provided him with 
direct personal access to the Department for Foreign Information and Counterespionage 
(SDECE).132 In particular, he put Maurice Robert, Colonel in the Resistance, in charge of 
SDECE's Africa operations from 1960 to 1973, resulting in very close co-operation between 
the two governmental agencies in Francophone Afiica during that period. III This situation 
most likely hinged on the role he played during the Nigerian Civil War to promote the inter-
ests of the French oil company Elf Aquitaine, as will be indicated below. Thereafter, from 
1974 to 1979, Robert headed Elf Aquitaine's secret services. Subsequently, he was France's 
Ambassador to Gabon until 1981 and thereafter Head of Elf Aquitaine Gabon."' 
Jean Mauricheau-Beaupre was another, rather mysterious, figure in Foccart's politico-
military network. To cite a journalistic work on the French secret services: 
His name neither appears in the Who's Who nor in the directory [of French government 
officials]. He does not belong to any department, not even to the secret services. ( ... ) In 
fact, he occupies an office in the general secretariat in the Presidency of the Republic for 
12' Van Meter. 1980. The French Role in Africa, p.32; Who's Who in France, 1989-1990, p.678. 
129 Carlsnaes. 2002. Foreign Policy, pp.337f. ; Evans and Newnham. 1998. The Penguin Dictionary of Inter-
national Relations, p.299. 
110 Samuel, Patrick. 1999. Michel Deb"i: I'architecte du Gimiral. Paris: Arnaud Franel: 198. 
III Minister of Justice (1958-59); Minister of Economy and Finances (January 1966 - May 1968); Minister of 
Foreign Affairs (June 1968 - June 1969); Prime Minister (August 1959 - April 1962); Member of Parliament for 
the island of Reunion (1963- 88) . Who 's Who in France, 1989-1990, p.522. 
Il2 The Service de documentation exterieure et de contre-espionnage was established in 1946, changing its 
name in 1982 to Direction generale de la securite exterieure (DOSE; Oeneral Directorate for External Security) 
<http://www.dgse.orgiinformations/histoire.php>. 
tJ3 Chipman. 1989. French Power in Africa, p.233; Faligot and Krop. 1985. La piscine, pp.228-231; McNa-
mara. 1989. France in Black Africa, pp.l92f.; Pean, Pierre. 1983. Affaires africaines. Paris: Fayard: 8. 
13' Faligot and Krop. 1985. La piscine, pp.230, 231, 320; pean. 1983. Affaires africaines, pp.139f.; 
<http://www.africaintelligence.comlpslFRiArchILC-/LC-_3 14 .asp>. 
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African and Malagasy Affairs. But one can never find him there. Officially, he is also 
said to be technical counsellor to the President of the Ivory Coast, Felix Houphouet-
Boigny. But in Abidjan, no trace of him135 
From 1960, «Monsieur Jean» finds himself involved in all jolts on the black continent. 
Wherever France hesitates to intervene officially, or the SDECE is too detectable, we can 
see appear the profile of Mauricheau-Beaupre. 136 
115 
Mauricheau-Beaupre was of prime importance in the Paris-Pretoria alliance in Francophone 
Africa. Foccart himself referred to him as an "indefatigable militant of a reconciliation be-
tween black Africa and South Africa".' 37 Due to his involvement in the Resistance, Mau-
richeau-Beaupre was very close to Jacques Foccart, Michel Debre and Maurice Robert. He 
was attached to Foccart's African and Malagasy Affairs agency and has been described as 
Foccart's "right arm".'38 Mauricheau-Beaupre's contact with Debre originated in the late 
1950s, when the two owned a weekly newspaper, and he worked for Debre during the 
1960s,'39 while having a working relationship with Maurice Robert."o Finally, and of crucial 
significance for this study, Mauricheau-Beaupre was adviser to, and maintained particularly 
good connections with presidents Felix Houphouet-Boigny, Albert Bernard Bongo of Gabon, 
who changed his first name to Omar in 1973, and Fran90is Tombalbaye of Chad. '" 
After having introduced the main personalities that influenced Paris' Africa policy, we 
now examine the close bilateral Franco-South African relations, particularly in the military 
and nuclear fields, providing the framework for an understanding of the co-operation between 
the two countries in Africa. As we pointed out in the previous chapter, France abstained when 
the UN Security Council voted on a voluntary arms embargo against Pretoria in August 1963, 
and thereafter became one of South Africa's main armaments suppliers until the mid-1970s. 
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), France sold Pre-
toria 239 aircraft, 159 missiles, 800 armoured vehicles and three warships during that pe-
riod. '42 Pik Botha described the importance of these arms deliveries: "All these helicopters 
135 Faligot and Krop. 1985. La piscine, p.253 (translation from French). 
136 Faligot and Krop. 1985. La piscine, p.254 (translation from French). 
137 Foccart, Jacques. 1997. Foccart parle: entretiens avec Philipe Gaillard. Vol. II. Paris: Fayard; Jeune Afri-
que: 110. 
138 Lunel. 1991. Bob Denard, pp.396f. 
139 Faligot and Krop. 1985. La piscine, p.253; Foccarl, Jacques. 1995. Foccart parle: entretiens avec Philipe 
Gaillard. Vol. 1. Paris: Fayard; Jeune Afrique: 213; Samuel. 1999. Michel Deb,,!, pp.105f. 
"0 Lunel. 1991. Bob Denard, p.404; Weinberg. 1994. Last of the Pirates, p.246. 
'" Telephone interview with Neels van Tonder, 19 March 2002; Grundy, Kenneth William. 1973. Confronta-
tion and Accommodation in Southern Africa: The Limits of Independence. Berkeley, CA: University of Califor-
nia Press: 143. 
"2 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIPRJ. 1976. Southern Africa: The Escalation of the 
Conflict. A Politico-Military Study. New York: Praeger: 208f. Also Bach, Daniel C. 1990. Un systeme autonome 
de relations: la France et I ' Afrique du Sud, 1963-1977, in Daniel C. Bach, ed. La France et I 'Afrique du Sud: 
histoire, mythes et enjeux contemporains. Paris: Karthala: 177ff., 200; Cuddumbey, Chantal. 1996. France and 
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and the aircraft, coming from France, at a time in our history when we were totally isolated; 
you must not forget the impact of that; it is tremendous. If you are alone on the ocean, and 
your boat is about to sink, then another ship goes along; that is quite something".I" Military 
exchange between the two countries intensified after P .W. Botha became the Minister of De-
fence in April 1966, as he was keen to obtain French armaments to strengthen the military's 
standing and to have the support of an important international political actor. From 1969 to 
1971 alone, he paid four official visits to France during which he also met both Debre and 
Foccart, thus emphasising the importance of these two Frenchmen in the military's Africa 
approach. 1" In a military-related area, South Africa was an important provider of uranium, 
thus furthering France's goal of playing an important role in global politics. In that context, de 
Gaulle once made the statement that "no country without an atom bomb can consider itself 
properly independent".I" From 1965 to 1974, French personnel also made use of South Af-
rica's space tracking station at Paardefontein, near Pretoria, to monitor French satellites 
launched from its space centre in Kourou, GuyanaI46 After the mid-1970s, however, Franco-
South African relations became more "banal",147 because Foccart departed from office in May 
1974, and South Africa's military involvement in both Angola and Mozambique made it in-
creasingly difficult for Paris to explain to its Francophone African partners why it still col-
laborated with Pretoria. 1" This also negatively impacted on France's preparedness to assist 
Pretoria in finding support from Francophone African countries. 
After having outlined both the personalities that shaped France's Africa policy and the 
bilateral relations between France and South Africa, we now turn to the resulting co-operation 
in Africa that reinforced the already close ties between the two countries. The following quo-
tation from the secondary literature, a publication that analyses various aspects of French-
South Africa, in Chris Alden, Jean-Pascal Daloz, eds. Paris, Pretoria and the African Continent: The Interna-
tional Relations of States and Societies in Transition. Basingstoke: Macmillan: 70f.; Harshe. 1983 . France, Fran-
cophone African States and South Africa, p.56; Mugomba. 1977. The Foreign Policy ojDespair, pp.140f.; Ojo, 
B. Adesegun. 1992. Nigerian and French Perspectives on the South African Question, in Haruna J. Jacob, Mas-
soud Omar, eds. France and Nigeria: Issues in Comparative Studies. Ibadan: Centre for Research and Documen-
tation and University Exchange: 85-88. 
I" lnterview withPik Botha, 20 April 1999. 
144 DFA, 22/3/26, Vol. 2; Bach. 1990. Un systeme autonome de relations, p.184. 
145 Harshe. 1983. France, Francophone African States and South Africa, pp.56f. Also Bach. 1990. Un sys-
teme autonome de relations, pp.175ff. 
146 Bach. 1990. Un systeme autonome de relations, pp.179f. 
147 Darbon, Dominique. 1990. Les rapports franco-sud africains depuis 197,7, in Daniel C. Bach, ed. La 
France et I 'Afrique du Sud: histoire, mythes et enjeux contemporains. Paris: Karthala: 233. 
148 Alden, Chris. 1996. From Policy Autonomy to Policy Integration: The Evolution of France's Role in Af-
rica, in Chris Alden, Jean-Pascal Daloz, eds. Paris, Pretoria and the African Continent: The International Rela-
tions of States and Societies in Transition. Basingstoke: Macmillan: 18f.; Bach. 1990. Un systeme autonome de 
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South African contacts, appropriately presents the geopolitical convergence of their interests 
in that area until the mid-1970s: 
In the case of both France and South Africa, the condition of their power status was con-
sciously linked to their chosen role in the field of Africa. Each state, aspiring to playa 
significant role in international politics through the projection of power on the African 
continent has based its claim to this status on the combination of military wherewithal 
and economic pre-eminence in the context of Africa.'" 
On the South African side, the various Directors of Military Intelligence largely ensured the 
promotion of military co-operation in Africa in the decade after the mid-1960s. Fritz Loots, 
who held that post from 1966 to 1971 and was introduced in Chapter 2, played an especially 
crucial role in directing South Africa's engagement in the Nigerian Civil War in his capacity 
as P.W. Botha's personal envoy to Presidents Bongo of Gabon and Houphouet-Boigny of the 
Ivory Coast. In that context, Cornelius Jacobus 'Neels' van Tonder was of equal significance. 
Officially accredited as a member of the diplomatic corps, as Second and First Secretary, at 
the South African Embassy in Paris,'lO he was charged with overseeing Franco-South African 
co-operation in Francophone Africa and possibly other matters. Van Tonder impressed offi-
cials even outside the military sphere. Interviewed in 1999, former DFA Director-General 
Neil van Heerden spoke in the highest terms about him: 
[In the 1970s, the military] started to develop a breed of military officers that were ( ... ) 
quite excellent. They were enormously well trained, they spoke languages, ( ... ) and they 
needed no sloppy diplomats to tell them what to do. That was their attitude. They were all 
can-do people, and Neels van Tonder was one of the prime examples of that. ( ... ) Neels 
was one hell of an operator. ( ... ) Speaks French like a Frenchman, understands the cul-
ture, and goes anywhere.'SI 
Reflecting his high respect for and close relationship with van Tonder, also in the context of 
the Nigerian Civil War, P.W. Botha later put him in command of the Directorate of Special 
Tasks, responsible for the military destabilisation of Angola, Lesotho, Mozambique and Zim-
babwe, from 1975 to 1984.'52 In 1986, P.W. Botha further supported his promotion from 
Brigadier to Major General.'" 
"9 Alden, Chris, Jean-Pascal Daloz. 1996. Introduction, in Chris Alden, Jean-Pascal Daloz, eds. Paris, Preto-
ria and the African Continent: The International Relations of States and Societies in Transition. Basingstoke: 
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ISO Foreign Affairs List. Pretoria: DFA. (December 1971) 
'SI Interview with Neil van Heerden, 7 Apri11999. 
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and the South African Communist Party in Exile. London: James Currey: 188; Hamann. 2001. Days of the Gen-
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Chad 
The first available evidence of Franco-South Africa military co-operation in black Africa we 
found related to Chad during the mid-1960s, and prior to P.W. Botha becoming the Minister 
of Defence. Pretoria's primary interest probably needs to be gauged against the intensifying 
military exchange with Paris, making this something of a test run for practical military inter-
action in the field. This aside, Chad's strategic geographical position, particularly the fact that 
it shared the northern border with Islamic, anti-Western and Moscow-allied Libya, possibly 
made it an interesting listening post for the military intelligence community. It appears that 
the Director of Military Intelligence, Brigadier Pierre Retief, established the first contact with 
Chad five years after the country's independence from France, when he met President 
Tombalbaye in October 1965 in the capital Fort Lamy, renamed N' Djamena in 1973. Later 
evidence suggests that this meeting was facilitated through the services of Jacques Foccart 
and Jean Mauricheau-Beaupre. In a letter dated 29 May 1970 to P.W. Botha over Nigerian 
Civil War issues, Fritz Loots states: "Up to now, they [Foccart and Mauricheau-Beaupre] 
have gone out of their way to be helpful to make contact in Africa. So, for example, we have 
to thank them for our contact with ( ... ) Chad ( ... )". 154 During their encounter, Tombalbaye and 
Retief agreed that communism posed a threat to the African continent and that closer co-
operation should therefore be established between the two countries. I SS As the first step in this 
direction, Retief proposed geological assistance for the exploration of Chad's mineral re-
sources, motivating Tombalbaye to make such a request to Vorster.1S6 For reasons we could 
not establish, the mission of two South African geologists to Chad for the above purpose was 
only deployed from 12 October to 25 November 1966.157 It is possible to explain this delay by 
the fact that P.W. Botha became the Minister of Defence in April 1966, and that only he was 
assertive enough to push through the military's interest against that of the Department of For-
eign Affairs. The latter was then in a relatively strong position due to the promotion of contact 
with Lesotho, Malawi and Madagascar. 
After returning from their mission, the geologists Jacob Wouter du Preez and Gerrit Jo-
hannes Smit suggested that Pretoria should provide the country with equipment so that further 
explorations could take place by the relevant authorities in Chad. IS' On 1 March 1967, enclos-
1S4 'Voorgenome ontmoeting : Dr Muller en ' n ander Minister - Presidente Houphouet-Boigny en Bongo' , 
from Fritz Loots to Pieter Willem Botha, Pretoria, 29 May 1970, p.3 (DoD, MV/56/16, Vol. 26) (translation 
from Afrikaans). 
ISl DFA,II184/4, Vol. I. 
1S6DFA, 1/184/4, Vol. I. 
I57 DFA, 11184/4, Vol. 1PL. 
ISS The final reports are contained in DFA, 11184/3, AJ 1971 and DFA, 1/184/4, AJ 1966. 
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ing the final report, Vorster offered Tombalbaye two Land Rovers, a rock cutting machine, a 
driller to operate five diamond drills and the deployment of further geologists, and concluded: 
"If you feel there is any other way in which South Africa might be able to assist, you should 
not hesitate to let us knoW".I l9 After Tombalbaye had happily accepted Vorster's offer,l60 Mul-
ler promised to deliver as soon as possible and generously offered to pay the travel expenses 
and salaries for the two geologists. I' 1 Yet, according to the DFA files, it was only in February 
1970 that Tombalbaye resumed contact with Muller on that matter, informing him that all 
material had arrived and that it was still in good working order. I" In the same letter, Tombal-
baye explained his long silence due to domestic problems, referring to the military attacks 
from the Front national de liberation du Tchad (Frolinat), formed in mid-1966 by the politi-
cally underrepresented northern Muslim community with Libya's support. l63 While not ne-
glecting the validity of that reason, Tombalbaye's behaviour towards Pretoria's DFA officials 
also lay in rivalry between the foreign affairs ministry and the military over the shaping of 
relations with Chad, the intricacies of which are now outlined. 
Apart from assisting Pretoria' s military intelligence in Chad, Tombalbaye's adviser, Mau-
richeau-Beaupre, also served as the link between John Vorster, Hilgard Muller and Franyois 
Tombalbaye from 1967 to 1969, delivering letters, ensuring the transport of the South Afiican 
equipment to be used for geological exploration and allowing his house outside Paris to be 
used as a meeting place. l64 In a letter to Tombalbaye, Muller therefore referred to him as "our 
mutual friend in Paris".I" However, what van Tonder later termed "the cotton affair"l 66 
brought to the fore the policy differences between the military and the foreign affairs minis-
try, troubling the DFA's access to Mauricheau-Beaupre. This incident had its origins in 
Tombalbaye' s letter to Vorster, dated 31 March 1967, in which he asked Pretoria to buy cot-
ton,''' Chad's major agricultural product, accounting for more than 80% of its export income. 
In April 1967, van Tonder discussed the cotton sale issue with Tombalbaye, informing him 
119 Letter from John Vorster to Franl'ois Tombalbaye, Pretoria, I March 1967 (DFA, 11184/3, Vol. IPL). 
160 Letter from Franl'ois Tombalbaye to John Vorster, Fort Lamy, 31 March 1967 (DFA, 11184/3, Vol. IPL). 
1' 1 Letter from Hilgard Muller to Franl'ois Tombalbaye, Pretoria, 14 May 1967 (DFA, 11184/3, Vol. I). 
162 Letter from Franl'ois Tombalbaye to Hilgard Muller, Fort Lamy, 14 February 1970, p.2 (DFA, 1/184/3, 
Vol. I). 
I') Letter from Franl'ois Tombalbaye to Hilgard Muller, Fort Lamy, 14 February 1970, pp.l, 3 (DFA, 
1/184/3, Vol. I). 
164 'Tsjaad (24-26 April 1967)" from Neels van Tonder, p.1 (DFA, 11184/3, Vol. I). Also DFA, 1/184/3, 
Vols. I, IPL; 1/184/4, Vols. 2PL, 3PL. 
165 Letter from Hilgard Muller to Franl'ois Tombalbaye, Pretoria, 14 May 1967, p.2 (DFA, 1/184/3, Vol. I). 
Also DFA, 1118413, Vol. IPL; 11\84/4, Vols. 2PL, 3PL. 
166 Letter from Neels van Tonder to Fritz Loots, Paris, II July 1969, p.4 (DoD, MV/56/16, Vol. 26) (transla-
tion from Afrikaans). 
167 Letter from Franl'ois Tombalbaye to John Vorster, Fort Lamy, 31 March 1967 (DFA, 11184/3, Vol. IPL). 
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that "the Government itself normally does not buy cotton, and that the requirements for this 
season have already been bought".I" Evidently not satisfied with this response, Tombalbaye 
also discussed the cotton sale with Ambassador Burger during his visit to Paris in early 
May. 169 In line with the DFA's policy of providing technical assistance and assisting in devel-
opment/investment projects, Burger gave the scheme his approval after authorisation from 
Pretoria. Following that lead, and trying to position the Department of Foreign Affairs vis-a-
vis the military, Muller wrote to Tombalbaye, claiming to speak on behalf of Pretoria: "My 
Government has accepted Mr. Burger's recommendation that we should buy, if the quality is 
acceptable, some of your cotton at a special premium above world prices. My Government 
does not normally act as buyer of cotton, but we are prepared to do so in this instance in an 
endeavour to assist yoU" .170 This divergent approach caused significant friction between the 
foreign service officials and the military. In July 1969, during a discussion with Muller, van 
Tonder used the incident to exemplify the dispute over respective areas of responsibility be-
tween the two departments: "I recalled the episode when I newly arrived here [in Paris] and 
when the Ambassador [Burger] warned me not to cross wires with him. (You know the story 
of the telegram that was sent about the cotton affair in Chad.) I sometimes have the impres-
sion that people work more for themselves than for anything else".'71 
Deducing from Tombalbaye's silence towards the Department of Foreign Affairs, the 
South African military and/or its French partners seem to have convinced the president that it 
was not useful for him to co-operate with the foreign service officials in view of his military 
needs in the fight against Frolinat. However, after the defeat of the Franco-South African 
military alliance on the side of Biafra in the Nigerian Civil War in January 1970, the Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs reasserted itself over the military, causing Tombalbaye to resume 
contact with the above-mentioned letter to Muller in February 1970. In addition to apologis-
ing for the long silence by citing domestic problems, he also assured Muller that his Foreign 
Minister would in future refrain from launching verbal attacks against South Africa, such as 
he had done during the UN General Assembly in 1969. 112 Furthermore, and undoubtedly the 
main aim of that letter, he again requested the Department of Foreign Affairs to buy 170,000 
168 'Tsjaad (24-26 April 1967)', from Neels van Tonder, p.2 (DFA, 11184/3, Vol. 1). 
169 Letter from Fran90is Tombalbaye to John Vorster, Fort Lamy, 10 May 1967 (DFA, 1/184/3, Vol. 1). 
170 Letter from Hilgard Muller to Fran90is Tombalbaye, Pretoria, 14 May 1967, p.2 (DFA, 11184/3, Vol. 1). 
171 Letter from Neels van Tonder to Fritz Loots, Paris, 11 July 1969, p.4 (DoD, MV/56116, Vol. 26) (transla-
tion from Afrikaans). 
172 DFA, 1/184/4, Vol. 3PL. 
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tons of cotton. l73 Possibly tired of Tombalbaye's behaviour, Muller only replied more than 
two months later. While appreciating the president's assurances of no further diplomatic faux 
pas, he simply stated that he had taken note of the cotton offer, while making it clear that the 
geological assistance offered in 1966/67 was "no longer valid" and would have to be recon-
sidered. To that end, he enquired about the possibility of a meeting with one of Tombalbaye's 
ministers during June 1970 in Europe. I " Presumably not primarily interested in that assis-
tance, but in selling cotton, Tombalbaye left this unanswered and the Department of Foreign 
Affairs did not try to establish contact again. Both in July 1971 and May 1972, the South Af-
rican Consul-General in New York reported that direct contact with Tombalbaye might be 
feasible through the mediation of two businessmen,175 but this was not pursued, as we deduce 
from the fact that the relevant DFA file does not contain further communication on this issue. 
Nigerian Civil War 
The differences between Pretoria's foreign service corps and the military over the cotton af-
fair in Chad were insignificant compared to those that erupted in the context of Pretoria's 
military involvement in Nigerian Civil War (1967-70). During that war, a network of over-
lapping interests evolved between France, Gabon, the Ivory Coast and South Africa, while we 
will argue that Ivorian President Houphouet-Boigny was of crucial importance in bringing 
France and South Africa together in this operation. His role apart, the joint French-South Af-
rican engagement was maintained by P.W. Botha, Fritz Loots and Neels van Tonder, as well 
as their French colleagues Jacques Foccart, Jean Mauricheau-Beaupre and Michel Debre. The 
SADF's activity during the Nigerian Civil War laid the groundwork for Pretoria's Dialogue 
with Africa from 1970, with Houphouet-Boigny as the prime exponent. These developments 
are our present subject. 
In May 1967, Lieutenant-Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu proclaimed the independence of 
Biafra, Nigeria's south-eastern province. The Nigerian federal government, mainly supported 
by the Soviet Union and, towards the end, Great Britain, opposed this move militarily. The 
ensuing Nigerian Civil War lasted until January 1970, but the chances of Biafra succeeding 
already faded during 1969. 176 In order to understand Pretoria's involvement in this war, we 
l73 Letter from Fran90is Tombalbaye to Hilgard Muller, Fort Lamy, 14 February 1970, p.2 (DFA, 1/ 184/3, 
Vol. 1). 
174 Letter from Hilgard Muller to Fran90is Tombalbaye, Pretoria, 17 April 1970 (DFA, 1/184/3, Vol. 1). 
175 Letter from Oert Cornelius Nel (Consul-General) to Pretoria, New York, 2 July 1971 and 19 May 1972 
(DFA, 1/184/3, Vol. 1). 
176 Aguo1u, Christian Chukwunedu. 1973. Nigerian Civil War, 1967-70: An Annotated Bibliography. Boston, 
MA: G.K. Hall; Cervenka, Zdenek. 1971. The Nigerian War, 1967-1970: History of the War. Selected Bibliog-
raphy and Documents. Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Graefe; Cronje, Suzanne. 1972. The World and Nigeria: 
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need to examine the position of its partners in the conflict. In Africa, only Gabon, the Ivory 
Coast, Tanzania and Zambia recognised Biafra as a sovereign state.177 In doing so, they devi-
ated from the OAU's position that the territorial integrity of African states had to be safe-
guarded with the purpose of promoting nation-building and political stability. '" While the 
reasons for the latter two countries' stance need not be of interest here, the presidents of both 
Gabon and the Ivory Coast were outspokenly anticommunist and considered a Soviet-
supported Nigeria as a danger to their security in West Africa. Consequently, Bongo and 
Houphouet-Boigny offered their countries as transit areas for the channelling of weapons to 
the Biafra secessionists, co-ordinated by Mauricheau-Beaupre and Maurice Delauney, the 
French Ambassador in Libreville from 1965 to 1972, and again from 1975 to 1980.179 In fact, 
French journalist Pean refers to Mauricheau-Beaupre as the "chief conductor of the French 
clandestine support to the Biafra secessionists".I11<l 
The French government supported the secessionists, while withholding diplomatic recog-
nition of Biafra, for the reasons now indicated. To begin with, the presidents of Gabon and 
especially of the Ivory Coast pressured de Gaulle into supporting Biafra so as to secure their 
stability. Their pro-Biafra advocacy was effective because they enjoyed a privileged status 
among the Francophone African countries, having direct access to de Gaulle, Foccart, Mau-
richeau-Beaupre and Debre. l81 Another reason for France to support Biafra was Nigeria's 
hegemonic position in West Africa that posed a potential threat to the French sphere of inter-
est in that region. As Foccart frankly declares in his memoirs, de Gaulle considered a "break-
The Diplomatic History of the Biafran War, 1967-1970. London: Sidgwick and Jackson; De St. Jorre, John. 
1972. The Nigerian Civil War. London: Hodder and Stoughton; Stremlau, John Julius. 1977. The International 
Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
177 They recognised Biafra on 13 April (Tanzania), 8 (Gabon) , 15 (Ivory Coast) and 20 May (Zambia) 1968. 
See Anglin, Douglas George. 1971. Zambia and the Recognition ofBiafra, African Review: A Journal of African 
Politics, Development and International Affairs I , 2: 102-136; Naldi, Gino J. 1989. The Organisation of African 
Unity: An Analysis of Its Role. London: Cassell, p.37; Nweke, G. Aforka. 1976. External Intervention in African 
Conflicts: France and French-Speaking West Africa in the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970. Boston, MA: Boston 
University, African Studies Center: 38, 41ff; Stremlau. 1977. The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil 
War, 1967-1970, pp.127f. 
178 See the Preamble of the OAU in Cervenka, Zdanek. 1968. The Organisation of African Unity and Its 
Charter. London: Hurst: 231. 
179 Daddieh. 1984. Ivory Coast, p.135; Foccart. 1995. Foccart parle. Vol. 1, p.345; McNamara. 1989. France 
in Black Africa, p.180; Nweke. 1976. External Intervention in African Conflicts, pp.37, 54; rean. 1983. Affaires 
africaines, pp.12, 285. See also Delauney's memoirs, in which he does not mention South Africa 's involvement, 
however: Delauney, Maurice. 1982. De 10 casquelle Ii lajaquelle, ou de I 'administration coloniale Ii 10 diploma-
tie africaine. Paris: La Pensee Universelle: 176-182; Delauney, Maurice. 1986. "Kala-kala ": de 10 grande Ii la 
petite histoire. Paris: Robert Laffont: 193-217. On Delauney, see Who's Who in France, 1989-1990, p.535. 
180 Pean. 1983. Affaires africaines, p.72 (translation from French). Also Faligot and Krop. 1985. La piscine, 
p.264. 
181 Akinyemi. 1994. Origins, Articulations and Continuities in Foreign Policy and Foreign Policy Formula-
tion, p.62; Bach, Daniel C. 1980. Le General de Gaulle et la guerre civile au Nigeria, Canadian Journal of Afri-
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up of Nigeria" desirable in order to weaken that country's influence in West Africa. '" In that 
context, Paris attempted to forge closer links with Ghana, a former British colony surrounded 
by the former French colonies Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso and Togo, to counterbalance Nige-
ria's influence. In a report of November 1972, Under-Secretary Johan Pretorius stated: "We 
also know that Mr. Foccart's organisation, and Mr. Beaupre [sic] in particular, became in-
volved in ( ... ) Biafra and Ghana in the framework of France's attempts to "infiltrate" the Eng-
lish-speaking countries in Africa for economic and political reasons".' '' This needs to be seen 
against the overall picture of French-British rivalry in Africa,''' accentuated by de Gaulle ' s 
dislike of the British.' '' His distrust toward and suspicion of the Anglo-Saxons, shared by 
Foccart and Mauricheau-Beaupre, was rooted in World War II, when the Resistance fought 
for the 'Free France' movement against the pro-German ' Vichy' government. Great Britain 
pledged to support the Free France, but its actual policy was inconsistent and some of its ac-
tions were actually detrimental to de Gaulle 's ambitions."· After de Gaulle's resignation from 
power in 1946, both Great Britain and the United States undermined France's position in 
world politics. One of de Gaulle's main aims after becoming President of the Fifth Republic 
in January 1959, therefore, was to save "France's honour".''' The importance of these anti-
British feelings as a factor for France's decision to support Biafra is confirmed in a hand-
written letter from Mauricheau-Beaupre to P.W. Botha in November 1970: "We know the 
subject well, we who were a moral colony of the Anglo-Saxons until De Gaulle returned". In 
the same correspondence, he speaks of "Anglo-Saxon hypocrisy" on two occasions, referring 
to the inconsistent British policy towards de Gaulle during World War II. 18' A fmal dimension 
of France's role in the Nigerian Civil War was the interest of the French petroleum group, Elf 
can Studies 14,2: 262, 271; McNamara. 1989. France in Black Africa, p.180; Samuel. 1999. Michel Debre, 
pp.235f 
182 Foccart. 1995. Foccart parle. Vol. I, p.342; Foccart. 1997. Foccart parle. Vol. II, p.269 . Also Akinyemi. 
1994. Origins, Articulations and Continuities in Foreign Policy and Foreign Policy Formulation , p.62 ; Bach. 
1980. Le General de Gaulle et la guerre civile au Nigeria, pp.260, 263f, 271; Chipman. 1989. French Power in 
Africa, pp.126f; McNamara. 1989. France in Black Africa, p.180; Nweke. 1976. External Intervention in Afri-
can Conflicts, pp.6, 19f; Samuel. 1999. Michel Debre, p.361. 
183 'Jean Maurichaux Beaupre', trom Johan Pretorius, Pretoria, 9 November 1972, p.2 (DFA, 1199/ 19, Vol. I) 
(translation from Afrikaans). 
184 Gifford, Prosser, William Roger Louis, eds. 1971 . France and Britain in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Co-
lonial Rule. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
'" Akinyemi. 1994. Origins, Articulations and Continuities in Foreign Policy and Foreign Policy Formula-
tion, p.62 ; Cronje. 1972. The World and Nigeria, p.198; Kersaudy, Franl'ois. 1981. Churchill and de Gaulle. 
London: HarperCollins; Shennan. 1993. De Gaulle, pp.17f 
18. Gallo, Max. 1998. De Gaulle. Vol. II: La solitude du combal/ant. Paris: Robert Laffont: 55-128; Shennan. 
1993. De Gaulle, pp.16-36. 
18' Shennan. 1993. De Gaulle, pp.75, 90. 
IS' Letter from Jean Mauricheau-Beaupre to Pieter Willem Botha, Paris, 19 November 1970, pp.2f (DoD, 
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Aquitaine. This is admitted by Foccart and finds confirmation in a report by van Tonder to 
Ambassador Burger in Paris.I89 Elf Aquitaine was a pillar of French influence in Africa since 
the 1960s and, through a web of contacts with intelligence, especially SDECE's Robert, had 
established particularly close relations with Gabon's President Bongo. Attempting to extend 
activities from its Gabon base to other African countries, "Elf and its clan deployed a policy 
( ... ) that was in symbiosis with [that of] Jacques Foccart".190 Elf Aquitaine already had some 
oil rights in Biafra, but its ambition to control all reserves clashed directly with the interests of 
the British-Dutch oil companies British Petroleum (BP) and Shell,I'I part of French-British 
competition in Africa. In order to secure its claims, according to Foccart, Elf Aquitaine was 
directly involved in financing weapons and arms deliveries to Biafra by transferring the in-
come generated from selling oil from Biafra to the secessionists. In 
While France, Gabon and the Ivory Coast supported Biafra from the early days of the Ni-
gerian Civil War for the above reasons, the South African military as an armament provider to 
Biafra only enters the stage during the second half of 1969, when the chances for the success 
of the secessionist cause became uncertain. For that reason, and based on the evidence pre-
sented below, it is reasonable to argue that Houphouet-Boigny, in conjunction with Mau-
richeau-Beaupre and Foccart, turned to South Africa to boost Biafra's position in the war. At 
the same time, we argue that Pretoria's military engagement at this stage, despite the bleak 
situation for Biafra, was motivated threefold. First, again with reference to Malan's Africa 
Charter of 1949, it provided the military an occasion to perform as a continental power along-
side a respected international player. Second, it could be seen as the key in establishing a net-
work of black African states with anticommunist, conservative and politically stable leaders, 
that might find followers among other countries and, eventually, lead to Pretoria finding ac-
ceptance in Africa. Co-operation with both Gabon and the Ivory Coast in the Nigerian Civil 
War was promising, as their presidents fulfilled these criteria and were held in high esteem 
among African leaders. The third motivation for the South African military to assist France 
and two important Francophone African countries in that war, was to ensure the continued 
French armament supplies to strengthen its own capacity. I9J 
189 Foccart. 1995. Foccart parle. Vol. I, p.342; 'Biafra - Shell-BP', from Neels van Tonder to Albie Burger, 6 
November 1969 (DFA, 11129/3, Vol. I). Also Akinyemi. 1994. Origins, Articulations and Continuities in For-
eign Policy and Foreign Policy Fonnulation, p.62. 
190 Vallee, Olivier. 2000 Une Afrique sous influence: Elf au service de l'Etat franyais, Le monde diplomati-
que 553, 1 avril: 24. Also Renou. 2002. A New French Policy for Africa?, p.24. 
191 Crocje. 1972. The World and Nigeria; Faligot and Krop. 1985. La piscine, p.261; Nweke. 1976. External 
Intervention in African Conflicts, pp.2lf.; Vallee. 2000. Une Afrique sous influence, p.24. 
192 Foccart. 1995. Foccart parle. Vol. I, p.343. 
I9J Aluko, Olajide. 1990. France and South Africa, Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 12,4: 59-76. 
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Pretoria's military engagement, according to the available Department of Defence sources, 
was rooted in P.W. Botha' s contacts with Houphouet-Boigny dating from early 1969. There is 
no clear evidence, but it was most certainly Mauricheau-Beaupre, in his capacity as 
Houphouet-Boigny's adviser, who forged the initial contact between the two men, seeing a 
potential benefit for all parties involved. That link was subsequently maintained through the 
services of Loots, P.W. Botha's personal envoy to the West African leaders, Houphouet-
Boigny in particular. '94 Botha's first recorded direct meeting with Houphouet-Boigny took 
place on 19 March 1969 in Paris. A thread running through their discussion was the shared 
pre-occupation with the communist influence from both the USSR and the People's Republic 
of China in Africa. '" As Ivorian political scientist Cyril Daddieh aptly remarks: "Abidjan and 
Pretoria shared an ideological affinity. President Houphouet-Boigny detested communism and 
saw in Pretoria the much needed bulwark against this menace to the continent".'% The mili-
tary's strategy of emphasising the common stance against communism and propounding that 
this "was a greater threat to the continent than apartheid", as political scientist Sam Nolut-
shungu argued,'97 was successful and the initial meeting was the breakthrough necessary for 
future contact. Within a month, Houphouet-Boigny met with Loots in Paris, subsequently 
writing to P.W. Botha: "Thank you for having sent General Loots to me and it was a great 
pleasure to meet him again. He explained to me what is possible as of immediate from your 
side".'98 In the same letter, P.W. Botha and Loots were invited to come to Abidjan. Later cor-
respondence and events suggest that Loots, on behalf ofP.W. Botha, had offered South Afri-
can military assistance to Biafra and a loan of 1 million Rand to the Ivory Coast. '99 The pri-
mary documents do not reveal the purpose of this loan and Neels van Tonder, whom we in-
terviewed in 1999, did not divulge any information, but it is possible that the proposal was 
made to provide the Ivory Coast with money to buy arms for Biafra. 
Given the already close link with Paris and the newly created connection with Pretoria, 
Foccart plausibly suggests that Houphouet-Boigny now began to push for closer contact be-
194 'Gesprek met Mnr Beaupre op 7/7/69', from Neels van Tonder to Fritz Loots, Paris, July 1969, p.3 (000, 
MV/56116, Vol. 26). 
19' Transcript of that meeting (000, MV/56/16, Vol. 26). 
196 Daddieh, Cyril Kofie. 1997. South Africa and Francophone African Relations, in Larry Anthony Swatuk, 
David Ross Black, eds. Bridging the Riji: The New South Africa in Africa. Boulder, CO: Westview Press: 186. 
197 Nolutshungu. 1975. South Africa in Africa, p.295 (emphasis in the original). 
198 Letter dated 21 April 1969 (000, MV/56/16, Vol. 26) (translation from French). 
199 'Onderhoud met Dr. Muller op 9/7/69', from Neels van Tonder to Fritz Loots, Paris, July 1969, pp.2, 6; 
letter from Neels van Tonder to Fritz Loots on a meeting between Houphouet-Boigny and Muller, Paris, II July 
1969, pp.3f. (000, MV/5611 6, Vol. 26). 
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tween P.W. Botha and himself, through Mauricheau-Beaupn! ' s mediation,")() on the matter of 
a joint military operation in support of Biafra. Van Tonder's report to Fritz Loots on a meet-
ing with Minister Muller also validates Foccart's claim that it was Houphouet-Boigny's "pro-
found conviction" to seek contact with Pretoria and that it was not brought about by French 
pressure.201 This and another document from van Tonder to his superior further underline that 
president's influence on the French and South African governments regarding support for 
Biafra: 
The Minister [Muller] also said that the RSA was a small country and therefore should 
not carry the whole burden of Biafra alone. Therefore, the position of the new French 
government in this matter is very important. I [van Tonder] have advised that he should 
approach the situation with a view to what we can and what we are prepared to do to-
gether with HB, if France would also help, which would be necessary for the successful 
accomplishment of Biafra, and it is the choice of the French to say what they will do. The 
importance ofHB's leadership for the RSA ( ... ) was again emphasised'02 
The Minister [Muller] also reported on the importance that we attach to the policy that the 
French government pursues regarding indirect as well as direct help to Biafra. HB re-
sponded by saying that he would see [French President Georges] Pompidou on 16 July 
[1969] and that he would inform us what the results of the discussion were. He added that 
the indirect help actually goes through the Ivory Coast and therefore was more a matter 
between him and France rather than Biafra and France.203 
In July 1969, P.W. Botha decided to provide Biafra with "plus minus 200 tons", for which 
time period is not recorded, of unspecified "weapons of ammunition". This did not, however, 
correspond to the two hundred and fifty tons that Mauricheau-Beaupre had requested on be-
half of Houphouet-Boigny.204 The reasons for this difference are not known to us, but it is 
possible that it was a compromise decision, having weighed up the military's keen interest in 
promoting contact with Houphouet-Boigny against the caution of launching itself into an un-
certain adventure, as there was no guarantee that the Biafran cause would succeed. 
Soon thereafter, official British sources and newspapers close to the British government 
articulated claims of South African arms deliveries to Biafra, most likely trying to discredit 
the secessionists' standing by stating that it was prepared to deal with the apartheid state. The 
200 Foccart. 1997. Foccartparle. Vol. II, p.IIO. 
201 Foccart. 1997. Foccart parle. Vol. II, pp.108f.; 'Onderhoud met Dr. Muller op 9/7/69', from Neels van 
Tonder to Fritz Loots, Paris, July 1969, p.5 (DoD, MV/56/16, Vol. 26). 
202 'Onderhoud met Dr. Muller op 9/7/69 ', from Neels van Tonder to Fritz Loots, Paris, July 1969, p.5 (DoD, 
MV/561l6, Vol. 26) (translation from Afrikaans). 
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II July 1969, p.3 (DoD, MV/561l6, Vol. 26) (translation from Afrikaans). 
204 Letter from Neels van Tonder to Fritz Loots on a meeting between Houphouet-Boigny and Muller, Paris, 
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first report to that effect appeared in the conservative Sunday Telegraph on 10 August 1969,'" 
followed by a report in the same daily on 30 November that year.206 The publication of the 
report in this newspaper, which usually kept a Pretoria-friendly style, can be seen as a warn-
ing from London that this military activity of South Africa, an otherwise important partner, 
was intolerable. These two articles formed the basis for a publication by the Nigerian Ministry 
ofInformation in which Pretoria was accused of providing Biafra with military assistance. 207 
Still in August, similar allegations were voiced in the 'Scott Report ' , prepared by Colonel 
Robert Scott, Defence Adviser in the British High Commission in Lagos. 208 On 11 August, in 
reaction to the Sunday Telegraph article, P.W. Botha refuted the allegation as "fantasy",'O' and 
on 23 September, the Department of Foreign Affairs issued a press statement that emphasised 
that only medical and other emergency relief material was supplied to war-tom Biafra via the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC);210 this claim cannot be verified due to the 
highly restricted access to the ICRC archive. The denial of both the military and the foreign 
affairs ministry can be explained by their attempt to prevent exposure of the black African 
countries co-operating with Pretoria in that operation, as this would have endangered their 
ambitions of making inroads into black Africa. However, the already presented material re-
veals that the military did supply the secessionists with arms, thereby confirming the claims 
made in the secondary literature.2 11 The following paragraphs detail further developments and 
20' 'South African Air Force Runs Arms for Biafra', Sunday Telegraph 10 August 1969 (DFA, 1/ 129/3, Vol. 
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implications of the military's engagement in the Nigerian Civil War and the resulting clashes 
with the Department of Foreign Affairs. 
In the months from July to October 1969, a rectangular network of co-operation between 
France, Gabon, the Ivory Coast and South Africa evolved, ensuring the delivery of military 
supplies to Biafra. Within this network, Portugal actively supported the Biafran cause and 
granted South African planes the permission to fly over Angolan territory en route to Libre-
ville and thence to UIi, an airstrip in Biafra.212 As a DFA document of 1983 points out, the 
island of Fernando P6, belonging to Spain's former colony, Equatorial Guinea, was equally 
used as a "staging post" for South African arms deliveries.213 Portugal ' s support for Biafra 
also surfaced during talks between the South African and the Portuguese Minister of Foreign 
Affairs on 16 June 1969 in Lisbon, with the latter asking Muller to give assistance to Biafra.214 
South African military support in this limited range continued until October 1969, when 
P.W. Botha reviewed the situation after meetings with Bongo, Houphouet-Boigny and Debre 
in the second half of October 1969. According to a provisional itinerary, he and Loots were to 
fly to Libreville in the morning of26 October, where van Tonder and the SADF Commandant 
General,'Is Rudolph Christian Hiemstra,216 would join them. On that afternoon, discussions 
were to take place with Bongo, who had already invited P.W. Botha and Loots in August to 
visit him.217 In the late afternoon, the company was to fly to Abidjan with a Mystere 20, an 
eight-passenger VIP plane,218 of which both Bongo and Houphouet-Boigny owned one2I' and 
which was put at their disposal by either of them, to hold discussions with the Ivorian presi-
dent the following day. Just before midnight of 27 October, they were to board a flight to 
Paris, where talks were to be held with Debre on 28 and 29 October. P.W. Botha, Loots and 
Hiemstra were to arrive back in South Africa on 30 October.220 That trip did take place, but a 
212 Cronje. 1972. The World and Nigeria, pp.185, 237, 323f.; Strem1au. 1977. The International Politics of 
the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970, pp.233f.f. 
213 'EG: meeting with Security Adviser to President Bongo', from Rae Killen, 3 November 1983 (DFA, 
1120713, Vol. 1). 
21. 'Notes on the talks between Dr. Hilgard Muller, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Af-
rica, and Dr. Franca Nogueira, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Portugal, on Monday, 16th June, 1969, at the Pala-
cio das Necessidades', p.2 (DFA, 22/3/29, Vol. 3). 
2IS This designation changed to Chief of the SADF in July 1973. 
21 6 Hiemstra held this position from October 1965 to March 1972. Uys. 1992. South African Militmy Who 's 
Who, 1452-1992, p.106. 
217 See letter of invitation from Albert Bongo to Pieter Willem Botha, Paris, 1 August 1969, and letter of re-
ceipt from Pieter Willem Botha to Albert Bongo, Pretoria, 27 August 1969 (DoD, MV/561l6, Vol. 26). 
218 <http://www.raafrnuseum.com.auiresearchiaircraftla3series/index.htm>. 
21' Jeune Afrique 767, 19 September 1975: 37; Pean. 1983. Affaires africaines, p.196. 
220 ' Voorgestelde reisplan vir die voorgenome besoek van die Minister en KG, SAW', ca. September 1969 
(DoD, MV/56116, Vol. 26). 
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few days earlier than envisaged, as can be deduced from later correspondence and the fact that 
P.W. Botha sent a hand-written note from Pretoria to van Tonder in Paris, dated 29 October. 
These meetings caused P.W. Botha to reconsider South Africa' s involvement in the Nige-
rian Civil War. It is not cited specifically, but one of the reasons for this was the deteriorating 
chance of Biafra winning the war. In addition, van Tonder reported of the "weak reception" 
from Debre, possibly due the fact that he had only been Minister of Defence for three months 
at that stage, and this had a negative impact on P.W. Botha.221 According to a letter from Am-
bassador Burger to Brand Fourie, Botha did not share with Debre the "spirit of understand-
ing"'" he had with Pierre Messmer, the Minister of Defence from February 1960 to June 
1969. As a result, Botha wrote to van Tonder in the above-mentioned note of29 October: 
After an open-hearted discussion between the French Minister of Defence [DebreJ and 
myself, the following has been decided by me: 
L Regarding further arms and weapons deliveries to Biafra, we shall make it available 
only if the French Minister of Defence informs me in writing that such armaments are 
still considered to be necessary.223 
It is unclear whether the French made such a further request, but it appears that Mauricheau-
Beaupre, on behalf of Houphouet-Boigny, requested additional supplies around October 
1969224 Judging from the available documents in the one relevant box in the Department of 
Defence archive, South Africa's military did not further provide armaments, possibly because 
it had become clear by then that Biafra was going to lose the war. Before turning to the results 
of Pretoria' s military activities, one aspect has not yet been mentioned, namely the role of the 
French mercenary Bob Denard and his South African colleagues. This deserves special treat-
ment because co-operation with Denard fell within the framework of French-South African 
co-operation and, even more significantly, Pretoria's military used his mercenary services as 
an indirect, although essential, tool to advance its interests on this occasion and in other black 
African countries later on. 
Bob Denard, who worked under different aliases, was probably the most notorious merce-
nary of the twentieth century because of his participation in the conflict situations of numer-
ous countries. Born in 1929, he served in the French navy from the mid-1940s. He left the 
French army in 1953 and became a policeman in Morocco. In 1960, he moved further south 
and worked as a security officer for a mining company in the former Belgian Congo. This 
221 Document undated (DoD, MV/5611 6, Vol. 26) (translation from Afrikaans). 
'" Letter from Albie Burger to Brand Fourie, Paris, 13 November 1969, p.2 (DFA, 1199/19, Vol. I) (transla-
tion from Afrikaans). 
223 DoD, MV/5611 6, Vol. 26 (translation from Afrikaans). 
224 'Opsomming van 'n gesprek: Mnr Fourie - Maj van Tonder: 27 Mei 70 ', from Neels van Tonder, Paris, 
May 1970, p.4 (DoD, MV/56/16, Vol. 26). 
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marked the beginning of his career as a mercenary and, during the 1960s, he fought for the 
Katanga secessionist movement under MOise Tshombe and later for President Mobutum Re-
garding Denard's contacts with the relevant French authorities, one DFA document dated 
1971 suggests that he was working for Mauricheau-Beaupre and the French intelligence 
agency, SDECE, in Gabon.226 While Foccart claims to have "never had any relation with Bob 
Denard",z" it is a reasonable assumption that he acted with, at least, "orange light" from Foc-
cart' s Africa agency and that he therefore became a "banal instrument of French Africa pol-
icy", as Foccart' s interviewer suggests.228 Denard himself described it as follows: 
All the sleeping partners for whom I worked were states or future states, never private 
people. But not France. France was behind Gambia, behind Gabon, behind Morocco, but 
they never directly gave the orders. It was always the people who represented the state, or 
who were going to represent the state, who gave the orders. I never had direct contact 
with the French services. But it' s their job to watch, to control, to manipulate ... of 
course we were manipulated.22' 
In the Nigerian Civil War, Denard and his mercenaries fought on the side of Biafra. McNa-
mara, later US Ambassador to Gabon (1981-84), argued that they were stationed in Libreville, 
prior to nocturnal airlifts into Biafra.'30 Foccart admits this, but suggests that Mauricheau-
Beaupre and the French Ambassador in Gabon, Delauney, were in charge of them. His further 
claim of not having had any direct contact with Denard2JI might be true, but he at least had 
knowledge of Denard's activities through his large network of contacts. This is substantiated 
with Denard's own account. With the knowledge of an insider, he describes the role of Mau-
richeau-Beaupre as the "great architect ofthe rapprochement" between Pretoria and Paris, and 
their alliance with Houphouet-Boigny and Bongo over the Nigerian Civil War. He also re-
veals that Loots was P.W. Botha' s personal envoy to Houphouet-Boigny and claims that he 
was "sometimes" present during their meetings.'" This information cannot be verified, but it 
seems plausible and there can be little doubt that both Paris and Pretoria were aware of De-
nard's role and that some co-ordination took place on the ground. 
225 Foccart. 1997. Foccart parle. Va!. II, p.259 (note 1); McNamara. 1989. France in Black Africa, p.181 ; 
Weinberg. 1994. Last of the Pirates, pp.58ff. 
226 ore: visit to Libreville from 28 July to I August 1971 ', from Jan Boyazoglou, Paris, 2 August 1971 , pp.3, 5 
(DFA, 11178/4, Vol. 3). 
227 Foeeart. 1997. Faccart parle. Va!. II, p.122. Also Weinberg. 1994. Last of the Pirates, p .246. 
228 Foceart. 1997. Faccart parle. Vol. II, pp.259f, 263. 
229 Interviewed in Weinberg. 1994. Last of the Pirates, p.198 . 
230 McNamara. 1989. France in Black Africa, p.180. 
2JI Foceart. 1995 . Faccart parle. Vol. I, p.345 ; Foceart. 1997. Faccart parle. Vol. II, p.259 (note 1). 
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Regarding the question of South African mercenaries fighting in that war, Denard claims 
that he was in contact with them, although not providing more specific detailsm By citing the 
British Daily Telegraph, Suzanne Cronje suggests that South African mercenaries were em-
ployed by the Nigerian government "on a strictly commercial basis" after 1967 to train its 
troops.''' According to the same author, but without substantiation, some fifty-three South 
African mercenaries arrived in late 1967, this time in support of Biafra, while only nine re-
mained until early 1969.''' Deon Fourie, a South African academic in strategic studies with 
close ties to the South African military, recalled that one South African, "Mitch", flew as a 
transport pilot for Biafra. He further mentioned that Mitch "was put C .. ) out of the South Afri-
can Air Force and he had to become a civilian",236 suggesting that the military had actively 
approved of their mission. Yet, according to Neels van Tonder, it were not South African 
mercenaries that fought in Biafra, but a small contingent of five SADF members, officially 
deployed to Biafra.2l7 Given this sparse and contradictory information, no clear picture 
emerges as to how many South Africans were involved in Biafra and in what capacity. 
After this lengthy presentation of the military's endeavours to win friends among black 
African countries through France's assistance and likely co-operation with mercenaries, the 
following paragraphs provide an analysis of its success. This is particularly important for a 
later comparison with the results achieved by the DF A in utilising their leverage of technical 
assistance and support for development/investment projects. Pretoria's military contacts with 
those countries that surfaced in the context of the Nigerian Civil War, namely Ghana, Gabon 
and the Ivory Coast, will be examined within that context. Thereafter, the focus will be on the 
resulting friction with the Department of Foreign Affairs. 
Ghana 
The military 's interaction with Ghana was only incidental to the Nigerian Civil War. While 
not directly implicated in the war, Foccart, Mauricheau-Beaupre and Houphouet-Boigny had 
an interest in making this former British colony part of the Francophone African states net-
work in West Africa to counteract Nigeria's predominance. In doing so, and as we will see 
shortly, they also tried to facilitate Pretoria's access to Ghana, probably as an incentive to win 
its subsequent support for the Biafran cause. Apart from further strengthening interaction with 
233 Lune!. 1991. Bob Denard, p.4lO. 
234 Cronje. 1972. The World and Nigeria, pp.187f., referring to the Daily Telegraph 19 October 1967. 
235 Cronje. 1972. The World and Nigeria, pp.187f. 
236 Interview with Deon S. Fourie, 22 April 1999. 
237 Telephone interview with Neels van Tonder, 19 March 2002. 
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Paris, Ghana was an important country to have on South Africa's side given its political sig-
nificance; it attained independence in 1957, and thereafter, Kwame Nkrumah, Prime Minister 
until 1960 and State President until he was ousted in a military coup in February 1966, be-
came the symbol of Africa's liberation, pan-Africanism, thus supporting liberation move-
ments, such as the Pan-Africanist Congress of South Africa.'" It would have represented a 
considerable success for the military to have the backing of such a leading African country. 
The resulting activities by Paris and Pretoria in Ghana in pursuit of their overlapping interests 
are now outlined. In April 1969, General Akwasi Afrika came to power in Ghana's second 
military coup. Wishing to prepare Ghana for democratic rule, he subsequently set presidential 
elections for August of that year, and Kofi Busia was one of the candidates. According to a 
military document on van Tonder's discussion with Muller within weeks of the elections, 
Houphouet-Boigny had "undoubted influence" on Busia and the latter's chances of winning 
the elections were estimated at 85%. Therefore, Muller was urged to discuss with Houphouet-
Boigny "the modalities of support to Ghana" and "to find a way whereupon we can offer help 
to Busia in such a way that he would accept it in the best of spirit".'" In less diplomatic terms, 
the military tried to convince the Department of Foreign Affairs that it was worthwhile to 
support Busia at that time, presumably with economic lures, in the hope that the assistance 
would be remembered by the president-to-be, and that he would then promote a pro-Pretoria 
stance within the African community of states. Houphouet-Boigny apparently played a lead-
ing role in this framework, with the mediation attempts of Foccart and Mauricheau-Beaupre 
again being of crucial importance. According to one document, dated 7 July 1969, Mau-
richeau-Beaupre "discussed" Ghana with Muller,2" while Loots wrote to P.W. Botha on 29 
May 1970: "Up to now, they [Foccart and Mauricheau-Beaupre] have gone out of their way to 
be helpful to make contact in Africa. So, for example, we have to thank them for our contact 
with Ghana ( ... )".241 A final statement on the outcome of these endeavours is not possible due 
to the lack of additional sources. However, later evidence on Busia's South Africa stance sug-
gests that Pretoria probably had provided him with some assistance. In particular, after his 
23' Dumor, Ernest K 1991. Ghana, OA U and Southern Africa: An -'ifrican Response to Apartheid. Accra: 
Ghana Universities Press. Nkrumah strongly favoured the PAC over the ANC, because the former pursued a 
policy of black exclusivity in its ranks. As a consequence, the ANC 's relationship with Ghana was difficult dur-
ing the entire period under review. See Pfister. 2003. Gateway to International Victory, pp.54f. 
23' 'Onderhoud met Dr. Muller op 917169 ', from Neels van Tonder to Fritz Loots, Paris, July 1969, p.3 (DoD, 
MV/56116, Vol. 26) (translation from Afrikaans). 
240 'Gesprek met Mnr Beaupre op 717169 ', from Neels van Tonder to Fritz Loots, Paris, July 1969, p.3 (DoD, 
MV/56/ 16, Vol. 26) (translation from Afrikaans). 
241 'Voorgenome ontmoeting : Dr Muller en ' n ander Minister - Presidente Houphouet-Boigny en Bongo', 
from Fritz Loots to Pieter Willem Botha, Pretoria, 29 May 1970, p.3 (DoD, MV/56116, Vol. 26) (translation 
from Afrikaans). 
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election to the presidency, Busia adopted Houphouet-Boigny's Dialogue approach, details of 
which are examined below. In a speech before the National Assembly on 10 December 1970, 
Busia articulately argued that "dialogue and armed pressure are not necessarily incompati-
ble" .2" Yet, Accra's pro-Dialogue attitude was contradictory, because the government was 
divided on the issue. While Victor Owosu, Foreign Minister from 1969 to 1971, rejected this 
approach, his successor up until 1972, William Ofori-Atta, favoured Dialogue, and this re-
sulted in conflicting statements by Busia and his Foreign Minister during 1971.243 Given his 
pro-Dialogue view, Ofori-Atta was invited by Prime Minister Vorster in March 1971 to visit 
the Republic."4 This visit never materialised, possibly because Accra judged it to be too great 
a risk in view of Africa's condemnation of apartheid and the negative reactions for Ghana. In 
any event, Accra's unstable pro-Dialogue stance ended in January 1972, when Busia was 
ousted in a military coup. 
Gabon 
In comparison to the Ghanaian case, Pretoria' s military's involvement in the Nigerian Civil 
War resulted in a strong and long-lasting military bond with Gabon' s President Bongo 
through to the 1980s, examples of which will be provided later in this and the next chapter. 
However, whereas these case studies clearly show that Bongo had no qualms in interacting 
with Pretoria's men from the military and happily accepted their armaments, he felt continu-
ously uncomfortable with the visible and diplomatic style pursued by the Department of For-
eign Affairs, despite his acceptance of their technical assistance and support for develop-
ment/investment projects. In November 1974, for example, Under-Secretary Pretorius noted 
that Bongo was "cautious at all times" regarding contact with Pretoria and that he carefully 
watched the "reaction" from fellow DAU members. Even though Gabon' s representatives no 
longer verb all y attacked Pretoria at international gatherings, as the report further stated, their 
UN ambassador still voted in favour of anti-apartheid resolutions.'" Similarly, in view of his 
DAU Presidency from July 1977 to July 1978, Pretoria' s man in charge of the agricultural 
project in Gabon, examined later in this section, described Bongo's viewpoint: "He again 
mentioned that it would be appreciated if during this period a low profile policy is followed 
"2 The speech is contained in DFA, 11106/3, AJ 1970. 
"3 DFA, 11106/3, Vol. 5. 
244 Letter from John Vorster to William Ofori-Atta, Pretoria, 23 March 1971 (DFA, 11106/3, Vol. 5). 
245 'Gaboen ' , from Joban Pretorius, Pretoria, 21 November 1974, p.7 (DFA, 1/178/3, Vol. 4) (translation 
from Afrikaans). 
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by South Africa, as he will be open to criticism and will at times be obliged to react in a man-
ner not necessarily or truly representing his way ofthinking".246 
The first example of Bongo's co-operation with Pretoria's military as a follow-up to the 
Nigerian Civil War was the latter's provision of armament supplies in April 1970 and early 
1971. The initial act of delivering three T6 planes, light Harvard planes of North American 
origin, used for pilot training, low-intensity warfare and border surveillance,2" from Pretoria 
to Libreville can be interpreted as a gesture of thanks in return for Bongo' s co-operation dur-
ing that war. The journey extended from 23 to 26 April and went via Namibia, Angola and 
then over the sea before reaching Gabonese territory. Mirroring the alliance established during 
the Nigerian Civil War, the Portuguese provided aircraft to escort the planes across Angola 
and made a frigate available in the area where the planes would fly across the sea. The French 
provided a plane to accompany the squadron from the north of Angola to its final destina-
tion.'" On 9 November 1970, through the services of Loots, Bongo appealed to P.W. Botha's 
anticommunist stance to convince him of Gabon's need for an additional three T6 planes, 
spare parts for them and coastal patrol boats. In particular, Bongo argued that Gabon was sur-
rounded by the communist-inspired countries Cameroon, the Congolese Republic and Equato-
rial Guinea.'" Either jUdging Bongo's argumentation as reasonable and/or seeing this is an 
opportunity to reinforce the military link with Gabon, P.W. Botha replied on 2 December: "It 
gives me pleasure to inform you that I have approved of both requests and that the items in 
question will be delivered to you in accordance with arrangements to be made by Maj Genl 
Loots in consultation with our mutual friend Mr Beaupre [sic]. No charge will be levied on 
these items".''' Regarding the naval equipment, P.W. Botha informed Bongo that he could 
not, or was not prepared to, assist and proposed that he contact Paris, arguing "that the French 
Government might be in a better position to assist you in this regard".2>I In contrast, he ap-
pears to have had sufficient stock to supply him with three additional T6 planes, with anti-
communism appearing to have been P.W. Botha's guiding principle in providing them, as 
"6 're: Visit to the Gabon: 19 to 23 November 1976', from Jan Boyazoglou to Brand Fourie, Paris, 3 Decem-
ber 1976, p.1 (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 9). 
247 Potgieter, Henman, Willem Steenkamp. 1981. Aircraft of the South African Air Force. Cape Town: C. 
Struik: 138-143 . 
"8 Letter from Albert Bongo to Pieter Willem Botha, Libreville, 30 April 1970; letter from Pieter Willem 
Botha to Albert Bongo, Pretoria, early May 1970; 'Aflewering van drie Harvard-vliegtuie', ca. April 1970 (000, 
MV/56/16, Vol. 26). 
24' Letter from Albert Bongo to Pieter Willem Botha, Paris, 9 November 1970, pp.lf. (DoD, MV/56/16, Vol. 
26). 
250 Letter from Pieter Willem Botha to Albert Bongo, Pretoria, 2 December 1970, p.l (DoD, MV/56/16, Vol. 
26). 
251 Letter from Pieter Willem Botha to Albert Bongo, Pretoria, 2 December 1970, p.l (DoD, MV/561l6, Vol. 
26). 
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reflected in his letter to Bongo of 17 February 1971 , acknowledging the letter of thanks for 
the T6 delivery: "With regard to the communist threat which is the cause of your serious con-
cern, I wish to assure you that we are equally concerned. I am sure that we shall all have to 
bend our efforts towards a better understanding amongst our friends of our several and mutual 
problems".'" 
The military arrangements between Pretoria and Libreville outlined above were not known 
to the public until March 1995, when the Weekly Mail & Guardian reported them through a 
reference to a commander in the Gabonese defence force who, however, merely stated that 
"South Africa [had) supplied a number of military aircraft to his country" in the late 1960s.'" 
Ivory Coast 
In contrast to the relations with Ghana and Gabon, as a result of the military' s engagement in 
the Nigerian Civil War, the ensuing contact with Ivory Coast was by far the most significant 
success for Pretoria. Given Houphouet-Boigny' s high profile among Africa' s leaders and the 
backing he enjoyed by France, this allowed him to take a much more prominent stance and to 
openly advocate Dialogue with Pretoria. In November 1969, at the opening of a congress of 
the country's ruling Democratic Party, he raised that issue for the first time, clearly influenced 
by the Nigerian Civil War that was still in operation. One year later, on 4 November 1970, he 
reiterated his stance at a well-attended international press conference,'l4 and again at a widely 
noted press conference on 28 April 1971: "Apartheid is South Africa's domestic problem. It is 
not through the means of force that we will ensure its disappearance in the Republic of South 
Africa. C •.. ) allow me to come back C •. . ) to the necessity of dialogue with South Africa".'" 
Once Houphouet-Boigny had made the bold step of openly promoting Dialogue with Pretoria, 
he paved the way for other African states to follow with less hesitation, for example Ghana's 
Busia in December 1970. At the same time, the counting game of which African countries 
were pro- and anti -Dialo gue was a tricky issue, with speculation abounding in the South Afri-
can media and also in the contemporary literature on which African leader had already talked 
252 Letter from Pieter Willem Botha to Bongo, Pretoria, 17 February 1971 , p.l (DoD, MV/56/ 16, Yol. 26) 
(translation from French). 
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to Pretoria. The South African government, on occasion, deliberately fuelled these conjec-
tures, althougb it had to avoid openly exposing any African state involved in Dialogue to po-
litical pressure from other African nations, as this would endanger the existing relationship.'l6 
For instance, on 7 May 1969, Minister Muller told Parliament that Pretoria was in contact 
with more African states than he was able to mention.'" This, however, was also due to the 
fact that the Department of Foreign Affairs was not alone in trying to establish relations with 
African states, as has been shown, and was not always fully informed of the activities by its 
sister department. Contradictory statements from a minister and the head of state, for example 
in the case of Ghana, gave further impetus to the controversy. The features of politically un-
stable African countries and personalised African politics embodied in the head of state 
caused additional problems. Previously pro-Dialogue countries, such as Ghana and Madagas-
car, could change sides overnight because of a coup d'etat. Finally, the concept of Dialogue 
was not uniformly and unconditionally interpreted. Several African countries committed 
themselves unreservedly to the concept, while others wanted Dialogue to encompass all as-
pects of Pretoria's apartheid policy, including domestic ones. '" The latter aspect that contrib-
uted to the confusion is now briefly demonstrated by the case of Uganda. 
Uganda 
Within months after his assumption of power through a military coup, Colonel Idi Amin 
sougbt direct contact with Pretoria, and the first step in this direction took place in April 1971. 
While attending a conference in the United States that month, a Ugandan participant ap-
proached Professor John Phillips from the University of Natal in Pietermaritzburg with the 
message that Amin "would be prepared to meet Mr. Vorster if given the opportunity".259 Phil-
lips duly conveyed this to the Prime Minister, who subsequently invited Amin in September 
1971, to visit South Africa. In his reply, Amin suggested the deployment of a "lOman delega-
tion made up of students, outstanding politicians and other prominent Ugandans to study con-
ditions prevailing in South Africa and to make a report to me which will also be submitted to 
256 ' Ivory Coast, a target for S.A. diplomacy', The Star 31 March 1970 (DFA, 11179/3, Vol. 2); 'Willing to 
talk to S. Africa' , Th e Argus 29 March 1971 (DFA, 1118113, Vol. I). 
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the Organisation of African Unity".'60 The evidence we present now suggests that Vorster 
inquired from the DFA, probably Secretary Fourie, rather than Minister Muller, how to re-
spond and that they, in line with their guiding principle of non-interference in the domestic 
matters of other countries, advised him not to continue. This, at least plausibly explains why 
Vorster rejected Amin's proposal by arguing that it could "only be construed in my country as 
an attempt to interfere in our internal affairs and would, therefore, be unacceptable".'61 Their 
subsequent interchange, partly exposed by the Rand Daily Mail, 262 lasted until 5 October 
1971,263 but did not lead to any rapprochement. Amin' s visit to South Africa did not material-
ise, and he thereafter pursued a hard-line stance against Pretoria. 
Mogadishu Declaration 
Given the confusion among African states regarding Dialogue with South Africa, clarification 
was necessary and this occurred during 1971172, at meetings of the OAU and regional Afri-
can bodies. In January 1971, the issue was discussed at a meeting of the Orgarrisation com-
mune africaine, malgache et mauricienne (OCAMM),264 an alliance of Francophone African 
states, in Fort Lamy. The OCAMM final communique took note of Houphouet-Boigny' s ar-
gument that "there is no other solution than contact and dialogue which will pay in the long 
run",2" but did not propose further action. In mid-June 1971, the OAU Council of Ministers, 
meeting in Addis Ababa, rejected Dialogue on the grounds that such an exchange of ideas 
first had to take place within South Africa between the government and the black population. 
The issue was subsequently tabled at the OAU Summit of Heads of State and Government in 
Addis Ababa from 20 to 23 June, with Table 4 presenting the voting results.266 
260 Telegram from Idi Amin to John Vorster, Kampala, 28 September 1971 (DFA, 1/120/3, Vol. I; ARCA 
PV.614, Plaakboek Nr. 53, Bylae A). 
261 Telegram from John Vorster to Idi Amin, Pretoria, I October 1971, pp.lf. (DFA, 11120/3, Vol. 1). 
262 'Uganda visit a lost chance?' , Rand Daily Mail 4 October 1971 (DF A, 11120/3, Vol. I). 
263 Telegram from Idi Amin to John Vorster, Kampala, 3 October 1971 ; letter from John Vorster to Idi Amin, 
Pretoria, 5 October 1971 (DFA, 1/120/3, Vol. I). 
264 Organisation commune africaine et malgache (OCAM) from 1965 to 1970. 
265 ' Peace in Africa through Neutrality and in Neutrality'. Declaration by President Houphouet-Boigny, 
President of the Republic of the Ivory Coast to the Conference of O.C.A.M. Heads of State, January 1971. Issued 
as ' Ivory Coast News' by the Information Section of the Ivory Coast Embassy, London (DFA, 1/179/3, Vol. 2). 
266 Barratt. 1971. Dialogue in A/rica, pp.6f.; Barratt. 1971. Dialogue in Africa, p.99; KJotz. 1995. Norms in 
International Relations, pp.77f. ; Olivier. 1982. South Africa 's Relations with Africa, pp.28If. 
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Table 4: Voting on Dialogue at the OAU Summit in Addis Ababa, June 1971 
No 28 Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Congolese 
Republic, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Western Sahara, Zaire, Zambia 
Yes 6 Gabon, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius 
Abstentions 5 Benin, Burkina Faso, Niger, Swaziland, Togo 
Absent 2 Central African Republic, Uganda 
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The final death knell to the Dialogue debate came at the meeting of the Conference of East 
and Central African States from 18 to 20 October 1971 in Mogadishu, whose Declaration 
read: 
We ( ... ) therefore do declare ( ... ) that there is no way left to the liberation of Southern Af-
rica except armed struggle to which we already give and will increasingly continue to 
give our fullest support; that the policy of dialogue advanced by a small group of African 
leaders which has already been rejected by the OAU is again rejected because it is a ploy 
to hoodwink the African people.'" 
In this context, it is important to discuss the visit of the Progressive Party's Colin Eglin and 
Helen Suzman to Botswana, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Senegal, Tanzania and Zambia, 
only days before the OAU adopted the Mogadishu Declaration.268 Regarding their motivation 
for that journey, it must be borne in mind that none of their party's members had previously 
toured Africa. In recent correspondence, Eglin explained that it reflected his strategy as the 
party's leader from 1971 to increase the Progressive's popularity that had steadily declined 
since its establishment in 1959, as is shown in the secondary literature:269 
The decision of the Progressive Party to engage in "reaching out to Africa" was part of 
the broader strategy which I as the new leader in 1971 put forward to establish the politi-
cal relevance of the Party which, save for Suzman's victories, had been badly mauled at 
three successive elections. Indeed its viahility as a political party was in question.''' 
Eglin further argued that by going to Africa they aimed at breaking the foundation of the 
apartheid ideology: 
The Progressive Party's success in promoting the acceptance of a non-racial democratic 
South Africa required breaking the racial stereotypes that existed in the minds of the ma-
26' Reprinted in Africa Contemporary Record, J 97 J -72: C 18f.; Southern Africa Record 2, 1975. 
268 Newspaper coverage at the time: ARCA, PV.59, Files KN 59/A2/5/3 and KN 591D4/J / 1. Suzman's views 
are contained in her autobiography In No Uncertain Terms: Memoirs. London: Sinc\ar-Stevenson, 1993: 126-
129. Secondary literature: Nolutshungu. 1975. South Africa in Africa, pp.293f; Von der Ropp. 1971. Chancen 
eines Dialoges zwischen der Republik Siidafrika und dem schwarzen Afrika, p.734; Strangwayes-Booth, Joanna. 
1976. A Cricket in the Thorn Tree: Helen Suzman and the Progressive Party. Johannesburg: Hutchinson: 241 ff. 
269 Barnard, Schalk Leopold 'Leo'. 1987. Die eensame pad: '0 evaluering van die geskiedenis van die Pro-
gressiewe Party van Suid-Afrika (1959-1966), Journal for Contemporary History 12, 1: 1-27. 
270 Correspondence with Colin Eglin, 13 January 2003. See also Eglin, Colin. 1971. Africa: A Prospect of 
Reconciliation. Cape Town: Progressive Party. 
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jority of white South Africans. In this "Africa" was very relevant. It was important to 
show that white South Africans representing an anti apartheid party like the P[rogressive 
Party] were welcome in ' black' Africa. It was important to come back with a message to 
white South Africans that the black leaders we met were not anti white or anti South Af-
rica, but that they were anti the policy of apartheid that treated black people as lesser citi-
zens. 271 
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Finally, Eglin convincingly rejected the idea that the Progressives went to the African coun-
tries to counter further economic sanctions against South Africa "to do the bidding of Anglo 
American [the party's main financier] or any other business house": "While the PP represen-
tatives did not shy away from the fact that they did not believe comprehensive economic 
sanctions was the appropriate policy to apply, indeed hardly any of the countries were apply-
ing this policy in practice, the issue of sanctions was not the main thrust of our discussions".272 
At the same time, whether intended or not, both Eglin's and Suzman's initiatives in Africa 
favoured the English-speaking business community, as any attempt to alleviate South Africa's 
isolation benefited them. 
Returning to the analysis of the success of Pretoria's Dialogue, ofthe six African countries 
that had approved that policy at the OAU Summit in June 1971, only Gabon and the Ivory 
Coast could really be considered as major successes in Pretoria's Dialogue policy. Regarding 
Madagascar, it was not overtly dependent on South Africa in economic terms and could have 
therefore refused Dialogue. Having nevertheless won it over was thus a partial success, partial 
because it could have never found a large following due to its relatively low political standing 
in the African context. The economic dependence of both Lesotho and Malawi, finally, left 
them with little choice but to establish open contact with Pretoria, although Banda's conserva-
tive political style greatly favoured this move. In any event, by the end of 1971 , the Dialogue 
policy had stalled and received another blow when Tsiranana was ousted in the coup d' etat in 
May 1972.273 Only Houphouet-Boigny firmly stood by his Dialogue stance until the mid-
1970s, for example evidenced by the visit of his Minister of State, the Director of Cabinet and 
one parliamentarian to South Africa from 6 to 8 October 1971, meeting Vorster and P.W. 
Botha.274 While the reasons for the pro-Dialogue stance of Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Lesotho, 
271 Correspondence with Colin Eglin, 13 January 2003. 
272 Correspondence with Colin Eglin, 13 January 2003. 
273 Guelke. 1972. South African Foreign Policy in Africa, p.269; Johns. 1973. The Thrust of Pretoria's Afri-
can Policy of Dialogue, pp.179, 197; Olivier. 1982. South Africa' s Relations with Africa, p.283. 
274 'Visit of Ivory Coast Minister of State to South Africa: 6-8 October, 1971 ' , Pretoria, 14 October 1971 
(DFA, lII79/3, Vol. 2). Also Houphouet-Boigny, Felix. 1971. Message on Dialogue with South Africa, Africa 
Institute Bulletin 9, 6: 250f.; Houphouet-Boigny, Felix. 1974. Comments on Dialogue with South Africa, News-
letter of the South African Institute of International Affairs 6, 3: 34f.; Africa Contemporary Record, 1976-77: 
B613; 'Dialogue before war - Boigny', Rand Daily Mail 9 April 1975 (DFA, 1/179/3, Vol. 4). 
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Madagascar and Malawi at the OAU Summit in Addis Ababa have been outlined above, what 
follows is an examination of the position taken by Mauritius. 
Mauritius 
The stance of Mauritius at the OAU Summit in June 1971 can be partly explained with the 
role played by Gaetan Duval. As the leader of the main opposition party until 1969, he cam-
paigned against Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, Prime Minister since the island' s independence 
from Great Britain in March 1968. During 1969, in an attempt to quell this opposition, Ram-
goolam included Duval's party in a government of national unity and Duval became Minister 
of External Affairs, Tourism and Emigration. In this capacity, and in contrast to the prime 
minister, he openly advocated Dialogue with Pretoria and paid a visit to South Africa in May 
1971.'" As the OAU Addis Ababa Summit took place shortly thereafter, it is likely that Duval 
influenced the stance that was taken by the Mauritian representative. Besides this component, 
however, Mauritius' position at that OAU meeting must primarily be seen against the back-
ground of its economic dependence on South Africa. 
Trade and tourism were the main aspects of interaction between the two countries. Re-
garding trade, this had been a dominant feature for a long time, illustrated by the presence of a 
South African Honorary Trade Commissioner on the island since 1957, a post that remained 
during the remaining period under review.'76 Mauritius was economically dependent on South 
Africa for its tea export, second only to sugar, while it was South Africa's largest export mar-
ket in Africa beyond southern Africa, rivalled only by Zaire (Appendixes B and C). The de-
pendency of Mauritius gradually increased and, in early 1971, South Africa raised the coun-
try's tea quota.'" In the context of Dialogue, Pretoria did not need to make specific use ofthat 
situation to demonstrate to Ramgoolam that this approach was in his country's own interest; 
Ramgoolam already followed the prescribed line, cognisant of Pretoria's ability to use the 
dependency factor as a means of leverage. In fact, such a situation occurred in 1973, although 
under slightly different circumstances, as the next section demonstrates. Still in the domain of 
increasing trade activities between the two countries, the DF A files record a number of recip-
rocal economic missions from the late 1960s'78 Among them, the Durban Chamber of Com-
merce' s Trade Mission to Madagascar, Reunion and Mauritius in September/October 1971 
'" DFA, 1162/3, Vol. 4. Also 'Mauritian PM: talks are not for me', The Star 21 March 1972 (AReA, PV.59, 
File KN 59/A2/5/3). 
276 See the Foreign Affairs List (Pretoria: Department of Ex tema I AffairsIDFA). 
", DFA, 1162/3, Vol. I. 
278 DFA, 1/62/3, Vols. 1,2,4,7,8. Also 'Visitors from Mauritius to South Africa from beginning 1972 ', July 
1974 (DFA, 1/62/3, Vol. 9). 
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deserves special mention. It is mentioned here, and not in connection with Pretoria' s contacts 
with Madagascar or Reunion, because Mauritius was the prime motivation for the Chamber' s 
visit, and this lay in the person of the its Manager from 1965 to 1984, Kenneth Hobson. Simi-
larly to the Malawi missions that were mentioned in the previous section, he had personal 
connections with and knowledge of Mauritius, because he was married to a Mauritian and 
therefore was generally well acquainted with the Indian Ocean islands.279 It is justified to cite 
these reasons in order to clarify the Chamber' s subsequent missions to the Seychelles, Mauri-
tius and Reunion in October 1973, as well as to Reunion, Mauritius and Malawi in April/May 
1979.280 
Turning to tourism, the other factor of importance in South Africa' s economic exchange 
with Mauritius, South African Airways had opened an office on the island in October 1969 
and subsequently flew to Port Louis four times weekly.281 Two of these flights served as an 
essential stopover en route to Australia,282 with the island becoming an important locus within 
SAA's international network, an aspect of South Africa's foreign relations with Africa exam-
ined more closely in the next section. The other two flights served the South African holiday-
maker, as they simultaneously operated a service to Reunion, another sought-after holiday 
destination in the western Indian Ocean. In recognition of this region being an important holi-
day destination for South Africans, the hotel chain Southern Sun had already become active in 
Madagascar during 1968, and now began to show an interest in a hotel project on Mauritius. 
After the positive outcome of feasibility studies during 1970 for such an investment, Southern 
Sun approached Jan Bouwer in May 1971 to assess Credit Guarantee 's willingness to insure a 
credit with conditions similar to those of the Nosy Be project in Madagascar. The estimated 
cost was 2.5 million Rand, with 1 million being equity capital from Southern Sun and the rest 
a long-term loan from Credit Guarantee. Bouwer informed the Department of Commerce of 
this development, while Southern Sun Chairman Sol Kerzner "mentioned" the project to DF A 
Under-Secretary Pretorius in April 1972.283 Apart from these primary documents, there was a 
paucity of additional evidence, and the sparse information on that project therefore does not 
allow a pronounced statement on the intensity of Pretoria' s interaction with Southern Sun in 
this instance. The outcome of this project, as well as an assessment of the interest by national 
279 Correspondence with Geoffrey Tyler, 27 February 2002. 
28. Report of the 1973 Trade Mission to Malawi. 1973; Reunion, Mauritius, Malawi . .. Report of 1979 Trade 
Mission. 1979. 
281 Correspondence with Frans Swarts and Gert van der Veer, 11 February 2003. 
282 DFA report dated 29 November 1978, p.4 (DFA, 1162/3, Vol. 11). 
CHAPTER FOUR: PRIME MINISTER VORSTER, 1966-78 142 
intelligence and the military is provided in the next section on Secret Diplomacy, as their ac-
tivities took place during that phase. After this excursion to Mauritius, with the purpose of 
illustrating why it adopted a pro-Dialogue stance at the important OAU Summit in June 1971, 
let us now return to the implications of that policy for the future course of South Africa' s for-
eign policy towards black Africa beyond southern Africa. 
The evidence presented so far has revealed that Pretoria's Dialogue originated in the mili-
tary's activities, in conjunction with France, Gabon and the Ivory Coast, during the Nigerian 
Civil War, causing Ivorian President Houphouet-Boigny to make the pronouncements of No-
vember 1969 and November 1970 in favour of this policy. As stated at the outset of this sec-
tion, Dialogue was therefore not the result of any diplomatic initiative, even though the DFA 
became part of the military's activities. In comparison to the DFA's achievements with the 
Outward Movement, namely the establishment of diplomatic relations with Malawi, the mili-
tary's approach of achieving its goals through the means of power was much more successful, 
as illustrated by a country as far away and politically influential as the Ivory Coast, which 
could be won. Yet, the foreign affairs ministry's policy of providing both technical assistance 
and support for development/investment projects did not predispose them to achieve such 
results. As Deon Fourie appropriately suggested: "DMI was prepared to take risks. They were 
prepared to go into places that the diplomats, because of their cultural attitude [i .e. their dip-
lomatic rules] , would not go in without following the normal channels".28' In addition, Minis-
ter Muller's relatively tame personality was also responsible for his department being over-
taken. It is not difficult to imagine that this caused jealousy among Pretoria's foreign service 
officials, as their role as the country's principal foreign policy makers had been severely and, 
what was even worse, successfully, undercut. Evidently not prepared to accept this fate, they 
sold the military's achievements as their own. While the DFA had not been in a position to 
stop the military's Africa adventures, it now began to reap the fruits of these relatively risky 
manoeuvres and began to set foot in countries that otherwise would not have been accessible, 
Gabon in particular. A closer look at these inter-departmental rivalries resulting from the mili-
tary's participation in the Nigerian Civil War constitutes our current interest, helping us to 
understand Pretoria's subsequent foreign relations with this West African state. 
283 Letter from the Director of Southern Sun to Jan Bouwer, JohalUlesburg, 10 May; letter from Jan Bouwer 
to the Secretary, Department of Commerce, JohalUlesburg, 12 May 1971 (DFA, 1162/3, Vol. 1); DFA, 1/62/3, 
Vol. 4. 
284 Interview with Deon S. Fourie, 22 April 1999. 
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Hawks versus Doves 
The role played by South Africa in the Nigerian Civil War provides an illuminating illustra-
tion of the frictions that occurred between the militants and the moderates, the hawks and the 
doves respectively, in the formulation and implementation of Pretoria's Africa policy. In this 
example, the main opponents were the military, the hawks, represented by P.W. Botha, Fritz 
Loots and Neels van Tonder, against Minister Hilgard Muller and Secretary Brand Fourie 
from the Department of Foreign Affairs, the doves. The military tried to build a military net-
work with friendly African states, while the establishment of diplomatic relations with them 
was only a 'nice-to-have' by-product, as revealed by van Tonder's note of 29 October 1969 to 
P.W. Botha: "at present we will not try to build up a diplomatic representation between the 
R.S.A. and West African states, but rather a non-official mission".28' For the foreign affairs 
ministry, however, the list of priorities was precisely the opposite. The foreign service offi-
cials' profession was to maintain diplomatic relations between states and to establish such 
contact was their primary aim, and while military co-operation might be a means to that end, 
it was not the ultimate goal. On the French side, Jacques Foccart and Jean Mauricheau-
Beaupre fully shared the military's views, as they also had military and intelligence back-
grounds, in other words realist worldviews. In Mauricheau-Beaupre's hand-written letter of 
19 November 1969 to P.W. Botha, these socio-ideological affinities are very pronounced. 
Given their importance, an extensive quotation is justified: 
I am well aware of the fact that you, like me, are contemptuous towards laurel-wreaths; 
( ... ) The Trojan horse that holds great danger for you, a nationalist Afrikaner, is, as far as 
I know, not black terrorists, but Anglophile views. ( ... ) What can we do? To take away all 
the privileges and brotherly relations that you had with our friends [Bongo and 
Houphouet-Boigny] and replace those with relations that have a "diplomatic" form? ( .. . ) 
You, an old Afrikaner, should know, to what extent your black brothers are not consid-
ered as normal strangers. There is no "foreign affairs" possible with them ( ... ). When I 
accepted, almost two years ago, on your formal demand, to introduce him [Muller] to HE 
[Houphouet-Boigny] in Geneva, I knew that I made a mistake and he himself gave me the 
proof: the only specific subject that he seriously dealt with HE, was his desire to have his 
name published in a communique after the meeting had taken place ... (and HE judged 
him adequately, do not be in doubt). ( ... ) it is really sad to come to such a position with 
regard to less important things such as the possible establishment of diplomatic relations, 
that is but an unimportant factor of that which we must do. This will also happen, but at 
the right time. ( ... ) You have to have a real Africa policy with men and means to execute 
it.286 
285 DoD, MV/561l6, Vol. 26 (translation from Afrikaans). 
286 Letter from Jean Mauricheau-Beaupre to Pieter Willem Botha, Paris, 19 November 1970, pp.2f , 5, 8 
(DoD, MV/56/ 16, Vol. 26) (emphasis in the original; translation from French). 
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Having introduced the differences in attitude and behaviour of the military and the foreign 
service corps, we tum now to an examination of the implications of these during the final 
phase of the Nigerian Civil War. 
As we have seen, Fritz Loots was P.W. Botha's personal envoy to West African heads of 
state, while Neels van Tonder, at the Paris Embassy, was charged with co-ordinating Preto-
ria's activities with the relevant French authorities. P.W. Botha had initially given permission 
for the Department of Foreign Affairs to utilise van Tonder's services for its agricultural pro-
ject in Gabon,'87 our focus later in this section. This facility-sharing deal, however, proved to 
be difficult from the beginning and led to disputes over who had the right and permission to 
do what and through whom, as illustrated with three examples. First, during his meeting with 
Mauricheau-Beaupre in July 1969, Hilgard Muller questioned van Tonder's presence, even 
though he relied on the latter's co-ordinating and translating services.'" Second, regarding 
Pretoria's initial armaments supply to Biafra, P.W. Botha rejected a request from Houphouet-
Boigny to this effect that the Department of Foreign Affairs had handed over to him, and was 
only prepared to accept when that same request came through Mauricheau-Beaupre.'89 Third, 
after his Paris meeting with Houphouet-Boigny in July 1969, Muller had a lengthy conversa-
tion with van Tonder, pressuring him to co-operate with Ambassador Burger. According to 
van Tonder, Muller said "that it would be a pity, but if I could not work with the Ambassador, 
he would be obliged to talk with Minister [P.W.] Botha, whom he considered to be one of his 
best friends in Cabinet, and he would ask him to take me away from here" . In reply, van Ton-
der "assured him [Muller] that it would make things much easier for me if I did it in co-
operation with the Ambassador [Burger], but that I had no confidence in their [=foreign ser-
vice officers] good faith. I got the impression that they were more concerned about me tres-
passing on their territory, rather than an attempt to co-operate with me"."o 
This tension between the foreign service officials and the military steadily developed into 
open confrontation after the end of the Nigerian Civil War, with the Department of Foreign 
Affairs trying to escape from its perceived position of weakness. It appears that Secretary 
Brand Fourie, in confirmation of what has been said in Chapter 2, now took the lead and side-
287 'Voorgenome ontmoeting : Dr Muller en 'n ander Minister - Presidente Houphouet-Boigny en Bongo' , 
from Fritz Loots to Pieter Willem Botha, Pretoria, 29 May 1970, p.4; 'Gesprek met Mnr Beaupre op 717/69 ', 
from Neels van Tonder to Fritz Loots, Paris, July 1969, p.3 (000, MV/561l6, Vol. 26). 
288 'Gesprek met Mnr Beaupre op 717/69', from Neels van Tonder to Fritz Loots, Paris, July 1969, p.2 (000, 
MV/561l6, Vol. 26). 
289 Letter from Neels van Tonder to Fritz Loots on a meeting between Houphouet-Boigny and Muller, Paris, 
II July 1969, pp.2f. Also 'Onderhoud met Dr. Muller op 917/69' , from Neels van Tonder to Fritz Loots, Paris, 
July 1969, p.2 (000, MV/561l6, Vol. 26). 
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lined Muller in the Department's dealings with Prime Minister Vorster. During a meeting 
with van Tonder at the end of May 1970, Fourie argued that "we ought to build our own 
communication with African states because tomorrow or the next day Foccart and Beaupre 
[sic] may not be there and then we will have no contact with these countries".291 He acknowl-
edged "the extraordinary manner in which initial contact was made with West African states" 
and the "particular role" of Foccart and Mauricheau-Beaupre, as well as "that the SA Defence 
Force ( .. ) [had] organised this contact and has kept it going since then" .292 Nonetheless, he 
wanted to use direct political and diplomatic contacts as the channel of communication be-
tween South Africa and West African states. With this in mind, Fourie urged a direct meeting 
between Bongo, Houphouet-Boigny, Muller and another, unspecified, South African minister 
in Europe.293 For both van Tonder and Mauricheau-Beaupre, this request was the antithesis of 
their approach towards African political matters and they felt that the foreign affairs ministry 
would reap the fruits of the seeds that they had sown. For example, in his letter of 19 Novem-
ber 1970 to P.W. Botha, Mauricheau-Beaupre speaks of "the workers of the 25th hour",294 
referring to the Department of Foreign Affairs ' intention of invading their field of activity at 
the last minute and benefiting from their work. 
Towards the end of May 1970, Brand Fourie' s intention of setting up the above-mentioned 
meeting in Europe, notably with Mauricheau-Beaupre's assistance, proved central to the divi-
sions between the foreign affairs ministry and the military. In particular, the Frenchman 
wanted to know the identity of the unspecified South African minister, but Fourie either was 
not prepared to, or could not divulge this, causing Mauricheau-Beaupre to say that he "unfor-
tunately" had to come to the conclusion that this was an attempt to "bypass him and the re-
sponsible French authorities". He therefore requested a direct meeting with Vorster in South 
Africa "with the purpose of personally discussing the matter with the Prime Minister in de-
tail".29l Fourie flatly rejected this request. According to van Tonder's notes on his meeting 
with Fourie, the latter accused Mauricheau-Beaupre of having dragged South Africa into the 
290 Letter from Neels van Tonder to Fritz Loots on a meeting between Houphouet-Boigny and Muller, Paris, 
II July 1969, pp.4f. (000, MV/56/16, Vol. 26) (translation from Afrikaans). 
291 'Opsomming van ' n gesprek: Mnr Fourie - Maj van Tonder : 27 Mei 70', from Neels van Tonder, Paris, 
May 1970, p.2 (000, MV/5611 6, Vol. 26) (translation from Afrikaans). 
292 'Verslag insake reelings vir die voorgenome ontmoeting met Houphouet-Boigny en Bongo', from Brand 
Fourie, Pretoria, 25 May 1970, p.1 (DoD, MV/5611 6, Vol. 26) (translation from Afrikaans). 
293 'Verslag insake reelings vir die voorgenome ontmoeting met Houphouet-Boigny en Bongo' . from Brand 
Fourie, Pretoria, 25 May 1970, p.l (000, MV/5611 6, Vol. 26). 
294 Letter from Jean Mauricheau-Beaupre to Pieter Willem Botha, Paris, 19 November 1970, p.3 (000, 
MV/5611 6, Vol. 26) (translation from French). 
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already lost Nigerian Civil War and "wanted to know who Mr. Beaupre [sic] thinks he is to 
dictate to us, and where he thinks he comes from to demand to see the Prime Minister" .'% 
Brand Fourie's attitude and behaviour caused great concern among the military. In a letter 
to P.W. Botha on 29 May 1970, Loots expressed the following: 
It must be realised that Mr. Foccart's African Affairs organisation, in which Mr. Beaupre 
[sic) plays a leading role, holds the key to our further contact with, in particular, West Af-
rica, but also to other parts of Africa, ( .. . ). If the Department of Foreign Affairs thinks that 
they could get by without Mr. Beaupre's [sic) help, then, in my view, they are making a 
mistake as they don't realise the extent of his organisation's influence in West Africa. 
This can only result in the collapse of everything that was built up with difficulty in the 
past years. I want to, in all seriousness, warn that refusing to allow Mr. Beaupre [sic) to 
meet the Prime Minister in the RSA before his departure could have serious repercussions 
for us. He shows no interest at all in discussing matters with Mr. Fourie, or even Dr. Mul-
ler. ( ... ). I am afraid that if he is forced to work with Foreign Affairs, instead of DMI, as 
in the past, he would end his co-operation with the RSA.'91 
Although the military worried about the possible negative impact on South Africa' s future 
relations with West Africa and France, the Department of Foreign Affairs, and particularly 
Secretary Fourie, appear to have won the upper hand and convinced Vorster to henceforth use 
diplomatic channels of communication, possibly by citing the military's failed involvement in 
the Nigerian Civil War. This shift was not well received by Bongo, who, on 9 November 
1970, wrote to P.W. Botha: "I do not agree with the new dispositions that seem to have been 
adopted by your government with regard to the form that our future relations should take. I 
will think about it and propose to soon write a letter to your Prime Minister in which I will 
convey him my feelings".'" Mauricheau-Beaupre also disproved, writing in his lengthy and 
hand-written letter, dated 19 November, to P.W. Botha: 
you had a system of relations with HB [Houphouet-Boigny) that worked very well. ( ... ) 
Now you have nothing left. I nevertheless cannot believe that your diplomats would carry 
their lack of self-respect so far that they would ( .. . ) still ask me to help them. ( ... ) He 
[Houphouet-Boigny) again reassured me that, from his side, I still was his only mediator 
regarding the relations with you, i.e. with you or your Prime Minister. But if the situation 
has not changed in the meantime, I will tell him, if he asks me to go to Pretoria, that I 
nevertheless prefer to abstain."9 
'96 'Opsomming van 'n gesprek: Mnr Fourie - Maj van Tonder : 27 Mei 70', from Neels van Tonder, Paris, 
May 1970, pp.2, 4 (000, MV/56fl6 , Vol. 26) (translation from Afrikaans). 
297 Voorgenome ontmoeting : Dr Muller en 'n ander Minister - Presidente Houphouet-Boigny en Bongo', 
from Fritz Loots to Pieter Willem Botha, Pretoria, 29 May 1970, pp.2ff. (000, MV/56fl6, Vol. 26) (translation 
from Afrikaans). 
298 Lener from Albert Bongo to Pieter Willem Botha, Paris, 9 November 1970, p.l (000, MV/56/16, Vol. 
26) (translation from French). 
299 Letter from Jean Mauricheau-Beaupre to Pieter Willem Botha, Paris, 19 November 1970, p.6 (000, 
MV/56/16, Vol. 26) (emphasis in the original; translation from French). 
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Despite these intimidating warnings from both Libreville and Paris, the evidence on later de-
velopments suggests that Pretoria' s inter-departmental clashes did not seriously affect the link 
with Gabon. The military remained the key player, as we shall see later in this chapter, but the 
foreign affairs ministry came to playa more significant part, probably due to Fourie's insis-
tence. In particular, it now became involved in providing Gabon with technical assistance and 
support in the context of two development/investment projects, which are examined below. 
Regarding contact with the Ivory Coast, the military 's role appears to have been curbed, but 
this did not automatically allow the Department of Foreign Affairs to establish itself more 
prominently than during the Nigerian Civil War, when there had been some contact between 
Muller and Houphouet-Boigny. In contrast to Gabon, there are no traces of technical assis-
tance or development/investment projects being launched. 
As we argued earlier, the military's activities in the Nigerian Civil War and the resulting 
successes in establishing contact with both Gabon and the Ivory Coast were met with jealousy 
by the foreign service officers. In response, they not only claimed Dialogue to have been their 
work, but also tried to benefit from the situation brought about by the military's endeavours. 
This is amply illustrated by the Department of Foreign Affairs' engagement in Gabon with the 
use of its usual levers, technical assistance and support for development/investment projects. 
It is true that some contact had already been established during the second half of 1969 and 
without any apparent connection to the Nigerian Civil War. Yet, the DFA's activities ex-
panded significantly in the wake of that war, developments we now examine. 
Gabon 
The DFA's initial contact with Gabon dates from 1969 and involved a visit of three Gabonese 
doctors to the Republic. This took place as a result from a trip to Gabon earlier in the same 
year by medical authority Chris Barnard and Jack Penn, a renowned plastic surgeon. Barnard 
subsequently informed the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the South Africa Founda-
tion, of which he was a Trustee, of their wish to invite two Gabonese doctors to South Africa. 
In the end, three medical doctors visited the Republic during August 19693 00 This account is 
on the Foundation's first appearance in the framework of Pretoria's foreign relations with the 
black African states of interest in our study. Given that we did not have access to the Founda-
tion's archival material and that we could not interview Chris Barnard,'·' the motivation of the 
organised business association for this approach could not be ascertained. On 20 August 
1969, as a likely outcome of the above medical visit, Minister Muller informed President 
300 'Technical aid to Gabon to 31 December 1972' , from Glenn Babb, p.1 (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 3). 
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Bongo of Pretoria's willingness to deploy an "economic mission" to Gabon.302 A month later, 
Bongo accepted this offer and requested that representatives from the mining, agricultural, 
industrial, fisheries, road-planning and pharmacy sectors be included.303 That mission, how-
ever, was only deployed in April 1970, probably because the military did not want to have 
DF A officials on the spot who might disturb their interaction with Bongo in the context of the 
Nigerian Civil War. Thus, and confinning this assumption, during a preparatory meeting for 
the economic mission on 25 March 1970, Fourie regretted what he called "unfortunate de-
lay".304 In contrast, DFA Deputy Secretary Montgomery had led a different mission to Gabon 
from 21 to 27 September 1969, comprising a SAA representative, two officials from the De-
partment of Agriculture, the Inspector in the Department of Mining, his working colleague 
Shearar and van Tonder.30' Whereas the economic mission could not take place due to the 
military's likely intervention, this one was evidently not considered problematic, as, accord-
ing to Montgomery's report, the entire visit had been organised by Mauricheau-Beaupre, the 
military's go-between. In other words, the military was not against any Department of For-
eign Affairs involvement per se, but it wanted to determine how and when this took place. 
The purpose of the Montgomery mission was to "establish contact" and to obtain infonnation 
on Gabon's requirements from Pretoria. A meeting was held with Bongo on 23 September 
1969, and visits were made to several sites where South Africa could possibly provide assis-
tance. Montgomery concluded that assistance was urgently needed to upgrade the existing 
transport infrastructure, while mentioning agriculture and mining. ")6 
However, and for reasons we could not establish from the DF A files, the September 1969 
mission did not result in a follow-up exercise, while Muller's original proposal of sending an 
economic mission was now given preferential treatment. As mentioned above, a preparatory 
meeting for such a mission took place on 25 March 1970, attended by four officials from the 
DFA and nine from the Departments of Trade, Finance, Agriculture and Mining, as well as 
from the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR). Fourie itemised agriculture, 
mining, trade, housing and pharmaceutical equipment as the priorities of the mission that 
301 He died in September 2001, at the age of78. 
302 Letter from Hilgard Muller to Albert Bongo, Pretoria, 20 August 1969 (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. I) (translation 
from French). 
303 Letter from Albert Bongo to Hilgard Muller, Libreville, 18 September 1969 (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. I). 
304 'Opsomming van besprekings by inderdepartementale vergadering oor voorgenome besoek van 'n eko-
nomiese sending aan Gaboen: Uniegebou, Woensdag 25 Maart 1970', Pretoria, 7 April 1970, p.l (DFA, 1/178/4, 
Vol. I). 
30' DFA, 1117813, Vol. 1. 
306 'Besoek aan Gaboen: 21-27.9.1969' , from Robert Montgomery to Brand Fourie, Pretoria, 6 October 1969, 
pp. 7-1 0; ' State mission to the Republic of Gabon, 21 st - 27th September, 1969', from the Inspector of Mining 
Leases, Johannesburg, 9 October 1969 (DFA, 1/178/3, Vol. I). 
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spent the week from 12 to 18 April 1970 in Gabon, led by the Secretary for Trade, but funded 
by the Department of Foreign Affairs.30' The Deputy Secretary for Trade, van Tonder, the 
Agricultural Counsellor at the Embassy in Paris, Jan George Boyazoglou, a representative 
from the CSIR's National Building Research Institute and three members from the private 
business sector involved in mining and pharmaceutical drugs made up the mission to ascertain 
Gabon's needs in the field of technical assistance, an operation aimed at impressing President 
Bongo.'08 After their return, the government officials gathered to discuss the outcome. From 
the outset, Fourie stated that Gabon's "needs are unlimited" and the crux of the matter was to 
determine how assistance might be provided in a "practical manner", but without "burdening 
the Treasury too much". In consequence, emphasis was put on the provision of medical ser-
vices, assistance for stock-breeding, the establishment of a game park and mining. 309 In June 
1970, presumably after closer examination, the Department of Foreign Affairs offer looked 
somewhat different, entailing the provision of medical services, assistance for the develop-
ment of stock-breeding, a supply of seeds to improve agricultural production and technical 
assistance to preserve the fauna.'lo After Bongo's acceptance of the offer,311 Pretoria deployed 
a "technical assistance mission" from 27 September to 3 October, composed of Under-
Secretary Best, van Tonder, Boyazoglou and four medical doctors, for the further clarification 
of Gabon's needs,'!' In reflection of its composition, the mission concluded that medical and 
agricultural assistance should begin with immediate effect.J1J After a brief outline of the for-
mer, Pretoria's major agricultural project will be our main focus. 
Concluding that "South Africa can play an important role in providing aid to Gabon with-
out excessive expenditure" the medical doctors that were part of the mission recommended to 
supply vaccines and drugs to combat "the major endemic diseases", to invite Gabonese medi-
cal officials to South Africa for an exchange of experience, to despatch medical experts to 
Gabon to solve particular medical problems and to provide treatment in South Africa to Ga-
30' 'Opsomming van besprekings by inderdepartementale vergadering oor voorgenome besoek van 'n eko-
nomiese sending aan Gaboen: Uniegebou, Woensdag 25 Maart 1970', Pretoria, 7 April 1970, p.1 (DFA, 11178/4, 
Vol. I). 
308 DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 2. 
309 'Notules van inter-departementele vergadering gehou te Uniegebou op Vrydag, 24 April 1970', from Jer-
emy Shearar, Pretoria, April 1970 (DFA, 1/178/4, Vol. I) (translation from Afrikaans). 
310 'Aide-memoire', ca. June 1970 (DFA, 11178/4, Vol. I). 
311 Letter from Albert Bongo to Hilgard Muller, Libreville, 16 July 1970 (DFA, 11178/4, Vol. I). 
31' Letter from Hilgard Muller to Albert Bongo, Pretoria, 3 September 1970; 'Technical assistance mission to 
Gabon', from Brand Fourie to Albie Burger, Pretoria, 14 September 1970 (DFA, 11178/4, Vol. I). 
313 'South African mission to Gabon: 27 September-3 October 1970' , from Norman Best to Brand Fourie, 
Pretoria, 13 October 1970 (DFA, 11178/4, Vol. I). 
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bonese patients with special medical problems.'14 Evidently finding Pretoria's support, the 
relevant government authorities organised a variety of medical supplies. The vaccines, phar-
maceutical products, blood plasma, vehicles for transportation and two mobile X-ray units 
were subsequently delivered to Gabon in November 1970.315 Fourie supported all of the re-
maining proposals and concrete offers were made to Bongo, mainly through the South Afri-
can Embassy in Paris. 3l6 Yet, in February 1973, foreign affairs official Glenn Babb reported 
on the assistance provided thus far, stating that the X-ray units "proved to be white ele-
phants", the visit of Gabonese medical teams had been abandoned, no further action had been 
taken with regard to the visits by South African medical teams to Gabon and the training of 
Gabonese doctors in South Africa proved too difficult because of the language problems.317 
That situation and Bongo's reaction in later cases of co-operation with Pretoria justifies at-
tributing to him a large degree of egocentric behaviour, only showing real interest in projects 
that were to his own personal benefit or that strengthened his political standing. For that rea-
son he preferred dealing with the military, as they provided armament supplies. Consequently, 
Bongo's main interest regarding the DFA's offers, examined below, centred on the agricul-
tural project in his home area, and he wanted to obtain his own personal doctor from South 
Africa. Even though the foreign affairs ministry had approved that request, so as to "have the 
President's ear day and night",3i8 it was not possible to find a suitable person, particularly one 
who could speak French.319 
OGAPROVand other Projects 
While Bongo does not appear to have been particularly keen on the DFA's medical assistance 
to Gabon, what became known as the OGAPROV agricultural project was relatively close to 
the president' s heart and forms a case study on Pretoria's provision of technical assistance to 
314 ' Report of the medical mission to Gabon, September 1970 by Prof. F. Daubenton and Prof. A.B. Bull 
(Members of Council) and Dr. J. Terblanche (Honorary Registrar, College of Physicians, Surgeons and Gynae-
cologists of South Africa) and Brig. J. Gilliand (Department of Health)', October 1970 (DFA, 11178/4, Vol. 2). 
' 15 'South African mission to Gabon: 27 September-3 October 1970 ', from Norman Best to Brand Fourie, 
Pretoria, 13 October 1970, pp.9ff. ; 'Technical aid to Gabon', from Brand Fourie, Pretoria, 19 October 1970, p.1 
(DFA, 11178/4 , Vol. I); letter from Brand Fourie to John Terblanche and J. Gilliand, Cape Town, 5 March 1971, 
pp.1 £ (DF A, 11178/4, Vol. 2). 
316 Letter from Brand Fourie to John Terblanche and J. Gilliand, Cape Town, 5 March 1971 , pp.2£ ; ' Techni-
cal aid to Gabon: visit to R.S.A. : Gabonese officials' , from J. Gilliand to Norman Best, Pretoria, 14 December 
1970 (DFA, 11178/4, Vol. 2). 
317 ' Medical aid to Gabon ' , from Glenn Babb to Norman Best, Pretoria, 15 February 1973 (DFA, 11178/4, 
Vol. 6). 
318 'South African mission to Gabon: 27 September-3 October 1970 ', from Norman Best to Brand Fourie, 
Pretoria, 13 October 1970, p.11 (DFA, 111 78/4, Vol. I). 
319 Letter from Brand Fourie to John Terblanche and J. Gilliand, Cape Town, 5 March 1971 , p.2 (DFA, 
1/ 178/4, Vol. 2). 
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African states. Similar to the interdepartmental problems experienced towards the end of and 
after the Nigerian Civil War, as seen above, the establishment and the maintenance of this 
project brought to the fore differences in approach as to how foreign relations should be con-
ducted and the nature of their content. 
The English translation of the acronym OGAPROV stood for Gabonese Office for the 
Improvement and Production of Meat"20 It was a show model for Pretoria's technical assis-
tance, demonstrating "South Africa's core competency in agricultural research, cattle breed-
ing under very difficult circumstances", as former DFA official Runge summarised in 1999.321 
It was an ambitious project, also in terms of finance, with the credit for the first five years 
amounting to 800,000 Randm It bore considerable significance within the DFA's aim ofim-
pressing leaders from black African states with that kind of assistance to win their political 
approval of apartheid, and we will show in the next chapter that it even appealed to other Af-
rican countries, such as the Comoros. Jan Boyazoglou, the Agricultural Counsellor at the 
South African Embassy in Paris, was Pretoria's man responsible for all issues relating to agri-
cultural assistance to Gabon, with a focus on the OGAPROV project. OGAPROV comprised 
a separate ranch for both cattle and goats, as well as two sheep farms in Franceville and 
nearby Okouma, as well as a small model farm situated near Franceville, capital of Bongo's 
home province Haut-Ogooue in the west of Gabon, with subtropical fruit and pastures for the 
use of the president. The project, "planned to be self-supporting after 5 years", was intended 
to reduce Gabon' s dependency on the import of meat,323 with Pretoria' s foreign service offi-
cials attempting to make inroads to Bongo with this practical aspect of their technical assis-
tance. Furthermore, Boyazoglou chose the area around Franceville as the location of the pro-
ject by arguing that this combined "the best potential and possibilities for the successful intro-
duction of imported animal material and for the implantation of the first cross-breeding units, 
particularly for cattle and sheep".'" However, it is a reasonable assumption that it was se-
lected largely because Franceville was Bongo' s home-town, and the Department of Foreign 
Affairs therefore stood a good chance of appealing to the president. Boyazoglou suggested the 
Frenchman Jean Muxart as the director of the project, because he had already been involved 
in similar projects for the French development agency, and because he considered him as "po-
320 OGAPROV: Office gabonaise d' amelioration et de production de viande. 
l21 Interview with Paul Runge, 7 April 1999. 
J22 'Report on the agricultural aid to Gabon following the visit from 27th September to 4th October 1970 
(Special Report No. 34)' , from Jan Boyazoglou, Paris, 7 October 1970, pp.3f. (DFA, 11178/4, Vol. I). 
m 'Technical aid to Gabon', from Brand Fourie, Pretoria, 19 October 1970, p.l (DFA, 11178/4, Vol. I). 
l24 ' Report on the agricultural aid to Gabon following the vi sit from 27th September to 4th October 1970 
(Special Report No. 34)', from Jan Boyazoglou, Paris, 7 October 1970, pp.3f. (DFA, 111 78/4, Vol. I) . 
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litically quite secure" and "as a friend of South Africa".'" Proving this assumption correct, six 
months after his retirement in May 1976, Muxart was decorated with the lowest class of the 
Order of Good Hope award, the highest award with which South Africa honours citizens of 
other countries, "for his unselfish and devoted contribution to O.G.A.P.R.O.V.".326 Having 
introduced the principal characteristics of that project, let us now turn to the developments 
that led to its establishment. This also serves the purpose of again highlighting the conflict 
between the foreign affairs ministry and Mauricheau-Beaupre, this time as Bongo's adviser, 
dating back to the final phase of the Nigerian Civil War. 
The OGAPROV project was the result of Pretoria's decision to follow the recommenda-
tions of the technical assistance mission that visited Gabon in September/October 1970 by 
providing assistance for the development of stock-breeding. Expressing an interest in Preto-
ria's proposals, Bongo formally established OGAPROV in April 1971 and a management 
board was established. The DFA designated Jan Boyazoglou and the Agricultural Attache 
Julian A. Thomas, seconded to him at the Paris Embassy, to represent South Africa on this 
board. J27 Subsequently, the South African input was co-ordinated through the Department of 
Agricultural Technical Services, the Agricultural Section at the Paris Embassy and the DFA's 
Africa Division. The early days of the project were overshadowed by clashes between the 
parties involved in OGAPROV, namely the Department of Foreign Affairs and the relevant 
Gabonese authorities vs. people close to Mauricheau-Beaupre. According to his report dated 
August 1971 , Boyazoglou initially took decisions "in agreement with, and in many cases on 
the proposals of' one of Bongo's personal advisers and two officials from the Gabonese Min-
istry of Agriculture. While Mauricheau-Beaupre "and his organisation [French intelligence 
agency SDECE] were only indirectly involved" at that time, this changed after the deploy-
ment of more French staff seconded to him and their subsequent engagement in OGAPROV. 
Boyazoglou's correspondence with Pretoria suggests that these Frenchmen tried to give or-
ders to Muxart who, by then, had accepted the South Africans "as his only direct bosses, and 
might not easily agree to orders from any other source than from us or the Presidency". Mau-
richeau-Beaupre was upset by the fact that his men were not given the expected respect, 
summoning both the DMI's van Tonder, who happened to be in Gabon, and Boyazoglou. 
'" ' Report on the agricultural aid to Gabon following the visit from 27th September to 4th October 1970 
(Special Report No. 34)" from Jan Boyazoglou, Paris, 7 October 1970, p.8 (DFA, 11178/4, Vol. I). 
326 'Award of the "Order of Good Hope" to', from Anton Loubser, 2 July 1979, pp.IE (OFA, 11178/3, Vol. 
9). This had been suggested by Jan Boyazoglou in November 1975: ' re: Gabon - award of the "Order of Good 
Hope" to Messrs. P. Monier-Vinard and J.M. Muxart', from Jan Boyazoglou to Brand Fourie, Paris, 23 Novem-
ber 1975, pp.3E (OFA, 1/178/3, Vol. 7). 
327 Letter from Albert Bongo to Hilgard Muller, Libreville, 7 April; letter from Hilgard Muller to Albert 
Bongo, Cape Towo, 23 April 1971 (OFA, 1/ 178/4, Vol. 2). 
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Probably in an attempt not to endanger the link with Bongo by upsetting his adviser, Mau-
richeau-Beaupre, Boyazoglou smoothed over the situation as one of "a simple misunderstand-
ing between two people who have possibly been wrongly incited by persons who have no say 
in the whole matter".J2' In order to prevent a similar incident, he suggested to Mauricheau-
Beaupre, who agreed, that he could second two men to Muxart. At the same time, he wrote to 
Pretoria: "I personally feel that it would be better if it is we South Africans that pay these 
people and not Jean's organisation. ( ... ) After all, the person who pays is the boss!"J29 
That the situation was not entirely clarified suggests that the position of the foreign service 
officials in Gabon did not give them sufficient leverage to remove Bongo's adviser from the 
OGAPROV project. As a result, the problems persisted. In October 1971, Agricultural Atta-
che Thomas visited Gabon and stated that "at present these [technical] aspects pose minor 
problems when compared with the personnellhuman difficulties that are handicapping the 
development of the project".330 For the diplomats, the main problem lay in the clashes be-
tween Muxart and Mauricheau-Beaupre's men seconded to the project, as described by Am-
bassador Burger to Under-Secretary Best in October 1971: "The position - very simply - is 
that Jean [Mauricheau-Beaupre] carmot or will not draw the line between matters of high pol-
icy and technical detail. We are playing matters as coolly as ever we can. But the position is 
quite as difficult and complicated as Jean is himself'.331 A later DFA report, dated November 
1972, even describes Mauricheau-Beaupre as a "refractory personality".3J2 Towards the end of 
1971 , for reasons that are not reported, Mauricheau-Beaupre and his men withdrew from the 
project, and this facilitated the project's progress. By April 1972, there were some five hun-
dred and thirty cattle on the ranch, most of the equipment had arrived and Boyazoglou con-
cluded that "the essential facilities have been provided, a lot of groundwork has been done, 
and invaluable experience gained. The project has reached take-off point".3JJ The 800,000 
Rand originally allocated to the project, however, proved to be insufficient and, in April 1972, 
Boyazoglou indicated that a further 400,000 Rand would most probably be needed "to cover 
328 're: visit to Libreville from 28 July to I August 1971', from Jan Boyazoglou to Albie Burger, Paris, 2 Au-
gust 1971, p.4 (DFA, 1/178/4, Vol. 3). 
329 're: visit to Libreville from 28 July to I August 1971', from Jan Boyazoglou to Albie Burger, Paris, 2 Au-
gust 1971, p.6 (DFA, 11178/4, Vol. 3). 
330 'Report on visit to the Gabon: 2 to 17 October 1971', from Julian Thomas to Jan Boyazoglou, Paris, I 
November 1971 (DFA, 1/178/4, Vol. 4). 
331 Letter from Albie Burger to Norman Best, Paris, 29 October 1971 (DFA, 1/17814, Vol. 4). 
JJ2 ' Jean Maurichaux Beaupre!' , from Johan Pretorius, Pretoria, 9 November 1972, p.2 (DFA, 1/9911 9, Vol. 1) 
(translation from Afrikaans). 
JJJ 'The O.G.A.P.R.O.V. project during 1971 /72 and prospects for the future' , from Jan Boyazoglou, Paris, 
April 1972, p.20 (DFA, 11178/4, Vol. 5). Also 're: Report on informal O.G.A.P.R.O.V. meeting held at Embassy 
on 25/26 January 1972', from Jan Boyazoglou to Albie Burger, Paris, 16 February 1972 (DFA, III 78/4, Vol. 4). 
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the effect of devaluation (15%), galloping inflation and other unforeseen costs".'34 The De-
partment of Foreign Affairs nevertheless still felt very strongly about OGAPROV, because, as 
noted by Best, it "could be a major break-through in the field of intensive beef production in 
tropical Africa and, as such, an international "first" for South Africa".'" Yet, by May 1973, 
and contrary to the original pessimistic forecast, some 60,000 Rand remained unused and the 
proj ect was therefore well on track. '36 In the ensuing months, numerous South African mis-
sions, usually composed of officials from the Departments of Agricultural Technical Services 
and Foreign Affairs, as well as Boyazoglou and Thomas from the Paris Embassy, visited the 
project to follow its progress. 
It is not necessary to discuss the technical details of the project, but rather its overall de-
velopment with the political implications. In late 1973, Boyazoglou and Thomas strongly mo-
tivated for an extension of South Africa's commitment in OGAPROV. By then, the 800,000 
Rand were almost depleted, some five hundred hectares of pasture had been cleared and there 
were approximately six hundred cattle on the ranch. This success was also due to the mili-
tary's cost free assistance, indicating an interest on their part to make OGAPROV a success; 
if Bongo was pleased with this project, this would undoubtedly also benefit them in the long 
run. In particular, the South African Air Force (SAAF) flew to Libreville numerous times, 
airlifting cattle and equipment for the OGAPROV project to prevent them from being dam-
aged or stolen during the delivery by sea.'" Regarding Boyazoglou's and Thomas ' proposal 
of continuing with OGAPROV, this hinged on the project' s "spectacular and striking" 
achievement to produce "beef under an intensive system in tropical conditions, and in a coun-
try where domestic animals are hardly known".33' Even other African leaders, as well as FAO 
and European Development Fund (EDF)'39 representatives expressed an interest in 
334 'The O.G.A.P.R.O.V. project during 1971172 and prospects for the future ', from Jan Boyazoglou, Paris, 
April 1972, p.21 (DFA, 11178/4, Vol. 5). 
", 'OGAPROV', from Norman Best to Franl'ois Viljoen, Pretoria, II July 1972, p.2 (DFA, 1I178/4, Vol. 5). 
336 'OGAPROV: 1973174 budget ', from Norman Best to Brand Fourie, Pretoria, 16 May 1973, p.2 plus at-
tachment 'O.G.A.P.R.O.V.' (DFA, 11178/4, Vol. 7). 
'" 'Technical aid to Gabon', from Brand Fourie, Pretoria, 19 October 1970, p.2 (DFA, II I 78/4, Vol. I); 
'OGAPROV', from Norman Best to Franl'ois Viljoen, Pretoria, 7 September 1972, p.1 (DFA, 1I178/4, Vol. 5); 
'File note ', from Glenn Babb, Pretoria, I February 1973, p.2 (DFA, 11178/4, Vol. 6); 'O.G.A.P.R.O.V. - report 
on visit to the Gabon, 19 to 26 February 1973 by Messrs. Hawkins and Thomas', from Julian Thomas, Paris, 29 
March 1973, pp.lf.; 'OGAPROV: 1973174 budget', from Norman Best to Brand Fourie, Pretoria, 16 May 1973, 
p.1 (DFA, 1I178/4, Vol. 7); 'Besoek aan Gaboen: Mnr. J.F. Pretorius', from Johan Pretorius, September 1973, 
p.l; 'O.G.A.P.R.O.V. - report on visit to the Gabon: 3 to 25 September 1973', from Julian Thomas, Paris, 5 
November 1973, pp.2f. (DFA, 1I178/4, Vol. 8). 
338 'The future financing of the O.G.A.P.R.O.V. project', from Albie Burger to Brand Fourie, Paris, 19 No-
vember 1973 (DFA, 11178/4, Vol. 9). 
'39 The EDF was one of the key instruments of the European Commission's development assistance in terms 
of the various Lome Conventions that it had concluded with African, Caribbean and Pacific states since 1975. 
See Cosgrove, Carol, James McLeod. 1987. Trade from Aid: A Guide to Opportunities/rom EEC Funding in 
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OGAPROV. Boyazoglou and Thomas therefore insisted: "Withdrawal would certainly mean 
the collapse of the project before it has really had a chance to become autonomous. So far 
( ... ), it has become one of the show pieces in the country, thus gaining the confidence and 
support of certain influential people, including President Bongo".'40 Ambassador Burger con-
curred with the recommendation to continue with the project.34 1 As for Bongo himself, during 
a meeting with Boyazoglou in May 1974, he also stated that "he would welcome the continua-
tion of the co-operation between the two countries", provided that the project remained confi-
dential.''' In March 1975, summarising the first five years of the project, Boyazoglou and 
Thomas again emphasised the success of the project.34J However, it was only in November 
1976, after Bongo had approved an additional 1 million Rand to his annual contribution of 
200,000 Rand, that Minister Muller agreed, in principle, to the allocation of some 3 million 
Rand for five years, beginning in 1979. This shows the Department of Foreign Affairs' grow-
ing scepticism vis-a-vis President Bongo, due to his behaviour in the current example of sup-
posed co-operation and other cases presented later, whereby he merely tried to drain Preto-
ria's finances, while neither coming out in favour of Dialogue nor making a significant finan-
cial contribution to the project. Presumably for the same reason, the DFA's policy was "to 
gradually reduce our financial participation in this project" and the financial commitments 
were scaled down to 150,000 Rand annually for both 1976177 and 1977178.344 Regarding 
South Africa's participation in the OGAPROV project beyond 1979, the date to which access 
to the DFA's Gabon files was restricted, the DFA remained engaged until the mid-1980s at 
the least, such as indicated by Paul Runge, who was Project Liaison Officer in Gabon during 
1985/86 and whom we will meet again in the next chapter. 345 
Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. Reading: CT A Economic & Export Analysts; Parfitt, Trevor W., Sandra 
Bullock. 1990. The Prospects for a New Lome Convention: Structural Adjustment or Structural Transforma-
tion?, Review of African Political Economy 47: 104-116. 
340 'Memorandum on future fmancing of the O.G.A.P.R.O.V. proj ect' , from Julian Thomas, Paris, 14 No-
vember 1973, pp.l, 3, 5; ore: Memorandum on future financing of the O.G.A.P.R.O.V. project', from Jan Boya-
zoglou to Albie Burger, Paris, IS November 1973 (DFA, 1117814, Vol. 9). 
341 ' The future fmancing of the O.G.A.P.R.O.V. project', from Albie Burger to Brand Fourie, Paris, 19 No-
vember 1973 (DFA, 1117814, Yol. 9). 
342 Ore: Recent visit to the Gabon', from Jan Boyazoglou to Albie Burger, Paris, 10 May 1974, p.1 (DFA, 
1117814, Vol. 10). 
343 ore: Five year summary report on O.G.A.P.R.O.V.', from Jan Boyazoglou and Julian Thomas to Albie 
Burger, Paris, 6 March 1975,especiallyp.12(DFA, 111 7814, Vol. II). 
344 ' re : O.G.A.P.R.O. V. - fmal estimate of expenditure 1975176' , from Julian Thomas to Albie Burger, Paris, 
IS May 1975, pp.lf. (DFA, 117814, Vol. 12); Ore: Gabon - O.G.A.P.R.O.V. estimate of expenditure 197611977', 
from Julian Thomas to Albie Burger, Paris, 30 January 1976, p. l (DFA, 1178/4, Vol. 13); ore: Gabon -
O.G.A.P.R.O.V. estimate of expenditure 1977178', from Julian Thomas to Albie Burger, Paris, 10 December 
1976, p.2 (DFA, 1178/4, Vol. 14); 'Background ofOGAPROV', Pretoria, May 1978, ppAf. (DFA, 111 78/4, Vol. 
16). 
345 Telephone interview with Paul Runge, 18 January 2003. 
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After this detailed presentation of the DFA's medical and agricultural assistance to Gabon 
from the early 1970s to win the support of President Bongo, we now examine two develop-
ment/investment projects in which the Department of Foreign Affairs became involved at 
around the same time. This is of importance, as this economic leverage supplemented the 
technical assistance programmes aimed at furthering its political ambitions in Gabon. 
Regarding the smaller of the two development/investment projects, the firm LTA In-
formed the Department of Foreign Affairs in August 1971 that it had negotiated a housing 
project with the Gabonese government earlier that year. The motivation behind LTA's late 
approach is unclear, but in view of later developments it is possible that the private company 
was looking for some kind of official backing in case things should become problematic. Af-
ter all, it seems that this was LTA' s first activity in a black African country beyond South 
Africa' s immediate neighbourhood and it therefore lacked the necessary experience. The cost 
of the envisaged 1,000 housing units was estimated at 6.1 million Rand, for the financing of 
which LT A had previously approached the IDC, with Credit Guarantee acting as the insurer. 
In terms of repayment, the Gabonese government objected to the 20% initial cash payment, as 
required by the IDC. After discussions with Credit Guarantee and the Department of Com-
merce, but for reasons not mentioned in the documents, the IDC reconsidered the issue and 
lowered it to 10%. Prior to completion, "not less than 5%" had to be paid, with the remaining 
85% to be repaid in ten annual instalments commencing one year after the project's comple-
tion. In addition to the soft terms and conditions, the loan was granted at the low interest rate 
of 6.5%.346 Even though primary documents on the negotiations on these economic matters 
were not available, it is a reasonable assumption that Pretoria had such a keen interest in 
closer political contact with Bongo that it was prepared to step in with financial assistance to 
enhance the chances of LT A getting the job. This supports our argument, presented in Chapter 
I, that South Africa's Outward-Looking Policy in Africa was not an expression of the Marxist 
interpretation of political economy, but, and just the other way round, that the country' s eco-
nomic strength was used to achieve its political aims. 
According to a report from Under-Secretary Best, LTA was ready to cornmence with the 
construction of the housing units, when President Bongo intervened in late July 1972 "to can-
cel the arrangement for reasons which are not clear but he apparently felt the houses were too 
expensive and not suitable for Gabon". Consequently, LTA demanded payment, within three 
months, for those few houses that had already been built for demonstration purposes. Finding 
himself in an "embarrassing situation", according to Best's report, Bongo approached Mau-
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richeau-Beaupre, his adviser, for help. He, in turn, approached Neels van Tonder who dis-
cussed the matter with Norman Best. Van Tonder's information to Best was for the Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs to "intervene with L.T.A. to get them to agree to payment in six 
months, so as to avoid litigation and consequent harm to relations between Gabon and South 
Africa".'" Given his low ranking, Best presented the matter to his Secretary Fourie, who then 
approached the Department of Commerce." 8 Deputy Secretary Franyois Viljoen also dis-
cussed the matter with the LTA Chairman "in veiled terms" and was assured "that L.T.A. 
would co-operate with the government to the fullest extent possible".'" The DFA's compli-
ance with the military's instructions to sort out the matter amicably can be interpreted as its 
intention to endanger neither the now relatively co-operative situation between the two gov-
ernment actors, for example evidenced in the SAAF flights for OGAPROV, nor the continua-
tion of that project as a whole. On its part, LTA contacted Credit Guarantee during July 1972, 
and they resolved the matter by downplaying the problem and putting the blame on misunder-
standings on both sides.350 Given Pretoria's interest in the housing project, and in terms of the 
contract that existed between Credit Guarantee and the South African government (Chapter 
2), Credit Guarantee ' s financial involvement was reinsured by Pretoria, as Bongo' s behaviour 
would be considered as a political risk. In consequence, Credit Guarantee could reassure L T A 
that it would get back its money in any case and this, in the final analysis, is the interest of 
any private firm. The outstanding payment was finally made by November 1972, when Jan 
Bouwer from Credit Guarantee flew to Libreville to "convey apologies" to President Bongo 
for the problems that had arisen, again showing the importance of that project for Pretoria.351 
The second development/investment project in Gabon with Department of Foreign Affairs 
involvement in the early 1970s was the construction of a railway line, in which the firm Rob-
erts Construction of Murray & Roberts was interested. There is no clear evidence, but as we 
argued in Chapter 2, the relationship between Jan Boyazoglou, the Agricultural Counsellor at 
the Paris Embassy, and Stephen BoyazogJou, Murray & Roberts ' Deputy Managing Director, 
"6 'Housing project ' , from J. van der Walt (Secretary, IDC) to Mbouy Boutzit (Minister of Economic Af-
fairs, Gabon), Johannesburg, 6 August 1971, pp.lf. (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 2). 
347 'Relations with Gabon: L.T.A. Ltd housing project' , from Norman Best to Franyois Viljoen, Pretoria, 20 
July 1972 (DFA, 1/178/3, Vol. 2). 
348 'Relations with Gabon: L.T.A. Ltd. housing project', from Franyois Viljoen to Paul Kruger (Department 
of Commerce), Pretoria, 2 August 1972 (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 2). 
349 'Relations with Gabon: L.T.A. Ltd. housing project', from Franyois Viljoen to Paul Kruger (Department 
of Commerce), Pretoria, 2 August 1972 (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 2). 
350 Letter from Machiel de Klerk (Managing Director, Credit Guarantee) to J.P. Chassang (Union Gabonaise 
de Banque), Johannesburg, 7 August 1972 (DFA, 1/178/3, Vol. 2). 
351 Letter from Machiel de Klerk (Managing Director, Credit Guarantee) to J.P . Chassang (Union Gabonaise 
de Banque), Johannesburg, 27 November 1972, p.2; 'Gabon - L.T.A.-kontrak' , from Jan Bouwer to Norman 
Best, to the attention of Brand Fourie, Johannesburg, 29 November 1972 (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 2). 
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was important in the context of Pretoria' s co-operation with this private firm in Gabon. Given 
Jan Boyazoglou' s close involvement in the OGAPROV project, it is quite likely that he had 
insider knowledge about important political and economic developments in Gabon, the rele-
vant parts of which he would communicate to his cousin. In any case, in August 1971, two 
Roberts Construction representatives held talks with South Africa's Ambassador in London, 
Robert Montgomery, to inform him of their London office's interest in the so-called Transga-
bonais railway project.lS2 The proposed railway line, a project of some 200 million US Dol-
lars, was some eight hundred kilometres long, running from Owendo at the Atlantic Ocean to 
Booue in central Gabon (Section 1), then splitting into branches to Belinga in the north-east 
(Section 2) and MoandafFranceville in the south-east (Section 3). Its main purpose was to 
make good the lack of infrastructure needed to transport iron and manganese for export to the 
sea, and to access the country's vast timber potential.3SJ It was clear that the project would 
only become viable after the completion of either Section 2 or 3 as only then did the export of 
the mineral resources, located in the MoandaiFranceville area, become possible. By early 
1972, the railway project became a matter of international interest, as Bongo tried to secure 
financing from donors such as Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, the United States, the 
EDF and the World Bank. During discussions with Deputy Secretary Viljoen, a Roberts Con-
struction representative stated that his company was also "very interested in the development 
of this project" . He proposed that Pretoria should also tender for the project with " implica-
tions [that] go much further than that of just a normal construction project for a South African 
Company", thereby implying that government assistance for Roberts Construction in this in-
stance would aid Pretoria's political Dialogue with Gabon. In further promoting the com-
pany' s own financial interest in that project, the Roberts Construction representative sug-
gested that Pretoria should try to undercut the loan conditions offered by others: "In this re-
gard it is our [Roberts Construction' s] opinion that we may achieve some success if we were 
able to offer a loan of R5.000.000 repayable over a period of 15 years at an interest rate of 
5Y.% or less" .J" Viljoen informed Fourie about the meeting,'" who then contacted the Treas-
ury to ascertain their attitude towards such a loan. In his reply, the Treasury's Secretary for 
Finance advised the DF A not to become involved in arranging a "soft loan" for a project that, 
J52 ' Roberts Construction: development projects in Ivory Coast and Gabon ', from Fran,ois Viljoen, Pretoria, 
16 August 1971 (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 2). 
m ' Re: Transgabon railway project', from C.J. Miller (Roberts Construction, International Division) to Fran-
90is Viljoen, Johannesburg, 6 March 1972 (DFA, 1/178/3, Vol. 2). 
m ' Re: Transgabon railway project', from C.J. Miller (Roberts Construction, International Division) to Fran-
90is Viljoen, Johannesburg, 6 March 1972, p.3 (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 2). 
m 'Trans-Gaboen spoorwegprojek', from Fran90is Viljoen to Brand Fourie, Pretoria, 28 March 1972 (DFA, 
1/178/3, Vol. 2). 
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with reference to Section 1, "certainly looks like a bottomless pit as far as capital require-
ments are concerned"."6 Roberts Construction was informed of this negative position, but, in 
July 1972, pursued another avenue by approaching Credit Guarantee for a credit facility to 
participate in this potentially lucrative railway project. Yet, Credit Guarantee was not in a 
position either to make a commitment at that point, while indicating that "it was possible for 
us to offer a loan facility" to the amount of 10 million Rand, with repayment conditions simi-
lar to the LTA's above housing project and at a 6% interest rate.357 
By April 1973, however, the next available documents reveal that the situation had 
changed. In particular, World Bank President Robert S. McNamara had informed President 
Bongo in February 1973 that he was not in a position to provide the expected 30 million US 
Dollars, and Bongo now turned to South Africa for help. '" Two months later, Jan Bouwer 
infonned President Bongo that Credit Guarantee was in a position to offer the necessary fa-
cilities for Roberts Construction to tender for the Transgabonais project with a contract value 
of IS million Rand and for the IDC to negotiate with the Gabonese authorities a loan covering 
85% of that amount. Repayment would commence four years after the project's completion 
and the interest rate was set at 6.5%."9 While there is no indication in the DFA files as to why 
Credit Guarantee was all of a sudden prepared to commit itself to that project, a reading of To 
the Point, the magazine secretly funded by the rival Department of Infonnation, is infonna-
tive."o Against the background of competition between the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
the Department of Information over Pretoria' s Africa policy at the time, examined in detail in 
the next section, the latter tried to undennine and belittle its rival's ambitions regarding the 
Gabonese railway project. Thus, To the Point argued that Bongo now considered approaching 
South Africa as a last resort, but that "the South Africans", evidently meaning the Department 
of Foreign Affairs, "would certainly welcome a prestige coup of this kind".361 
This is, indeed, what seems to have happened. The next available document, dated No-
vember 1973, shows that South Africa was present at a meeting with other interested parties, 
namely the government of Gabon and its railway authority, representatives from Canada, 
France, West Gennany, Italy, the United States and the EDF, to discuss the project. The South 
356 'Trans-Gabon railway project', from the Secretary for Finance at the Treasury to Brand Fourie, 3 July 
1972 (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 2). 
357 ' reo Transgabon railway project' , from C.1. Miller (Roberts Construction, International Division) to Fran-
,ois Viljoen, Johannesburg, 28 July 1972 (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 2) . 
3" Pean. 1983. Affaires africaines, pp.119, 121. 
359 Letter from Jan Bouwer to Albert Bongo, Johannesburg, 13 April 1973 (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 3). 
360 ' Expresso Bongo', To the Point 30 June 1973: 27( 
361 'Expresso Bongo' , To the Point 30 June 1973: 27(; 'Bongo express' , To the Point 25 August 1973: 39. 
CHAPTER FOUR: PRIME MINISTER VORSTER, 1966-78 160 
African delegation consisted of an IDC official, Bouwer from Credit Guarantee and an inter-
preteL'·2 According to the available evidence, in May and June 1974, the Committee of the 
EDF and the European Commission decided in favour of the EDF's participation in the fi -
nancing of Section 1 of the Transgabonais railway project with some 20 million US Dollars.'·' 
Initially, Roberts Construction was meant to participate in the project, and this became public 
knowledge through press reports and the secondary literature.'·' By September 1974, how-
ever, Bongo decided to finance the entire project from the country's own financial reserves 
that had received a substantial boost from the discovery of oil, assisted by the sale of uranium 
and manganese ore. A French consortium was awarded the project and Roberts Construction 
was merely left with a small contract to build a bridge for the project to the amount of 2 to 3 
million US Dollars.'·s The DFA files were accessible until the end of 1979, but contain no 
further material on Roberts Construction's involvement in the railway project, of which Sec-
tion 1 was completed in 1983 and Section 3 to Franceville three years lateL'66 The overall 
impression gained from Pretoria's participation in the Transgabonais railway supports the 
earlier argument that Bongo tried to manipulate the situation to his own advantage, approach-
ing the South Africans when all other channels seemed closed, but dropping them quickly if a 
different source of assistance became available. 
The purpose of this section was to examine Pretoria's Dialogue policy. In contrast to what has 
been assumed in the secondary literature on this aspect of South Africa's foreign relations, it 
was not brought about by the Department of Foreign Affairs. It was due to the military' s en-
deavours in the Nigerian Civil War that President Houphouet-Boigny made his famous Dia-
logue pronouncement in November 1970. Their realist approach, based on the premise that 
African leaders only understand the language of force and power, was thus more successful 
than the Department of Foreign Affairs' diplomacy. The distrust and jealousy between the 
two goverrunent branches led to rivalry, particularly over the contact with Gabon, with the 
foreign affairs ministry not hesitating to reap the fruits of the military's risky initiatives. 
'.2 'Export finance - Gabon', November 1973 (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 3). 
3., Letter from David de Villiers du Buisson (Ambassador to the European Communities) to Brand Fourie, 
Brussels, 5 June 1974, p.l; also translations from the French magazine Industries et travaux d'outre-mer of Oc-
tober and November 1974, provided by Roberts Construction to the OF A (OF A, 11178/3, Vol. 4). 
364 'SA firm wins big railjob' , Th e Star 25 June 1974 (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 4); Legum. 1976. Vorster's Gam-
ble for Africa, p.16. 
3.S ' Gaboen' from Johan Pretorius, Pretoria, 21 November 1974, p.5 (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 4); Pean. 1983. Af-
[aires africaines, p.123. 
'66 Fair, Denis. 1987. The Transcameroon and the Transgabonais, Africa Institute Bulletin 27, 11 : 206ff.; 
Viel, Hugues. 1986. Le Transgabonais et I'economie du Gabon, Marches tropicaux et mediterramiens 2145: 
3217-3252. 
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Whatever the merits of their different approaches, neither the foreign service corps nor the 
men from the military could have done it alone. The former depended a great deal on the as-
sistance from the economic sector in financing the development/investment projects, while 
the military needed the French intelligence and military network of interests in Africa. An-
other point in common was that neither achieved their original intentions. For the Department 
of Foreign Affairs, the primary motivation was to find political acceptance and establish dip-
lomatic contacts; this was only fully realised in the case of Malawi. For the military, the main 
purpose was to create a network of allied African states through which it could play the role 
of continental gendarme; this was partly achieved in Gabon. One of the problems faced by 
both state actors was the fragile nature of African politics, with regime changes resulting in 
immediate adjustments in government policy towards South Africa. This made the outcome 
of their ventures unpredictable, such as experienced by the military in both Chad and Ghana, 
and by the Department of Foreign Affairs in Madagascar. The overall situation after some six 
years of Dialogue within the Outward-Looking Policy was appropriately summarised in South 
Africa's daily The Star in October 1972: 
The outward policy may not be quite dead, but these days it is looking very moribund. ( ... ) A 
couple of years ago the outward policy looked quite promising. It is clear now that the only 
way to reactivate it is to show some dramatic betterment of race relations at home.367 
This type of analysis formed the basis for what became known as Secret Diplomacy and De-
tente, that the Department of Information and the Bureau for State Security pursued respec-
tively. Their policies are examined in the two following sections. 
Secret Diplomacy 
Friction between the foreign affairs ministry and the military over strategy dominated Preto-
ria's foreign policy making towards Africa during roughly the first half ofVorster's premier-
ship. Interdepartmental struggles also characterised the remaining period of Vorster' s rule 
until his forced resignation following the Information Scandal in 1978. However, the spec-
trum of actors competing over the shaping of Pretoria's foreign relations with Africa in those 
years was extended, with the Department of Information and the Bureau for State Security 
prominently entering the scene from around 1972. While working together, they pursued their 
individual goals, namely the conduct of unconventional diplomacy to break South Africa's 
international isolation and the collection of intelligence respectively. Their strategies became 
367 The Slar 6 October 1972 (ARCA, PV.59, File KN 591D41l1l). Similarly the Sunday Times 25 June 1972 
(ARCA, PV.59, File KN 59/A2/5/3). 
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known as Secret Diplomacy and Detente, used to describe Vorster's subsequent approach to 
Africa during his last six years, or so, as Prime Minister. The implications of these policies 
are analysed hereafter, but it is appropriate at this stage to summarise the main points. The 
Department of Information was the main protagonist of the Secret Diplomacy, an approach 
which did not follow the conventional concept of inter-state relations being conducted on a 
formal level between diplomats. The climax to this approach was Vorster's visit to the Ivory 
Coast in September 1974, meeting Presidents Felix Houphouet-Boigny and Leopold Sedar 
Senghor of Senegal. At around the same time, Detente was predominantly pursued by the 
Bureau for State Security, aimed at easing the strained relations in southern Africa with the 
ultimate goal of establishing contact with African states further north. Its highpoint was the 
Victoria Falls Bridge Conference in August 1975 under the chairmanship of both Zambian 
President Kenneth Kaunda and the South African Prime Minister, and attended by the Rhode-
sian government and the black nationalists. 
We have so far emphasised that the Department of Information and BOSS shaped Preto-
ria's approach towards Africa beyond southern Africa from roughly 1972 to 1978. However, 
similar to the rivalries surrounding the Dialogue policy, competition became evident and in-
volving other state actors. Given the access to the DFA files , we can now reveal and discuss 
several pertinent diplomatic activities during this period illustrative of both their interrelation-
ship with, and counter approaches to both the BOSS and/or the Department of Information. 
Detente ran parallel to some of the initiatives discussed here, but it needs to be considered 
separately in the next section, as this phase was dominated by major rivalries between BOSS 
and the military. Previous military activities cannot be excluded, but their documentation is 
not possible due to the lack of archival sources. At the same time, it can be argued that the 
military remained relatively inactive in Africa until then because P.W. Botha's men were 
hesitant to venture into Africa beyond South Africa's immediate neighbourhood after their 
setback in the Nigerian Civil War. This explains their focus on the Angolan war from late 
1975. 
We presently investigate the nature of Secret Diplomacy. As we have argued earlier, nei-
ther the Outward Movement nor Dialogue had been successful in breaking South Africa's 
international isolation. Deon Geldenhuys describes the reasons for the Secret Diplomacy pri-
marily as the Department of Information' s "strong feeling of dissatisfaction and impatience 
( ... ) about the results achieved by Foreign Affairs ' conventional diplomacy".J6' With their 
avowed intention of outshining diplomatic activities in Africa, for this department "there was 
368 Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.86. 
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a clear-cut case to supplement conventional diplomacy with unconventional or unorthodox 
means",36' with the ultimate intention of improving South Africa's image overseas. In 1971, 
Minister Mulder and his then Secretary, Gerald Barrie, undertook an extensive foreign tour 
and found that there was a "propaganda onslaught" against South Africa, as Mulder described 
it, and this became one of the principal reasons prompting the Department of Information to 
pursue Secret Diplomacy.370 The Department used unorthodox methods to that end and these 
can be succinctly summarised as buying, bribing or bluffing the way to the opinion and deci-
sion makers of the world, by launching aggressive clandestine propaganda operations. To 
mention only a few of the known examples, attempts were made to buy the US daily Wash-
ington Post, The Citizen newspaper was launched in South Africa to counter the liberal Rand 
Daily Mail and front organisations, disguised as think tanks and introduced later in this chap-
ter, were formed. 31I Given both Secretary Rhoodie's and Deputy Secretary Les de Villiers' 
jOlul1alistic background, special attention was paid to the press and, in 1971, the Department 
of Information established the weekly current affairs magazine To the Point, with Rhoodie as 
Deputy Editor for the first two years after its inception. 
The secondary literature has ascribed the policy of Secret Diplomacy solely to the De-
partment of Information, based on the assumption that both the Outward Movement and Dia-
logue had been the work of the Department of Foreign Affairs alone, and the failure of which 
therefore had to be attributed to the foreign affairs ministry. As has been shown in Chapter 2, 
note is taken of the rivalries between the Minister of Defence, P.W. Botha, and the head of 
BOSS, Hendrik van den Bergh. However, due to the lack of knowledge about the military's 
crucial role in bringing about Dialogue as a result of the Nigerian Civil War, the motivation 
for BOSS to become involved alongside the Department of Information has been neglected. 
This part of the study argues that the Bureau's activities during Secret Diplomacy and Detente 
were the product of van den Bergh's ambition to outmanoeuvre the men from the military. As 
both BOSS and the Department of Information attempted to gain advantages over their re-
spective opponents, they assisted each other in gaining a more powerful bargaining position 
vis-ii-vis the Prime Minister. This endeavour was greatly enhanced by the close personal rela-
tionship between Prime Minister Vorster and van den Bergh, dating from their common ex-
perience in an interrunent camp during World War II, as well as Information Secretary Eschel 
Rhoodie (Chapter 2). This study primarily relies on DF A documentation, containing only a 
few primary documents on the Department of Information' s activities, and this applies even 
369 Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation , p.I09. 
370 Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation , p.84f. 
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more particularly to BOSS. While constituting a weakness in this study, attempts were made 
to overcome the lack of information by resorting to secondary sources. Yet, regarding details 
on BOSS 's activities, not even Deon Geldenhuys ' seminal study on South African foreign 
policy making provides much insight, notably because van den Bergh bluntly refused him an 
interview, the only ex-official approached to have done SO.372 Thus, Geldenhuys' assumption 
that there was a geographical separation of work between the Department of Information and 
BOSS with "an understanding that Rhoodie would focus on the Francophone states and Van 
den Bergh on Southern, East and Central Africa"m is of little help; the remaining part of this 
chapter reveals that joint operations were conducted in the Ivory Coast, in Zaire and on the 
Seychelles. Rather, a separation of tasks is discernible in that BOSS appeared in all matters 
related to security aspects ofVorster's visits abroad and intelligence gathering, while the De-
partment ofInformation concerned itself with unconventional diplomacy. 
In this section, we first probe the Department of Information's Secret Diplomacy endeav-
ours. Subsequently, we investigate the parallel activities by the Department of Foreign Affairs 
in Liberia and the Central African Republic, as well as Pretoria's concern in obtaining over-
flying rights for South African Airways. We then examine a third major aspect pertinent to 
South Africa's foreign relations with African states in the first half of the 1970s, namely con-
tact with the islands in the western Indian Ocean. Finally, we analyse the roles played by two 
non-state actors, the Progressive Party and the South Africa Foundation, at around time. 
Ivory Coast and Senegal 
The Department of Information was the driving force in Pretoria' s endeavour to establish 
presidential contact between South Africa, the Ivory Coast and Senegal, culminating in Vor-
ster's visit to the Ivory Coast on 22/23 September 1974, when he met Presidents Houphouet-
Boigny and Senghor. The choice of these two countries appears to have been based on the 
judgement that these two Francophone states held such political influence in African political 
matters that South Africa' s ambition of being accepted by the continent could be achieved by 
securing their joint support. This assumption most probably rested on them maintaining close 
links to Paris, therefore holding something of an international status. In his autobiography, 
Eschel Rhoodie explains: 
The logic of our argument ( .. . ) was that international dialogue will not be achieved unless 
South Africa could speak to at least some of the more prominent African States. ( ... ) 
371 Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy ollsoialion, pp.84f. , 110, 114-119, 183ff. 
372 Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy 01 Isolalion, p.271 (note 178). 
373 Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy ollsoialion, p.148. 
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These States did not include the third raters such as Liberia, the Central African Republic 
and Malawi, but countries with internationally recognised leaders: Leopold [sic] Senghor 
of Senegal, Houphouet Boigny [sic] ofthe Ivory Coast ( ... )374 
165 
President Houphouet-Boigny's pro-Dialogue attitude had remained unchanged since 1970, as 
shown in the previous section. As for Senghor, an article on 'Dialogue with Africa' , published 
in To the Point in January 1972, noted that he had recently "called for an OAU summit to 
discuss the question of dialogue with the White-rule African states". It went on to say that this 
linked him "with the pro-dialogue policies of Houphouet-Boigny [sic], Banda, Tsiranana and 
Chief Leabua Jonathan of Lesotho ( ... ). Banda and Jonathan, however, do not wield much 
influence. On their own they would always have remained renegades in the eyes of the rest of 
Africa. On the other hand, Houphouet-Boigny [sic], and now with him Senghor, are powerful 
figures who lead the influential Francophone African bloc".'" Despite this assessment, the 
Department of Information does not seem to have approached Senghor more vigorously until 
early 1973, for three possible reasons. First, as indicated in Chapter 2, the Department ofIn-
formation's budget only underwent a drastic increase in that year. Second, Senghor's pro-
Dialogue position was uncertain. Even in April 1973, in an interview with To the Point, he 
stated: "In some respects I am a man for dialogue. It is my opinion that problems between 
states can be adjusted at the negotiating table, so long as those conferring do so on a footing 
of equality. ( ... ) In the first place dialogue would have to take place, not between us and Mr 
Vorster, but between the Vorster government and the black majority in South Africa".376 
Third, Pretoria may have been confused by Senghor's explanation in the same interview: "if 
Mr Vorster wishes to talk to me he will first of all need to talk with representatives of the 
OAU. If Vorster's National Party is prepared to enter into dialogue with my party, the UPS 
[Union Progressiste Senegalaise], then I can say we are ready, in the same way as I personally 
am ready in my capacity as chairman of the UPS . But then it will be a dialogue between po-
litical parties" .J11 It is possible that this statement disturbed the South African government, as 
it could be interpreted as Senghor's overture towards the Progressive Party, opposition to the 
ruling National Party. There was some reason for Pretoria to consider this as a possibility, as 
we will see in the discussion on that party' s activities in Africa at the end ofthis section. 
Possibly due to its improved financial position, and even though the last two of the above 
factors remained unchanged, the Department of Information tried to establish contact with 
Senghor during 1973. Utilising its favourite propaganda tactic, the press, the department 
374 Rhoadie. 1983. The Real Information Scandal, pp.98, 123. 
m To the Point 29 January 1972: 42. Also To the Point 15 January 1972: 37. 
376 To the Point 21 April 1973: 20. 
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enlisted the services of Bernard A. Lejeune, a French journalist based in Johannesburg, be-
coming one of its first secret collaborators.l7' That contact was established through Eschel 
Rhoodie, who met him when he was the Deputy Editor of the Department ofInformation's To 
the Point magazine. l7' The choice specifically fell on Lejeune, because he could speak French, 
which was an essential attribute in any contact with Francophone Africa. Furthermore, he 
"knows Africa like the back of his hand, especially French West Africa, and will help us to 
make good contacts out there, including people around President Houphouet-Boigny and 
President Senghor", as Information Deputy Secretary Les de Villiers recalls in his autobiog-
raphy. lao A primary Department of Information source in the National Archives reveals that 
Lejeune, in early May 1973, paid a visit to both Senegal and to the Ivory Coast. According to 
his final report to Minister Mulder, this trip had been "very successful", as he had meetings 
with Bara Diouf, Editor-in-Chief of the Senegalese daily Le Soleil, and Laurent Dona-Fologo, 
Editor-in-Chief of the Ivorian daily Fraterniui Matin . As an outcome of the talks, these two 
newspapermen were "scheduled to come to South Africa towards the end of this year". From 
the same report, we learn that Dioufwas "married to President Senghor's niece, and he enjoys 
the full confidence of the President", while Dona-Fologo was "very closely associated to the 
work of his President C ... ) and he is a member of the political bureau, with a recognised influ-
ence on the political trends of his country". Lejeune therefore appears to have selected these 
two newspaper editors in order to get direct access to both President Senghor and Houphouet-
Boigny through them. In the case of Dona-Fologo, this strategy was very productive, as "in-
stead of the ten minute interview secured by Laurent Fologo [sic], the President kept me a full 
hour", and Houphouet-Boigny gave Lejeune "a personal assurance that I can go back to him 
any time to discuss any problem with him whenever it may prove necessary to ease up the 
Dialogue issue". In Dakar, however, again mirroring Senghor's ambivalence towards Dia-
logue, Diouf could only arrange a future meeting between Lejeune, Minister Mulder and 
President Senghor. Lejeune consequently insisted that the Department of Information should 
encourage strengthening the Ivorian-Senegalese relationship over the Dialogue issue: "the 
more we will be able to encourage an association between Ivory Coast and Senegal the greater 
advantage we will derive from it, bearing in mind that the real leadership for the Dialogue is 
177 To the Point 21 April 1973: 20. 
178 Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.117. 
179 Rhoodie. 1983. The Real Information Scandal, p.123. 
1.0 De Villiers. 1980. Secret Information, p.49. 
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unmistakably in Abidjan (although we must accept that the Dakar leader takes precedence of 
his counterpart for diplomatic considerations)".'" 
Due to the lack of archival documentation, the Department of Information's follow-up 
initiatives after Lejeune's visit cannot be reconstructed. Judging from later evidence in the 
DFA files, however, and in contrast to Houphouet-Boigny, President Senghor retained his 
critical stance towards actively promoting Dialogue. Thus, while the Department of Informa-
tion's contact with Abidjan had a stable foundation, Senghor still had to be convinced. How 
this was attempted in practice is unclear, but in their autobiographies, Les de Villiers and Es-
chel Rhoodie concurrently suggest that Vorster's eventual visit to the Ivory Coast in Septem-
ber 1974 was the result of painstaking groundwork that went by the code-name of Operation 
Wooden Shoe. Rhoodie undertook most of this task and shuttled between Pretoria, Paris, 
Abidjan and Dakar. 'i2 While primary BOSS or Department of Information sources were not 
available, the relevant DFA documents covering the months until September 1974 provide an 
indication of the problems experienced in wooing Senghor. Examination of these documents 
reveals that there was a genuine willingness on the part of this African leader to conduct Dia-
logue with Pretoria, but this was dependent on the South African government making signifi-
cant moves in changing the apartheid system. We now illustrate how Pretoria attempted to 
convince him of its bona fides. 
More than likely within the framework of Operation Wooden Shoe, a DFA document re-
cords correspondence between Senghor and Vorster from March to September 1974, with the 
Senegalese President expressing his concern over an ongoing court case against Barend van 
Niekerk,J8J a white Professor of Law at the University of Natal in Durban since 1970. Accord-
ing to the university's Website, he "was an avid crusader for human rights and the need for a 
just legal system in South Africa" who "fearlessly attacked the apartheid legal system" and 
who was particularly concerned about the freedom of speech.'i' This made him highly un-
popular in government circles, and court cases were conducted against him in 1970, 1972 and 
1975, the last of which triggered President Senghor's current interest. This case concerned the 
newspaper publisher South African Associated Newspapers Ltd. and van Niekerk v Estate 
li l On the above, see 'Report of my trip to Dakar and Abidjan' , from Bernard Lejeune, Johannesburg, May 
1973, pp.Iff. (NAT.ARC., MNL, INL22/6, Vol. 73). 
li2 De Villiers. 1980. Secret Information , pp.49, 78f.; Rhoodie. 1983. The Real Information Scandal, pp.122-
132. Also Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation , pp.73, I17f. 
lil 'Senegal: President Senghor and Detente' , from Johan Pretorius to Brand Fourie, 4 February 1976, p.2 
(DFA, 1/186/3, Vol. 2). 
384 <http://www.nu.ac.zallaw/fachistory.html>. Also Van Niekerk, Barend. 1986. The Cloistered Virtue: 
Freedom of Speech and the Administration of Justice in the Western World. New York: Praeger; Louw, Ronald 
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Peiser, managed by Petrus Cornelius Peiser, the Minister of Prisons and Justice from 1966 to 
April 1974.385 The outcome resulted in the court accepting "the principle that a Cabinet Minis-
ter may sue, in his or her personal capacity for defamatory statements made about the Cabi-
net"."6 Given his background as a poet and writer, Senghor was concerned about Pretoria's 
restrictions on the freedom of speech, and by intervening he more than probably wanted to 
assess the seriousness of Pretoria's Dialogue intentions. His special interest in this particular 
case, however, was undoubtedly due to van Niekerk having written a book about Senghor' s 
literary work in 1970.387 The ensuing correspondence between Senghor and Vorster is not 
contained in the DF A files. However, and drawing from later DF A reports, Senghor expressed 
"his satisfaction" with Vorster's attitude in a letter of27 June 1974.388 In addition, on 26 Sep-
tember 1974 and on 16 May 1975, John Barratt, the Director of the South African Institute of 
International Affairs, informed Deputy Secretary Killen that Senghor had expressed "satisfac-
tion to the correspondence and said that it was a useful example of dialogue".'" Barratt's in-
formation was based on a meeting with Senghor during a group visit organised by the Africa 
Institute to both Senegal and the Ivory Coast in mid-August 1974. The background to this 
visit is important and discussed now, because it provides some insight into the intricacies of 
the Department of Information's Secret Diplomacy. 
The essence of the present argument is that the Department of Information attempted to 
convince both leaders, and especially Senghor, that Pretoria intended reforming apartheid, 
that a dialogue took place among South Africans and that not all whites supported apartheid. 
The concept of separate development and an exchange of views between the more verligte 
sections among the minority and the two presidents, particularly Senghor, were important 
pillars upon which their approach rested. In this context, and with reference to the Policy 
Network concept introduced in Chapter 2, Figure 2 illustrates a web of individuals and or-
ganisations of the verligte Afrikaner political and economic elite involved in fostering this 
strategy. Their links with the Department ofInformation will now be disentangled. 
H. 2000. The Legacy of Barend van Niekerk: A Challenge to the On-going Abuse of Prisoners' Rights, South 
African Journal o/Criminal Justice 13, I: 83-98 . 
3" Parliamentary Register, 1910-1984. 1991. p.160. 
386 <http: //www.nu.ac.zallaw/fachistory.html>. 
387 Van Niekerk, Barend. 1970. The African Image (Negritude) in the Work 0/ Leopold Sedar Senghor. Cape 
Town: A A Balkema. 
388 ' Senegal: President Senghor and Detente', from Johan Pretorius to Brand Fourie, 4 February 1976, p.2 
(DFA, 1/186/3, Vol. 2). 
389 'Prime Minister 's Correspondence with President Senghor', to Brand Fourie, 16 May 1975, p.1 (DFA, 
111 86/3, AJ 1978); 'Senegal : President Senghor and Detente', from Johan Pretorius to Brand Fourie, 4 February 
1976, p.2 (DFA, 11186/3, Vol. 2). 
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Figure 2: Policy Network in the Realm of the Department of Information's Secret Diplomacy 
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In doing so, we need to discuss the apartheid idea of separate development that fonned the 
kernel ofVerwoerd' s 'grand apartheid', supposed to solve South Africa's racial problems. To 
this end, the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act (No 46 of 1959) had provided for the 
establishment of eight homelands, accommodating the Pretoria-defined black ethnic groups. 
Over time, these would, under white guardianship, develop into self-governing units and 
could, if so desired, attain full independence. In 1963, the Transkei first took this route by 
establishing a Constituent Assembly.)90 Yet, during the remaining part of the 1960s, the home-
lands idea remained a paper tiger, because the conservative voices among white society saw 
this, in similar vein to the official contacts between Pretoria and African leaders, as the begin-
ning of the end of apartheid. However, as Pretoria became more confident in establishing con-
tact with independent African states, significant steps were also taken in promoting the home-
lands issue in the early 1970s. External factors resulting in changes to international law were 
also relevant, particularly the International Court of Justice's Advisory Opinion of 21 June 
1971 on the S.W.A./Namibia case. The UN Security Council had requested this in July 1970 
)90 Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy oj Isolation, p.ll. 
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at the instigation of Burundi, Finland, Nepal, Sierra Leone and Zambia.39J Reversing its 1966 
ruling, the ICJ now concluded "that South Africa's continued presence is illegal" and "that 
she is obliged to withdraw her administration immediately from the territory",392 a finding 
both the UN General Assembly and the Security Council endorsed in late 1971.393 In essence, 
the Advisory Opinion meant "that the primary issue regarding South Africa's continued pres-
ence in Namibia was its refusal to allow the Namibians the right to determine their own fu-
ture",394 and this had implications on Pretoria's homelands policy. Notably, Pretoria promul-
gated the Bantu Homelands Act (No 21) on 31 March 1971, "designed to accelerate the de-
velopment of the homelands".39' As a result, by the end of 1972, Bophutatswana, Ciskei, 
Gazankulu, KwaZulu, Lebowa, QwaQwa and Venda joined the Transkei as self-governing 
entities.3" That the ICJ ruling was of great relevance in this respect is evidenced in a To the 
Point article of 15 January 1972: 
substantial progress towards eventual sovereignty for the embryonic Black nation-states 
is expected in 1972 with at least two of them joining the Transkei in partial se1f-
government. Externally, the heat is perceptibly off South Africa at the moment. After the 
flush of success when the World Court [=ICJ] gave South Africa an unfavourable advi-
sory opinion last June, critics of South Africa had a rough time at the United Nations.397 
While Pretoria's increased homelands activities appear as a reaction of the verkrampte to ac-
commodate both the needs of the minority and external pressure, the more verligte took the 
idea of separate development further, trying to improve foreign relations with African states. 
An article in the same To the Point issue is again illustrative: "The conservatives, as well as 
the moderate nationalists, are in agreement on one point: that the development of the South 
African Bantu Homelands towards independence, be drastically speeded up. However, the 
moderates presently attach more importance to the success of the government's dialogue with 
Black Africa, while the conservatives would like to see independence of the Homelands given 
priority".398 In the forefront of the former was Information Secretary Rhoodie, who appears to 
have convinced Minister Mulder of his views to some extent.J99 Even though known for his 
39J SIRE S 284; S/9886 (22 July 1970); Lissitzyn, Oliver J. 1972. International Law and the Advisory Opinion 
on Namibia, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 11, I: 50-73. 
392 Dugard, Christopher John Robert. 1972. Namibia (South West Africa): The Court's Opinion, South Af-
rica's Response and Prospects for the Future, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 11 , 1: 14. 
393 SIRES 301; AIRES 2871 (XXVI). 
394 Gross, Steven R. 1973. The United Nations, Self-Determination and the Namibia Opinions, Yale Law 
Journal 82, 3: 534. 
30S Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.35. 
396 Horrell. 1973. The African Homelands of South Africa. 
397 To the Point 15 January 1972: 38. 
398 To the Point 15 January 1972: 47. 
399 Telephone interview with Cas de Villiers, 18 January 2003. On Cas de Villiers, see below. 
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otherwise conservative leanings, Mulder recognised the potential of the concept of separate 
development in breaking South Africa' s isolation, as Deon Geldenhuys notes: "He acknowl-
edged that the policy was a stumbling block to South Africa's foreign relations, but saw this 
as being caused by the caricature made of the policy abroad. The way out of the dilemma was 
by correcting the distorted image through improved salesmanship, and not by tampering with 
the fundamentals of separate development".40o In particular, and probably due to both 
Mulder's and Rhoodie's increasing influence on Vorster as of the early 1970s, the Prime Min-
ister intensified interaction with the homeland leaders. For example on 31 July 1971, and after 
a week-long joumey through several homelands, Vorster rejected the accusation that he only 
talked to the leaders from the rest of Africa.'01 This trip was rather likely Pretoria's response 
to the OAU Summit in Addis Ababa in mid-June 1971, examined in the previous section, 
which stipulated that Dialogue could only take place parallel to discussions among all South 
Africans. Thus, by initiating political contact with the homeland leaders, Pretoria sought justi-
fication for Dialogue with African countries further north.'02 Vorster interacted particularly 
with Kaizer Matanzima, Chief Minister ofTranskei, and Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, Chief 
Executive of KwaZulu.403 This was quite obviously due to their policies being compatible 
with those of Pretoria's; Matanzima held a keen interest in leading Transkei to full independ-
ence, as eventually requested in March 1974,'()4 while Buthelezi rejected sanctions and vio-
lence to bring about political change, such as advocated by the African National Congress.'os 
In consequence, and as will be revealed, both Matanzima and Buthelezi held prominent posi-
tions in Pretoria's Africa plans, even accompanying South African delegations to African 
countries. 
We have now explored the background to Pretoria's verkrampte homelands policy. The 
more verligte Eschel Rhoodie and, to a lesser degree, Connie Mulder tried to utilise the sepa-
rate development concept to convince African leaders of Pretoria's willingness to talk with 
the majority. As argued earlier, this was an important element in the Department of Informa-
tion's Secret Diplomacy, especially over contact with Senghor of Senegal. The principal pro-
moter of what can be termed a marketing strategy was Secretary Rhoodie, who applied this 
400 Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.llO. Also telephone interview with Cas de Villiers, 18 
January 2003. 
' 01 Keesing 's Archiv der Gegenwart 1971 : 16489£ 
402 Barber, James. 1999. South Africa in the Twentieth Century: A Political History. In Search of a Nation 
State. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers: 179-188. 
403 To the Point 4 November 1972: 39. 
4()4 Keesing's Archiv der Gegenwart 1974: 18672. 
405 Harber and Ludmann. 1994. A-Z of South African Polities, pp.12ff. 
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aspect of US politics, to which he had been exposed during his five years as Press Attache and 
Information Officer in Washington and New York.406 Of relevance within the Department of 
Information's strategy was the support from the policy network with exponents from the ver-
tigte Afrikaner political and economic elite (Figure 2), of which Caspar Francois 'Cas' de 
Villiers and Frederick Redvers ' Red ' Metrowich are presently discussed. Both of them en-
joyed a close relationship with Information Secretary Rhoodie, dating from their early days as 
Associates of To the Point,'07 while de Villiers was also a Broederbonder,'os as was Informa-
tion Minister Mulder. Based on the former link, they issued publications for both the Depart-
ment of Information itself and Valiant Publishers, covertly financed by the same depart-
ment.409 Subsequently, they headed two front organisations, set up clandestinely by that very 
department, under the guise of think tanks. From 1975, de Villiers was the Director of the 
Foreign Affairs Association (FAA), financed by five South African Afrikaner millionaires, 
among them Louis Luyt,'10 whom we will meet again later, while Metrowich became the Ex-
ecutive Officer of the Southern African Freedom Foundation (SAFF) in 1977.411 Regarding 
their political views, these were somewhat conservative and in line with Pretoria's current 
official policy. Notably, their numerous publications conveyed the message that closer co-
operation between South Africa and the countries in the rest of Africa benefited their eco-
nomic development, which, in turn, would stem the communist influence on the continent' 12 
In the context of the Cold War, it was generally accepted that economic development would 
result in political stability and prevent communism from making inroads into Africa. On the 
other hand, To the Point described de Villiers as a "strong believer in separate development", 
one who argued that "we must create a marketing value for separate development via Africa 
to the rest of the world".413 In fact, during our recent interview, Cas de Villiers stated that his 
then long-term view of separate development was that of "separate independent viable states" 
406 This assumption was confinned during the telephone interview with Cas de Villiers, 18 January 2003. 
407 Telephone interview with Cas de Villiers, 18 January 2003. Also NAT.ARC., MNL, CP78, Vol. 42; 
Geldenhuys. 1984. Th e Diplomacy of Isolation, pp.108f.; Rhoodie. 1983. The Real Information Scandal, p.61. 
408 Telephone interview with Cas de Villiers, 18 January 2003. 
409 Metrowich, Frederick Redvers 'Red', Caspar Francois ' Cas' de Villiers. 1975. The Communist Strategy. 
Pretoria: Department ofInformation. Metrowich, Frederick Redvers 'Red', ed. 1975. Towards Dialogue and 
Detente. Johannesburg: Valiant Publishers. On Valiant Publishers, see Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of 
Isolation, p.1 19. 
410 Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, pp.119, 169; Sunday Times 9 March 1975. 
411 Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.65. 
412 De Villiers: 1974. Three Potential Black Giants, Africa Institute Bulletin 14, 10: 401-417. Metrowich: 
1973. South African-African Contacts, Africa Institute Bulletin 13, 4: 139-144; 1975. Africa Survey: Essay on 
Contemporary African Affairs. Sandton: Valiant Publishers for the FAA. (FAA Popular Series, I) See also their 
publications in a previous footnote. 
4lJ To the Point 12 September 1975: 7. 
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in a "confederal arrangement similar to that of Switzerland", and that he had a "remote hope" 
for this to succeed in influencing African leaders to accept Pretoria's domestic policies.'14 
Indeed, de Villiers indicated that this thinking was among the messages he conveyed during 
his numerous visits to African countries. While not at the direct bidding of the Department of 
Information, these activities supported its Secret Diplomacy endeavour. In addition, Cas de 
Villiers communicated his ideas to the NP Foreign Affairs Study Group that, "on occasion" 
invited him to address them.415 We mentioned in Chapter 2, that the ruling party had twenty-
four such study groups, giving its parliamentarians the possibility to inform themselves more 
comprehensively about issues related to the relevant ministerial portfolio. Although Deon 
Geldenhuys did not find this particular Foreign Affairs Study Group to have a significant im-
pact on Pretoria's foreign policy making,''' the fact that Cas de Villiers was invited reflects 
his importance on the one hand, while simultaneously offering the Department of Information 
a channel in making itself heard in political circles, on the other. At the same time, de Villiers 
claimed that this brought him in conflict with the country's political leadership, stating that 
Prime Minister Vorster had summoned him several times to his office, telling him to restrain 
advocating his liberal views 417 
Apart from the issue of separate development discussed above, it has been stated earlier 
that personal contact with African leaders, inferring not all South Africans were apartheid 
supporters, was another important aspect of the Department of Information's Secret Diplo-
macy. Here again, the policy network in support of this department's policies is of signifi-
cance (Figure 2). Before discussing the joumeys of members from both the Africa Institute 
and the South Africa Foundation to Senegal and the Ivory Coast in 1974, we need to examine 
their connections with the Department of Information. In beginning with the South Africa 
Foundation, Chris Barnard and Jan S. Marais personified the link. In addition to being an As-
sociate of To the Point, it is known that the Department ofInformation made use of heart sur-
geon Barnard' s fame in promoting several of its projects,4J8 although these are not of rele-
vance to this study. Deon Geldenhuys explains this relative closeness as follows: "the former 
Department of Information no doubt saw the Foundation as a valuable ally in promoting 
South Africa's interests in a hostile world, particularly because of the Foundation's independ-
414 Telephone interview with Cas de Villiers, 18 January 2003. 
41S Ge1denhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.63; telephone interview with Cas de Villiers, 18 January 
2003. 
416 Ge1denhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, pp.60-66, 165. 
417 Telephone interview with Cas de Villiers, 18 January 2003. 
4 18 De Villiers. 1980. Secret Information, pp.l77f.; Rhoodie. 1983. The Real Information Scandal, pp.143, 
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ence from government"."9 Another important contact was Jan Marais, whose importance as a 
businessman has been mentioned in the context of the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (Chapter 
2). Although an Afrikaner in origin, he quickly rose in the Foundation ranks, becoming its 
President within four years of membership (Chapter 2). Significantly, commenting on his 
election to that post, To the Point observed that this might give the Foundation a more verligte 
outlook.420 Marais laid the foundation for his business career by forming the Trust Bank dur-
ing 1955, combining Afrikaner nationalism with modem banking and finance methods'21 To 
the Point praised his achievements: "Marais ( ... ) has not only built it [Trust Bank) up into an 
institution with assets exceeding $1 billion, but has changed the entire face of banking in 
South Africa. He is also known outside of South Africa for his enlightened views on co-
operation between white and black and on the economic development of Africa".422 Marais' 
relationship with the Department of Information was manifold. He was an Associate of To the 
Paint, which offered him a platform for his verligte views, most notably expressing his opin-
ion in an article of August 1972 entitled 'There is no alternative to dialogue,.42J Marais also 
wrote an article for Metrowich's Towards Dialogue and Detente, published by Valiant Pub-
lishers, alongside the country's prominent citizens, such as Prime Minister Vorster, State 
President Fouche and Minister Muller.424 On the other hand, Marais provided the Department 
of Information with offices in his bank to publish To the Point; the magazine's editorial ad-
dress was the African International Publishing Company (Pty) Ltd., located on the seventh 
floor of the Trust Bank Centre in Johannesburg. It further appears that the Department used 
Trust Bank for financial transactions. As has been shown, Lejeune reported after his visit to 
the Ivory Coast and Senegal in May 1973 that newspaper editors Dona-Fologo and Diouf 
were to come to South Africa before the end of 1973, suggesting the following: "Although I 
ignore what procedure you usually follow in regards to air tickets and other material arrange-
ments, I heard that Dr. J. Marais will very much appreciate it if you would consider dealing 
with Trust Express for the occasion".'" This proposal may have been circumstantial, but 
nonetheless indicates contact between the Department of Information and Marais. This is fur-
419 Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.176. 
420 To the Point 20 September 1974: 25. 
421 Verhoef, Grietjie. 1992. Afrikaner Nationalism in South African Banking: The Case of Volkskas and 
Trust Bank, in Stuart Jones, ed. Financial Enterprise in South Africa since 1950. London: Macmillan: 115-153. 
412 To the Point 26 August 1972: 39. 
42J To the Point 26 August 1972: 37ff.; To the Point 5 January 1974: 9f. 
424 Marais, Jan S. 1975. South Africa: A Country with Great Challenges and Golden Opportunities, in Freder-
ick Redvers 'Red' Metrowich, ed. Towards Dialogue and Detente. Sandton: Valiant Publishers: 85-93. 
4" 'Report of my trip to Dakar and Abidjan' , from Bernard Lejeune, Johannesburg, May 1973, p.2 
(NAT.ARC., MNL, INL22/6, Vol. 73). 
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ther substantiated by correspondence from Marais to Connie Mulder, in which he reports on 
his journey through the United States during September 1975. Significantly, in the section on 
"South Africa - what to note and what to do", Marais suggests to Mulder: ""Separate devel-
opment" is not fully understood and there is much confusion about the basics of the separate 
development programme. Once explained, one could say that the concept is saleable!"'26 In 
his letter of 20 November 1975, acknowledging receipt of the brief, Mulder wrote: "I have 
read it with interest and found it very interesting and insightful. Above all, I agree with the 
thoughts in the section S.A. - WHAT TO NOTE AND WHAT TO DO. We shall soon give 
more attention to these matters" 4 27 
The last element in the Department of Information's policy network for consideration is 
the Africa Institute. Again, it was a personal link, with both Cas de Villiers and Red 
Metrowich working at the Africa Institute and Director Joseph Moolman serving as an Asso-
ciate with To the Point. We will illustrate later in this section that Deputy Director Erich 
Leistner was also close to Cas de Villiers. Similar to the contents of the publications by de 
Villiers and Metrowich, Leistner and Moolman emphasised the need for economic co-
operation among African countries, especially in southern Africa."8 Regarding their views on 
separate development, former Africa Institute researcher Richard Cornwell aptly suggested 
that the Department of Information used their academic output as "intellectual gloss" for sell-
ing this concept to African leaders.429 As a pointer in this direction, part of the Department of 
Information's material stored in the Archive for Contemporary Affairs originates from the 
Africa Institute.' 30 Clearer evidence that this department made use of the Africa Institute in its 
Africa plans is provided in Bernard Lejeune's above-mentioned report after his trip to the 
Ivory Coast and Senegal in May 1973: "It has been unanimously agreed that the invitation [to 
'26 'South Africa and the United States of America: brief notes on a visit to the U.S.A. by Dr. Jan S. Marais, 
Chairman and Chief Executive of the Trust Bank Group and President of the South Amca Foundation, Septem-
ber 17th to September 25th, 1975', to Connie Mulder, October 1975 (NAT.ARC., MNL, INL8, Vol. 52/5) (em-
phasis in the original). 
421 Letter from Connie Mulder to Jan Marais, Pretoria, 20 November 1975 (NAT.ARC., MNL, INL8, Vol. 
52/5) (translation from Amkaans; emphasis in the original). 
'28 Leistner: 1967. Die Republiek en hllip aan ander Afrikastate. Pretoria: Amca Institute. (Occasional Paper, 
11); 1967. Malawi, South Africa and the Issue of Closer Economic Co-operation. Pretoria: Amca Institute. (Oc-
casional Paper, 13); 1968. Perspectives of Economic and Political Co-operation in Southern Africa. Pretoria: 
Africa Jostitute. (Occasional Paper, 15); 1973. Co-operation for Development in Southern Africa. Pretoria: Af-
rica Institute; 1974. with Moolman: Bophuthatswana hulpbronne en ontwikkeling. Pretoria: Amca Institute. 
Moolman: 1972. Intra-regionale ajhanklikheid en die strewe na seljbeskikking. Paper delivered at the Confer-
ence on "Vreedsame Naastebestaan in die Ruimtelike Sisteem R.S.A.", Africa Institute, Pretoria. 
429 Interview with Richard Cornwell, 19 February 1999. 
430 ARCA, PV.395 . One of the five boxes contains Amca Institute publications only. 
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newspaper editors Diouf and Dona-Fologo] should be issued under the auspices of the Africa 
Institute" .• 31 
Let us now examine the relevance of the personalities and organisations that have been 
discussed within the realms of the Department of Information's Secret Diplomacy, particu-
larly towards Senegal. For this purpose, we recall the above-mentioned visit of a South Afri-
can group to both Senegal and the Ivory Coast in mid-August 1974, a mere five weeks before 
Vorster met with Senghor and Houphouet-Boigny. In our interview, then Deputy Director 
Erich Leistner recalled that Africa Institute Director Joseph Moolman had arranged this ex-
cursion together with the Department of Information's middleman, Bernard Lejeune, who 
"helped to somehow prepare the ground".'l2 Further, according to Leistner, both Moolman 
and himself were aware of Lejeune's role with the department. Joseph Moolman could not be 
contacted on that issue, as he passed away in the 1990s. However, we learn from his pub-
lished account of the trip, and Leistner confirmed this, that the Afrikaner bank Volkskas and 
insurance company Sanlam, as well as Anglo American had provided the necessary financial 
assistance.'JJ The DFA files, finally, contain a report on this visit, although we could not es-
tablish how the foreign affairs ministry obtained it.'" This document reveals that the group 
comprised both Moolman and Leistner from the Africa Institute, John Barratt from the South 
African Institute of International Affairs, as mentioned earlier, Professor William M. Kgware, 
Vice-Chancellor of the University of the North and the financier Jayaram N. Reddy. They 
first flew to Dakar, where talks were held with President Senghor and newspaper editor Bara 
Diouf. The second stop was in Abidjan, from 12-16 August 1974, where the group attended 
the 14th World Conference of the Society for International Development (SID) on the theme 
'Confrontation or Cooperation?' They also met Laurent Dona-Fologo, now the newly ap-
pointed Ivorian Minister of Information.'" In correspondence, John Barratt suggested that 
attending the SID conference was the main purpose of the group' s journey."6 Furthermore, 
taking into account that talks were held with the Department of Information' s interlocutors in 
both Senegal and the Ivory Coast, one gains the impression that the department and Lejeune 
had organised this visit in an attempt to engage academic and business circles interested in 
'31 'Report of my trip to Dakar and Abidjan', from Bernard Lejeune, Johannesburg, May 1973, p.1 
(NAT.ARC., MNL, INL22/6, Vol. 73). 
"2 Correspondence with Erich Leistner, December 2002 and telephone interview, 26 February 2003. 
433 Moolman, Joseph Hulme. 1974. South Africans Visit West Africa, Newsletter of the South African Insti-
tute of International Affairs 6, 3: 15f. ; correspondence with Erich Leistner, December 2002 and telephone inter-
view, 26 February 2003. 
43' 'Africa Institute ofS. A.: Notes on Visit to West Africa', August 1974 (DFA, 1/17913, Vol. 4). 
'35 ' Africa Institute ofS.A.: Notes on Visit to West Africa ', August 1974 (DFA, 11179/3, Vol. 4). 
'36 Correspondence with John Barratt, 15 January 2003. 
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contact with Africa within its Secret Diplomacy. Notably, the side-trip to Senegal was in-
tended to place its policy towards President Senghor on a broader foundation. First, the pres-
ence of both Kgware and Reddy, a black professor and an Indian businessman respectively, 
illustrates the attempt by the Department of Information to present the group as representative 
of the full spectrum of South African society. Second, both of them were Trustees of the 
South Africa Foundation,'37 again revealing the department's close link with this organised 
business association at the time. In addition, although unconnected to the group's visit, an 
article in To the Point reveals that Peter Sorour, the Foundation's Director General, and Rich-
ard John Maponya, supermarket entrepreneur in the Soweto township and Foundation Trustee 
(1974-95),'38 also attended the SID Conference.'39 While the above-mentioned individuals 
appear rather close to the Department of Information, this observation does not apply to John 
Barratt. In correspondence, Leistner explained Barratt's participation: "We had a cordial 
working relationship with Barratt's Institute, and he was a member of the Africa Institute's 
Council. You can be assured that he would not have come with us if there had been even the 
vaguest whiff of suspicion that State funds were involved!"'40 Asked about this, Barratt con-
firmed, although adding with hindsight: "I later came to suspect, correctly it seems, that In-
formation had a hand in arrangements".'41 His main motivation to join, Barratt further states, 
was the fact that "in those days we had very few opportunities of visiting other parts of Af-
rica",''' and he later published an article on the visit.443 
Having presented the available evidence on this excursion to West Africa, one is quite 
justified in proposing that the above-mentioned Africa Institute members, especially Mool-
man, became part of the Department ofInformation' s strategy of winning Senghor for direct 
contact with Pretoria, while the South Africa Foundation Trustees were probably less deeply 
involved. While the importance of the visit described above should not be overemphasised, it 
quite probably favoured Senghor's eventual decision to meet Vorster in the Ivory Coast in 
September 1974. Other reasons were certainly his correspondence with Vorster over the van 
Niekerk case and, above all, the Department of Information's propaganda activities, of which 
precious little could be revealed due to the lack of archival information. In any event, Vor-
' 37 To the Point 20 September 1974: 25. 
'38 Information provided by courtesy of Rose Fitzpatrick, South Africa Foundation, November 2002. 
'39 To the Point 20 September 1974: 25. 
440 Correspondence with Erich Leistner, 20 January 2003. 
441 Correspondence with John Barratt, IS January 2003. 
442 Correspondence with John Barratt, 15 January 2003. 
443 Barratt, John. 1974. Report on a Visit to Senegal and the Ivory Coast, Newsleller of the South African In-
stitute of International Affairs 6, 3: 19ff. 
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ster's meeting with Houphouet-Boigny and Senghor in the Ivory Coast in September 1974 
can be ascribed to the Department of Information's Secret Diplomacy. Reflecting this, those 
aboard the plane from Cape Town to Abidjan on 22 September included Vorster, his son, his 
personal physician and his private secretary, van den Bergh, Mike Geldenhuys, Rhoodie and 
Fourie, while BOSS agent Albie Geldenhuys and journalist Lejeune awaited the party in 
Abidjan. The latter two acted as interpreters and accompanied the party to Yamassoukro, 
where the meeting took place in Houphouet-Boigny's presidential palace'" Yet, the journey 
was cloaked in secrecy; the plane, parked far away from the terminal so as not to provoke 
attention, left before dawn from the Cape Town airport, chosen for the same reason as it was 
less frequently utilised than Johannesburg's Jan Smuts Airport. Additionally, and probably 
acknowledging Senghor's persistent uneasiness towards open Dialogue with Pretoria, the visit 
was kept secret at the time. Significantly, in December 1974, the Rand Daily Mail became the 
first paper to claim that Vorster had undertaken a trip to the Ivory Coast."5 The news was only 
officially released with the consent of Vorster and Houphouet-Boigny on 15 May 1975,44' 
while Senghor still denied that he had met Vorster. 
Given the fact that both Senegal and the Ivory Coast belonged to Francophone Africa with 
especially good relations to Paris, the question of France having played a role in Vorster's 
visit requires some reflection. All the available information indicates that Jacques Foccart, 
Jean Mauricheau-Beaupre and South Africa's Ambassador to France, Albie Burger, did not 
playa significant role. There is no such evidence in the DF A files, Eschel Rhoodie argues that 
the Department of Information did not use their services'47 and Foccart suggests in his mem-
oirs that he tried to decelerate Houphouet-Boigny's Dialogue initiative.''' Although To the 
Point positively reported that Foccart was the "crucial link" between Francophone Africa and 
described Burger as "one of the chief proponents and executor of the dialogue policy","9 the 
aforementioned information seems plausible. It must not be forgotten that Foccart and Mau-
richeau-Beaupre were Defence Minister P.W. Botha's contact men, and it was most unlikely 
444 Barber and Barratt. 1990. South Africa 's Foreign Policy, pp.148f.; De Villiers. 1980. Secret In/onnation , 
pp.49, 78f. ; Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, pp.73, 117f.; Rhoodie. 1983. The Real In/onnation 
Scandal, pp.l22-132; Swanepoel. 1982. Die diplomasie van Adv. B.J. Vorster, pp.217, 223. ARCA, PV.132, 
Bylae A, Nr. 12 contains photos of the meeting. 
"5 ' Ivory Coast denies SA peace visit', Rand Daily Mail 3 December 1974 (DFA, 1/179/3, Vol. 4). 
446 'Big talks in a small Ivory Coast town', Rand Daily MaillS May; 'Premier in Ivoorkus: Ie foto ' s', Die 
Transvaler 15 May; 'PM earned respect on African visit', Rand Daily Mail 16 May 1975 (DFA, 11179/3, Vol. 
5). 
447 Rhoodie. 1983. Th e Real In/onnation Scandal, p.l04. 
'" Foccart. 1997. Foccart parle. Vol. II, pp.1l2, 281. 
449 To the Point 29 January 1972: 42, 46. On 14 June 1974, To the Point (p.2S) featured a short report on 
Foccart, as he left office. 
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that they were prepared to offer their services to either BOSS or the Department of Informa-
tion, particularly given that the former was a great rival of the military. We can even take this 
point one step further, by arguing that the Department ofInformation' s plans of Vorster meet-
ing with Houphouet-Boigny and Senghor in September 1974 could only become possible 
once Foccart had left office in May 1974. 
We now examine Pretoria' s contact with both Abidjan and Dakar after Vorster' s historic 
trip to the Ivory Coast until his resignation as Prime Minister in 1978. This will reveal, first, 
that these two countries remained within the orbit of the Department of Information, while 
second, diplomatic activities curtailed its rival ' s contact with Senegal after 1976. Regarding 
interaction with the Ivory Coast, that country' s Minister of Information, Dona-Fologo, and 
Balla Keita from the Ministry of Scientific Research spent ten days in South Africa during 
September 1975 as a guest of Information Minister Mulder, accompanied by BOSS agent 
Geldenhuys during the entire stay.'50 One must recall that Bernard Lejeune, the Department of 
Information' s secret collaborator, had proposed such a visit as far back as May 1973, upon 
returning from the Ivory Coast and Senegal. He had also suggested that a possible invitation 
should be made through the Africa Institute in Pretoria. While the reasons for the long delay 
are not recorded, the latter aspect remained an important component. In particular, Dona-
Fologo visited the Africa Institute in the company of Mulder, and a dinner was arranged 
there'51 This supports the earlier claim that the think tank played an important role in assisting 
the Department of Information to gain both Houphouet-Boigny and Senghor's support. Fur-
thermore, the Africa Institute's Deputy Director, Erich Leistner, visited the Ivory Coast from 
25 January to 9 February 1976. While Leistner could not recall the exact circumstances of this 
visit as part of a journey through Europe and to Israel, he agreed that, "in all probability", it 
took place in a reciprocal move to Dona-Fologo's stay in South Africa, as Leistner met both 
the Ivorian Information Minister and Balla Keita while in Abidjan.'" 
Coinciding with Leistner' s visit, and as gleaned from internal Africa Institute documents, 
Louis Luyt had flown to Abidjan in his private BAC III Lear Jet, accompanied by, inter alia, 
journalist Lejeune, Cas de Villiers, as well as Kobus Hamman and Daan Claassen from the 
410 'Proposed programme for the official visit to the Republic of South Africa by the Hon. Laurent Dona-
Fologo, Minister of Information of the Republic of the Ivory Coast ' , ca. August 1975; 'Accueil enthousiaste 
pour Ie ministre Fologo', Fraternite Matin (Abidjan) 22 September 1975 (DFA, 1/179/3, Vol. 5); To the Point 
19 September 1975: 7ff. Also Daddieh. 1997. South Africa and Francophone African Relations, pp.187f. ; 
Rhoodie. 1983. Th e Real Information Scandal, pp.133ff. 
41 1 Africa Institute: Annual Report, 1976; Swanepoel. 1982. Die diplomasie van Adv. B.J Vorster, p.221. 
'" Correspondence with Erich Leistner, 21 December 2002. Also Leistner, Gerhard Max Erich. 1976. "Dia-
logue and Tolerance" : Report on a Recent Visit to the Ivory Coast and Senegal, Africa Institute Bulletin 14, 3: 
93 . 
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South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC).'53 Although not co-ordinated undertakings, 
Leistner's travel itinerary reveals that he spent considerable time together with Cas de Villiers 
from 26 to 28 January. '54 This constellation shows the importance of the policy network sup-
portive of the BOSS-Information policies of the day. Regarding Louis Luy!, he was an influ-
ential Afrikaner businessman, running his own fertiliser company, TriomfFertilisers Ltd., one 
of the world's largest producer of finished product at the time, while acting as a front man in 
two of the Department of Information' s principal covert projects inside South Africa during 
1975.'" These were the establishment of The Citizen newspaper"6 and the Foreign Affairs 
Association, mentioned above. In addition, and again supporting the earlier argument of rela-
tively close co-operation between this department and the South Africa Foundation, Luy! was 
also a Foundation Trustee from 1973 to 1995.'" Thus, a critical biographer, South African 
journalist Max du Preez, referred to him as a "business tycoon" and "political maverick".''' 
Concerning his link with the Ivory Coast, Luy! stated in recent correspondence that he had 
been in contact with President Houphouet-Boigny since 1968, allowing him to land with his 
Lear Jet in Abidjan. Luyt also indicated that he "regularly visited" the country thereafter by, 
in particular, stopping "en route to Brazil", his "biggest [fertiliser) customers".''' With respect 
to the visit to the Ivory Coast in 1976, Luy! elaborated that he had been invited by the Minis-
ter of Information, Dona-Fologo, because of his involvement with the French shipping com-
pany Gasocean460 from 1976.'61 Further on the circumstances of that trip, Luy! informed us: 
I was contacted by the SABC and Cas de Villiers when news of the visit leaked out for a 
ride ( ... ). I went there on my own behalf and as possible supplier of fertilisers to the coun-
try. The minister, together with the president, supplied us with contacts'62 
Significantly, and confirming the continued importance of the Department of Information in 
Pretoria's contact with Abidjan, a short while later, Connie Mulder led a party there. This 
"3 ' Verslag - Abidjan, G M E Leistner, 1976' and 'Enkele indrukke van n reis na Wes-Afrika, Wes-Europa 
en Israel 24 Januarie tot 4 April 1976, G M E Leistner, 1976' . Documents provided by courtesy of Amanda 
Wortman and Justa Kruger from the Africa Institute in Pretoria. 
45' 'Enkele indrukke van n reis na Wes-Afiika, Wes-Europa en Israel 24 Januarie tot 4 April 1976, G M E 
Leistner, 1976' , Appendix: Reisprogram. Document provided by courtesy of Amanda Wortman and Justa Kru-
ger from the Arnca Institute in Pretoria. 
'" On Luy!, see Ball, Paul. 1989. Giant-Killer, Leadership South A/rica 8, 2: 24ff.; 29; Du Preez, Max. 2001. 
Louis Luyt: Unauthorised. Cape Town: Zebra Press: 19-25. 
456 De Villiers. 1980. Secret In/ormation, pp.1l8-132; Jones, Adam. 1998. From Rightist to "Brightest"? The 
Strange Tale of South Africa's Citizen, Journal a/Southern African Studies 24, 2: 325-346. 
'" Information provided by courtesy of Rose Fitzpatrick, South Africa Foundation, November 2002. 
458 Du Preez. 200 I. Louis Luyt, back cover. 
'" Correspondence with Louis Luy!, 23 February 2003. 
'60 <hnp:llcom.niceshipping.comlGASOCEAN/eindex.htm>. 
461 Correspondence with Louis Luy!, 25 February 2003. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: PRIME MINISTER VORSTER, 1966-78 181 
delegation was composed ofInformation Secretary Rhoodie, DFA Deputy Secretary Killen, 
as well as Lejeune and Justus de Goede as their respective translators, and stayed in the Ivory 
Coast from 22 to 24 March 1976, holding talks with Houphouet-Boigny and Dona-Fologo.'6J 
The DFA' s interest in establishing contact with the Ivory Coast was to obtain landing rights 
for South African Airways, an issue that will be discussed in detail later in this section. At-
tempts to this end began after Dona-Fologo's stay in South Africa. In a letter dated December 
1975, Brand Fourie wrote to the Ivorian Minister ofInformation: "South African Airways are 
anxious to introduce as a start-off as soon as possible one weekly service northwards and one 
weekly service southwards through Abidjan".'" After an exchange of correspondence and the 
visit of a SAA delegation to the Ivory Coast from 22 to 25 February 1976, led by Salomon 
'Pi' Pienaar, the airline's Chief Executive from February 1975 to October 1977,''' the relevant 
Ivorian authorities granted SAA technical stopover facilities as of May that year.466 Further-
more, SAA showed an interest in obtaining passenger rights, but the Abidjan-based African 
airline Air Afrique opposed such a move by this competing airline.'" SAA subsequently ap-
proached all Air Afrique member countries "to plead the cause of passenger rights in Abid-
jan";'68 SAA only received full traffic rights during 1990/91.469 After Houphouet-Boigny's 
meetings with Secretary Fourie and Prime Minister Vorster in Geneva, in February and May 
1977 respectively, SAA was furthermore "allowed to place a technical representative in Abid-
jan".'10 These developments underline the depth of support given by the Ivorian President to 
the South African government in assisting it to overcome the negative consequences of its 
apartheid policy. Not even the Soweto Uprising of 16 June 1976471 appears to have affected 
the good relationship. 
However, the death of Steve Biko, the leader of the Black Consciousness Movement, on 
12 September 1977, seriously strained the relations between Abidjan and Pretoria. The ban-
'63 'Visit to Ivory Coast: Minister C.P. Mulder and party: 21-24 March 1976', from Rae Killen; 'Discussion 
between President Houphouet-Boigny and Minister c.P. Mulder: Abidjan, 22 March 1976'; 'Le dialogue conti-
nue', issued by the Ivorian Service Press, Infonnation, Documentation, 25 March 1976 (DFA, 11179/3, Vol. 6). 
46' Telex from Brand Fourie to Laurent Dona-Fologo, Pretoria, 4 December 1975 (DFA, 11179/3, Vol. 6). 
'65 ' Fonner chief ofSAA was top-flight instructor ', Sunday Times 4 February 2001. 
466 Telex from Laurent Dona-Fologo to Brand Fourie, Abidjan, 16 January 1976; letter from Brand Fourie to 
Laurent Dona-Fologo, Pretoria, 17 March 1976 (DFA, 11179/3, vol. 6); 'SAA's Ivory Coast touchdown', To the 
Point 14 May 1976: 50. 
'67 ' Ivory Coast', from Rae Killen, Pretoria, 5 July 1976 (DFA, 11179/3, Vol. 7). 
'68 'Note', from Rae Killen, Pretoria, 9 August 1976 (DFA, 11179/3, Vol. 7). 
469 Correspondence with Frans Swarts and Gert van der Veer, II February 2003. 
470 ' Ivory Coast', Pretoria, 13 March 1978, p.1 (DFA, 11179/3, Vol. 9). AJso Yao. 1992. Le dialogue Yamas-
soukro - Pretoria, p.7; Yao. 1991. Cote d' Ivoire - Afrique du Sud, p.146. 
471 Magubane, Peter. 1986. June 16: The Fruit o/Fear. Johannesburg: Skotaville; Moss, Glenn. 1982. Crisis 
and Conflict: Soweto, 1976-1 977. MA, University of the Witwatersrand. 
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ning of eighteen anti-apartheid movements to counter a wave of township violence following 
Biko' s death,''' as well as Pretoria's non-compromising attitude towards Namibian independ-
ence were further contributory factors. After Biko's death, a DFA report noted that "several 
Ivory Coast spokesmen had expressed condemnation of the South African Government".473 
Abidjan's position was in line with that of the African Group at the UN which displayed 
heightened activity, such as pushing the Security Council to adopt Resolution 418 on 4 No-
vember 1977, imposing a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa.'" In addition, the 
S.W.A./Namibia issue began to weigh heavily on the Ivory Coast-South African relationship. 
For example, in December 1976, South Africa's daily The Star cited an appeal made by the 
Ivorian Ambassador to the UN, urging Pretoria to "see reason and to co-operate with the UN 
on the South West African issue".'" As a result of these developments, the Ivorian President 
began to distance himself from South Africa. In June 1978, a DFA report noted that "repre-
sentatives of Liberia, the Ivory Coast and Senegal said in interviews that they had concluded 
that their peaceful approach to South Africa had produced no significant change", 476 indicating 
that Houphouet-Boigny and his colleagues from the other two countries were rethinking their 
approach to this matter. 
Regarding South Africa's contact with Senegal, Senghor had maintained a more sceptical 
attitude towards Dialogue than Houphouet-Boigny ever since. A contributing factor prompt-
ing Senghor nevertheless to meet Vorster in September 1974, was their correspondence over a 
court case against author and Law Professor Barend van Niekerk, as discussed above. At a 
later stage, Senghor appears to have been similarly pleased with Vorster's reply to his letter of 
concern regarding the fate of Breyten Breytenbach,'77 a white South African writer in exile in 
Paris since the early 1960s who was jailed during a clandestine return to South Africa in Au-
gust 1975478 In particular, Vorster assured Senghor in October 1975 that Breytenbach's life 
472 Marx, Anthony W. 1992. Lessons of Struggle: South African Internal Opposition, 1960-1990. Cape 
Town: Oxford University Press; Pityana, Nyameko Barney, ed. 1991. Bounds of Possibility: The Legacy of Steve 
Biko and Black Consciousness. Cape Town: David Philip. 
' 73 '1978: annual review of relations with Ivory Coast', December 1978, p.1 (DFA, 11179/3, Vol. 9). 
47' AlRES/3068 (XXYlII); Pfister. 1992. United Nations Sanctions against Apartheid. 
, ,, Cited in 'Ivory Coast in surprise SWA move', The Star 6 December 1976 (DFA, 1/179/3, Yol. 8). 
' 76 ' 1978: annual review of relations with Ivory Coast', December 1978, p.l. Also 'Francophone Africa is 
disillusioned with SA' , Pretoria News 2 June 1978 (DFA, 1117913, Vol. 9). 
477 Letter from Leopold Senghor to John Vorster, Dakar, 29 September; letter from John Vorster to Leopold 
Senghor, Pretoria, 16 October 1975; 'Senegal: President Senghor and Detente', from Johan Pretorius to Brand 
Fourie, 4 February 1976, p.2 (DFA, 1/186/3, Vol. 2). 
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was not threatened, as the Senegalese President had feared.47' However, by early 1976, Sen-
ghor had become disillusioned with Pretoria. In January 1976, he hosted an intemational con-
ference on "Namibia and Human Rights", an indication of his concern regarding the contin-
ued South African presence there. This conference was also attended by Christopher John 
Robert Dugard, Professor of Law at the University of Witwatersrand from 1969 and author of 
many publications on the S.W.A./Namibia issue,4so who went there in the company of his 
"friend and colleague", Barend van Niekerk, as we established in correspondence with John 
Dugard.481 This exchange also underlines what has been discussed previously, namely that 
Senghor's concern over the van Niekerk court case had been motivated by his friendship, flat-
tered by van Niekerk' s study on his literary work; Dugard further mentions that Senghor had 
invited van Niekerk to Senegal on previous occasions. According to a DF A report, during the 
international conference just mentioned, Senghor expressed his disappointment over Preto-
ria' s attitude to Professor Dugard. According to this brief from Under-Secretary Pretorius, 
marked for the attention of Brand Fourie, Dugard had "revealed" to Andre Jaquet from the 
Francophone Africa Desk "in a private conversation" that Senghor "felt that his attempts at 
dialogue had been rebuffed by South Africa".482 Senghor's view was based on his having sent 
two letters to Vorster in early 1975 and not having received a reply. In these letters, Senghor 
had expressed the intention of despatching a fact-finding mission comprised of three Senegal-
ese jurists to South Africa and asked Vorster to free political prisoners as a gesture of good-
will. The Paris correspondent of the Rand Daily Mail communicated this information in May 
1976, after talks with Senghor,''' while it was also reported in several local newspapers and 
by the French news agency Agence France Press.''' The subsequent evidence suggests that 
Senghor's idea of a fact-finding mission led to controversy between the Department of Infor-
mation and the foreign affairs ministry, with the former being in favour. In particular, Infor-
mation Secretary Eschel Rhoodie recounts in his memoirs that Prime Minister Vorster had 
479 'Senegal: President Senghor and Detente', from Johan Pretorius to Brand Fourie, 4 February 1976, p.2 
(DFA, 1/ 186/3, Vol. 2). 
480 Dugard, Christopher John Robert. 1976. "Namibia and Human Rights ": A Report on the Dakar Confer-
ence and Its Implications for the South West Africa Issue and Detente. Johannesburg: South African Instirute of 
International Affairs. See, for example, Dugard, Christopher John Robert. 1973. The South West Africa/Namibia 
Dispute: Documents and Scholarly Writings on the Controversy between South Africa and the United Nations. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
481 Correspondence with John Dugard, 4 December 2002. 
48l ' Senegal: President Senghor and Detente' , from Johan Pretorius to Brand Fourie, 4 February 1976, p.2 
(DFA, 11186/3, Vol. 2). In correspondence of 4 December 2002, John Dugard states that there "was a steel wall 
between me and [the Department of] Foreign Affairs", but he confIrms to have met Jaquet unoffIcially. 
483 'SA snubbed me - Senghor', Rand Daily MaU23 May 1976 (DFA, 11186/3, Vol. 2). 
484 'Senegal: President Senghor and Detente' , from Johan Pretorius to Brand Fourie, 4 February 1976, p.1. 
Also 'Senegal: moontlikhede vir kontak', to Anton Loubser, 14 September 1977, pp.lf. (DFA, 11 186/3, Vol. 2). 
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"refused to reply to Senghor's two letters",''' although Rhoodie had emphasised the impor-
tance of a positive reply necessary to sustain Pretoria' s contact with Dakar. The foreign ser-
vice officials, on the other hand, and judging from circumstantial evidence now presented, 
seem to have been against such a mission, probably deeming that this represented an act of 
interference in the country' s domestic affairs. Importantly, in the above-mentioned report des-
tined for Brand Fourie, Under-Secretary Pretorius states that their "records show no evidence" 
that Senghor had written the two letters.486 Queried about the developments surrounding Sen-
ghor' s proposal and why the DFA files would not contain more information, Andre Jaquet 
proposed the following: 
Rae [Killen] was the consummate bureaucrat and a very cautious chap indeed. He always 
made his conunents or instructions on documents in pencil in the margins and regularly 
drew files to review how events had unfolded. If with hindsight he had made an unwise 
decision or had given a directive that later proved to be wrong, he would erase his initial 
comment and, with the benefit of hindsight, write an insightful new remark in the margin. 
( ... ) Finally, Rae Killen had three safes and a few ftling cabinets in his office which were 
crammed full offtles, some of which eventually went to Registry and most of which were 
probably shredded.'87 
Indeed, Johan Pretorius' report to Brand Fourie first went to Deputy Secretary Killen, and it is 
not certain whether it ever reached the Secretary. A hand-written note from Counsellor Anton 
Loubser, dated 25 January 1978 and at the end of this docwnent reveals that Killen transferred 
this report to the files only at that stage: "This brief (prepared by Mr J. Pretorius on 4/2176 
and handed over to Mr Killen) was returned to me today by Mr Killen with the request to file 
it".'88 As we know, Senghor completely retreated from any contact with Pretoria after Vor-
ster' s non-reply to his proposal of a fact-finding mission, while it is possible to argue that 
Vorster's acceptance of such a mission would have convinced Senghor to pursue a more ac-
tive pro-Dialogue stance, representing a significant contribution to Pretoria's ambition of 
breaking its isolation. Given that Killen had kept a relevant document on that matter to him-
self suggests that he and/or Brand Fourie had been against Senghor' s idea and that it was sup-
pressed to cover their unwise attitude that subsequently caused the demise of Pretoria's im-
portant contact with Dakar. 
On the whole, therefore, the Department of Information' s successful initiative leading to 
Vorster's meeting with Presidents Houphouet-Boigny and Senghor in the Ivory Coast in Sep-
485 Rhoodie. 1983. The Real Information Scandal, p.132. 
486 'Senegal: President Senghor and Detente', from lohan Pretorius to Brand Fourie, 4 February 1976, p.1 
(DFA, 1/186/3, Vol. 2). 
' 87 Correspondence with Andre laquet, 2 December 2002. 
'88 Loubser's hand-written note on 'Senegal: President Senghor and Detente', from lohan Pretorius to Brand 
Fourie, 4 February 1976, p.1 (DFA, 1/186/3, Vol. 2) (translation from Afrikaans). 
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tember 1974 did not result in a stable relationship between South Africa and these two coun-
tries. This was due to Pretoria's intransigence over the S.W.A.lNamibia issue and because the 
two African leaders became dissatisfied with South Africa' s domestic situation. Parallel to 
these developments, the Department of Foreign Affairs was active in two other relatively im-
portant mainland African countries, but this was not given the same attention as received by 
the Department ofInformation's coup in the Ivory Coast. The diplomatic undertakings, exam-
ined as follows, led to Vorster' s visit to Liberia in February 1975, and we subsequently focus 
on the DF A initiatives in the Central African Republic. 
Liberia 
Although it was not public knowledge at the time, the Department of Information' s prepara-
tions for Vorster' s mission to the Ivory Coast did not go unnoticed by the Department of For-
eign Affairs top officials. Clearly, this added to the already strained relations between the two 
state agencies. For example, Brand Fourie's autobiographical accounts devote only a few 
pages to the Outward-Looking Policy in Africa. Fourie emphasises the establishment of con-
tact with Malawi, but he does not make any reference to the activities of either BOSS or the 
Department ofInformation and criticises the latter's boastful behaviour. He also objects to the 
fact that not enough credit was given to DFA's achievements.'89 Thus, in an attempt to prove 
their ability against the Department of Information, the foreign service officials also tried to 
achieve a breakthrough in Africa. Liberia did not have the high political standing of the Ivory 
Coast, but it was important for symbolic reasons; it was founded in 1847 by liberated Afro-
American slaves and it was never ruled by a foreign power. In addition, in 1966, Liberia and 
Ethiopia had taken Pretoria to the International Court of Justice over the S.W.A.lNamibia 
issue, but the IC] did not deem that South Africa' s presence in the country was illegal, as dis-
cussed earlier in this chapter. This ruling was only made in 1971 by virtue of the ICJ Advi-
sory Opinion, and it is possible to argue that the Department of Foreign Affairs considered 
establishing contact with their former adversary as a tactical success. The first evidence of 
interaction between Pretoria and Monrovia is noted in April 1974, when South Africa' s Am-
bassador at the Permanent Mission to the UN in Geneva, Harold Langmead Taylor 'Tassie ' 
Taswell, held informal talks with his Liberian counterpart, David Thomas. Thomas "remarked 
that he would very much like to visit South Africa", but he had "to act with caution" because 
"undue friendliness would not stand him in good stead with many of his African colleagues 
48' Fourie, Bemardus Gerhardus 'Brand'. c1986. Bui/e/andse woelinge om Suid-Afrika, 1939- /985 . Pretoria: 
131-1 34; Fourie, Bemardus Gerhardus 'Brand' . 1991. Brandpunte: agter die skerme met Suid-Afrika se 
bekendste dip/omaat. Cape Town: Tafelberg: 56-59, 61 f., 67. 
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here".49o The main diplomatic activities subsequently took place at the UN in New York and 
Geneva, and appear to have been pursued more vigorously after Vorster' s trip to the Ivory 
Coast in September 1974. On 31 October 1974, South Africa's Ambassador to the UN, Pik 
Botha, met Ambassador Thomas in Geneva. Evidently having resulted in a fruitful exchange 
of ideas, Liberian President William Tolbert signalled his preparedness to meet Pik Botha on 
6 November, on the fringes of the UN General Assembly.'" On 18 December 1974, probably 
encouraged by these developments and by the energetic Pik Botha, Prime Minister Vorster 
invited Tolbert to visit South Africa and alternatively proposed that he himself would go to 
Liberia.'92 
The documentation, relating to December 1974, on the diplomatic endeavours to organise 
a meeting between Tolbert and Vorster, suggests that the foreign service officials imitated the 
Department ofInformation's more aggressive propaganda style to win followers in Africa. In 
the first instance, from 17 to 23 December 1974, Pik Botha and BOSS' s van den Bergh 
courted Ambassador Thomas by taking him on a confidential mission through both South 
Africa and Namibia. Shortly thereafter, from 31 December 1974 to 6 January 1975, KwaZulu 
leader Buthelezi visited Liberia, where he also met President Tolbert. The aim was to con-
vince Monrovia of Pretoria's respect for the freedom of the South African majority and of its 
intention to grant Namibia self-autonomy. These unfolding events, examined later in the De-
tente section, eventually led to the Tumhalle Conference. The idea of sending homeland lead-
ers to African countries to generate the goodwill of their leaders was most probably derived 
from the Department of Information. Notably, in July 1972, To the Point had run the follow-
ing Editorial: "South Africa would have to include in its delegation to any talks the leaders of 
its planned non-white states, to avoid creating the impression that only the white man's inter-
ests are at stake".'93 Both Thomas' visit to South Africa and Buthelezi's trip to Liberia ful-
filled their main purpose. It was after Thomas ' journey that Pik Botha reported: "It is Ambas-
sador Thomas' firm conviction that there is now a definite desire, conscious effort and deter-
mination on the part of the Vorster Government C ... ) to bring about a favourable change which 
totally eliminate inequity and injustice an [sic] equal rights to all in South Africa. C ... ) in view 
of its efforts C ... ) , the present South African Government deserves a sympathetic listening ear 
'90 Report from Tassie Taswell (Ambassador), Geneva, 23 April 1974 (DFA, 1/ 13/3, Vol. 2). 
' 91 ' Memorandum' , from Pik Botha to Brand Fourie, New York, 4 November 1974; letter from Pik Botha to 
William Tolbert, New York, 7 November 1974; telegram from Pik Botha, New York, 8 November 1974 (DFA, 
1/ 13/3, Vols. lA, 2). 
492 Letter from John Vorster to William Tolbert, Pretoria, 18 December 1974 (DFA, 1113/3, Vol. IA). 
493 To the Point I July 1972: 21. 
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instead of complete condemnation and ridicule".494 Regarding Buthelezi's excursion to Libe-
ria, Tolbert stated in a press communique one week after Vorster's visit to Liberia in February 
1975: "As I had been informed by Chief Buthelezi that the South African Government had 
undertaken dialogue with the black people of that country, the criterion for dialogue with that 
Government had been met and the stage was now set for direct communication between 
US".495 
Significantly, a mere five weeks after Buthelezi's visit, South Africa's Prime Minister 
went to Liberia on 11112 February 1975. The list of people that accompanied Vorster this time 
was very different to that of the Ivory Coast, reflecting the influence of the players behind this 
meeting: Vorster's Private Secretary, his medical doctor, Minister Muller, Secretary Fourie, 
Pik Botha, Hendrik van den Bergh and Mike Geldenhuys.496 Probably to demonstrate the ef-
fectiveness of their policy in Africa, the DFA immediately made the meeting public. It was 
hailed as a breakthrough,49? but this move was overtaken by events when, only three months 
later, Vorster's trip to the Ivory Coast became known and was reported as the more important 
achievement. As a result, during our interview in 1999, Pik Botha insisted angrily that both 
BOSS and the Department of Information had "jumped on the bandwagon" and stolen the 
merits of the Liberia trip.'98 A final note needs to be made on the relationship between the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and BOSS in this instance. We suggest that BOSS's intelli-
gence support was essential for the Department of Foreign Affairs to pursue plans of this na-
ture. Notably, BOSS agent Gert H. Rothmann was involved in the run-up to Vorster's meet-
ing with Tolbert, as Brand Fourie's unpublished memoirs reveal, but without further specifi-
cation of Rothmann's role.'99 
Subsequent to Vorster's visit to Liberia, and similar to the stance taken by Presidents 
Houphouet-Boigny and Senghor, Tolbert also became disillusioned with Pretoria and ceased 
all contact, due to Pretoria's uncompromising attitude towards Namibian independence and 
treatment of South Africa's majority. Regarding the S.W.A./Namibia issue, we learn from a 
brief in the DFA files that during a discussion with Liberia's Ambassador to Geneva, David 
Thomas, in June 1975, Tolbert pleaded with Pretoria "to help him to further help". In addi-
494 Report from Pik Botha to JaM Vorster, Pretoria, 6 January 1975, pp.llf. (DFA, 1/13/3, Vol. IA). 
495 Official statement by Liberian President William Robert on 18 February 1975, issued by the Embassy of 
Liberia, Rome, II March 1975, pA (DFA, 1113/3, Vol. IA). 
496 DFA, 1113/3, Vol. IA. 
497 Frank, Aymon. 1975. Is Pretoria on the Point of Break-Through to Africa?, African Development 9, 4: 59: 
Swanepoel. 1982. Die diplomasie van Adv. B.J. Varster, p.228. 
498 Interview with Pik Botha, 20 April 1999. 
499 Fourie. c1986. Buitelandse woelinge om Suid-Afrika, 1939-1985, p.132. 
CHAPTER FOUR: PRIME MINISTER VORSTER, 1966-78 188 
tion, he stated that " if some dramatic statement were made indicating some imminent spec-
tacular action C ... ) to show willingness and plans for cooperation with the United Nations for 
the independence of Namibia, e.g. if within two years plans would be undertaken to prepare 
for granting the people of Namibia independence, the President would be able to present 
something tangible to his colleagues with the plea for understanding and patience in behalf of 
South Africa".500 Vorster's reaction, the Turnhalle Conference in September 1975, outlined in 
the next section, was only a half-hearted solution, however. Even less promising was Vor-
ster's attitude towards Tolbert's written plea, dated 3 December 1975, requesting that Robert 
Sobukwe, a prominent PAC figure, be granted permission to attend a political ceremony in 
Liberia.50l Vorster rejected the idea, possibly influenced by foreign service officials, reasoning 
that this constituted an interference in South African domestic matters. Notably, Fourie com-
municated the following to Ambassador Pik Botha in New York two weeks later, for further 
transmission to Liberia's Ambassador, Thomas: "invitation is regarded as transparent move 
which if permitted would establish dangerous precedent. Sobukwe is not regarded as leader of 
black people. He has furthermore not been inactive since his release from prison".5" This evi-
dence supports the earlier argument that Vorster's non-reply to President Senghor's proposal 
of sending a fact-finding mission to South Africa was due to the intervention of the foreign 
service officials. After the expiry of Tolbert's two years deadline on S.W.A./Namibia, he 
again contacted Vorster in September 1977, raising the issues of Namibian independence, 
hospital treatment for Sobukwe and the oppression of the majority in South Africa. 503 By now, 
Vorster's attitude had hardened and he only replied more than a month later, possibly again 
on diplomatic advice, declaring that the enquiries constituted an " interference in domestic 
affairs".5" We explain Vorster's harsh response with Pretoria' s defeat in Angola in early 
1976, examined in the Detente section, causing him to state before Parliament on 30 January 
1976 that "when it comes to the worst, South Africa stands alone".505 His flexibility and pre-
paredness to engage in foreign interchange thus appears to have suffered as a result. 
Apart from the Department of Foreign Affairs' Liberian venture, undertaken to rival the 
Department of Information's exploits in Senegal and in the Ivory Coast, the foreign service 
officials were also actively applying their favourite policy-levers, namely technical assistance 
500 'Memorandum' on a discussion between Ambassador Thomas and President Tolbert, 23 June 1975 (DFA, 
111 3/3, Vol. 3). 
501 Letter from William Tolbert to John Vorster, Monrovia, 3 December 1975 (DFA, 1/13/3, Vol. 3). 
502 Telegram from Brand Fourie to Pik Botha, Pretoria, 17 December 1975 (DFA, 1/ 13/3, Vol. 3). 
503 Letter from William Tolbert to John Vorster, Monrovia, 14 September 1977 (DFA, 1113/3, Vol. 3). 
5 .. Letter from John Vorster to William Tolbert, Pretoria, ca. November 1977 (DFA, 1113/3, Vol. 3). 
50S Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.81. 
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and development/investment projects, in the Central African Republic. This forms the basis of 
the following discussion. 
Central African Republic 
Two factors probably influenced the DFA's interest in the C.A.R., namely its close relation-
ship with France, the former colonial power, an aspect we examined earlier in this chapter and 
attributing that country an importance in continental matters. Second, the C.A.R. President, 
Jean Bedel Bokassa, had taken a pro-Dialogue attitude, although somewhat questionable in 
content. On 8 June 1971, he made positive statements to this effect to the news agency 
Reuters,506 but this remained unconfirmed at the OAU Summit in Addis Ababa some two 
weeks later, due to the country's non-attendance. A later DF A report notes that the C.A.R. 
Foreign Minister supported the Mogadishu Declaration in October 1971, adopted by the Con-
ference of East and Central African States to put an end to the Dialogue debate, and that the 
same minister also attacked South Africa at the UN. According to the same brief, the first 
direct contact between the two countries occurred in April 1972, when the C.A.R. Ambassa-
dor in Brussels met South Africa's Ambassador in Paris, Albie Burger.507 Yet, further interac-
tion did not take place until mid-1973, this time initiated by both BOSS and the military. 
As an indication of the relevance of economic interaction in stimulating political contact 
between South Africa and Africa at the time, on 26 July 1973, Jack Kagan of a Johannesburg-
based import-export company implicated in drawing up a development programme for the 
c.A.R. met Joel Barkan, President Bokassa's Technical Adviser, in Paris. Kagan subse-
quently informed the Bureau for State Security that he might be in a position to establish con-
tact with Bokassa. 508 A month later, on 27 August, and according to the DFA files, Kagan also 
consulted with Major van Rhyn from Military Intelligence, and reported the event to the Min-
ister of Defence, P. W. Botha, who subsequently informed both Hilgard Muller and Brand 
Fourie. Significantly, the DFA report indicates that van Rhyn's wife was related to that of 
P.W. Botha' s. However, the Department of Foreign Affairs ' "enthusiasm was ( .. ) still only 
weak" and it did "not react immediately".509 It was only on 29 January 1974 that both Muller 
506 Keesing 's Archiv der Gegenwart, 1971, p.16527. 
507 'Rol van Mnr. Jack Kagan in ons kontak met Pres. Bokassa' , p.1 (DFA, 111 83/3, Vol. 5). 
508 'Rol van Mnr. Jack Kagan in ons kontak met Pres. Bokassa', pp.2ff. (DFA, 1/1 83/3, Vol. 5) (translation 
from Afrikaans); ' Interview with Mr J. Kagan of Union Fabrics, 20 June 1974', Pretoria, 20 June 1974, p.l; 
' Draft letter to J. Kagan from SOCODEAF and FMDC', Brussels (DFA, 11183/3, Vol. 2). 
50' 'Rol van Mnr. Jack Kagan in ons kontak met Pres. Bokassa', pp.2ff. (DFA, 1/ 183/3, Vol. 5) (translation 
from Afrikaans); ' Interview with Mr J. Kagan of Union Fabrics, 20 June 1974 ', Pretoria, 20 June 1974, p.l ; 
' Draft letter to J. Kagan from SOCODEAF and FMDC', Brussels (DFA, 1/1 83/3, Vol. 2). 
CHAPTER FOUR: PRIME MINISTER YORSTER, 1966-78 190 
and Fourie received Kagan in Cape Town.s lO Thereafter, the military retained an important 
position in the DFA' s initial contact with the Central African Republic. Their particular inter-
est in this Francophone African country may have been Barkan's background. According to 
DF A documentation, he was in the service of the Israeli Foreign Ministry before being sec-
onded to Bokassa in the early 1970s, and it is possible that Barkan became the contact man 
for the Israeli intelligence, which had close links with Pretoria.lll In any event, the military's 
keen interest is shown by the fact that high-ranking Military Intelligence personnel met with 
either Kagan or Barkan, and was present when foreign service officials held meetings with 
them. Thus, a Colonel Oosthuizen met Barkan in September 1973 in Paris, the Chief of Staff: 
Intelligence, Hein du Toit, saw Barkan in South Africa in March 1974l12 and he was present 
when Kagan met Deputy Secretary Killen three months later. lI3 
Barkan's visit to South Africa from 25 to 29 March 1974 laid the foundation for the De-
partment of Foreign Affairs' significant interaction with the C.A.R. in the form of technical 
assistance and development/investment projects. In particular, Barkan was in the company of 
Maurice Methot, Director of Services at the Presidency of the C.A.R., and they held meetings 
with the DFA's Muller, Fourie and Killen. During the discussions, these officials raised the 
issue of overflying rights for SAA,sl4 an important factor prompting their interest in establish-
ing contact with Bangui and other African countries, as we will investigate closely later in this 
section. Talks were also held with the Secretary in the Department of Commerce, as well as 
representatives from the parastatal and private business community, namely the IDC, the 
Bantu Development Corporation (BDC), Roberts Construction, LTA and Credit Guarantee.Sll 
While the other enterprises were discussed in Chapter 2, the BDC was established in 1959 
with the objective of promoting industrial and other undertakings in the homelands, as well as 
lIO 'Rol van Mnr. Jack Kagan in ons kontak met Pres. Bokassa', p.2 (DFA, 11183/3, Yol. 5). 
SII Adams, James. 1984. The Unnatural Alliance: Israel and South Africa. London: Quartet; Joseph, Benja-
min Manashe. 1988. Besieged Bedfellows: Israel and the Land of Apartheid. New York: Greenwood Press; Osia, 
Kunirum. 1981. Israel, South Africa and Black Africa: A Study of the Primacy of the Politics of Expediency. 
Lanham, MD: University Press of America. 
lI2 'Central African Republic: visit of Mr Joel Barkan, Technical Adviser to the President and Mr Maurice 
Methot, Director of Services in the Office of Life President Bokassa' , 10 April 1974, p.1 (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 2). 
1I3 'Note:', ca. June 1974 (DFA, 1/ 183/3, Vol. 2); 'Oorsig van verhoudings en kontakle tussen die R.S.A. en 
Sentraal Afrikaanse Republiek', from Johan Pretorius, Pretoria, 30 January 1976, p.4 (DFA, 11183/3, AJ 1976). 
lI 4 'Central African Republic: visit of Mr Joel Barkan, Technical Adviser to the President and Mr Maurice 
Methot, Director of Services in the Office of Life President Bokassa', 10 April 1974, p.12 (DFA, 11183/3, Vol. 
2). 
lIS 'Central African Republic: visit of Mr Joel Barkan, Technical Adviser to the President and Mr Maurice 
Methot, Director of Services in the Office of Life President Bokassa', 10 April 1974, pp.lff. (DFA, 11183/3, Vol. 
2). 
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to act as a development, financial and investment institution,'" Its presence in this instance 
can be seen as Pretoria's attempt to create political goodwill by demonstrating that its work 
was to the benefit of the majority, and that this expertise could also be used for develop-
ment/investment projects in interested African countries. A visit was made to an industrial 
project in a township created by the BDC, to show what could be achieved. 
Evidently impressed by the feedback from Barkan and Methot after their visit,'" Bokassa 
met a South African delegation in Paris from 17 to 23 September 1974. This was led by Johail 
Adendorff from the BDC, and consisted of representatives from the Departments of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade and Industry, as well as from the enterprises that attended the March meet-
ings, to discuss development/investment projects.S18 Contact intensified in the following 
weeks, leading to important projects and the provision of technical assistance. A brief over-
view of the relevant meetings is now provided, followed by a detailed discussion of the types 
of assistance rendered. Bokassa wrote directly to Prime Minister Vorster on 3 October 1974, 
acknowledging the "extremely positive" results of the Paris talks and emphasising the impor-
tance of the proposed projects for his country.'" Then, on 7 October, Barkan met Vorster in 
South Africa.'20 Subsequently, from 5 to II November, Ambassador Burger led a South Afri-
can delegation comprised of officials from the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Com-
merce, as well as private business, to the C.A.R.m A joint communique was issued during the 
visit, the contents of which are noted in the secondary literature.'" 'Operation Bokassa', as it 
was code-named by the DF A, consisted of the following projects: a hotel complex of five 
hundred bedrooms, a railway line, five hundred prefabricated houses, mineral research and 
exploitation, an agricultural-industrial complex, tourist facilities, a second hospital in the capi-
". Established in tenns of the Black Investment Corporation Act (No 34 of 1959), which was replaced by the 
Promotion of the Economic Development of National States Act (No 46 of 1968). Stultz, Newell Maynard. 
1968. The Realities of 'Bantustans' with Special Reference to the Transkei: 1965, in Gary Gappert, ed. South 
African Dilemmas: Some Dynamics of a Stalic State. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University, Maxwell Graduate 
School of Citizenship & Public Affairs, Program of Eastern African Studies: 60ff.; Swart, S.P., Johan Adendorff, 
Micheal H.H. Louw, eds. 1966. The Economic and Administrative Development in Bantu Territories. Sovenga: 
University College of the North. 
517 Letter from Jean Bokassa to Hilgard Muller, Bangui, 6 September 1974 (DFA, 11183/3, Vol. 2). 
51 8 ' Meeting with the President: France, 24/911974 at 8 P.M. ' (DFA, 11183/3, Vol. 2). 
51' Letter from Jean Bokassa to John Vorster, Paris, 3 October 1974 (DFA, 11183/3, Vol. 3) (translation from 
French). 
520 ' S.E. die Eerste Minister se onderhoud met Mor. J. Barkan, gesant van Pres. Bokassa van die Sentraal Af-
rikaanse Republiek, Kaapstad - 7 Oktober 1974', from Johan Pretorius, Pretoria, 8 October 1974 (DFA, 11183/3, 
Vol. 3). Pretorius acted as a translator between Barkan and Vorster. 
521 Letter from John Vorster to Jean Bokassa, Pretoria, I November 1974; letter from Rae Killen with an invi-
tation to the various companies, Pretoria, 25 October 1974 (DFA, 11183/3, Vol. 3). 
522 Deeter. 1976. South Africa alld Black Africa, p.5; Osia. 1981. Israel, South Africa and Black Africa, p.72. 
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tal, Bangui, educational projects and a paper pulp mil!.'" We henceforth examine the rele-
vance of those projects where sufficient primary sources were available. 
Similar to Gabon's President Bongo, Bokassa' s motivation to seek contact with Pretoria 
was self-interest. As one journalist wrote at the time: "For Bokassa, his "flirtation" with South 
Africa is a matter of economic expediency rather than part of an overall ideology" .'" The 
prime example was his wish to have a hotel of international standing built in Bangui, named 
Hotel Intercontinental Bokassa. For the reasons aptly summarised in a DF A report, Bokassa 
accorded it absolute priority over all other projects of Operation Bokassa: 
The third hotel is an absolute necessity and must be completed before January, 1976, 
when 65 countries of the O.A.U. will confer in his country. He considers the selection of 
his country for the conference ( ... ) as a great honour ( ... ) and must at all costs provide the 
necessary accommodation by that time. He also mentions that many members of the 
O.A.U. have suggested that the permanent seat of the Organisation be changed from Ad-
dis Ababa to his capital city ( ... )'" 
In spite of Bokassa's reputation as a corrupt and eccentric politician, but being aware of his 
role as foreign policy maker in the C.A.R., the Department of Foreign Affairs pursued the 
plans for the prestige-building exercise. Besides winning Bokassa's sympathies, the foreign 
service officials saw the hotel project as an opportunity for gaining recognition by other OAU 
member countries. The report quoted above reads: "It can hold great advantages for South 
Africa if we can undertake this prestige project for the accommodation of the O.A.U.".'" 
Muller being the cautious Minister of Foreign Affairs he was, argued in October 1974 that 
"the Republic cannot participate in prestige projects" and that it should "support something 
productive". '" Yet, possibly overruled by Secretary Fourie, Pretoria went ahead in providing 
assistance. For this purpose, the foreign affairs ministry approached the companies Brian Col-
quhoun, introduced in Chapter 2, and its associate, Cereal and General Exports, considering 
them to be suitable for involvement in the project. Representatives from these two firms 
formed part of the group invited by the DFA to visit the C.A.R. in November 1974. Several 
problems soon became apparent, however. The provision of credit finance was the most criti-
cal issue, as Cereal and General Exports was responsible only for the delivery of material, 
with no involvement in construction activity. In addition, the C.A.R. request for credit repay-
ment exceeded the normal duration of five years usually stipulated by Credit Guarantee, the 
S23 ' Communique conjoint', by Albie Burger and C.A.R. Minister of Tourism, Water Affairs, Forestry, Hunt-
ing and Fisheries, Bangui, 9 November 1974 (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 4). 
S24 'Bokassa and South Africa ', West Africa 3624, 31 March 1975: 359. 
m 'Meeting with the President: France, 24/9/1974 at 8 P.M. ', p.3 (DFA, 111 83 /3, Vol. 2). 
52' 'Meeting with the President: France, 24/9/1974 at 8 P.M', p.3 (DFA, 11183/3, Vol. 2). 
m ' Principes directeurs indiques pendant Ie vol it Londres par son Excellence Ie Ministre des Affaires Etran-
geres ', October 1974, p.1 (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 3, also in Vol. 7) (translation from French) . 
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company contracted by Pretoria to insure the export of capital goods. Furthermore, the cost of 
6 million Rand was considered too high and it became clear that the required amount of ce-
ment was not readily available in South Africa. It therefore became apparent that the comple-
tion of the hotel by January 1976 was not a feasible proposition. The South Africans thus de-
cided to build only sections of the hotel, known as Blocks A and B.528 On 17 December 1974, 
Ambassador Burger communicated Pretoria's preparedness to finance them with a 1.5 million 
Rand credit over ten years at 5% interest, with a moratorium of two years before repayment, 
which would have to be completed in sixteen instalments and interest payments every six 
months. Two days later, the provider company, Cereal and General Exports, obtained insur-
ance from Credit Guarantee. 52' In a letter to Vorster on 5 February 1975, Bokassa gratefully 
accepted the offer530 and deployed his Technical Adviser, Barkan, the Minister of Housing and 
the Permanent Secretary of Housing to Pretoria from 12 to 17 February to negotiate and sign 
the loan agreement, and meetings took place with both Vorster and Muller.531 The agreement 
was not contained in the relevant DFA file, but later documents suggest that the IDC provided 
an export credit of 3 million Rand and Pretoria added 1.015 million Rand in the form of a 
loan. SJ2 This evidence shows, once again, that the Department of Foreign Affairs made use of 
the country' s economic capacities for its political objectives aimed at impressing African 
leaders at every attempt, stretching credit guarantees provided by Credit Guarantee to the ab-
solute limit. 
Second on the list of priorities itemised in Operation Bokassa was a railway line to the 
port of Douala in Cameroon, facilitating import to and export from the landlocked C.A.R. 
While in South Africa at the end of March 1974, Barkan and Methot discussed this project at 
great length with Fourie and a Mr. Catacuzene from Roberts Construction.'" In a letter to 
President Bokassa after the visit, Minister Muller singled out the project: 
regarding the railway line project, a project of vital importance for the Central African 
Republic, a frrst contact has been established with a very important South African com-
528 'Report on Working Group 1' , pp.I-4, 8f. (DFA, 1118313, Vol. 4). 
529 Lener from Albie Burger to Jean Bokassa, Paris, 17 December 1974 (DFA, 1118313, Vol. 5). 
530 Lener from Jean Bokassa to John Vorster, Bangui, 5 February 1975 (DFA, 1118313, Vol. 5). 
531 DFA, 1118313, Vol. 5 contains photographs of this visit. 
SJ2 'Dr Koomhof: visit to Bangui' , from Johan Pretorius to Rae Killen, Pretoria, 17 November 1975, p.1 
(DFA, 1118313, Vol. 7). 
'" 'Central African Republic: visit of Mr Joel Barkan, Technical Adviser to the President and Mr Maurice 
Methot, Director of Services in the Office of Life President Bokassa' , 10 April 1974, pp.10-13 (DFA, 1118313, 
Vol. 2). 
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pany [Roberts Construction 1 that has great experience in that field. A representative from 
this company will shortly come to Bangui to examine the documents more closely'l' 
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The project again figured prominently in Bokassa's discussions with the South African dele-
gation during September 1974 in Paris.'15 Catacuzene was also part of the South African dele-
gation that visited the C.A.R. in November 1974. Yet, given the size of this project, the joint 
communique of 9 November stated that it could only be undertaken by a consortium of com-
panies, following which Catacuzene made it clear that Roberts Construction was not inter-
ested in joining, but merely in undertaking sub-contractual work,516 and they consequently did 
not take part in this project. 
Third on the list of development/investment projects contained in Operation Bokassa was 
the construction of five hundred prefabricated houses in Bangui. The main parties involved 
were LTA, the IDC and Credit Guarantee. Spencer R. Whiting from LTA and Jan Bouwer 
from Credit Guarantee were part of the group that the DFA had invited to visit the C.A.R. in 
November 1974. For the same reasons applicable to the hotel project, the provision of credit 
finance proved to be a critical issue. However, rating the railway line as bearing less political 
weight in comparison and judging this project to be "the only one [of Operation BokassaJ 
which appears capable of being dealt with on a normal commercial basis", the South Africans 
insisted on the normal five year repayment period in this case.517 On 14 March 1975, during 
their visit to South Africa, the C.A.R. delegation and the relevant South African parties signed 
several financial agreements. Accordingly, the total cost of the project to be undertaken by 
LT A amounted to close on 10 million Rand.5l8 In line with its Export Finance Scheme, the 
IDC provided the credit that was insured by Credit Guarantee. Repayment was to begin three 
years after the commencement of the contract and in six-monthly instalments over a period of 
ten years, with an interest rate of 7.25%.519 Sections of the agreement were thus not consistent 
with what the South Africans termed a "normal commercial basis" in November 1974, an-
other example that shows that economic logic was subordinated to political interests. This 
again repudiates the Marxist interpretation of political economy, examined in the Introduction 
to this study, that economic ambitions formed the motivation for South Africa's Outward-
Looking Policy in Africa beyond its neighbourhood. 
514 Letter from Hilgard Muller to Jean Bokassa, Pretoria, 29 March 1974, p.2 (DFA, 11183/3, Vol. I) (transla-
tion from French). 
515 'Meeting with the President: France, 24/911974 at 8 P.M.' , pp.1 f. (DFA, 11183/3, Vol. 2). 
516 'Report on Working Group J' , pp.IO, 4f. (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 4). 
517 'Report on Working Group 1' , pp.lO, 6f. (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 4). 
538 DFA, 1118313, Vol. 6. 6.882 million Rand for the material, 753,000 for the transport, 2.321 million for the 
erection. 
519 DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 6. 
CHAPTER FOUR: PRIME MINISTER VORSTER, 1966-78 195 
The final aspect of Operation Bokassa to be examined here, is Bokassa's request for tech-
nical assistance in mineral research and exploitation of its reputedly rich mineral resources. 
During the talks in November 1974, the C.A.R. representatives asked for assistance from pri-
vate South African mining companies, but no names are mentioned in the relevant DF A re-
port. Evidently preferring to actively display the government's expertise, this request remains 
unanswered in the documents.5" Instead, the South African delegation proposed sending one 
or two geologists from the National Metallurgical Institute in Johannesburg to undertake sur-
veys. In consequence, a South African geologist visited the C.A.R. sometime between No-
vember 1974 and June 1975, recommending the concentration of operations on diamonds.5" 
This overview of the key projects within Operation Bokassa is followed by an investigation of 
aspects relevant to their development until the end of the Vorster era. 
Only one year after the financial agreements had been signed, the Hotel Intercontinental 
Bokassa, which originally enjoyed top priority status, encountered financial difficulties as a 
South African delegation, led by Minister Muller, learnt during a visit to Bangui from 21 to 
24 February 1976.542 Bokassa told Muller that due to "inflation etc.", another 4 million Rand 
was required. Furthermore, Muller was informed that the OAU congress, the raison d'i3tre for 
building the hotel, would no longer take place in Bangui. Muller's reaction was cautious, not 
wanting to give "false hopes,,5" as to Pretoria's preparedness in providing additional finance. 
The South Africans "noted with surprise""" that the additional money was needed to pay the 
salaries, as the original agreement stated that Bangui was responsible for the construction 
costs. Nonetheless, the IDC drafted a set of contracts to formalise an additional credit of 1.5 
million Rand, while Pretoria intended to send a clerk of works to Bangui "to streamline con-
struction procedures and ensure proper control".5" It is likely that the foreign service officers 
displayed such generosity to win Bokassa's assistance in two important matters. The first is-
sue was their request for SAA overflying rights to form an air corridor through Africa,5" an 
540 'Report on Working Group II' , pp.lff. (DFA, 1/ 183/3, Vol. 4). 
5" ' Barkan - 25.6.75 ' (DFA, 111 83/3, Vol. 7). 
5" 'Official visit of our Foreign Ministerto the Central African Republic: 21 to 24 February 1976', 3 March 
1976 (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 8). 
5" 'Onderhoud met President Bokassa by die Presidensiele Paleis of 23 Februarie', from Joban Pretorius, 26 
February 1976, p.5 (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 7) (translation from Afrikaans). 
54. 'Proces-verbal de la seance de travail entre la delegation centrafricaine et certains membres de la delega-
tion sud-africaine, 24 fevrier 1976', Bangui, 24 February 1976, p.2 (DFA, 11183/3, Vol. 8) (translation from 
French). 
545 ' Central African Republic ' , from Rae Killen to Hilgard Muller, Pretoria, 2 June 1976, p.1 (DFA, 1/ 183/3, 
Vol. 8). 
546 'Onderhoud met President Bokassa by die Presidensiele Pale is of 23 Februarie', from Johan Pretorius, 
Pretoria, 26 February 1976, p.4 (DFA, 11183/3, Vol. 7); 'Proces-verbal de la seance de travail entre la delegation 
1 
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aspect examined in the next sub-section. The second matter dealt with Pretoria's homelands 
policy. We have seen that the Department of Information attempted to win over African lead-
ers by selling this concept as the government's answer to reforming apartheid. Similar to the 
situation when KwaZulu leader Buthelezi visited Liberia in January 1975, the foreign affairs 
ministry imitated the Department of Information's strategy, including George Matanzima in 
the delegation that went to Bangui in February 1976. He was the Minister of Justice in the 
Transkei and brother of Kaizer Matanzima, the leader of this homeland and strong advocate of 
its independence.s" While the foreign service officials' promise of additional financing for the 
hotel projects did not achieve obtaining overflying rights for SAA, they could report some 
success in their second aim. Significantly, Bokassa expressed that he was "pleased" to receive 
Matanzima, adding "that there was no doubt that he would not accept the independence of 
Transkei". s48 Bokassa also indicated that he was "prepared to establish, without delay, diplo-
matic relations on an ambassadorial level and with fully-fledged embassies in the two coun-
tries".549 
Returning to the hotel project, this was again the main issue of discussion during the visit 
of a South African delegation, led by Deputy Secretary Killen and Andre J aquet from the 
Francophone Africa Desk, and comprising ten businessmen,slO to Bangui from 10 to 17 Au-
gust 1977. According to the available information, new financial agreements had been negoti-
ated, revealing that the IDC provided further credit, while Cereal and General Exports contin-
ued their responsibility for the hotel's building material and LTA supervised the construction 
of the hotel, in the meantime scaled down to two hundred and seventy rooms." l In spite of the 
problems, it still remained a profitable enterprise for the private companies involved; if Ban-
gui should not be able to pay, Credit Guarantee would act as the financial guarantor, again 
reinsured by Pretoria. Mirroring this situation, a relatively close contact developed between 
LTA's Spencer Whiting and Rae Killen. In a letter of November 1976, addressing Killen by 
centrafricaine et certains membres de la delegation sud-africaine, 24 fevrier 1976', from Andre Jaquet, 24 Febru-
ary 1976,p.1 (DFA, 1/ 183/3, Vol. 8). 
l47 Laurence, Patrick. 1976. The Transkei: South Africa 's Politics of Partition. Johannesburg: Ravan Press: 
11,25. 
548 'Onderhoud met President Bokassa by die Presidensiele Pale is of23 Februarie' , from Johan Pretorius, 26 
February 1976, p.2 (DFA, 11183/3, Vol. 7) (translation from Afrikaans). 
549 'Onderhoud met President Bokassa by die Presidensiele Paleis of 23 Februarie', from Johan Pretorius, 26 
February 1976, pp.2f. (DFA, 11183/3, Vol. 7) (translation from Afrikaans). 
llO Spencer Whiting and Brian Melhuish from LT A, Jan Bouwer and Robert Speedie from Credit Guarantee, 
Johan van Vuuren from the Industrial Development Corporation, C. Lewis and David Lewis from Cereal and 
General Exports, Mr. Lister from Brian Colquhoun, M. Simpson from Hallows Architects and interior decorator 
L. Hansen. 'Visit to Bangui, Central African Empire: 10-17 August 1977', from Rae Killen, Annexure A (DFA, 
11183/3, Vol. 8). 
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his first name, Whiting reported on a recent visit to Bangui: "we saw B. [Bokassa] twice and 
he was very affable. He undoubtedly has genuine regard for Minister Muller, and I would 
think a deal of gratitude for what South Africa has done""" Regarding the further develop-
ment of the hotel project, Bangui's increasing financial difficulties meant that it could not 
repay the loan of LOIS million Rand provided by Pretoria"" 
In contrast, and turning to the development of the other projects that comprised Operation 
Bokassa, the erection of the five hundred prefabricated houses "was proceeding satisfactorily" 
and "there was a 12-month waiting list of eager purchasers", as Rae Killen reported after his 
visit to Bangui in August 1977."4 In March 1978, Johan Pretorius also reported that most "of 
the houses have been bought or let and the scheme is a great success".'" The last aspect of 
Operation Bokassa entailed South African technical assistance for mineral research, resulting 
in the engagement of a South African geologist for exploration purposes by June 1975. Based 
on his report, indicating that further assistance was worthwhile, the South African delegation 
led by Minister Muller to Bangui from 21 to 24 February 1976 conveyed Pretoria's decision 
to provide the C.A.R. with some 5.5 million Rand to cover the period 1976/77. The South 
Africans also proposed a visit by the C.A.R. Director of Mines to South Africa to hold talks 
on the prospecting and exploitation of diamonds with the Department of Mining and private 
mining companies. '" The offer further included Safair's delivery of technical material to es-
tablish the extent of the diamond areas, the secondment of a South African geologist for a 
year to undertake prospecting in the C.A.R. and the training of three local geologists by Preto-
ria's Geological Service. '" In June 1976, Killen reported to Muller that the C.A.R. Director of 
Mines, who had recently visited South Africa, was suspended from his post, that the country's 
diamond industry had been nationalised, that two planeloads of material were awaiting deliv-
ery and that a geologist from the Department of Mines would soon leave for Bangui.'" How-
lSI 'Visit to Bangui, Central African Empire: 10-17 August 1977', from Rae Killen, ppAf. (DFA, 11183/3, 
Vol. 8). 
S52 Letter from Spencer Whiting to Rae Killen, Johannesburg, 15 November 1976 (DF A, 1/183/3, Vol. 8). 
SS3 'Main points of discussion with Minister Toleque and Mr Barkan of Central African Empire', from Johan 
Pretorius, Pretoria, 7 March 1978, p.l (DFA, 11183/3, Vol. 9). 
'" 'Visit to Bangui, Central African Empire: 10-17 August 1977', from Rae Killen, Bangui, p.6 (DFA, 
11183/3, Vol. 8). 
'" 'Main points of discussion with Minister Toleque and Mr Barkan of Central African Empire' , from lohan 
Pretorius, Pretoria, 7 March 1978, p.2 (DFA, 1/ 183/3, Vol. 9). 
". 'Official visit of our Foreign Minister to the Central African Republic: 21 to 24 February 1976', 3 March 
1976 (DFA, 1/ 183/3, Vol. 8). 
SS7 'Proces-verbal de la seance de travail entre la delegation centrafricaine et certains membres de la delega-
tion sud-africaine, 24 fevrier 1976', Bangui, 24 February 1976, ppAf. (DFA, 111 83/3, Vol. 8). 
ssg 'Central African Republic' , from Rae Killen to Hilgard Muller, Pretoria, 2 June 1976, p.2 (DFA, 1/183/3, 
Vol. 8). 
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ever, according to a OF A report of March 1978, "a private company of Israeli and American 
interests has been formed to develop the diamond deposits",'" putting an end to this aspect of 
co-operation between South Africa and the C.A.R. 
In summary, Pretoria's contact with Bangui, which had begun during 1973/74, proved to 
be a very difficult exercise. With only one of the projects advancing well by 1978, their final 
outcome falls within the ambit of the early part ofP.W. Botha' s premiership and is therefore 
examined in the next chapter. The DFA's involvement in costly prestige develop-
ment/investment projects, namely the Hotel Intercontinental Bokassa, is a prime example of 
the foreign service officials placing the political goal of impressing an African leader higher 
than the economic viability of the project itself. The actual gain for Pretoria, however, was 
minuscule. Once it became clear that the envisaged OAU conference, for which purpose the 
hotel was to be built, would not take place in Bangui, Bokassa's interest in co-operating with 
Pretoria dropped significantly. On a personal level, during the above-mentioned stay of the 
South African delegation in the C.A.R. in August 1977, Killen was supposed to have a meet-
ing with Bokassa at 6p.m. on 12 August, but "was eventually received" at 10:30a.m. on the 
next day, as Killen disappointedly reported. The signing of the documents relating to the hotel 
project also proved to be a tedious exercise. 560 
On the whole, the contact with Liberia and the development of Operation Bokassa in the 
Central African Republic were not conducive to the DFA's ambition of establishing itself vis-
a-vis the Department ofInformation, in view of their simultaneous activities in both the Ivory 
Coast and Senegal. The visit of the C.A.R. delegation to South Africa in February 1975, men-
tioned above, appeared in South African newspapers and in the secondary literature, present-
ing the contact as an important breakthrough for Pretoria in Africa. 561 However, this was over-
shadowed by the Department of Information's subsequent public relations coup in revealing 
Vorster's visit to the Ivory Coast. Apart from that, the DFA's initiatives in the c.A.R. did not 
produce any tangible results to Pretoria's advantage. In particular, Bokassa did not recognise 
Transkei as a sovereign state when Pretoria declared its independence in October 1976. Fur-
", 'Main points of discussion with Minister Toleque and Mr Barkan of Central African Empire', Pretoria, 7 
March 1978, p.l (DFA, 11183/3, Vol. 9). 
560 'Visit to Bangui, Central African Empire: 10-17 August 1977', from Rae Killen, pp.2, 5 (DFA, 11183/3, 
Vol. 8). 
561 'Detente met sending na S.A. bevoerder' , Die Burger 17 February; 'Detente is issue for d' Estaing in Af-
rica' , The Star 3 March; 'Bangui talks may boost SA detente attempts' Pretoria News 4 March; 'Bokassa takes 
aid where he finds it', The Argus 10 March; 'SA builds in Black Africa', Cape Times 11 March; 'RI67-m ties 
between SA, Bokassa?, The Star 18 March 1975 (ARCA, PV.59, File 43/2/1; PV.132, Koeranteknipsels; DFA, 
11183/3, Vol. 5). Also Daddieh. 1997. South Africa and Francophone African Relations, p.189; Deeter. 1976. 
South Africa and Black Africa, p.5; Frank. 1975. Is Pretoria on the Point of Break-Through to Africa?, p.59; 
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thermore, the foreign affairs ministry did not obtain overflying rights for South African Air-
ways,'62 an aspect of Pretoria's foreign relations with African countries beyond South Africa's 
neighbourhood that became increasingly important, our focus now. 
Air Routes for SM 
South African Airways was established in 1934, operated by the equally state-owned South 
African Railways and Harbours until 1990,'63 ensuring a connection to the developed world 
and to Western Europe in particular. Geographically, South Africa occupies a remote position 
on the southernmost tip of Africa, "far from principal trading partners, far from the major 
hubs of commerce, industry and innovation of the world, far from the Anglo-European cul-
tural hearth to which many South Africans remain firmly bound"'''. As white South Africans 
identified themselves with the culture in Europe and because the country's economy was de-
pendent on trade with this continent, air transport to and from the Republic was of vital im-
portance. The first international service, between South Africa and the United Kingdom, be-
came operative at the end of 1945, with the first non-stop flights to Europe taking place from 
1962.'" However, with independence sweeping across Africa in the early 1960s, the most 
direct air routes to Western Europe traversing the continent became disrupted. Exploiting 
their geographical location, African countries began to attack South Africa's vital lifeline, 
withdrawing both landing and overflying rights from SAA to put pressure on Pretoria to 
abandon apartheid. Western European airlines serving South Africa were hardly affected by 
these actions,'" but they posed a severe problem for the South African government. By hav-
ing to fly around the western bulge of Africa, "flying distance to all European centres in-
creased by at least 1 400 kms, the journey time lengthened correspondingly, and fuel usage 
Legwn. 1976. Vorster's Gamblefor Africa, p.16; Osia. 1981. Israel, South Africa and Black Africa, pp.72, 74; 
'Bokassa and South Africa', West Africa 3624, 31 March 1975: 359. 
'" Telephone interview with Frans Swarts, 7 December 2002. 
'.3 <http://www.saamuseum.co.zalhistory.htm>. South African Railways and Harbours then became Trans-
net. 
, .. Pirie, Gordon Harvey. 1990. Aviation, Apartheid and Sanctions: Air Transport to and from South Africa, 
1945-1989, GeoJournal22, 3: 231. 
,., South African Airways: Thirty Years of Progress, 1934-/964. 1964. Johannesburg: Da Gama; 
<http://www.saa.co.za>. 
". The DFA files document only two exceptions. In 1975, the Congolese Republic closed its airport to the 
French airline UTA and the Dutch airline KLM, both of which served Johannesburg, which gave rise to the idea 
0[ using Bangui instead: 'Central African Republic', 2 December 1975 (DFA, 11183/3, Vol. 7). In 1977, UTA 
planes on the way to and from Johannesburg were not allowed to land in Libreville for the duration of the OAU 
conference there: ' UTA flights to and from South Africa during OAU Conference', from Andre Jaquet, Pretoria, 
11 May 1977 (DFA, 11183/3, Vol. 8). 
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soared,,567 (Figure 3). Yet, SAA could not increase its prices accordingly for fear of losing 
passenger volume and thereby income to the competing airlines on the profitable routes be-
tween South Africa and Western Europe. The result was great additional expenditure by Pre-
toria to sustain these SAA flights. In an attempt to circumvent the impact of African air sanc-
tions, the airline, in conjunction with the government, tried to gain landing and overflying 
rights in specific African countries and this was an important feature of South Africa' s foreign 
relations with Africa, especially after the mid-1970s. Apart from the information contained in 
the DF A files, a particularly useful source to reconstruct their initiatives and results were in-
terviews and correspondence with both Frans Swarts and Gerrit Dirk ' Gert' van der Veer, 
SAA Chief Executives from 1982 to 1983 and then until 1993 respectively. 
Given that African countries withdrew their overflying and landing rights for South Afri-
can Airways in the wake of independence, and according to Swarts and van der Veer, "nu-
merous African countries were targeted on an on-going basis since August 1963 to reduce 
costs and also flying time in order to stay competitive on the European route" .568 Las Pa1mas 
on the Spanish Canary Islands became an important stopover in this regard,569 permitting 
planes to start with less fuel in Johannesburg, thereby increasing their capacity to carry pas-
sengers and making the flights more economical. During the first half of the 1970s, SAA in-
creasingly switched over to Ilha do Salon Cape Verde, an island off the Senegalese coast and 
Portuguese colony until July 1975. In particular, Ilha do Sal was used as a stopover for the 
New York flights that commenced in November 1973 and lasted until 1986, when the US 
Congress imposed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) (Chapter 5) ;510 Las Pal-
mas was still used for other flights until April 1983.571 In return for the landing rights on Ilha 
do Sal, Pretoria provided financial compensation and technical assistance to ensure the main-
tenance of airport standards,572 notably by calibrating the airport' s landing and navigational 
aids, as prescribed by the United States Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) to comply with 
airport safety standards world-wide. Based on the available documents, Pretoria contributed 
60,000 Rand for that purpose covering the budget years 1977/78 and 1978/79. In addition, a 
loan agreement of 15.75 million US Dollars at an interest rate of 6% was concluded with the 
567 Pirie. 1990. Aviation, Apartheid and Sanctions, p.233. See also 'Real measures ofSAA savings', Finance 
Week 20-26 June 1991: 4f. 
568 Correspondence with Frans Swarts and Gert van der Veer, 11 February 2003. 
569 Potgieter, Hennan. 1986. Aviation in South Africa. Cape Town: C. Struik: 11. 
570 Griffiths, [euan L.1. 1989. Airways Sanctions against South Africa, Area 21 , 3: 255f. 
571 Correspondence with Frans Swarts and Gert van der Veer, 11 February 2003. Also Potgieter. 1986. Avia-
tion in South Africa, p.l1. 
572 'Sununary of discussions between representatives of the Government of Cabo Verde and SA Airways: 
Ilha do Sal: 8 August 1975' , p.l (DFA, 11224/3, Vol. 1). 
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Cape Verde government in late 1979 to finance repairs and improvements to the runway, 
apron and control tower at Ilha do Sal. The available documents reveal that the operator of 
SAA, South African Railways and Harbours, was involved in the project.S7l Also, around the 
mid-1980s, and according to the firm' s in-house publication, LTA was responsible for main-
tenance work on the runway at the airport, serving as another example of private business 
activity in support of Pretoria's ambitions in Africa, with a financial benefit for the firm in-
volved. At the same time, it saved the South African government a great deal of money in 
subsidising SAA flights. On this issue, former foreign service official Paul Runge candidly 
stated in 1999: "there were projects that paid off nicely. In Cape Verde, for example, we only 
uplifted the runway, and in return we could put through three SAA flights a week. One flight 
paid for the project". '74 For its part, and the assistance necessary to maintain and improve the 
airport's standards aside, the Cape Verde government was fmanciaIly so dependent on the 
income from the SAA stopovers that it could not afford to cancel the landing rights, despite 
the condemnation of the apartheid system. In fact, one secondary source suggests that this 
income constituted "about 90 percent of the income generated by the airport".575 
Figure 3: Africa in South African Airways' International Network 
1 """"""" 2 GenITal African Republic 
3 ""'" 4 Egypt 
5 GaIxln 
6 Somalia 
1 Sudan 
8 Zaire 
573 DFA, 11224/3, Yol. 1. 
574 Interview with Paul Runge, 7 April 1999. 
575 King, Godfrey. 1986. Cape Verde: Airport Dresses up, but Who Will Come?, African Business 98: 42. 
Also Wbann, Christopher A. 1998. The Political Economy of Cape Verde' s Foreign Policy, Africana Journal: A 
Bibliographical and Review Quarterly, 17: 46. 
CHAPTER FOUR: PRIME MINISTER VORSTER, 1966-78 202 
The DFA files reveal increased activities on the pali of SAA to circumvent the African air 
sanctions after 1974, as a result of Pretoria's critical lack of access to petrol such as we now 
detail. Already in the 1950s, the two oil-from-coal plants Sasol I and Sasol II near Johannes-
burg had been established to synthetically produce oil, and, in 1965, Pretoria formed the 
Southern Oil Exploration Corporation, mentioned earlier in this chapter, to co-ordinate and 
promote the search and development of commercial gas and oil fields. In spite of these meas-
ures, it was still important for South Africa to obtain the precious raw material directly from 
oil-producing countries, as the quality was generally better and the cost for producing oil syn-
thetically was very high. The Arab states proved to be an important source, but this changed 
substantially after October 1973, as a result of the Yom Kippur War between Israel and 
Egypt. In order to create pressure so that Tel Aviv would withdraw her troops from the Sinai 
and the Golan Heights, the oil-producing Arab states embargoed Israel's allies, among them 
South Africa.s76 The only Arab country to continue supplying oil to South Africa was Iran 
until the fall of Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1979,177 supplementing the alleged close co-
operation between the two countries in the fields of nuclear development and arms manufac-
turing.S78 The Arab oil embargo aggravated the situation regarding SAA flights to Europe 
around the bulge of Africa. The further restriction of Pretoria' s access to the oil and the dra-
matic rise in the price of the available oil increased the cost of these SAA flights. In sum, as 
stated by Frans Swarts and Gert van der Veer, "the increase in fuel prices in 1973 and 1979 
obviously highlighted the need for more economical routes". '" Apart from the stopover on 
Ilha do Sal, Pretoria pursued two principal strategies from 1974 to alleviate the problem, as 
further explained by them: "two routes in particular were considered; i.e. over West Africa, 
cutting the bulge of Africa and over East Africa and the Red Sea"sso (Figure 3). 
In his study, Deon Geldenhuys indicates that both BOSS and the Department of Informa-
tion actively supported the airline's endeavours during 1976. Between them, van den Bergh 
and Eschel Rhoodie tried to secure overflying rights in Sudan and Egypt respectively.S8i 
S76 See Adams. 1984. The Unnatural Alliance. 
177 Ojo, Olusola. 1985. Oil Sanctions and South Africa, in Olajide Aluko, Timothy Milton Shaw, eds. South-
ern Africa in the 1980s. London: Allen and Unwin: 240f.; Whitehill, Robert. 1986. The Sanctions that Never 
Were: Arab and Iranian Oil Sales to South Africa, Middle East Review 19, I: 38-46. 
"8 Frank, Aymon. 1974. Nuclear Joint Venture for South Africa, Iran, France: Analysis, African Develop-
ment 8, 9: 45; Korner, Peter. 1981. Sudafrika zwischen Isolation und Kooperation: okonomische. politische und 
militiirische Zusammenarbeit des Apartheidstaates mit Submetropolen (Brasilien, Argentinien, Iran, Israel. 
Taiwan, Sudkorea). Hamburg: Institut fur Afrika Kunde; Deutsches 'Obersee Institut; Seidman, Ann, Neva 
MakgetIa. 1979. Transnational Corporate Involvement in South Africa's Military Build-up, Journal of Southern 
African Affairs 4, 2: 153-173 . 
", Correspondence with Frans Swarts and Gert van der Veer, II February 2003 . 
580 Correspondence with Frans Swarts and Gert van der Veer, II February 2003 . 
581 Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.117. 
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Rhoodie' s advances cannot be verified because the files on Egypt were not consulted, falling 
outside the scope of this study, but DFA files partly document van den Bergh's enterprise in 
Sudan. Importantly, this failed because he rejected the Sudanese demand of a 200 million US 
Dollar loan and a 50 million Dollar grant in retum.'82 The reasons for this could not be ascer-
tained, with Frans Swarts and Gert van der Veer merely stating that "Sudan proved to be the 
major stumbling block".'" In consequence, as the two former SAA Chief Executives in-
formed us: "The possibility of over-flying Somalia, Djibouti and up the Red Sea was seri-
ously considered [by 8AA] and theoretically possible, but never introduced due to the high 
risk of passing between Yemen and Ethiopia where a Russian no-go area (Sub-marine base) 
was proclaimed. Any adverse weather conditions would have forced us over either Yemen or 
Ethiopia, both of which would not have given us any rights. The risk of running a commercial 
service under such conditions was totally unacceptable".'84 Regarding the West African route, 
we have seen that overflying rights for the C.A.R. were not obtained. Yet, SAA persisted in 
finding the support from other relevant countries, thus reflecting the importance of this issue 
in the company's strategy. In particular, during 1978, the engineering flflll Brian Colquhoun 
reported its interest in a road-building programme in Cameroon to the Department of Foreign 
Affairs, leading it to the following assessment: "As far as the firm Brian Colquhoun's interest 
( ... ) is concerned, it should be borne in mind that the Cameroon forms part of an area in cen-
tral Africa, together with the adjacent Congo[lese Republic] and Central African Empire 
[=C.A.R.] , where we are trying to expand our interests. As far as our interest in regaining 
rights to overfly central Africa is concerned, it is also necessary for us to make contact with 
and extend our friendship in this area".' 85 The files up to and including 1979, however, do not 
contain any trace on whether the road project was pursued, while we could establish that SAA 
never obtained overflying rights for Cameroon.'" In any case, and with hindsight, Frans 
Swarts and Gert van der Veer corresponded that overflying rights for these African countries 
would have been oflittle use, as the same rights could not be obtained from the North African 
countries Algeria and Libya, necessary to form a complete air corridor.'87 
582 ' Contact with Sudan: meeting with Dr van Riebenberg: SAR & H Headquarters - 10 August 1979 ' , from 
Carl von Hirschberg, 13 August 1979, p.4; 'Contact with Sudan: meeting between Minister and Dr van Rieben-
berg: Pretoria - 14 August 1979', from Carl von Hirschberg, 15 August 1979, p.l (DFA, 1/163/3, Vol. IPL). 
583 Correspondence with Frans Swarts and Oert van der Veer, 11 February 2003 . 
'84 Correspondence with Frans Swarts and Oert van der Veer, 11 February 2003. 
'85 'Cameroon', 25 January 1978, p.2, (DFA, 11101 /3, Vol. 2). 
586 Telephone interview with Frans Swarts, 7 December 2002. 
587 Correspondence with Frans Swarts and Oert van der Veer, 11 February 2003. 
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The information presented so far proposed that the Department of Information targeted the 
Ivory Coast and Senegal in an attempt to break South Africa's isolation. For its part, the De-
partment of Foreign Affairs liased with Liberia and the C.A.R. to the same end, but also to 
establish itself vis-a-vis the Department of Information and to obtain overflying rights for 
SAA. Another dimension, based on geo-strategic concerns, shaped Pretoria's relations with 
those black African countries beyond southern Africa that formed the western Indian Ocean 
area, namely the Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Reunion and Seychelles. The next section 
examines Pretoria's contact with these islands and reveals that the Bureau for State Security, 
given its position as the dominant intelligence gathering agency, played an important role. 
Western Indian Ocean 
The five islands itemised above constituted the western part of the Indian Ocean that experi-
enced ever increasing rivalry over the spread of influence between the United States and the 
Soviet Union in the context of the Cold War.'" The relevant developments are now outlined 
to provide the framework necessary to the understanding of Pretoria' s activities in this area. 
Three major events explain why the Indian Ocean as a whole, and the western part in par-
ticular, became of "strategic importance in the external powers ' jockeying for both global and 
littoral influence and for positions of strategic offense or defense vis-a-vis each other".'89 To 
begin with, Great Britain held a relatively strong position in the western Indian Ocean with its 
colonial administration over Mauritius and Seychelles until 1968 and 1976 respectively, and 
in late 1966 signed an agreement which allowed the United States to use both these islands for 
defence purposes. Yet, in a landmark decision, the British government announced, in early 
1968, that it was going to withdraw from east of the Suez Canal by 1971. Shortly thereafter, 
Moscow sent four warships to the Indian Ocean from the east and subsequently deployed na-
val units on a regular basis. '90 A second reason for the strategic importance of the western 
Indian Ocean area relates to the closure of the Suez Canal in June 1967, in the context of the 
Six Days War between Egypt and Israel. During the next eight years, shippers were forced to 
sail around South Africa's Cape of Good Hope to reach either Europe or the United States. As 
a result, and "by virtue of their potential for command of the Cape route", the Comoros, 
'" In the following, and unless indicated otherwise, see Bowman, Larry Wells. 1982. African Conflict and 
Superpower Involvement in the Western Indian Ocean, in Larry Wells Bowman, Ian Clark, eds. The Indian 
Ocean in Global Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press: 87-103; Kapur, Ashok. 1983. The Indian Ocean: Re-
gional and International Power Politics. New York: Praeger. 
'89 Cooke, Melinda W. 1983. Strategic Considerations, in Frederica M. Bunge, ed. Indian Ocean: Five Island 
Countries. Washington, DC: The American University: 251. 
'90 Cooke. 1983. Strategic Considerations, pp.253f.; Sparks, Donald L. 2001. Indian Ocean Region, in Joel 
Krieger, ed. Th e OxJord Companion to Politics oJthe World. New York: Oxford University Press: 390. 
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Madagascar and Seychelles gained particular significance, more so than the further distant 
Mauritius and Reunion."l While the Suez Canal was closed, the Yom Kippur War erupted in 
October 1973 between Egypt and Israel. As was mentioned earlier, the Arab states cut off 
their oil supply to Israel and its allies, and this constituted the third reason in explaining the 
western Indian Ocean's growing strategic relevance. In particular, a military or intelligence 
presence in this area allowed the monitoring of shipments around the Cape sea route gener-
ally, and particularly the movement of oil tankers. This aspect remained highly significant 
even after the Suez Canal was reopened in June 1975, because its closure had led to the con-
struction of more voluminous tankers to make the long route around the Cape more economi-
cal; these tankers were now too large to pass through the canal and still had to sail around the 
Cape of Good Hope and pass the Comoros, Madagascar and the Seychelles.'" 
An important note on the strong French presence in the western Indian Ocean is relevant 
at this point, as it partly curtailed Pretoria's undertakings in this area. The French ambitions 
were symptomatic of its desire to be a global player. Their military forces were based on 
Madagascar, even after the island 's independence in 1960, but were moved to the Comoros, 
Reunion and, further north, to Djibouti after Ratsiraka took power in June 1972. The presence 
on Reunion remained unaffected due the island' s status as a Departement d'Outre-Mer (Over-
seas Department), administered by Michel Debre from 1963 to 1988; as seen previously, he 
was of some relevance as the Minister of Defence in the context of Pretoria's engagement in 
the Nigerian Civil War. Regarding the Comoros, this island declared its unilateral independ-
ence from France in July 1975. While originally refusing to grant it independence, France 
accepted this development by the end of that year, because it could retain its military presence 
on Mayotte, part of the Comoros, while suspending all assistance to the island state.'" 
Having outlined the geo-strategic relevance of the western Indian Ocean, we now investi-
gate Pretoria's activities there. The DFA files serve as the main source of information, reveal-
ing some interest by both the military and by BOSS, but a full picture on their activities can-
not be given due to a lack of archival material. The presentation of the available evidence fol-
lows a loose chronological order, beginning with Madagascar. 
The only information in the DFA files on Pretoria's interest in this island reveals that, in 
January 1973, BOSS agent Albie Geldenhuys reported from Paris on the "existing possibility 
that the Bureau [for State Security] could again establish contact with the Malagasy Intelli-
gence through agents of General Andriamahazo [Malagasy Minister of Regional Develop-
591 Cooke. 1983 . Strategic Considerations, p.2S6; Sparks. 2001. Indian Ocean Region, p.390. 
,,, Cooke. 1983 . Strategic Considerations, p.263; Sparks. 2001. Indian Ocean Region, p .390. 
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ment]",5" after Ratsiraka's assumption of power in June 1972 had put an end to contact be-
tween the two countries. There is no record of any further activity, but Geldenhuys' brief re-
veals that BOSS held an interest in Madagascar as a source of intelligence gathering. 
The geo-strategic interest shown by BOSS was also reflected in Pretoria's attitude towards 
Mauritius. We have seen in the section on Dialogue that Mauritian-South African relations 
were primarily based on trade and tourism. Together with the role played by the Minister of 
External of Affairs, Tourism and Emigration, Gaetan Duval, this resulted in its pro-Dialogue 
stand at the OAU Summit in Addis Ababa in June 1971. At the time, Mauritius was already 
dependent on tea export to South Africa, but Pretoria did not need to make use of that eco-
nomic lever to exert political pressure. However, it was applied after the two countries had 
reached an understanding in September 1973, whereby South Africa bought the tea at a price 
15% above world price, thus increasing Mauritius' dependency;595 the reasons for this agree-
ment are not recorded and could not be ascertained from secondary sources. On 5 October 
1973, Mauritius' UN Ambassador, in his capacity as Chairman of the African Group, pre-
vented Minister Muller from addressing the General Assembly and called him a "criminal".596 
On 12 October, in retaliation for the diplomat'S behaviour, Pretoria stopped all tea import 
from Mauritius. In an attempt to alleviate the tension, Minister Duval wrote to Muller, ex-
plaining that the ambassador, who "had not acted in accordance with Government instruc-
tions", had been "recalled for consultation on this matter" and that a press conference would 
be held to clarify the government's position.597 Duval's prompt action and the visit of Mauri-
tius' Minister for Trade and Industries to Pretoria in late October 1973 598 soothed South Africa 
sufficiently to resume the import of tea in November. 599 Regarding the tourism sector, we pre-
viously showed that SAA flew to Mauritius from October 1969. Further, and recognising its 
value as a holiday destination, Southern Sun Chairman Sol Kerzner displayed an interest in 
the island. Taken in conjunction with Southern Sun's activities on Madagascar that came to a 
halt after President Tsiranana' s fall in June 1972, this provides an early indication of the hotel 
chain's increasing ambition to expand into the western Indian Ocean. On Mauritius, Kerzner 
directed the Mauritius Southern Sun Hotels Limited that opened the Le Saint Geran Hotel, 
593 Chipman. 1985. French Military Policy and African Security, pp. 11 f. 
594 'MadagaskarIRSA: geheime onderhandelinge in Parys ', from Albie Geldenhuys, Paris, 15 January 1973, 
p.3 (DFA, 11115/3, Vol. 3PL) (translation from Afrikaans). 
595 'Mauritian tea question' , from Johan Pretorius to Pik Botha, 15 January 1979 (DFA, 1/62/3, Vol. 12). For 
the agreement, see DFA, 1/62/3, Vol. 5. 
5% 'Uproar as UN stops Muller speech', Rand Daily MailS October 1972 (DFA, 1162/3, Vol. 7). 
597 Letter from Gaetan Duval to Hilgard Muller, Port Louis, 2 November 1973 (DFA, 1/6213, Vol. 7). 
598 DFA, 1162/3, Vol. 7. 
599 'Press statement', Pretoria, 23 November 1973 (DFA, 1/62/3, Vol. 7). 
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Casino and Golf Club in October 1975.600 According to a secondary source, this was financed 
partly by a loan ostensibly provided by the IDC and insured by Credit Guarantee.601 Sol Ker-
zner undertook further activities on the island in the 1980s that are examined in the next 
chapter on Pretoria's relations with Africa during P.W. Botha's rule. 
Bureau for State Security involvement on Mauritius can be discerned in early 1974, linked 
to the sacking of Minister Duval by Prime Minister Ramgoolam in December 1973, thus put-
ting an end to the political coalition between them that political scientist Larry Bowman de-
scribed as "shaky from the outset" .602 One contributory factor to the difficult relationship was 
that Duval "tended to run a pro-Western, pro-French, and pro-South African foreign policy 
that was often at variance with the more muted pro-British, pro-Indian, and somewhat more 
nonaligned stance" promoted by Ramgoolam;603 this helps to explain South African press 
speculations that Duval's active pro-Dialogue stand had cost him his job.GO< In early January 
1974, BOSS agent Rothrnann, whom we have met in the context of the DFA's contact with 
Liberia, was planning on going to Mauritius for reasons unknown, but obviously entailing 
intelligence work, and asked Deputy Secretary Killen whether he could do anything for the 
foreign affairs ministry. Being interested in trying to ascertain the new political climate on the 
Indian Ocean island after Duval's sacking, it took up the offer.60' Rothmann spent 24/25 Janu-
ary 1974 on Mauritius, meeting the Prime Minister, his Security Adviser and the Commis-
sioner of the Police's Special Branch, and, on his return, reported to Secretary Fourie on 
Ramgoolam's affirmation that "contact must continue".606 Whereas the preceding events re-
flect a degree of mutual acceptance by BOSS and the Department of Foreign Affairs for their 
respective roles in foreign policy making, the ensuing developments illustrate the inherent 
risk of friction. In particular, Deputy Secretary Killen lamented to his superior that Rothmann 
"had entered diplomatic terrain" in having met Ramgoolam and that this "had gone further 
600 <http://www.semdex.com/companYJ.rofile/sun.htm>. Also ' Southern Sun shines through', To the Point 
20 December 1974: 26. 
601 'Mauritian threat to cut ties ' , The Citizen 24 December 1976 (DFA, 1/62/3, Vol. 10). 
602 Bowman, Larry Wells. 1991. Mauritius: Democracy and Development in the Indian Ocean. Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press; London: Dartmouth: 71. 
603 Bowman. 1991. Mauritius , pp.73f Also Wickman, Stephen B. 1982. Mauritius, in Frederica M. Bunge, 
ed. Indian Ocean: Five Island COllntries. Washington, DC: The American University: 160. 
604 'Mauritian PM sacks Democrats' and 'Did SA cause Duval's fall?', Pretoria News 19 December 1973 
(DFA, 1/62/3, Vol. 8). 
60' 'Verhoudings met Mauritius ', from Rae Killen to Brand Fourie, Pretoria, 7 Februaty 1974, p.1 (DFA, 
1/62/3, Vol. 8). 
606 'Mauritius _ voortsetting van kontak met R.S.A.', from the Secretaty, BOSS, to Brand Fourie, Pretoria, 30 
January 1974, p.1 (DFA, 1/62/3, Vol. 8) (translation from Afrikaans). 
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than what we had asked".607 Whether this dispute had any consequences is not known, but 
similar to the Madagascar case, BOSS held an intelligence interest in this Indian Ocean island 
in view of Mauritius' overtures towards the communist camp, reflected in Ramgoolam's visit 
to Moscow in August 1973 and the presence of a Soviet warship in Port Louis in December of 
that year.60• The DFA was equally concerned and, in January 1974, the Minister at the South 
African Embassy in Washington, David Vrede Louw, held discussions with Herman J. Cohen, 
Director for Central African Affairs in the US State Department, who had just returned from 
Mauritius. According to Cohen, there was no reason for Pretoria to worry, as the " U.S. Navy 
still used Port Louis, side by side with the Soviet Union".6'" 
Now turning to Reunion, due to the island's factual status as a French colony, adminis-
tered by Michel Debre, and its importance for the French military, Paris was not prepared to 
let Pretoria benefit from this advantageous position. One example of Pretoria' s limited possi-
bilities was SAA's interest in obtaining landing rights on Reunion, as the South African au-
thorities had to make a formal application to Paris for permission. The negotiations were only 
successful, because SAA was prepared to perform the weekly flight to Saint-Denis, and on-
wards to Mauritius, in co-operation with the French airline UTA after March 1974.610 Related 
to that, both Holiday Inn and Southern Sun showed an interest in establishing casino hotels on 
the island; during his visit to South Africa from 4 to 13 March 1972, the Prefect of Reunion 
met Sol Kerzner.611 Subsequent attempts by both companies to establish a foothold on Reun-
ion remained unsuccessful,612 the principal reason being the strong position of the French ho-
tel chain Novotel and Air France's share in a casino hotel that was nearing completion in mid-
1976.613 In consequence, the flow of South African tourists to this Indian Ocean island re-
mained low, as reported by Johan von Gernet, the South African Consul on Reunion since late 
1974: "There is a steady trickle of South African tourists to the island - almost without excep-
tion they prefer Mauritius with its vastly superior beaches, better hotel facilities and easier 
607 'Verhoudings met Mauritius', from Rae Killen to Brand Fourie, Pretoria, 7 February 1974, p.3 (DFA, 
1162/3, Vol. 8) (translation from Afrikaans). 
60' 'Soviet navy consolidates Mauritian friendship' , Pretoria News 20 December 1973 (DFA, 1162/3, Vol. 8). 
609 Letter from David Louw to Brand Fourie, Washington, 23 January 1974, p.2 (DFA, 1/62/3, Vol. 8). 
6IO DFA, 1/138/3, Vol. I. 
611 DFA, 11138/3, Vol. I. 
612 Letter from W.A.E. 'Ted' Hirst (Director of Development and Corporate Planning, Holiday Inn) to Rae 
Killen, Johannesburg, 16 February 1976; letter from Rae Killen to Ted Hirst, Pretoria, 3 March 1976 (DFA, 
1/138/4, Vol. 1); 'Holiday Inn hotel project', from Johan von Gemet to Brand Fourie, Saint-Denis, 10 November 
1976, p.2 (DFA, 1/138/4, VoL2). 
613 'Holiday Inn hotel project' , from Johan von Gemet to Brand Fourie, Saint-Denis, 10 November 1976; let-
ter from Ted Hirst to Rae Killen, Johannesburg, 9 June 1976 (DFA, 1/138/4, Vol. 2). 
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language communication".614 The establishment of a South African mission on the island was 
another example of France's highly critical attitude towards South African ambitions to gain a 
foothold on Reunion. Pretoria's plan for a permanent mission on the island for economic and 
military purposes was born in mid-1974. In order to determine their viewpoints, the Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs contacted the relevant departments in Pretoria. On the economic 
front, according to a DFA report of August 1974, the Department of Commerce felt that the 
"trading possibilities ( ... ) have been neglected" and therefore favoured "the opening of a Con-
sulate on Reunion".615 In all likelihood, that position was influenced by the Durban Chamber 
of Commerce's positive assessment after a visit to the island in October 1973. As early as 
June 1973, the Secretary in the Department of Commerce had contacted the Chamber to as-
certain its views regarding the appointment of a trade representative. In his reply after the 
return of the mission to the Seychelles, Mauritius and Reunion, the Chamber's General Man-
ager, Kenneth Hobson, enthusiastically stated that "the Chamber would support whole-
heartedly the appointment of a full-time Trade Representative on Reunion with responsibili-
ties for the whole Indian Ocean Island area".616 The military also supported the idea of a per-
manent mission on Reunion. In March 1974, the Naval Chief of Staff, Hugo Hendrik Bier-
mann, wrote to Fourie that the naval presence from East and West in the southern Indian 
Ocean made it "desirable to have a listening post in the area".6i7 The only factor blocking the 
plan was the French attitude, causing Under-Secretary Pretorius to suggest to Fourie, in Au-
gust 1974, that "perhaps we should consider bringing pressure to bear via Mr Debre"618 to 
facilitate matters, but it is not recorded whether or not this avenue was pursued. The Consu-
late was eventually established in late 1974, originally staffed by a Consul, joined by a Vice-
Consul from 1985.619 Also not known is whether Military Intelligence posted a representative, 
such as indicated by a report from Pretorius in January 1975: "D.M.1. are also likely to place 
one of their people there".62o 
614 'Reunion: end of stay report', from Johan von Gemet to Brand Fourie, Saint-Denis, 17 February 1978, p.2 
(DF A, 1/138/3, Vol. 3). 
61S 'Representation on Reunion', from Johan Pretorius to Brand Fourie, 7 August 1974, p.1 (DFA, 11138/3, 
Vol. I). 
616 Letter from Kenneth Hobson to the Secretary in the Department of Commerce, Durban, 26 October 1973, 
pp.lf. (DFA, 11138/3, Vol. I). 
6i7 'Reunion: possible South African representation' , from Hugo Biermann to Brand Fourie, 4 March 1974 
(DFA, 11138/3, Vol. I). On Biermann, see Uys. 1992. South Aji-ican Military Who 's Who, 1452-1992, p.19. 
618 ' Representation on Reunion', from Johan Pretorius to Brand Fourie, 7 August 1974, p .1 (DFA, 11138/3, 
Vol. I). 
619 DFA, 1/138/3, Vol. 1. See Foreign Affairs List. Pretoria: DF A. 
620 'Establishment: St. Denis, Reunion ', from Johan Pretorius, 31 January 1975 (DFA, 11138/3, Vol. 2). 
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Turning to the Comoros, a military interest also becomes evident in Pretoria's contact with 
this island, which had begun before its independence in July 1975 and through the Eilande 
Sending"" Its visit to the Comoros in early 1974 resulted in the island approaching Pretoria 
for technical assistance"" Compared to the situation on Reunion, and although the Comoros 
were still a French colony then, there is no indication in the documents that France put obsta-
cles in the way of Pretoria establishing contact with this island. This is surprising and cannot 
only be explained by recalling that Mayotte, part of the Comoros, had remained French terri-
tory and a site of its military. In any event, and following up on the request for technical assis-
tance, from 18 to 23 July 1974, Killen led government officials in charge of fisheries, trade, 
agriculture and a SAA representative on an "exploratory visit" to the Comoros to establish 
what they required623 A reading of Killen's reports after the visit indicates the reasoning for 
providing such kind of assistance, namely the DFA's interest in obtaining landing rights for 
SAA en route to Asia"" In contrast, the men from the military were interested in the island 
for strategic reasons,625 but the files contained no further evidence of possible activities. On 3 
September 1974, based on the findings of the above-mentioned visit, Muller offered to pro-
vide Ahmed Abdallah, the President of the Comoros' Governing Council, with chickens and 
assistance in cattle breeding, seven fishing boats, an ambulance and protein supplements to 
combat the problem of malnutrition.626 On Abdallah's acceptance of the offer,627 Killen led 
another delegation with officials from the Departments of Fisheries and Agriculture to the 
Comoros from 14 to 21 February 1975. They brought material needed for technical assistance 
with them and held meetings with several ministers. In particular, they handed over a hundred 
fowls, two bulls, three sheep, three goats, the ambulance, medical supplies and the seven fish-
ing boats.'" The only demand Pretoria did not comply with was to establish a five hundred-
bed hospital, because this "was beyond our resources", as Killen argued. The decision was 
621 Literally translated as Mission to the [Indian Ocean] Islands. 
622 'Proposed invitation to Comoros Head of State to visit South Africa', from Carl von Hirschberg to Brand 
Fourie, Pretoria, 29 April 1979, p.1 (DFA, 11203/3, Yol. 3). 
623 'Summaries of discussions with Comorian ministers, 19-22 July 1974', from Rae Killen, Pretoria, 1 Au-
gust 1974, p.2 (DFA, 11203,3, Vol. I). 
624 'Besoek aan die Comora-Eilandgroep op versoek van die Departement van Buitelandse Sake via die Sek-
retaris van Nywerheid', p.l; 'Visit of technical mission to Comoros: 18-23 July 1974. Diplomatic significance 
of visit', p.2; 'Summaries of discussions with Comorian ministers, 19-22 July 1974', pp.3f. All reports from Rae 
Killen, I August 1974 (DFA, 11203/3, Vol. I). 
625 'Visit of technical mission to Comores: 18-23 July 1974. Diplomatic significance of visit', from Rae Kil-
len, Pretoria, I August 1974, p.2 (DFA, 1/203/3, Vol. 1). 
626 Letter from Hilgard Muller to Ahmed Abdallah, Cape Town, 3 September 1974 (DFA, 11203/3, Vol. 2). 
627 Letter from Ahmed Abdallah to Hilgard Muller, Moroni, I I September 1974 (DFA, 11203/3, Vol. 2). 
628 'Visit to Comores : 14-2 I February 1975', from Rae Killen, Pretoria, 25 February 1975, pp.2f., 6f. ; 'Co-
moros: current position of Technical Assistance', from Andre Jaquet, Pretoria, 6 May 1977, p.1 (DFA, 1/203/3, 
Vol. 3). 
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reinforced by the fact that "technical, nursing or para-medical personnel to provide essential 
services" were unavailable on the Comoros and that such a hospital would therefore be point-
less.62' Abdallah wrote a thank-you letter to Muller, expressing "the hope that this was the 
beginning of a greater and more fruitful co-operation between the two countries"." o However, 
in August 1975, the relatively fruitful relations came to a standstill, when Abdallah was de-
posed by a group of mercenaries led by Frenchman Bob Denard. Nonetheless, the Department 
of Foreign Affairs' endeavours on the Comoros had been productive, in that SAA landing 
rights were obtained for comparatively little technical assistance. At the same time, the airline 
did not make use of these rights until 1983 ,631 thus reflecting the increasing tourism to the is-
land at the time (Chapter 5). 
Finally turning to the last western Indian Ocean island in which Pretoria held an interest, 
the Seychelles, the previous section mentioned the visit of a Trade Mission of the Durban 
Chamber of Commerce in October 1973. This aside, the DFA files contain no record of dip-
lomatic interaction between the two countries prior to the island's independence in June 1976. 
However, for intelligence reasons, the Bureau for State Security showed an interest in the 
Seychelles, and we presently examine the subsequent joint BOSS-Department of Information 
venture. The British government granted its colony limited self-government in 1970 and 
preparations for full independence were under way during 1975. In the presidential election, 
set for April 1975, the island' s pro-capitalist Chief Minister since 1970, James Mancham, 
competed against the leftist France Albert Rene. According to the autobiographies of Eschel 
Rhoodie and Les de Villiers, the Department of Information supported Mancham financially 
in the run-up to the election to ensure that the island remained in the hands of a Western-
oriented leader, and one who favoured contact with Pretoria.6J2 Aware of Mancham's lavish 
lifestyle,''' they ironically code-named their policy on the island Operation Playboy. Man-
cham won the election and became President upon the island ' s independence in June 1976, 
while the leftist Rene became Prime Minister. Operation Playboy had evidently appealed to 
Mancham, because the Department of Information 's contact with him continued post-
independence. For example, in January 1977, Rhoodie and de Villiers, accompanied by their 
families and several friends, spent a luxury holiday on the Seychelles during which time they 
629 'Visit to Comores : 14-21 February 1975', from Rae Killen, Pretoria, 25 February 1975, pp.3f. (DFA, 
11203/3, Vol. 3). Also letter from Hilgard Muller to Ahmed Abdallah, Cape Town, 3 September 1974, pp.lf.; 
letter from Ahmed Abdallah to Hilgard Muller, Moroni, II September 1974, pp.lf. (DFA, 11203/3, Vol. 2) . 
630 Letter from Ahmed Abdallah to Hilgard Muller, Moroni, 21 February 1975 (DFA, 11203/3, Vol. 3). 
631 Correspondence with Frans Swarts and Gert van der Veer, II February 2003. 
632 De Villiers. 1980. Secret Information, p.142; Rhoodie. 1983. The Real InfO/mation Scandal, p.140. Also 
Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation , pp.1l8f. 
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met President Mancham.' 34 The developments surrounding this visit contain one significant 
element, namely that the holiday makers used the Lear Jet of the tycoon Louis Luyt.'" In re-
cent correspondence, Luyt tried to distance himself from specific knowledge about these de-
velopments: "My BAC III aircraft was chartered on different occasions, through a charter 
company, but I believe to carry government officials".636 Nevertheless, it is an indication that 
BOSS and the Department of Information favoured dealings with this influential Afrikaner 
businessman, thus making him part of the network that supported their policies of the day. 
Significantly, this holiday trip to the Seychelles was one of the examples cited in the Informa-
tion Scandal to substantiate the waste of taxpayer's money by this Department, which subse-
quently led to Prime Minister Vorster' s resignation (Chapter 2).637 
One year after independence, Rene, with Tanzanian assistance, ousted President Mancham 
and this affected the island's relationship with South Africa. Rene initially pursued a prag-
matic approach towards Pretoria, in all likelihood fearing to lose the revenue from South Af-
rican tourists. On its part, Pretoria's intelligence cornmunity retained an interest in the island. 
Notably, and again evidencing the close relationship with the Department of Information, 
Luyt and BOSS agent Albie Geldenhuys together informed Brand Fourie in January 1978 of 
their separate meetings with President Rene in the previous December.638 Luyt informed us in 
correspondence that he visited the Indian Ocean island twice a year with his family, but that 
he had never been accompanied by Geldenhuys. However, he further enlightened us that "Al-
bie Geldenhuys started to work for me after I entered into an agreement with Gasocean, the 
French Shipping company in 1976, because he could speak French fluently" .-39 Later that 
year, Rene's pragmatism towards South Africa changed; he informed Brand Fourie in July 
1978 that he had comply with the international pressure against Pretoria. After a week-long 
visit to Tanzania in August, "President Rene announced that his country would be severing 
trade and tourism ties with South Africa", as noted by Deputy Secretary von Hirschberg. Fur-
thermore, the Seychelles Tourist Office in Johannesburg was closed in December 1978.640 In 
633 Franda, Marcus F. 1982. The Seychelles: Unquiet Islands. Boulder, CO: Westview Press: 49. 
634 Letter from Eschel Rhoodie to Brand Fourie, Pretoria, 17 January 1977 (DFA, 11194/3, Vol. 2) . 
635 De Villiers. 1980. Secret In/ormation, pp.142f. Also Ellis, Stephen. 1996. Africa and International Cor-
ruption: The Strange Case of South Africa and Seychelles, African Affairs 95, 379: 171. 
636 Correspondence with Louis Luy!, 23 February 2003. 
637 'Dr Rhoodie's remarkable jaunt', Sunday Express 2 April 1978; 'Rhoodie slams claim of R30m Sey-
chelles deal', The Citizen 24 July 1978 (DFA, 11194/3, Vol. 2). 
638 'Verhoudings met die Seychelle', Pretoria, II January 1978 (DFA, 1119413, Vol. 2). 
639 Correspondence with Louis Luy!, 23 February 2003. 
640 'Relations between Seychelles and South Africa', from Rae Killen to Donald Sole, Pretoria, September 
1978 (DFA, 11194/3, Vol. 3); 'Seychelles: technical assistance' , from Carl von Hirschberg to Brand Fourie, July 
1979, p.l ; 'Seychelles', from Rae Killen, ca. February 1980, pp.lf. (DFA, 1/ 194/4, Vol. I). 
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spite of his anti-Pretoria statements, Rene did not completely break relations, probably still 
dependent on the money spent by South African tourists. As Rae Killen summarised the con-
versation between President Rene and Brand Fourie in July 1978: "The President added that 
his country was under international pressure to terminate SAA's landing rights. However, 
they had to consider their own interests and this pressure was being withstood"."1 To safe-
guard these important landing rights, Pretoria provided technical assistance to ensure the 
safety of the international airport on the Seychelles.'" However, and according to former SAA 
Chief Executives Swarts and van der Veer, the airline' s stopover en route to Hong Kong that 
had commenced in June 1974 eventually ceased in September 1980. In consequence, and to-
gether with the flights to Taipei that were introduced in November 1980, the services were re-
routed via Mauritius henceforth. "3 
Non-State Initiatives 
We have so far analysed the endeavours by the Department of Information in both the Ivory 
Coast and Senegal, by the Department of Foreign Affairs in both Liberia and the C.A.R., as 
well as Pretoria's interests in the western Indian Ocean. An important element in these ac-
counts was the inter-departmental rivalry and the fact that no lasting contact could be estab-
lished to break South Africa's international isolation. This situation appears to have motivated 
non-state actors to engage in contact with African countries, and we presently discuss the ini-
tiatives undertaken by the opposition Progressive Party and then by the South Africa Founda-
tion, the organised business association. 
Visits made by senior members of the Progressive Party to various African states are of 
interest to this period. Based on the DF A files and on recent correspondence with Colin Eglin, 
trips were made to the following: Senegal and The Gambia, September 1972 (Eglin, Helen 
Suzman);644 Botswana, Zambia, Kenya and Nigeria, July 1974 (Eglin, Frederik van Zyl Slab-
bert);"5 Zaire, May 1975 (Eglin);'" Mauritius, August 1975 (Suzman);" 7 Tanzania, October 
1975 (Eglin);'" Kenya, Senegal and The Gambia, September 1977 (Eglin);'" Zaire, 1978 (Eg-
" I 'Seychelles', from Rae Killen, ca. February 1980, p.1 (DFA, 1/ 194/4, Vol. I). 
'" Document from Civil Aviation, 18 April 1980, p.3 (DFA, 1119413, Vol. I); 'Seychelles: technical assis-
tance ', from Carl von Hirschberg to Brand Fourie, July 1979; 'Seychelles', from Rae Killen, ca. February 1980, 
pp.lf. (DFA, 1/194/4, Vol. I). 
"3 Correspondence with Frans Swarts and Gert van der Veer, II February 2003. 
644 DFA, 11 14913, Vol. I ; correspondence with Colin Eglin, 15 January 2003. 
645 DFA, 1112913, Vol. 3, AJ 1974; Slabbert. 1987. The Last White Parliament, pp.3 Iff. 
64' Correspondence with Colin Eglin, 13 January 2003 . 
647 DFA, 1162/3, Vol. 10. 
64' DFA, 1/199/3, Vol. 5. 
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lin);650 as well as Nigeria and Senegal in 1979651 In correspondence, Eglin and Suzman pro-
vided some insight into the circumstances of these excursions. The latter commented on her 
trip to Mauritius that "this was simply a stopover visit to address students at the university 
there on my return from a lecture tour I did to Australia ( .. . ) sponsored by the Australian Insti-
tute of International Affairs".652 The most relevant person in all the visits was Eglin, the 
party's leader from 1971 to 1978. The reasons mentioned in the previous section apart, 
namely to boost the party's relevance, Eglin argued that the entirety of these trips "led to the 
leadership of the PPIPFP being informed of and sensitised to developments and thinking tak-
ing place on the African continent. The contacts we made in Africa were politically valuable 
and personally enriching".''' Two countries can be singled out, however. According to Eglin's 
explanations, the trips to Zaire were linked to the developments in Angola, discussed in the 
following section. In particular, in May 1975 Eglin met Zairean President Mobutu "to get 
another perspective on the events that were unfolding in Angola following the Portuguese 
withdrawal. Zaire appeared to be an important player in view of its proximate to Angola and 
the close ties it had with Holden Roberto of the FNLA".654 During the 1978 visit, Eglin states 
to have "had discussions with senior members of the government. The object of this visit was 
to try to assess the role Zaire was playing in the civil war in Angola".''' 
The Progressives developed special ties with Senegal. In the Dialogue section, we noted 
that both Eglin and Suzman had paid a visit to Dakar in October 1971, while Eglin revealed in 
correspondence that he met President Senghor on four occasions thereafter. Although not 
specifying the dates, this must have happened prior to December 1980, when Senghor volun-
tarily resigned from the presidency, the first African leader to do so. Elaborating on the rea-
sons for the Progressives' close link with Senghor, Eglin proposed: "I found his views on the 
liberation of Africa, negritude, and on the form of democracy that he was trying to establish 
fascinating. These discussions, supplemented by discussions with Senegalese journalists and 
business entrepreneurs, gave me an insight into the Francophone perspective, one which was 
very difficult to get from SA".''' Given the last reason, we queried Colin Eglin why the Pro-
gressives had not gone to the Ivory Coast. Crucially, he responded that both he and Suzman 
649 DFA, 11186/3, Vol. 2; correspondence with Colin Eglin, 15 January 2003. 
650 Correspondence with Colin Eglin, 13 January 2003. 
65' Correspondence with Colin Eglin, 15 January 2003. 
652 Correspondence with Helen Suzman, 18 November 2002. 
65' Correspondence with Colin Eglin, 13 January 2003. 
654 Correspondence with Colin Eglin, 13 January 2003. 
'" Correspondence with Colin Eglin, 13 January 2003. 
656 Correspondence with Colin Eglin, 13 January 2003. 
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had tried to see Houphouet-Boigny after their visit to both Senegal and The Gambia in Sep-
tember 1972, but that they were prevented from entering the country: "Suzman and I had vi-
sas and an appointment but we were refused entry upon arrival at Abidjan airport. Years later 
in Paris I was told that the French government at the request of the SA government had put 
pressure on H-B not to meet with us"."S? Thereafter, Eglin indicates, the Progressives "did not 
attempt to go again as it appeared that the door had been closed to us as a result of H-B re-
sponding to South African Government pressure and would be likely to remain closed"."58 
While it appears that Pretoria managed to prevent the Progressives from snatching their im-
portant link with the Ivorian President, they evidently had less influence on Senghor, who 
pursued Dialogue only reluctantly, as shown earlier. Nevertheless, the party' s contact with 
Senegal led to friction with the South African government. Earlier in this section, we dis-
cussed the Department ofInformation's ambition to engage in political contact with Senghor. 
In the interview he gave to the Department of Information' s magazine To the Point in April 
1973, Senghor spoke of dialogue between political parties and this may have led to confusion 
in Pretoria as to whether Senghor was interested in direct contact with them. In fact, the visit 
of both Eglin and Suzman to Senegal in September 1972, meeting the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs there, lent some justification to these doubts. Open confrontation between the Progres-
sives and Pretoria over contact with Senegal occurred later. According to his interview given 
to the Rand Daily Mail prior to departing for Dakar in September 1977, Eglin had been in-
vited by President Senghor "to discuss the South African situation with him"."'9 The back-
ground to this lay in Vorster's non-reply to Senghor's request to send a fact-finding mission 
to South Africa in early 1976. The foreign service officials probably influenced his lack of 
response, as was argued earlier in this section. Eglin, in fact, viewed his role as something of 
a mediator, as he claimed in the interview: "It is difficult to understand why, when President 
Senghor recently wrote to Mr Vorster asking if he could send a group of magistrates to South 
Africa ( ... ) he received no reply whatsoever".660 Yet, upon Eglin's return, Pik Botha criticised 
that Eglin had played ''''a negative role" in South Africa's African policy" and that if Presi-
dent Senghor "knew what Mr Eglin and the PFP stood for, he would have nothing whatsoever 
to do with Mr Eglin".661 Two issues probably motivated the minister's harsh reaction. First, he 
may have been upset about the fact that the opposition party still had access to Senegal, while 
657 Correspondence with Colin Eglin, 15 January ;2003. 
658 Correspondence with Colin Eglin, 19 January 2003. 
"'9 'Eglin will try to restore SA link with Senegal', Rand Daily Mail 13 September (DFA, 1/186/3, Vol. 2). 
660 'Eglin will try to restore SA link with Senegal ', Rand Daily Mail 13 September (DFA, 1118613, Vol. 2). 
661 'Eglin will try to restore SA link with Senegal ' , Rand Daily Mail 13 September; ' PFP is SA 's saving 
grace, says Senghor' , Rand Daily Mail 23 September 1977 (DFA, III 86/3, Vol. 2). 
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the foreign service officials had blocked their way to Senegal by their own attitude; in recent 
correspondence with us, Eglin commented: "the Nationalist politicians were irked by the ac-
cess that the P[rogressiveJ representatives had to the African leaders, by the cordial way in 
which they were received and the frank discussions they were able to have".662 Second, a gen-
eral election amongst the white population was due in two months, and Pik Botha' s verbal 
attack entailed criticism of Eglin' s goal of having sought party-political gains through the 
visit to Senegal.663 
The tour of four African countries by Eglin and Slabbert in 1974 drew even heftier criti-
cism for similar reasons. In its mouthpiece, To the Point, the Department of Information de-
cried the activities as pure party politics: 
Dialogue is high fashion in Southern African unofficial diplomacy just at present. C ..• ) 
Leaders from various political groupings are outbidding each other in their enterprise, the 
idea being to talk with as many African leaders as possible, within the country and be-
yond its borders. The Progressive Party, with an eye to arming itself with plenty of am-
munition for the coming parliamentary session, has been extraordinarily busy in this field 
within the past two weeks.664 
A particularly strong reaction came from the Minister of Defence, P.W. Botha, who "assailed 
Eglin for sitting around the table with "terrorists" and falling over his feet in front or President 
Kaunda of Zambia".66' P.W. Botha's statement evidenced his special dislike for Eglin, as will 
be shown in the next chapter, and, at the same time, he did consider Kaunda as a terrorist for 
harbouring the ANC Headquarters in Lusaka since the early 1970s.666 
In contrast, by turning to the activities of the South Africa Foundation in Africa, these 
were generally well received by Pretoria because the information provided so far revealed a 
close link between the Foundation and the Department of Information. Significantly, the 
Foundation's activities in Africa involved two countries that did not have formal relations 
with Pretoria, thus supplementing the government's current ambitions. The first account in-
volved its efforts to initiate contact with Uganda during 1978 and through the services of the 
American, Edwin Stanton 'Ned' Munger.667 He was a Professor in Political Geography at the 
California Institute of Technology since 1961. As a member of the American Universities 
Field Staff (1950-60), he had travelled extensively in Africa and became well known to the 
politically powerful there, including South Africa' s prime ministers. Munger had especially 
662 Correspondence with Colin Eglin, 13 January 2003. 
663 Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy oJIsolation, p.52. 
664 To the Point 2 August 1974: 19. 
66' Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy oj Isolation , p.5l. Also The Star 30 July 1974 (DFA, 1/129/3, Yol. 3). 
666 Pfister. 2003. Gateway to International Victory, p.57. 
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close ties with South Africa and Pretoria's political elite. These were based on his stay as a 
Research Fellow at the University of Stellenbosch during 1955/56, his marriage to a South 
African, Ann Boyer, who served as a Cultural Attache in Washington during the 1970s. Fur-
thermore, he was a Trustee of the important US-South African Leadership Exchange Program 
(USSALEP), whose purpose was to organise visits from South Africans to the US to promote 
communication between the two countries.'" In this context, the majority of his publications 
on African affairs focus on the US-South African relationship or on political developments in 
South Africa.669 That Munger's publications held a generally favourable view towards the 
minority in this country is evidenced, for example, by a statement he made during an US-
SALEP-organised visit to South Africa in March 1976: "I am a strong believer in the recogni-
tion of the Transkei, but I don't think there is one chance in a hundred of the USA recognising 
the territory at the time of its independence".'10 Almost certainly aware of his position, the 
South Africa Foundation approached him sometime during 1977 to ascertain if he knew 
"anyone from East Africa" to bring to South Africa in order "to soften the SA image and 
maybe make a convert", as Munger divulged in correspondence. Given his relatively positive 
stance toward South Africa, he was willing to assist and, in his words, "thought that myoid 
friend Martin would be effective","1 meaning the Ugandan, Martin Aliker. Their friendship 
had begun during their concurrent studies at Makerere College in Kampala in the late 1940s. 
They subsequently remained in contact, especially as Aliker studied dentistry at Northwestern 
University in Evanston, lllinoism Aliker then became politically influential in his home 
country, while also holding important contacts in the United States. In particular, he was 
Uganda's Ambassador to the US and the Soviet Union in the 1960s, married to an American 
667 For the following, see his autobiography: Munger, Edwin Stanton 'Ned'. 1983. Touched by Africa. 
Pasadena, CA: Castle Press: 284-312; Who's Who in America, 2002, p.3776. 
668 On USSALEP, see Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation , pp.176£ 
669 1965. Notes on the Formation of South African Foreign Policy. 1967. Afrikaner and African Nationalism: 
South African Parallels and Parameters. London: Oxford University Press for the Institute of Race Relations; 
1968. South Africa's Prime Minister, John Vorster: New Impressions of His Evolving Political Commitment. 
Hanover, NH: American Universities Field Staff; 1968. John Vorster and the United States: An Exercise in 
Pragmatism; 1968. New White Politics in South Africa, in William Adams Hance, Leo Kuper, Vernon McKay, 
eds. Southern Africa and the United States. New York: Columbia University Press: 33-84; 1969. South Africa: 
Are there Silver Linings?, Foreign Affairs 47, 2: 375-386; 1971. How Black South African Visitors View the 
U.S., Munger Africana Library Notes 1,4: 1-22; 1971. ChiefGatsha Buthelezi of the Zulus: South Africa's Dy-
namic New Political Personality. Hanover, NH: American Universities Field Staff; 1973. Cultural Relations and 
Exchanges between South Africa and the United States: Some Remarks on Cultural Exchange with South Africa, 
Issue 3, 4: 10-14; 1974. The Afrikaner as Seen Abroad. Pasadena, CA: California Institute of Technology; 1975. 
Statement on South Africa and the United States, Issue 5, 3: 62-65; 1979. The Afrikaners. Cape Town: Tafel-
berg. 
670 To the Point 9 April 1976: 49. 
67 1 Correspondence with Ned Munger, 7 February 2002. 
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and a successful businessman with directorship posts in numerous Ugandan and international 
companies. However, his political viewpoints were evidently not popular with Idi Amin and 
he therefore fled to Kenya when Amin becarne Ugandan leader in January 1971.673 While the 
reasons are not recorded, the fact that Aliker approached the South African Embassy in Lon-
don in 1977674 is an indication that he appears to have been looking for contact, possibly even 
for support to stop Amin's terror regime. It could not be established whether Aliker's contact 
with the London Embassy took place in connection with Munger's initiative, following the 
query from the South Africa Foundation. In any case, Munger facilitated contact between 
Aliker and Pretoria, culminating in Aliker's visit to South Africa in April 1978. Accompanied 
by Munger, he held separate meetings with Prime Minister Vorster, Pik Botha, Brand Fourie, 
Hendrik van den Bergh, Pieter Gerhardus Jacobus 'Piet' Koornhof, the Minister of Co-
operation and Development, as well as the South Africa Foundation representatives Harry 
Oppenheimer, Basil Hersov and Jan Marais.67S The concentration of so much political and 
economic power reveals a keen interest in Aliker from a political, economic and intelligence 
point of view. While it is not recorded what the South Africans had to offer, Aliker assured 
Vorster of his services to ensure South Africa' s participation in the 1980 Olympic Games and 
to organise landings rights for South African Airways in Mombasa, Kenya,,'6 Yet, it is known 
that South Africa did not participate at these Olympic Games and SAA never used Mom-
basa,,77 Possibly as a result, the official contact with Pretoria appears to have ceased, although 
Aliker made renewed visits to South Africa in July 1978,.78 August 1979679 and July 1982,.'0 
again meeting Oppenheimer and Hersov. 
The second case study on South Africa Foundation activity in Africa relates to Kenya in 
1978, involving heart specialist and Foundation Trustee, Chris Barnard. This is the only re-
corded example of friction with Pretoria, giving credence to the above-made statement of an 
otherwise generally cordial relationship. According to the files , Pretoria had no diplomatic 
contact with Nairobi from Kenya's independence in December 1963,." which can be ascribed 
to the vehement anti-apartheid stance adopted by its President, Jomo Kenyatta. This changed 
673 Munger. 1983. Touched by Africa, pp.355f., 377; <http: //www.eardc.com/Direction.htm>. 
674 DFA, lI12013, Vol. 2. 
m DFA, 111 2013, Vol. 2. Partly confirmed by Munger. 1983. Touched by Africa, pp,360-373 . 
676 DFA, lI I20/3, Vol. 2. 
677 Correspondence with Gert van der Veer, S January 2003. 
678 Telegram from the South African Embassy to Brand Foune, London, 19 July 1978 (DFA, 1112013, Va Is. 
IPL,3). 
679 DFA, 11120/3, Vol. 2. 
680 DFA, 11120/3, Vol. 3. 
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in August 1978, when he was succeeded by Daniel arap Moi, Vice-President since 1967. Arap 
Moi 's political leanings were towards the West and Deputy Secretary Killen judged him to be 
"a businessman-orientated man".682 In line with this assessment, the files record that, on 20 
October 1978, Under-Secretary Hennie Geldenhuys met one Mr. Marende, a Kenyan busi-
nessman, member of the Board of Commerce and Trade in Kenya and "well acquainted" with 
arap Moi, in Pretoria.683 Possibly as an offshoot from this meeting, the Department of Foreign 
Affairs began to actively court Kenya's Attorney-General, Charles Njonjo, with whom 
Marende was equally "well acquainted" and who was highly influential in Kenyan politics 
and close to President arap Moi at the time.684 According to a later report from Deputy Secre-
tary von Hirschberg, the DFA made "many attempts ( ... ) to bring Attorney-General Njonjo to 
South Africa",68l but based on the available files, this did not materialise until the end of 1979 
and there is no indication that it did at a later stage. The Department's hopes to get Njonjo to 
South Africa were, in all likelihood, based on the new political situation in Kenya after Ken-
yatta's death, but also on Njonjo, on 8 August, having made a pro-Dialogue statement in a TV 
interview, which was reported in the South African press.686 It is not known whether the fact 
that Njonjo had passed his law studies at South Africa' s University of Fort Hare, renowned 
for educating a number of African political leaders, was of any relevance in this context. 
However, it appears that Njonjo ' s verbal advances towards Pretoria in August were related to 
a heart transplantation on an eight-year-old Kenyan girl, the second of its kind within months, 
by Chris Barnard in Cape Town in mid-July 1978.687 It further seems that this caused some 
friction between the Department of Foreign Affairs and the South Africa Foundation over the 
conduct of contact with Kenya. In particular, after his statement, Njonjo was severely attacked 
by Kenya's Foreign Minister for "interfering in the country' s foreign policy and contradicting 
Government policy on South Africa".688 Almost certainly related to that event, Pik Botha later 
complained to the Foundation's President and Secretary General, Hersov and Sorour respec-
tively: 
682 'Conversation with Mr Marende from Kenya' , to Rae Killen, Pretoria, 25 October 1978, p.1 (DFA, 
111 35/3, Yol. 7). 
683 'Conversation with Mr Marende from Kenya' , from Hennie Geldenbuys to Rae Killen, Pretoria, 25 Octo-
ber 1978, p.1 (DFA, 11135/3, Vol. 7). On Njonjo, see MOdard, Jean-Fran,ois Charles. 1997. Njonjo: portrait d ' un 
"Big Man" au Kenya, in Emmanuel Terray, ed. L 'Etat contemporain en Afrique. Paris: L'Harrnattan: 49-87. 
684 'Conversation with Mr Marende from Kenya', from Hennie Geldenbuys to Rae Killen, Pretoria, 25 Octo-
ber 1978,p.1 (DFA, 11135/3, Vol. 7). 
6" 'Meeting between the Minister and Messrs Hersov and Sorour of the South Africa Foundation', from Carl 
von Hirschberg, Pretoria, June 1979, p.1 (DFA, 11 135/3, Vol. 8) . 
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Njonjo had become over-awed by the interest displayed in him. Dr Christian Barnard had 
invited him [to South Africa] but the professor just did not understand the political situa-
tion in Kenya. Instead of keeping quiet about his plans he had publicised it. The Minister 
felt that we should be more sophisticated about the way we set about inviting people of 
the stature ofNjonj0 6 89 
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Pik Botha was probably irritated about the exposure of Pretoria's contact with Njonjo at that 
early stage, maybe aware of the friction between Njonjo and arap Moi that led to their even-
tual fall-out in 1983.690 In fact, he may have feared that the publicity given to Njonjo's pro-
Dialogue attitude would undermine Pretoria's position vis-a.-vis arap Moi. In any case, and 
supporting this argument, the files up to 1983 do not contain any further documentation on 
contact with Njonjo. 
This takes us to the end of this section, which foremost documented the initiatives taken 
by the Departments of Information and Foreign Affairs during the second half of Vorster' s 
premiership. These however, were not successful in moving Pretoria substantially closer to-
wards achieving its principal foreign policy aim of breaking South Africa' s isolation. Vorster 
had visited both the Ivory Coast and Liberia and met Senghor, but there were still more than 
thirty African states that refused to even talk to Pretoria. A more thorough assessment of Pre-
toria' s foreign relations with Africa during this phase of the Vorster era is provided in the 
conclusion to this chapter. For the moment, we still need to discuss Pretoria's Detente initia-
tive. We stated at the outset of this section that the Bureau for State Security was the main 
promoter of this policy in the mid-1970s, thus supplementing the Secret Diplomacy engaging 
its partner, the Department of Information. While this section mentioned some BOSS and 
military activity in Africa, especially in the strategically important western Indian Ocean, De-
tente is now examined separately because these two government agencies were the key actors 
during this period of the mid-1970s, with the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Information 
playing rather comparatively peripheral roles. 
Detente 
The majority of African states had won their independence from 1960 onwards, but Angola 
and Mozambique remained Portuguese colonies. By the beginning of 1974, white minority 
rule also continued in Rhodesia following the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in No-
688 'Kenya's Njonjo slated over SA', Pretoria News 15 August; ' Dialogue with SA useless, says Kenya min-
ister', Pretoria News 21 August 1978 (DFA, 1/135/3, Vol. 7). 
689 'Meeting between the Minister and Messrs Hersov and Sorour of the South Africa Foundation', from Carl 
von Hirschberg, Pretoria, June 1979, p.1 (DFA, 1/ 135/3, Vol. 8). 
690 Modard. 1997. Njonjo: portrait d'un "Big Man" au Kenya. 
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vember 1965691 and South Africa still occupied Namibia, notwithstanding the IC] Advisory 
Opinion of 1971 , which had declared its presence illegal. Thus, South Africa was surrounded 
almost entirely by countries run by white governments, and this was referred to as a cordon 
sanitaire, on which South Africa's "security and relative isolation had relied for so long to 
keep the black insurgent movements at a distance from its own frontiers". 692 Relations be-
tween Pretoria and the Portuguese colonies were friendly and co-operative, and in the case of 
Rhodesia, support was provided to Ian Smith in the form of police units to quell guerrilla at-
tacks, thus circumventing the UN sanctions imposed on the UDI government693 Yet, on 25 
April 1974, a military coup in Lisbon ignited Portugal's retreat from the African continent 
and undermined South Africa's protection through the cordon sanitaire. With the realisation 
that the days of white supremacy in southern Africa would soon be over, Pretoria needed to 
find an arrangement to safeguard the position of the white minority in South Africa69' The 
new situation engendered a particular military dimension, namely that the leaders in both 
Luanda and Maputo would render assistance to the Namibian and South African national lib-
eration movements, thus further encircling the Pretoria government. In the face of such a pos-
sibility, Pretoria's reaction to the watershed developments in South Africa's immediate 
neighbourhood became an intense struggle between the actors involved in intelligence and 
security issues, the Bureau for State Security and the military. Regarding BOSS, van den 
Bergh applied the Detente model between the United States, the Soviet Union and China, to 
southern Africa, while P.W. Botha pressurised Vorster to intervene militarily in the Angolan 
independence war in October 1975 to counter the Cuban and Soviet presence. The rivalry 
between BOSS and the military over Pretoria's southern Africa policy took place in the con-
text of the Cold War that became an important catalyst, as shown throughout this section. 
Even though the developments focused on southern Africa, its analysis below is of great sig-
nificance to this study given its implications on South Africa's foreign relations with the 
countries further north. 
The present investigation into the Detente phase begins with an analysis of the reasons 
causing BOSS to pursue this policy and how this was applied in Pretoria's approach towards 
Rhodesia, Namibia and Zaire. Concurrently, the military undertook preparations to further 
arm itself for the eventuality of a war on South Africa' s border, and of great relevance in this 
691 Charlton, Michael. 1990. The Last Colony in Africa: Diplomacy and the Independence of Rhodesia. Ox-
ford: Basil Blackwell. 
692 Legum, Colin. 1976. Southern Africa: The Politics of Detente, Year Book of World Affairs 30: 20. 
693 Barber and Barratt. 1990. South Africa'S Foreign Policy, pp.135- 143; Hill, Christopher R. 1969. UDI and 
South African Foreign Policy, Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies 7, 2: 96-103. 
694 Ge1denhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of [solation, p.39. 
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context were the arms deliveries via Gabon that are subsequent! y examined. The final section, 
then, focuses on the Angolan war where the different approaches by BOSS and the military 
reached their climax. 
Superpower Detente 
It is generally accepted that the idea for Detente among the superpowers is American in ori-
gin, going back to the 1 960s.69' It is associated with Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, consecu-
tive US Presidents from 1969 to 1976,696 but the driving force was Henry Alfred Kissinger, 
Assistant for National Security Affairs to both Presidents and Secretary of State from Sep-
tember 1973 to January 1977.697 It is not possible, here, to provide a comprehensive overview 
of Detente,6" but it is important to this study to present its broad characteristics. The principal 
motivation for Kissinger to promote Detente was to extricate the United States from Vietnam, 
where they had become involved in 1954. The longer the US presence lasted there, the more 
Washington became embroiled in a regional conflict that it could not win. As a result, co-
operation was sought, first with the Soviet Union, then with China, to terminate Washington's 
traumatic experience while ensuring that Vietnam did not fall into the hands of the commu-
nists699 Detente, in the view of the US governrnent, or Kissinger, for that matter, thus became 
"a means of maintaining the balance of power in a way that would be consistent with avail-
able resources",700 as appropriately summarised by diplomatic historian Gaddis. What Kiss-
inger referred to as "Nixon's Triangular Diplomacy"701 between Washington, Moscow and 
Beijing resulted in respectable success. To mention but the most significant achievements 
during 1972173, the US and Soviet governrnent signed several treaties, notably the Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I, the document on Basic Principles of Relations between the 
USSR and the US, which "seemed to hold out the promise of a more or less permanent flow-
ering of relatively harmonious relations between the two great nuclear powers", and the 
69l Chapter 'Detente in the Making, 1965-73', in Crockalt, Rkhard. 1995. The Fifty Years War: The United 
States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941-1991. London: Routledge: 207-234. 
6% Nixon: 1969 - August 1974; Ford: August 1974 - 1976. 
697 Bell, Coral. 1977. The Diplomacy of Detente: The Kissinger Era. London: Robertson. 
698 See, for example, Bowker, Mike. 1983. Superpower Detente: A Reappraisal. London: Sage, for the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs; Nelson, Keith L. 1995. The Making of Detente: Soviet-American Relations in 
the Shadow of Vietnam. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press; Stevenson, Richard W. 1985 . The 
Rise and Fall of Detente. London: Macmillan. 
699 Kissinger, Henry Alfred. 1994. Diplomacy. New York: Simon and Schuster: 674-702; Markwich, Roger 
D. 1990. Peaceful Coexistence, Detente and Third World Struggles, Australian Journal of International Affairs 
44, 2: 182. 
700 Gaddis, John Lewis. 1984. The Rise, Fall and Future of Detente, Foreign Affairs 62, 2: 359. 
701 Title ofa chapter in Kissinger. 1994. Diplomacy, pp.703-732. 
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Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War.702 Regarding Washington's Detente with China, 
Kissinger and Nixon visited Beijing in July 1971 and February 1972 respectively, meeting the 
country's leader, Mao Zedong, and restoring Sino-American relations. ,03 Yet, Detente with 
Moscow came under pressure, particularly in the context of the Yom Kippur War of October 
1973, mentioned earlier, between Washington-backed Israel and the Moscow-supported anti-
Israel alliance. 704 Underlying this problem was a difference of interpretation over what De-
tente was supposed to mean in regard to the superpowers' behaviour in the Third World. In 
essence, Washington, more precisely Kissinger, intended to link Detente to a Soviet restraint 
in that part of the world, while in Moscow's view, Detente "never meant renunciation of their 
support for national liberation and other 'progressive' struggles in the developing world".'oS 
Crucially, as we shall see later in this section, this difference surfaced during the Angolan 
war, an important event in Pretoria's foreign relations with Africa. 
After this brief introduction on the main themes in the international Detente debate, the 
following section examines how BOSS applied this approach to southern Africa. 
South African Detente 
The first evidence of the term Detente entering Pretoria' s political jargon as a strategy with 
which to come to terms with the new situation in southern Africa, dates from late 1974. An 
early indication that its principal promoting agency was BOSS, aided by the Department of 
Information, appeared in the latter' s To the Point editorial on 'Southern Africa's new Era' on 
6 December, introducing the term Detente and outlining its purpose: 
The lessons of the failure of South Africa's former Africa policy have been invaluable. 
The earlier attempts to achieve detente, as was done with Madagascar, for example, were 
a crushing disappointment. They taught the RSA that no breakthrough could come by de-
pending on good relations with single states whose political control could be switched 
overnight. The revised diplomatic objectives had therefore to include all Southern Africa 
and through them other to the north; which is precisely what Yorster's moves have re-
cently been about. ( ... ) The impediments to larger co-operation are still formidable. The 
South West Africa and Rhodesian issues are two of them. 706 
The argument was that South Africa' s relations with Africa could only improve by a consoli-
dation of its position in southern Africa, and Vorster was therefore supposed to "set his sights 
702 Markwich. 1990. Peaceful Coexistence, Detente and Third World Struggles, pp.171 , 179, 181. 
703 Kissinger. 1994. Diplomacy, p.726; Kissinger, Henry Alfred. 1999. Years a/Renewal. New York: Simon 
and Schuster: 146, 876. 
704 Bowker. 1983. Superpower Detente, pp.97-113. 
70S Markwich. 1990. Peaceful Coexistence, Detente and Third World Struggles, p.171 ; Blacker, Co it D. 1983. 
The Kremlin and Detente: Soviet Conceptions, Hopes and Expectations, in Alexander L. George, ed. Managing 
U.S.-Soviet Rivalry: Problems a/Crisis Prevention. Boulder, CO: Westview Press: 119-138. 
706 To the Point 6 December 1974: 17. 
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lower than previously".707 To achieve that goal, the editorial suggested, the situation in both 
S.W.A./Namibia and Rhodesia had to be settled to ease the strained relations between South 
Africa and the continent, paving the way for contact with African states. As an initial chal-
lenge, however, this meant that representatives from South Africa and other African states 
were to sit at the negotiation table, even though the latter disapproved of Pretoria's apartheid 
policies. In this regard, reference was made to the Detente debate between the superpowers. In 
November 1972, for example, Information Minister Mulder argued that dialogue and con-
structive co-operation was possible between countries despite differences over domestic poli-
tics. To substantiate this, he referred to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between Wash-
ington and Moscow, as well as the talks between Washington and Beijing that took place de-
spite their differing internal political situations. 70s On reading the To the Point issue of II July 
1975, it becomes evident that in promoting Detente, the Department of Information followed 
Washington' s approach towards Beijing at the time: "Yet it is open dialogue that has achieved 
most in the West, on the model of Kissinger-Nixon and Mao as the pioneer of new US-China 
relations".70, Based on evidence presented later, we suggest that BOSS, given its privileged 
access to Prime Minister Vorster and its co-operation with Washington's CIA, instigated the 
concept of Detente for Pretoria's southern Africa policy, with particular application by the 
Department ofInformation, BOSS ' s partner. Before proceeding, in the next three sections, to 
analyse South Africa's Detente characteristics, it is important to show that this policy, in all 
likelihood, met with Vorster' s approval because it had a large backing from significant parts 
of the Afrikaner community. This dimension is now examined. 
It will be recalled from Chapter 2 that the Broederbond favoured Detente to protect the 
interests of the white population in South Africa, and Vorster thus had the support from this 
powerful domestic lobby. Additionally, elements from the policy network of the Afrikaner 
political and economic elite that promoted the homelands concept to African leaders during 
Secret Diplomacy (Figure 2), now backed Detente. In particular, mention needs to be made of 
Cas de Villiers and Red Metrowich, the directors of the Department of Information's front 
organisations, the Foreign Affairs Association and Southern African Freedom Foundation 
respectively. While Metrowich' s edited study Towards Dialogue and Detente has been men-
tioned, their other publications, issued under the auspices of the FAA, SAFF or the Depart-
ment of Information' s front publishing house, Valiant, emphasised the political changes that 
had already taken place in South Africa. At the same time, taking into account the Cuban in-
707 Geldenhuys. 1994. The Head of Government and South Africa's Foreign Relations, p.27 I. 
708 To the Point 4 November 1972: 38. 
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volvement in Angola and the Soviet-US rivalry in the Indian Ocean outlined in the previous 
section, they stressed South Africa's importance for Africa in terms of economic co-
operation, its significance to the West as the source of several strategic raw materials and as 
an anticommunist bastion, as well as the strategic importance of the Cape sea route. 710 In this 
context we must also mention a publication by the Centre for International Politics at the Uni-
versity of Potchefstroom,711 a think tank that was also secretly funded by the Department of 
Information.712 Finally, a FAA researcher, Daniel Stefan 'Daan' Prinsloo, published two pa-
pers in which South Africa's activities in Namibia were presented as anticipating independ-
ence.713 In summary, the Department ofInformation' s propaganda activities aimed at present-
ing a picture of a South African government that was sincere in its intention of reforming the 
domestic apartheid system and of withdrawing from Namibia, while stressing the need for the 
West to support Pretoria during these turbulent times. Finally, Afrikaner businessman and 
Department of Information front-man Louis Luyt, examined in the previous section, also be-
came part of the policy network in the realm ofVorster's Detente, particularly with Zaire. As 
in the case of Secret Diplomacy, resulting in Vorster's visit to the Ivory Coast in September 
1974, the BOSS-Information alliance, strengthened by this policy network, was still the 
dominant factor in the Prime Minister's approach towards Africa. With these considerations, 
and taking cognisance of the above-mentioned issues raised in To the Point on 6 December 
1974, Vorster began to approach both the Rhodesian and S.W.A./Namibia problems, and the 
relevant developments are now outlined. 
Rhodesia and S. W.A.lNamibia 
The main parties involved in trying to resolve the Rhodesia impasse were BOSS, the Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs and, under their influence, Prime Minister Vorster, as well as Zam-
bian President Kaunda. The co-operation between Pretoria and Lusaka was a "coincidence of 
709 To the Point II July 1975: 18. 
710 Cas de Villiers: 1976. AJrican Problems and Challenges. Sandton, South Africa: Valiant Publishers; ed. 
1977. Southern Africa: The Politics oJRaw Materials. Pretoria: FAA; 1977. South AJrica, a Changing Society. 
Pretoria: FAA; 1977. South AJrica and the Demands Jor Change. Pretoria: FAA. Red Metrowich: 1977. South 
AJrica's New Frontiers. Sandton: Valiant Publishers. Also van Rensburg, Willem Cornelius Janse. 1977. The 
Strategic Role of South Africa ' s Mineral Resources, in Caspar Francois 'Cas' de Villiers, ed. Southern AJrica: 
The Politics oj Raw Materials. Pretoria: FAA: 78ff. (Conference Report, 3); Van Rensburg, Willem Cornelius 
Janse, Desmond Aubrey Pretorius. 1977. South AJrica's Strategic Minerals: Pieces on a Continental Chess 
Board. Johannesburg: Valiant Publishers. 
711 Liebenberg, Petrus Wessel. 1976. The Indian Ocean: A New Theatre oj Great Power Rivalry. 
Potchefstroom: Centre for International Politics, University ofPotchefstroom for Higher Christian Education. 
712 Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy oj Isolation, pp.119, 169. 
713 Prinsloo, Daniel Stefan ' Daan'. 1976. SW.A.: The Turnhalle and Independence. Pretoria: FAA; 1977. 
SW AlNamibia: Towards a Negotiated Settlement. Pretoria: FAA. 
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interests C ... ) in regard to the avoidance of direct confrontation in Southern Africa".'" With 
the choice of continued support for Smith, resulting in South Africa's further isolation, or 
withdrawing from Rhodesia and improving relations with Africa, Vorster chose the second 
option, Detente. This would buy the time needed to accommodate developments in Rhodesia 
in such a way that they would not pose a threat to white South Africa. With reference to the 
traumatic US experience in Vietnam, British political commentator Colin Legum specifically 
argued that Pretoria's involvement in Rhodesia could lead to a "Vietnamisation" of the situa-
tion.'" Regarding Zambia's engagement, Kaunda was motivated by the need for economic 
interaction with Pretoria and a desire to playa leadership role in southern Africa.'" The active 
co-operation between Pretoria and Lusaka, necessary in solving the Rhodesian conflict, began 
in late 1974. This was initiated by Vorster's speech to the South African Senate and foreign 
diplomats on 23 October, in which he proposed fmding a "durable, just and honourable solu-
tion" for Rhodesia, causing Kaunda to state three days later that this was a "voice of rea-
son".717 What followed was a flurry of activities by BOSS and the Department of Foreign Af-
fairs between the capitals of South Africa, Zambia and Rhodesia until mid-1975,718 with 
Hendrik van den Bergh playing a major role. In particular, he was present at the Victoria Falls 
Conference on 25 August 1975,"9 which was attended by the main protagonists of the Rhode-
sian conflict, as well as the initiators of the meeting, Kaunda and Vorster. Mirroring the coali-
tion that had engineered this conference, it took place in a South African railway carriage 
"perched on the Victoria Falls bridge sparming the border between Zambia and Rhodesia".720 
Shortly before the meeting, and to indicate Pretoria's commitment in finding a solution to the 
problem, Vorster withdrew the remaining police units from Rhodesia.72! Yet, the conference 
did not bring about Smith's immediate capitulation; his premiership only came to an end in . 
1979.722 While Vorster was quite prepared to sacrifice Rhodesia in pursuit of his Detente am-
714 Barratt, John. 1975. Detente in Southern Africa, The World Today 31, 3: 125. 
71S Legum. 1976. Southern Africa, p.22. 
716 Anglin, Douglas George. 1975. Zambia and Southern Africa 'Detente', International Journal 30, 3: 471-
508; Anglin, Douglas George. 1979. Zambia's Foreign Policy: Studies in Diplomacy and Dependence. Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press: 272-309; Shaw, Timothy Milton, Agrippah Tshabby Mugomba. 1978. The Political Econ-
omy of Regional Detente: Zambia and Southern Africa, Journal of African Studies 4, 4: 392-413. 
717 Cited in Spence, John Edward 'Jack'. 1977. Detente in Southern Africa: An Interim Judgement, Interna-
tional Affairs 53, 1: I. 
718 Legum, Colin. 1975. Southern Africa. Part I: The Secret Diplomacy of Detente; Part II: South Africa at 
the Cross Roads, /974-5. London: Rex Collings; Venter, Albertus Johannes 'Albert'. 1977. Vorster's Africa: 
Friendship and Frustration. Johannesburg: Ernest Stanton. 
719 Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, pp.148 , 213. 
720 Barber and Barratt. 1990. South Africa's Foreign Policy, p.185 . 
721 Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.39. 
722 Smith, Ian Douglas. 1997. The Great Betrayal: The Memoirs of Ian Douglas Smith. London: Blake. 
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bitions, the situation with Namibia was different. Pretoria considered what it called South 
West Africa, as South Africa's fifth province;nJ to abandon this territory, therefore, was a 
much more sensitive issue, entailing far bigger risks of a white backlash. At the same time, 
this was a matter of prime concern to African leaders, as reflected in a memorandum, partly 
cited earlier in the previous section, on a discussion between Liberian President Tolbert and 
the country's ambassador to Geneva, David Thomas, in June 1975: 
The President further said that he has reached a point that it is necessary and imperative 
that the South African Government should do something to help him to further help them 
- that if some dramatic statement were made indicating some imminent spectacular action 
on the part of the South African Government to show willingness and plans for coopera-
tion with the United Nations for the independence of Namibia, e.g. if within two years 
plans would be undertaken to prepare for granting the people of Namibia independence, 
the President would be able to present something tangible to his colleagues with the plea 
for understanding and patience on behalf of South Africa.'24 
After the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 1971, international pressure on Pretoria mounted in the 
attempt to force it to withdraw its presence from Namibia. It thus became evident that Vorster 
faced "increasing pressure from the UN and Western states, the changed southern African 
balance of forces and the requirements of detente", and "needed to show progress on Na-
mibia, but the constraints of his own political beliefs and the potential reaction of his white 
electorate still applied".'" As was characteristic of his premiership, Vorster bumbled his way 
through the minefield of foreseeable conflicts and launched the Turnhalle Conference, Tum-
halle being the German word for gymnasium in which the meeting took place. The idea for 
this came from the local National Party in September 1974, in an attempt to make it appear as 
an initiative emanating from the white population in that territory, but the party undoubtedly 
followed instructions from Pretoria. In addition, the black national liberation movements, es-
pecially the South West Africa People' s Organisation (SW APO), were excluded, and several 
of their leaders were even arrested prior to the first Turnhalle meeting in September 1975. The 
Turnhalle Declaration ofIntent stated that a draft constitution for Namibia would be drawn up 
within three years. '" However, Pretoria remained adamantly against granting Namibia' s inde-
pendence and the previous section showed that this was an important factor causing Presi-
dents Houphouet-Boigny from the Ivory Coast and Tolbert from Liberia to withdraw from 
contact with Prime Minister Vorster. 
723 Philipps, E.H. 1969. South West Africa, South Africa 's Fifth Province, Revue militaire gemirale 7: 181-
198. 
"4 'Memorandum' on a discussion between Ambassador Thomas and President Tolbert, 23 June 1975 (DFA, 
111313, Vol. 3). 
72S Barber and Barratt. 1990. South A/rica 's Foreign Policy, p.198. 
'" Barber and Barratt. 1990. South Africa 's Foreign Polky, pp.198f. 
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Zaire 
We have now examined the ways in which BOSS and the Department of Foreign Affairs ap-
plied the superpower Detente model to its relations with both Rhodesia and S.W.A./Namibia. 
Running parallel to these developments, BOSS and the Departments of Information and For-
eign Affairs were engaged in endeavours to draw Zaire into the Detente strategy, so as to es-
tablish political stability in southern Africa and to ensure white South Africa's secllrity. Judg-
ing from Eschel Rhoodie's autobiography, President Mobutu was rated as influential in Afri-
can politics as the presidents of the Ivory Coast and Senegal, and to win his support seems to 
have been considered to be of prime importance in Pretoria' s ambitions.'" Examination of 
this case is of great significance to this study because it plainly demonstrates that the different 
policy approaches followed by the various state actors couId be detrimental to each other's 
objectives. Furthermore, these developments entered into the realm of global politics, and this 
becomes a crucial element in the following paragraphs. 
As has been stated in the previous chapter, Zaire did not seek close contact with Pretoria 
after Mobutu had come to power in 1965, and as late as January 1973, Under-Secretary Preto-
rius noted that Mobutu came out "strongly against dialogue" and that his "attitude towards the 
Republic" was "unfriendly". 72' This hostile stance changed towards the end of 1974, in the 
context of Angola's war of independence. In this war, Mobutu actively supported the National 
Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA)729 because it pursued a pro-western attitude, it was 
led by his brother-in-law, Holden Roberto, and its ethnic base was among the Bakongo, who 
lived in both northern Angola and western Zaire. Together with the equally western-oriented 
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the FNLA opposed the 
communist-oriented Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).730 In early 
1975, Mobutu had unsuccessfully tried to solicit US support for Angola's pro-western libera-
tion movements and so turned to South Africa's intelligence and military community,731 as 
discussed in more detail later in this section when we focus on the Angolan war. Our main 
interest at present lies with the civilian aspect in the contact between Kinshasa and Pretoria. 
In the first example of such interaction, in early 1975, the Department of Foreign Affairs 
had some interaction with Etienne Kallos, owner of the Cape Town-based firm Kallos & Co., 
727 Rhoodie. 1983. The Real Information Scandal, pp.98 , 123 . 
728 'Attitude of Zarre towards the Republic ', from Johan Pretorius, Pretoria, 16 January 1973, p.1 (DFA, 
11112/3, Vol. 5) (emphasis in the original) . 
729 Front National de Liberation de I' Angola / Frente Nacional de Liberta<;iio de Angola. 
730 MPLA: Movimento Popular de Liberta<;iio de Angola; UNIT A: Uniiio Nacional para a Independencia To-
tal de Angola. 
731 Gleijeses. 2001. Conflicting Missions, pp.287ff 
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which exported foodstuff to Zaire through the Zairean-based Societe Africaine des Produits 
Alimentaires (SAP A). The director of SAP A was Justin Marie Bomboko, Zaire's former For-
eign Minister (1960-63, 1965-69),'" and it was through him that the DFA gained access to 
President Mobutu. The practicalities of the resulting exchange are not recorded, but it moti-
vated Mobutu to invite a South African business delegation to Zaire from I to 4 April 1975. 
Reflecting his wider interest in gaining Pretoria's support for the FNLA in Angola, he courted 
the Director of the Department of Trade, a representative from the Industrial Development 
Corporation, Jan Bouwer from Credit Guarantee and Under-Secretary Pretorius as translator, 
putting two cars and an aircraft at their disposal. During the visit, discussions were held on the 
provision of a 3 million Rand credit to SAP A and a similar firm dealing in food imports, 
while Bomboko mentioned three development/investment projects for which South African 
assistance might be considered. 7l3 From 12 to 16 May 1975, representatives from the Depart-
ment of Trade and the IDC, in the company of Pretorius, made a follow-up visit, offering the 
Zairean authorities an additional 5 million Rand credit for the import of South African capital 
goods.13' Given that the DFA also held a keen interest in promoting Detente with Zaire, the 
IDC concluded four agreements with Bomboko's SAPA in the period from June 1975 to Feb-
ruary 1976. They provided a total credit of IS million Rand for the purchase of South African 
foodstuff, pharmaceutical and medical goods.73S 
After the successful attempt to promote South African export to Zaire, the Department of 
Foreign Affairs launched several development/investment projects. From 5 to 10 July 1975, 
the Secretary for Commerce, with the DFA' s Justus de Goede as translator, led a group of 
seven business representatives to Zaire. Those destined to play an important role came from 
the firms Bessemer Steel, Brian Colquhoun, LTA and Roberts Construction. Mobutu again 
courted them, putting four cars at their disposal and breakfasting with the party one morning. 
Following their report, which identified an "enormous potential" in Zaire and therefore rec-
ommended "an energetic fOllow-up",736 the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Commerce 
selected ten development/investment projects considered suitable for South African participa-
732 <http://rulers.orglfml.html>. 
713 ' Besoek aan ZaIre deur ' n amptelike missie om die toestaan van 'n wentelkrediet aan twee staatsbeheerde 
invoerders van lewensmiddele te ondersoek, 1-4 April 1975', from Johan Pretorius, Pretoria, 7 April 1975 (OFA, 
1/112/3, Vol. 6). 
734 'Tweede besoek aan Zaii"e deur 'n amptelike missie om die toestaan van 'n wentelkrediet van R3 miljoen 
aan twee staatsbeheerde invoerders van lewensmiddele te beklink - 12 tot 16 Mei 1975', from Johan Pretorius, 
Pretoria, 19 May 1975 (OFA, 11112/3, Vol. 6). 
73S 'Unpaid exports made from South Africa to Zaire ', ca. May 1977 (OFA, 11112/3, Vol. 9). 
736 'Visit of delegation from private sector to Zaire, led by Secretary for Commerce : 5-10 July, 1975', July 
1975, p.7 (OFA, 1/112/3, Vol. 6). 
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tion.737 For a closer investigation, Bomboko arranged the visit of fourteen business representa-
tives to Zaire from 12 to 17 October 1975.738 During their stay in Zaire, they discussed the 
construction of a railway line and the establishment of grain silos. The representatives from 
Brian Colquhoun, L T A and Roberts Construction were interested in the construction of the 
one hundred and fifty kilometres railway line linking Matadi with the seaport at Banana to 
facilitate import and export to and from Kinshasa. The project cost was estimated at 30 mil-
lion Rand, 85% of which the IDC was prepared to finance with Credit Guarantee as the in-
surer. Yet, the proposed railway line covered only part of the route from the coast to Kin-
shasa; the construction of the remaining two hundred kilometres of railway line posed several 
geographical problems and Banana did not have port facilities. Therefore, Jan Bouwer from 
Credit Guarantee expressed caution regarding participation in such a project; 739 judging from 
the DFA files available until the end of 1979, no South African activity ever took place. Re-
garding the second project discussed in October 1975, Bessemer Steel' s three representatives, 
among them Paul Kruger Hoogendyk, were interested in the provision of "silos to contain 
grain" for import and export and of "storage facilities for food supplies for periods of up to 
three months". The estimated cost was 4 million Rand, to be made available by the IDC and 
insured by Credit Guarantee. Bessemer Steel decided to first undertake an analysis of Zaire' s 
needs prior to engaging in any concrete action, and Hoogendyk and his two colleagues re-
mained behind for a few days to inspect the silo sites.740 However, a DF A report, dated end of 
1976, states that "not much progress""1 had taken place since and, similar to the railway line, 
this project does not seem to have been implemented. 
Simultaneous to the above developments, the DFA' s contact in Zaire, Bomboko, wrote to 
Secretary Fourie on 17 October 1975 regarding the establishment of an agro-industrial com-
plex in Gbadolite. This high-level approach was more than likely pursued because this was 
Mobutu's birth-place, which he tried to develop during the 19705.742 According to the plans, 
the project was to include "a palm-plantation of more than one thousand hectares, an oil-
pressing factory, tabacco [sic 1 plantations, cattle breeding, the breeding of more than 20,000 
pigs and other agricultural undertakings".743 Similar to the successful OGAPROV agricultural 
737 'Notes for the discussions to be held with Mr. Steyn on Thursday July 17, 1975 ' , 15 July 1975 (DFA, 
1/11 2/3, Vol. 6). 
7). 
738 Telex to Justin Bomboko, Pretoria, 9 October 1975 (DF A, 11112/3, Vol. 7). 
739 'Memorandum: visit of group of contractors to Zaire ' , 23 October 1975, pp .4-10 (DFA, 1/112/3, Vol. 7). 
740 'Memorandum: visit of group of contractors to Zaire', 23 October 1975, pp.1 Off , 18 (DFA, 1111213, Vol. 
741 'Suid-Afrikaanse hu1p aan Zaire ' , November 1976, p.1 (DFA, 111 12/4, Vol. 1). 
742 'The changing fortunes of Mobutu ' s birthplace' , Mail & Guardian 12 July 1999. 
743 Letter from Justin Bomboko to Brand Fourie, Kinshasa, 17 October 1975 (DFA, 1/112/3, Vol. 7). 
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project in Gabon, the foreign service officials hoped to make a particularly strong impression 
on Mobutu by providing assistance to a project close to his heart, so as to gain his support for 
the Detente policy. Thus, it took Fourie only a week to reply that "in principle we are abso-
lutely ready C •. . ) to provide our assistance in the agro-industrial domain such as desired" .'" On 
22 December 1975, Bomboko asked Fourie whether a visit by South African agricultural ex-
perts to Gbadolite was possible at the end of January 1976.'45 Thereafter, however, the De-
partment of Information took over that initiative. While the reasons for this are not recorded, 
we consider it possible that BOSS felt it too risky to have foreign service officials involved in 
this project so close to Mobutu, who, at the time, worked closely together with BOSS over the 
Angolan war, as will be shown below, and therefore asked its partner to carry out the project. 
Whether any inter-departmental discussion took place is not recorded. In any event, according 
to Rhoodie' s autobiography, van den Bergh, himself and BOSS agent Albie Geldenhuys as 
translator flew to Zaire in early 1976 in Louis Luyt's Lear Jet, the Department of Informa-
tion's front man and "fertiliser king", to meet Mobutu.'46 This confirms the significance of the 
above-mentioned policy network in support of Detente. Further, and according to a later DFA 
document, two representatives of Luyt's Triomf Fertiliser company went to Zaire in May 
1976 in "connection with the supply of fertiliser"'47 for that project. This was the only addi-
tional information on the issue in the files. Luyt, whom we asked about it, claimed to have no 
knowledge of any such activity, while stating that Mobutu had invited him in 1978 because he 
"wanted plant nutrients".74' 
SMTF Project 
The previous paragraphs examined the activities of the Departments of Foreign Affairs and 
Information related to development/investment projects in and technical assistance to Zaire in 
order to promote Detente with Mobutu. The following account details a special kind of inter-
action between Pretoria and Kinshasa in this context and one that entered the global political 
scene. Similar to the situation in the western Indian Ocean, this part of southern Africa be-
came an issue of Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, as 
well as a Detente focus between Washington and Beijing. In consequence, Pretoria was no 
744 Letter from Brand Fourie to Justin Bomboko, Pretoria, 24 October 1975 (DFA, 1111213, Vol. 7) (transla-
tion from French). 
'45 Telex from Justin Bomboko to Brand Fourie, Kinshasa, 22 December 1975 (DFA, 1/ 112/3, Vol. 7). 
746 Rhoodie. 1983. The Real Information Scandal, p.136. 
74' 'Suid-Afrikaanse hulp aan Zaire' , ca. November 1976, p.2 (DFA, 1111214, Vol. I) (translation from Afri-
kaans). 
'48 Correspondence with Louis Luy!, 23 and 25 February 2003. 
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longer the only dominant player in the area and became itself prone to external pressures and 
influence. Prior to detailing the resulting complexities, it is appropriate to provide a brief 
overview of the main actors and interests. 
The Anglo American Corporation and US financial and mining interests with direct access 
to both Washington's Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department were involved in 
a mining project in Zaire. During 1975, this was faced with financial difficulties. Exploiting 
Pretoria's interest in Detente and Washington's concern over the Cuban and Soviet presence 
in Angola, the companies approached these two governments for assistance. Judging the pro-
ject to be of vital importance to keep anticommunist Mobutu in power and on the side of the 
FNLA-UNITA coalition against the MPLA in Angola, Pretoria and Washington supported 
their bid to support the mining project. However, Pretoria withdrew from the mining project 
in early 1976 as a result ofthe humiliating experience in the Angolan war, brought about by a 
change of direction by the US government. An attempt has been made to illustrate the intrica-
cies of this South African Detente case study in Figure 4, with no claim to completeness, as 
the nature of the intelligence and military activities is not sufficiently documented. We shall 
now provide the information necessary to an understanding of the various interconnections. 
Zaire was probably the African country beyond southern Africa in which Anglo American 
held its largest involvement. While its diamond mining activities were discussed in Chapter 3, 
it also held an interest in the fields of copper and cobalt, resources that were rich in Tenke 
Fungurume, province of Katanga. Exploration ofthese deposits by the Union Miniere du Haut 
Katanga (UMHK) had started in 1918.149 In 1967, Mobutu expropriated the UMHK as part of 
his economic nationalisation policy and created the state-owned Genera1e des carrieres et des 
mines (Gecamines), but given Zaire's worsening financial situation, Gecamines was not in a 
position to function effectively. Thus, in 1970, the Zairean government concluded an agree-
ment with foreign enterprises to form the Societe Miniere de Tenke Fungurume (SMTF),750 
with Charter Consolidated, the London-based Anglo American subsidiary, and the US Stan-
dard Oil Company of Indiana, as the largest shareholders, with a 28% participation each. Un-
til 1973, the SMTF conducted several exploration and feasibility studies, establishing that the 
copper and cobalt resources were sufficient to make the mining project viable. 
749 Whyte, James. 1997. Taking a Chance on Zaire: Tenke Mining Set for Feasibility at Tenke-Fungurume, 
Northern Miner 83, 2, 10 March; <http://www.tenke.com/tenke/history.html>. 
7' 0 Hocking. 1973 . Oppenheimer and Son, pp.417f ; Whyte. 1997. Taking a Chance on Zaire; 
<http://www.tenke.com/tenkelhistory.html>. 
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Figure 4: SMTF Project in Zaire and the Angolan War, 1975-76 
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During 1974, Washington's export credit agency, the Export-Import Bank,151 provided an ex-
port credit of 232 million, a Chase Manhattan-led bank consortium made available bank loans 
of 195 million and shareholder' s funds accounted for 234 million, totalling 661 million US 
Dollars to implement the project. Yet, originally estimated at 500 million US Dollars, the pro-
ject soon went beyond the available finance, mainly due to Zaire's hyperinflation, the falling 
copper price and the rise in the price of oil since late 1973.'" By late 1975, the cost estimate 
had risen to 812 million US Dollars and the date of completion was postponed to 1978. Con-
sequently, the loan-providing agencies became reluctant to remain engaged; the Chase Man-
hattan bank consortium withdrew in January 1976, while Anglo American and Standard Oil 
151 <http: //www.exim.gov>. 
'" 'Zaire', from Jeremy Shearar to Brand Fourie, Washington, 12 February 1976, p.3 (DFA, 11112/3, Vol. 7). 
On the Zairean economy at the time, see Kisangani, Emizet N. 1987. Implementation of Stabilization Policies in 
an Authoritarian Setting: Zaire, 1970-1980, Canadian Journal of African Studies 21,2: 175-200. 
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decided not to make any further investment for three years. At this point, the US administra-
tion became involved due to its interest in keeping Mobutu in power as a guarantor of politi-
cal stability in Central Africa and as an ally against the communist MPLA in Angola;'53 in his 
memoirs, Henry Kissinger declares that "during 1975 and 1976 the Ford Administration con-
sidered Zaire an essential counterweight to Angola".'" Yet, Kissinger's State Department was 
aware of the country's economic crisis, threatening "the Mobutu government at a time when 
its help over Angola was needed most",'" and feared that a postponement of the SMTF pro-
ject would further undermine Mobutu's standing. Therefore, in early January 1976, Harry 
Oppenheimer from Anglo American and a Standard Oil representative were invited to discuss 
possibilities of keeping the project alive. It is not known whether Kissinger himself was pre-
sent at the meeting, but the simple fact of Anglo American being approached by the State De-
partment evidences the multinational's vast influence in international politics. As a further 
indication of Washington's keen interest in keeping the SMTF project alive, Robert S. 
McNamara, former US Secretary of Defence (1961-68) and World Bank President from 1968, 
was contacted to obtain the 150 million US Dollars estimated sufficient to get the project off 
the ground. This powerful link was not helpful, however, as Oppenheimer informed Minister 
Muller in April 1976: "Mr. Robert Macnamara [sic] indicated that the World Bank was not in 
a position to mobilise such a loan".'" In a parallel move, Washington approached Pretoria; in 
February 1976, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Edward Mulcahy, held 
discussions with Jeremy Shearar, Minister Plenipotentiary at the South African Embassy, 
while Robert Bemerd Anderson went to South Africa to investigate the possibility of Pretoria 
raising the required 150 million US Dollars.757 Anderson was US President Dwight D. Eisen-
hower's Secretary of the Navy (1953-54) and Secretary of the Treasury (1957-61). He carried 
out diplomatic missions on behalf of President Lyndon B. Johnson until 1968,'58 and was the 
Press Secretary in the State Department in 1974, time during which he came close to Henry 
753 Gibbs, David N. 1991. The Political Economy a/Third World Intervention: Mines, Money, and U.s. Pol-
icy in the Congo Crisis. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press: 176f.; Kelly, Sean. 1993. America's Tyrant: 
The CIA and Mobutu a/Zaire. Washington, DC: American University Press. 
754 Kissinger. 1999. Years a/Renewal, p.945. 
7SS Gleijeses. 2001. Conflicting MiSSions, pp.258f.; Litwak, Robert S. 1984. Detente and the Nixon Doctrine: 
American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit a/Stability, 1949-1 976. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 181. 
'" On the above, unless otherwise stated, see ' SMTF-Zaire copper project: memorandum number one. Back-
ground infonnation', attached to a letter from Harry Oppenheimer to Hilgard Muller, Johannesburg, 14 April 
1976, p.5 (DFA, 1/112/4, Vol. I); 'Confidential note on the activities of the Anglo American group in Zaire', 
from Chris R. Stals (General Manager, South African Reserve Bank), Pretoria, 7 January 1976 (DFA, 11112/3, 
Vol. 7). Note: the South African Reserve Bank became involved because Anglo American's investment in the 
SMTF project had to be approved by them as a result of the Exchange Control. 
757 'Zaire', from Jeremy Shearar to Rae Killen, Washington, 12 February 1976, p.1 (DFA, 11112/3, Vol. 7). 
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Kissinger, who reports that Anderson was part of his "usual team of Mideast aides".7" Later 
on, Anderson attended to the management of his extensive ranches and oil properties in Texas 
and became "an investment adviser for wealthy individuals and corporations in New York".760 
Furthermore, Anderson was engaged in Standard Oil of Indiana and maintained very close 
ties with David Rockefeller, the business magnate who presided over the Chase Manhattan 
bank.'" Having said this, we argue that Anderson's mission to save the SMTF project came 
about due to his link with Kissinger and with the purpose of representing the financial inter-
ests of both Standard Oil and Chase Manhattan. This web of overlapping interests in the 
SMTF project by Kinshasa, Pretoria, Washington and Anglo American was further enlarged 
in the first half of 1976, when Iran entered the picture. 
From its side, Anglo American tried to resuscitate an investment of 35 million US Dol-
lars,762 and in February 1976, both Oppenheimer and Julian Ogilvie Thompson, Executive 
Director at the time, went to Tehran with that aim in mind. They thus followed the Shah's 
invitation after his Minister of Finance had met Sidney Spiro, Director of Charter Consoli-
dated, in Tehran in 1975, while rather likely taking into account the close politico-military 
relations between South Africa and Iran, mentioned in the previous section. Benefiting from 
the existing diplomatic contacts between the two countries, Oppenheimer made use of the 
services of South Africa's Consul-General to Iran, Colonel Charles Alan 'Pop' Fraser."3 In 
particular, Fraser set up meetings such as that of II February 1976, when Oppenheimer, 
Ogilvie Thompson and Fraser held talks with Iran's Prime Minister and two ministers. Three 
days later, Oppenheimer and Fraser were given an audience with the Shah. According to Fra-
ser's report, and confirming the alleged co-operation between the two countries in nuclear 
development, "the Shah' s interest is undoubtedly in acquiring more uranium while other min-
erals such as bauxite, copper and iron ore were mentioned in passing". 764 Although Oppen-
7" Kwitny, Jonathan. 1986. Endless Enemies: The Making oj an Unfriendly World. New York: Penguin 
Books: 178. 
759 Kissinger, Henry Alfred. 198Z. Years oJUpheaval. Boston, MA: Little and Brown: 1049. 
760 Domhoff, G. William. 1967. Who Rules America? Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall: 105, 99; The 
Complete Marquis Who 's Who; Who's Who in America, 1984-1985, p.76; <http://www.history.navy.mil>; 
<http://www.ustreas.gov/opc/opcOOZ6.html>. 
761 Gibbs. 1991. The Political Economy oJ Third World Intervention , pp.IIZff., 181 (note 114), 189£ 
762 'Confidential note on the activities of the Anglo American group in Zaire', from Chris R. Stals (General 
Manager, South Afiican Reserve Bank), Pretoria, 7 January 1976 (DF A, I/ IIZ/3, Vol. 7). 
763 His military career began during World War II; Army Chief of Staff7Chief of the Army (January 1966 -
November 1967); retired in 1973; Consul-General to Iran (1973-79). See Uys. 199Z. South AJrican Military 
Who's Who, 1945-/992, p.83 ; Seegers. 1996. The Military in the Making oj Modern South AJrica, p.l33. 
764 'Co-operation in development ofiranian mines ', from Pop Fraser to Brand Fourie, Tehran, 18 February 
1976, p. l (DFA, I / IIZ/4, Vol. I). Also ' Iran', document provided by Harry Oppenheimer to the Department of 
Foreign Affairs, 1976 (DFA, II11Z/3, Vol. 8). 
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heimer had emphasised the need for co-operation in Zaire' s SMTF project, arguing that it was 
"undoubtedly one of the potentially richest copper mines in the world", nothing specific in 
this regard resulted from the discussions.'65 In January 1976, and supplementing Anglo 
American's initiatives in Iran to save the SMTF project, US mediator Anderson introduced a 
proposal whereby Pretoria would purchase additional oil from Iran over a period of two years 
to the amount of 150 million US Dollars. In return, it would not repay Tehran, but put the 
money into the SMTF project in the name of Tehran, making the Shah an investor and share-
holder. Pretoria replied in the negative, stating that the necessary funds were not available. 
Anderson then devised a similar proposal whereby two US oil companies would buy the extra 
oil from Iran and sell it at a price somewhat lower than prescribed by the Organisation of the 
Petrolewn Exporting Countries (OPEC), with Pretoria making good the shortfall. This would 
have made Pretoria a shareholder with 10 million US Dollars, with Iran's share still amount-
ing to 150 million US Dollars. Pretoria again declined to become involved, citing a lack of 
clarity as the reason.766 However, Pretoria's negative response on both occasions can be 
counted as an early indication that its interest in the project began to suffer due to the deterio-
rating US-South African engagement in the Angolan war that is discussed below 
As all previous attempts to obtain the necessary financing for the SMTF project had fai led, 
both Anglo American and Washington increased their efforts and appear to have engaged 
Maurice Tempelsman. He was an apt choice as he had maintained special contact with both 
the US government and the South African multinational, as well as Zaire. He had close ties to 
all US Presidents from the 1960s to the 1990s and to the CIA, as well as "enjoyed excellent 
access to the State Department", according to historian and political scientist, David Gibbs.767 
As a businessman, he was successful as a senior partner in his father's firm, Leon Tempels-
man & Son, active in the fields of mining and minerals trading, particularly in Africa, for ex-
ample holding a 3% share in the SMTF project."· Tempelsman was also Chairman of the 
Board and Chief Executive of Lazare Kaplan International, the largest American diamond 
cutting and polishing firm.'·' These connections led Richard Mahoney to pen the statement 
765 'Co-operation in development of Iranian mines' , from Pop Fraser to Brand Fourie, Tehran, 18 February 
1976, p.2 (DFA, 1/11214, Vol. I). 
766 On the above, see 'Suid-Afrikaanse hulp aan Zaire' , ca. October 1976, pp.3f. (DFA, 1111214, Vol. I). 
" 7 Gibbs. 1991. The Political Economy a/Third World Intervention, p.182. 
768 'SMTF-Zaire copper project: memorandum number one. Background information' , attached to a letter 
from Harry Oppenbeimer to Hilgard Muller, Johannesburg, 14 April 1976, p.1 (DFA, 1/112/4, Vol. I). 
7.9 On the above, see Gibbs. 1991. The Political Economy a/Third World Intervention, pp.180-183; 'The 
man at Jackie's side' , The Washington Post 26 May 1994 p.DI ; Kwitny. 1986. Endless Enemies, pp.9, 58f.; 
<http://www.usrbforglTempelsman.htm>; <http://www.lazarediamonds.com>. 
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that Tempelsman "had a liking for mixing conspiracy with commerce in his African trade".770 
In this context, co-operation was particularly fruitful with Mobutu, who later awarded Tem-
pelsman the post of Zaire's Honorary Consul in New York as a result of his diamond trading 
with Zaire.77l This activity took place in co-operation with Anglo American, a contact dating 
back to the late 1950s. At the time, Tempelsman became uniquely important as the middle-
man in the supply of diamonds from the Central Selling Organisation (CSO) to the US. Cru-
cially, the CSO was the world-wide monopolistic diamond marketing subsidiary of De Beers, 
itself an Anglo American subsidiary, and Washington had barred it from trading in the US in 
retaliation for its under-supply of tool diamonds during World War n.m Furthermore, Tem-
pelsman held a concession to exploit diamonds in western Kasai, an area not controlled by the 
government-owned Societe miniere de Bakwanga (Miba), while the British Zaire Diamond 
Distributors (Britmond), the Zairean subsidiary of De Beers, sold both Miba's and Tempels-
man's production through the CSO.77l Thus, it is not surprising that Michael Spicer, Anglo 
American Executive Director and Special Adviser to the Chairman in 1999, referred to Tem-
pelsman as Oppenheimer's "personal friend".774 
On 6 April 1976, reporting on his first mission to safeguard the SMTF project, Tempels-
man informed Oppenheimer that he and Robert Anderson had met Iran's Minister of Finance 
to discuss the above-mentioned oil-for-copper deal and Iran's participation. During this meet-
ing, the Iranian Minister informed them that Henry Kissinger had encouraged the Shah "to 
consider participation" in the SMTF project.'" Kissinger's position on this matter was evi-
dence of his personal involvement in US policy towards southern Africa, which, against the 
background of the war in Angola, "was the product of his geo-political view that southern 
Africa was now a focal point in the EastlWest global struggle and a threat to superpower de-
tente".776 Harry Oppenheimer was equally active both in the US and South Africa to prevent 
the SMTF project from collapsing. In mid-April 1976, he submitted two memoranda to 
Charles W. Robinson, Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, who was to accompany 
770 Mahoney, Richard D. 1983. JFK: Ordeal in Africa. New York: Oxford University Press: 173. 
77l Gibbs. 1991. The Political Economy of Third World Intervention, pp.108, 110f; Kwitny. 1986. Endless 
Enemies, pp.52f 
772 <http://www.truthout.comlOI80.McKinney.Afiica.htm>;Callaghy.ThomasM.1985.Zaire and Southern 
Africa, in Olajide Aluko, Timothy Milton Shaw, eds. Southern Africa in the 1980s. London: Allen & Unwin: 69. 
77J Gibbs. 1991. The Political Economy of Third World Intervention, pp.183 (note 166), 189; Kwitny. 1986. 
Endless Enemies, pp.46ff., 87f; Onya, Paul. 1991. Afiican Diamonds SparkJe on the World Market, African 
Business 160: 10f.; Zaire: Overseas Business Report. 1991. Washington, DC: US Department of Commerce. 
774 Interview with Michael Spicer, 7 April 1999. 
775 Letter from Maurice Tempelsman to Harry Oppenheimer, 6 April 1976 (DF A, 11112/4, Vol. I). 
776 Barber and Barratt. 1990. South Africa's Foreign Policy, pp.201f. 
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Kissinger to Zaire shortly thereafter.777 In South Africa, he lobbied for Pretoria's assistance by 
keeping Minister Muller and Secretary Fourie informed of developments, providing them 
with the same documentation as had been given to Robinson and including the above-
mentioned letter from Tempelsman. On 30 March 1976, Oppenheimer held a meeting with 
Muller, which he later summarised in a letter to the Foreign Affairs Minister, indicating that 
Anglo American "would, naturally, welcome any assistance the South African Government 
might be in a position to offer". Emphasising that it was "important for us to remain in close 
communication on all matters relating to the project", Oppenheimer concluded: "If you wish, 
I would be happy to arrange for representatives of our Group to discuss the project further 
wi th members of your Department. We will, of course, keep the Department informed of any 
new developments".77. On 22 April, Oppenheimer despatched a letter containing very similar 
contents to Brand Fourie.'" However, the South African government was less than enthusias-
tic, and Muller only replied on 4 May with a very short message: 
Thank you for your letter of 14 April 1976 about the SMTF copper project in Zaire. It 
was certainly very useful to have had an exchange of views on the subject. I also appreci-
ate your kind offer to keep my Department informed of any new developments."o 
Pretoria had evidently lost interest in assisting Anglo American and the Americans in getting 
the SMTF project off the ground, but Muller' s curt reply indicates that the decision was not 
solely motivated by economic considerations. While interaction between Pretoria and Anglo 
American had been fairly intensive until the end of 1975, the atmosphere became markedly 
cooler in 1976. This change of attitude can be attributed to the failure of the US-South Afri-
can intervention in the Angolan war on the side of the Mobutu-supported FNLA, which badly 
affected Pretoria's relations with Washington, as we will see later in this section. A similar 
fate, detailed below, was experienced by another example of co-operation during the same 
time period and that expressed the common interest of Pretoria, Washington and Anglo 
American in keeping Mobutu in power as a political ally against the MPLA in Angola. This 
instance reveals for the first time that South Africa's intelligence agency, BOSS, was in close 
liaison with its American counterpart, the CIA, over Zaire; this supports the earlier argument 
that BOSS had became integral to Washington's activities in southern Africa. 
After mid-I975, Zaire appears to have experienced an oil shortage, possibly no longer 
being in a position to pay the petrol price that had risen since 1973 due to the country's finan-
777 Letter from Harry Oppenheimer to Hilgard Muller, Johannesburg, 14 April 1976; letter from Harry Op-
penheimer to Brand Fourie, Johannesburg, 22 April 1976 (DFA, 1111214, Vol. I). 
7" Letter from Harry Oppenheimer to Hilgard Muller, Johannesburg, 14 April 1976 (DFA, 11112/4, Vol. 1). 
779 Letter from Harry Oppenheimer to Brand Fourie, Johannesburg, 22 April 1976 (DFA, 1/ 11214, Vol. I). 
7'0 Letter from Hilgard Muller to Harry Oppenheimer, Cape Town, 4 May 1976 (DFA, 1/11214, Vol. I). 
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cial crisis. Thus, Bomboko, the DFA's middleman for Zaire, approached the foreign affairs 
ministry for help in finding a solution and sent Lawrence Raymond Devlin as an intermediary 
to Pretoria on 10 October 1975.781 This department knew that Devlin was a "former official" 
of the US government with "long experience" in Zaire, that he now worked for Leon Tem-
pelsman & Son as their representative there and that he was "well known to, among others, 
Mr. H. Oppenheimer and General van den Bergh", as Under-Secretary Pretorius reported.782 It 
is uncertain, however, to what extent the foreign service officials were aware that Devlin was 
the CIA's key person for Zaire. From the secondary literature, we established that he was the 
CIA Station Chief in Kinshasa from 1960 to 1963 and again from 1965 to 1967; in this role he 
had informed Washington about South African mercenary activity in the Congo (Chapter 2). 
Subsequently, Devlin was alleged to have been involved in Patrice Lurnumba's assassination 
in 1961, the act which brought Mobutu to power.783 As Chief of the CIA Africa Division from 
1971 to 1974, Devlin remained in very close contact with Mobutu even after his departure 
from Kinshasa. Thereafter, and until 1987, he put his connections at the disposal of Leon 
Tempelsman & Son, thus consolidating a connection that seems to have come into existence 
during Devlin's days in the Congo, where Maurice Tempelsman was involved in diamond 
mining.784 Given his close contacts with Mobutu, Anglo American, Tempelsman and the intel-
ligence communities in both South Africa and the United States, Devlin was the ideal man to 
make the necessary arrangements to help solve Kinshasa's oil problem. His stay in South Af-
rica in October 1975 served merely to convey Zaire's needs and to establish contact regarding 
the matter. He again visited the Republic from 21 to 25 November, holding meetings with 
Brand Fourie and representatives from the private business sector. Significantly, however, he 
781 Telex from Justin Marie Bomboko to Justus de Goede, Kinshasa, 30 September 1975 (DFA, 1/ 112/3, Vol. 
7). 
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does not appear to have met with Muller, offering further evidence that the Secretary of For-
eign Affairs often bypassed Muller because of the minister's weak personality and due to his 
unease in interacting with people, such as Devlin, who came from outside the diplomatic cir-
cle. 
According to the available documents, a scheme was devised whereby US Mobil Oil In-
ternational, which already had investments in Zaire,'" would supply Kinshasa with oil and oil 
products worth 50 million US Dollars. This would serve to bridge the gap for four to five 
months until the expected assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was forth-
coming. Repayment by Zaire would take place over a still-to-be-negotiated period of eighteen 
months to two years at approximately 2.8 million US Dollars per month. Kinshasa would 
pledge its 12% share in the oil production of US Gulf Oil, expected to begin at the end of 
1975 in Zairean off-shore wells;786 this would amount to an estimated 1 million US Dollars 
monthly as repayment. The remaining I. 8 million would come from Zaire's general budget. 
However, given Zaire's dire economic situation, Mobil Oil International insisted on bank 
guarantees, and this is where Mobutu hoped to obtain South African assistance. Among the 
businessmen consulted by Devlin, was Harry Oppenheimer, who either knew him in connec-
tion with De Beers' diamond mining in Zaire and/or through Maurice Tempelsman. This 
again reflects the significance of Anglo American as a foreign policy actor, involved in eco-
nomic arrangements of geo-political significance. Furthermore, given Devin' s close contact 
with Tempelsman, it can be reasonably assumed that Oppenheimer was aware of Devlin's 
work for the CIA, indicating that the South African multinational had no qualms in interacting 
with the US intelligence agency when it served its interests. In any event, Oppenheimer was 
not in a position to assist Devlin with a bank guarantee, possibly because Anglo American's 
own private merchant bank, Union Acceptances Limited, mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
experienced financial problems and subsequently underwent two mergers during 1973174.'87 
However, he referred Devlin to Frank Dolling, the Managing Director of South Africa' s Bar-
clays Bank, advice that was probably related to that bank's participation in the UAL after 
1959.'88 With Oppenheimer's recommendation, it is not surprising that Dolling showed his 
willingness to provide the necessary bank guarantee that would ensure Mobutu's political 
survival. Although Oppenheimer could not provide the bank guarantee, he offered to make 
78' Gibbs. 1991. The Political Economy o/Third World Intervention , p.191 (note 182). 
786 Gulf Oil was active in Zaire from 1966. Gibbs. 1991. The Political Economy o/Third World Intervention, 
p.67; Gleijeses. 2001. Conflicting Missions, p.262. 
78' Jones. 1992. Union Acceptances, pp.154-191. 
788 'Going it alone', Finance Week 25 June 1993. 
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good any shortfalls in the monthly repayments by Kinshasa to Mobil Oil International by 
Britmond, De Beers' diamond agency in Zaire, by using the income derived from the sale of 
Miba's diamonds .'89 Oppenheimer had previously obtained permission for such sales from 
Mobutu, again reflecting Anglo American's keen interest in keeping Mobutu in power as a 
guarantor of political stability, an important factor in the multinational's mining plans for Za-
ire. Oppenheimer had also contacted Secretary Fourie to ascertain the foreign affairs minis-
try' s preparedness to reinsure the deal and therefore act as guarantor in the last resort. 790 The 
State Security Council, the principal decision-making body during P.W. Botha's era, dis-
cussed the proposal in late November 1975.791 The SSC's involvement is highly significant, 
because, as stated in Chapter 2, the SSC only seldom met during the Vorster era. This sug-
gests either that the Zaire deal was one of the few cases that warranted discussion, or that the 
SSC held a more prominent position in this phase ofVorster's premiership than the secondary 
literature has assumed so far. The DF A files do not contain the final decision reached by the 
State Security Council, but again with reference to the failed US-South African military inter-
vention in the Angolan war, it is unlikely that Pretoria co-operated any further. 
We have now discussed the activities of BOSS and the Departments of Foreign Affairs 
and Information as part of Pretoria's Detente initiative in southern Africa. This entailed at-
tempts to provide a settlement to the situations in Namibia and Rhodesia, as well as securing 
support from Zaire's Mobutu in order to maintain political stability in South Africa's neigh-
bourhood. In this context, mention has been made, in several instances, of the Angolan war 
and its negative effect on the Detente initiative. We noted at the beginning of this section that 
Portugal's withdrawal from both Angola and Mozambique destroyed South Africa's cordon 
789 'Zaire: supply of$50 million oil by Mobil International ' , Pretoria, 22 November 1975, from lohan Preto-
rius, p.2 (DFA, 1/112/3, Vol. 7). 
790 'Zaire: supply of$50 million oil by Mobil International ', Pretoria, 22 November 1975; 'Zaire: versoek aan 
Suid-Afrikaanse regering om te borg te staan vir olievoorrade', Pretoria, 26 November 1975; 'Zaire: versoek aan 
die Suid-Afrikaanse regering om betaling van brandstofaankope te borg' , Pretoria, 28 November 1975, all from 
Johan Pretorius. Telex from Justin Bomboko to Rae Killen, Kinshasa, 4 December 1975 (DFA, 11112/3, Vol. 7). 
79 1 'Dr. Smit', 26 November 1975 (DFA, 1/112/3, Vol. 8). The document itself does not specify Dr Smit' s 
identity, but in all likelihood this refers to Robert van Schalkwijk Smit. He was Secretary in the Department of 
Finance and part of the Geneva Trade Negotiations (1964-67), did a doctorate in Economics in 1968 at the Uni-
versity of Stellenbosch, later became Alternative Executive Director of the IMF for South Africa, Australia, New 
Zealand, Lesotho, Swaziland and Western Samoa (1971 -74) and then Director of Finance in the Treasury (1975-
76). On 22 November 1977, and under circumstances unresolved until today, Robert Smit and his wife were 
murdered, while his mention in this context of this study adds to the recent speculations in a South African pa-
per: "No South African murder has provoked more skulduggery, conspiracy theorising and sheer guesswork than 
the killings almost 25 years ago of politician Robert Smit and his wife, Jean-Cora. ( .. . ) Who killed the Smits and 
why? A quarter century later, nobody knows for sure. A National Party MP, Smit was, according to one theory, 
investigating corruption at the highest levels of government. According to another theory, he was involved in 
dodgy offShore business deals. A third theory holds that he was involved in sanctions-busting. We may never 
know the full truth". 'Nasty secrets', Sunday Times 5 May 2002. Also Who 's Who o/Southern Afi'ica. 1977-78, 
p.817; De Beer, Mona. 1995. Who Did What in South Afi'ica. Johannesburg: Ad Donker: 129. 
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don sanitaire and that Pretoria's reaction was dominated by the struggle between BOSS and 
the military, with the former proposing Detente, and the latter armed intervention. Having 
examined the activities of BOSS, the following section details Pretoria' s relations with Ga-
bon, where the military took the lead, serving them as a stopover for armament transports to 
South Africa. These supplies are an important factor in understanding the reason for the mili-
tary's confidence in becoming involved in the Angola war during October 1975. This repre-
sented an apogee in the conflicting approaches followed by the military and BOSS over Preto-
ria's southern Africa strategy. 
Gabon 
We found earlier in this chapter that Gabon's President Bongo had become a reliable partner 
to Pretoria's military during and after the Nigerian Civil War. This prompted access to Gabon 
by the Department of Foreign Affairs that showed interest in development/investment projects 
and launched the OGAPROV agricultural project. However, although OGAPROV was suc-
cessful, the establishment and maintenance of this project revealed Bongo'S favouritism to-
wards the military. While disapproving the situation, the foreign service corps had little 
choice other than to accept the military's predominance in order not to lose contact with this 
relatively important African country. 
Bongo's interests and those of the military and the Department of Foreign Affairs led to a 
complex interplay that originated in May 1975. The co-operation with Pretoria's military in 
the Nigerian Civil War was most probably the background to Bongo's renewed approach to 
the South Africans. Significantly, although Jacques Foccart, who had been kingpin in the 
network of Gabonese-French-South African co-operation in support of Biafra, was no longer 
in office, Maurice Robert and Maurice Delauney were still present. During the Nigerian Civil 
War, they had been part of Bongo's entourage as the head for Africa intelligence agency, 
SDECE, and as French Ambassador to Gabon respectively. These functions involved co-
ordinating both French and South African support to Biafra. Presently, they were again part of 
Bongo' s entourage,'92 Robert as Head of the French petroleum company Elf Aquitaine and 
Delauney serving once more as France's Ambassador, as indicated earlier in this chapter. 
While their names do not appear in the DFA files relating to Pretoria's co-operation with 
Bongo during 1975, the following developments leave little doubt that they pulled the strings. 
Bongo's mediators in this instance were Patrick Monier-Vinard and Jean-Pierre Daniel, 
who shared the official title of Technical Adviser in the Presidency of the Republic of Ga-
' 92 pean. 1983. Affaires africaines, p.145. 
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bon,79J but actually served as Bongo's advisers in political, military and intelligence matters 
from 1971 to June 1975 and from 1975 respectively. Daniel was an agent for the French intel-
ligence agency, SDECE,794 and so more than likely was Monier-Vinard. Their importance to 
both Pretoria's military and the DFA in providing a conduit to Bongo led to their award of the 
Order of Good Hope in 1979 on the recommendation of both Jan Boyazoglou, Pretoria's man 
in charge of OGAPROV, and Deputy Secretary, von Hirschberg. 795 The latter argued that 
Daniel was the "most important contact person,,706 in Gabonese matters, while, according to 
Under-Secretary Loubser, Monier-Vinard was responsible for promoting "good relations be-
tween South Africa and Gabon". One of the many cited examples demonstrating his dili-
gence, some of which will be outlined below, was that he "acted as a contact between South 
African military authorities and the Gabonese".'" 
On 10 May 1975, and probably following the joint interventions of Monier-Vinard and 
Pretoria's military, Bongo granted the South African private airline, Safair, the right to use 
Libreville airport as a refuelling stop-over on the routes to and from Europe. 7O• Safair made 
this request as their previous stop-over, Ilha do Salon Cape Verde, became unstable during 
the country's strive for independence. The available documents suggest that Safair made fre-
quent use of the new facility until late 1976, with at least one north- and southbound weekly 
flight landing in Libreville.799 Thereafter, for reasons that are not recorded, the number of 
landings was drastically reduced; in the twelve months after September 1977, Safair appears 
to have made only made thirteen stopovers'oo On the northbound journeys, the aircraft occa-
sionally transported equipment and other items necessary for the technical assistance and de-
793 Letter from Patrick Monier-Vinard to Brand Fourie, Libreville, 17 May 1975, p.1 (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 5). 
794 Pean. 1983. Affaires africaines, pp.141 , 236, 261; Sery, Patrick. 1986. Le grand retour des barbouzes: Ie 
nceud de vlperes du Gabon, Peup/es Noirs Peup/es Africains July-August: 27f. 
< http://www.dgse.org/informationslagents.php>. 
79' ' re: Gabon - award of the "Order of Good Hope" to Messrs. P. Monier-Vinard and J.M. Muxart', from 
Jan Boyazoglou to Brand Fourie, Paris, 23 November 1975, pp.lf. (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 7); 'Gaboen: eerbewys 
aan Mnr. J.P. Daniel', from Carl von Hirschberg to Brand Fourie, Pretoria, 9 July 1979, p.2 (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 
9). 
796 'Gaboen : eerbewys aan Mnr. J.P . Daniel' , from Carl von Hirschberg to Brand Fourie, Pretoria, 9 July 
1979, p.2 (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 9). 
797 'Award of the "Order of Good Hope" to ', from Anton Loubser, 2 July 1979, pp.1 f. (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 
9). 
798 'Gabon: relations with South Africa and technical aid', from Anton Loubser, Pretoria, 2 October 1978, p.1 
(DF A, 11178/4, Vol. 16). 
799 'Klaring van Safair-vlugte', to Brand Fourie, Cape Town, 4 June 1975; 'Re: supply of jet fuel to France-
ville' , from Pi Pienaar to Jean-Pierre Daniel, Johannesburg, 30 June 1975, p.2 (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 5); ' Note', 
from Johan Pretorius, Pretoria, 20 June 1975; ' Route clearances', from J.J. Ie Raux (Safair) to Johan Pretorius, 
Kempton Park, Johannesburg, 18 August 1975 (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 6); ' re: Gabon - SAFAIR', from Julian 
Thomas to AJbie Burger, Paris, 20 November 1975 (DF A, 1/ 178/3, Vol. 7) . 
• 00 ' Gabon: relations with South Africa and technical aid ', from Anton Loubser, Pretoria, 2 October 1978, p. l 
(DFA, 1/178/4, Vol. 16). 
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velopmentlinvestment projects in the C.A.R. and Gabon,80l examined in the two previous sec-
tions. Judging from later evidence, however, the main purpose of the Safair flights to Euro-
pean destinations was the delivery of parts necessary for armament production in South Af-
rica by the Armaments Development and Manufacturing Corporation (Armscor). In addition 
to its airline subsidiary, Luxavia, undercutting African airspace closure to South African Air-
ways (Chapter 2), Safair now assisted Pretoria in circumventing the 1963 UN voluntary arms 
embargo. Armscor had been established in 1968 to counter this embargo and subsequently 
became the SADF's main armaments supplier. In 1976, it merged with the equally state-
controlled Armaments Production Board to form the Armaments Corporation of South Africa, 
while retaining the acronym Armscor. S02 To make armament deliveries to Armscor, and ac-
cording to the DF A files, the destinations for which Safair most frequently required clearance 
from Libreville were Malpensa Airport outside Milan, Glasgow Prestwick International Air-
port and Bordeaux.sol The French armament supplies after 1963, mentioned in the Dialogue 
section, explains the Bordeaux destination, while Malpensa possibly served as a trade centre 
for the alleged United States arms supplies and direct Italian deliveries to South Africa. s04 The 
use of Glasgow' s airport is explained in the case study that now follows. 
One Safair clearance request in the OF A files sheds some light on the secret deliveries to 
circumvent the UN arms embargo: "Freight from Malpenza [sic 1 consists of aircraft compo-
nents from Atlavar to Atlas Aircraft Corporation. Freight from Prestwick consists of Jet en-
gine starter cartridges and detonators from Nobel's Enterprises to Naschem (Pty) Limited".'os 
Both Atlas Aircraft and Naschem were Armscor subsidiaries; the former produced aircraft 
SOl 'Klaring van Safair-vlugte', to Brand Fourie, Cape Town, 4 June 1975; 'Route clearances', from J.1. Ie 
Roux (Safair) to Johan Pretorius, Kempton Park, Johannesburg, 30 June 1975 (DFA, 11178/3 , Vol. 5); 'Onder-
houd met President Bokassa by die Presidensiele Pale is op 23 Februarie', from Johan Pretorius, Pretoria, 26 
February 1976, p.4 (DFA, 11183/3, Vol. 7); 'Central African Republic' , from Rae Killen to Hilgard Muller, Pre-
toria, 2 June 1976, p.2 (DFA, 11183/3, Vol. 8). This became public knowledge: 'Hotel is detente bonus', The 
Star 19 November; ' SA builds hotel in CAR', Pretoria News 19 November 1975; Decter. 1976. South Africa 
and Black Africa, p.5 ; Osia. 1981. Israel, South Africa and Black Africa, pp.72, 74. 
S02 Landgren, Signe. 1989. Embargo Disimplemented: South Africa'S Military Industry. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press for the SIPRI; McWilliams, James P. 1989. Armscor: South Africa's Arms Merchant. London: 
Brassey's; Phillips, Mark. 1989. The Nuts and Bolts of Military Power: The Structure of the SADF, in Jacklyn 
Cock, Laurie Nathan, eds. War and Society: The Militarisation of South Africa. Cape Town: David Philip: 16-
27; <http://www.armscor.co.za>. 
80l Several documents in DFA, 11178/3, Vols. 4, 5, 6. 
804 Chandhok, Neera. 1983. The Armament Corporations and the UN Arms Embargo against South Africa, 
IDSA Journal 15, 3: 463-483; Gervasi, Sean. 1978. United States Arms Transfers to South Africa in Violation of 
the United Nations Voluntary Arms Embargo, 1963-1977. New York: United Nations, Centre against Apartheid; 
Klare, Michael T. 1977. U.S. Arms Deliveries to South Africa: The Italian Connection. Washington, DC: Trans-
national Institute; Klare, Michael T. 1981. Evading the Embargo: Illicit U.S. Arms Transfers to South Africa, 
Journal of International Affairs 35, 1: 15-28; Landgren. 1989. Embargo Disimplemented, pp.201-207, 215£ 
80S 'Route clearances', from J.1. Ie Raux (Safair) to Johan Pretorius, Kempton Park, Johannesburg, 18 August 
1975 (DFA, 1/178/3, Vol. 6). 
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and maintained "high technology alloys", while Naschem was described as "one of the largest 
ammunition producers in the southern hemisphere".so. Regarding the provider companies, 
only little information could be gleaned on what is referred to as Nobel's Enterprises, but 
whose actual name was Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI). It had its origins in 1871 , when 
Alfred Nobel established the British Dynamite Company south of Glasgow. Renamed Nobel 's 
Explosives in 1877, the company expanded and later merged with other British chemical 
companies to form IC!.so7 It appears, therefore, that Naschem needed ICI substances for the 
production of ammunition. 
Bongo was satisfied with the arrangements concerning Safair landings in Libreville. In 
November 1976, after a meeting with Bongo, the Agricultural Counsellor in Paris, Boya-
zoglou, reported: "In respect of the Safair flights, the President is clearly satisfied with the 
situation, and hopes that this will continue satisfactorily in the future". so, In particular, the deal 
comprised the monthly payment of an "honorarium", as Under-Secretary Loubser described 
it, of 8,000 Rand,''' paid directly to President Bongo.'lo However, and in similar vein to the 
discussion earlier in this chapter over the exposure of the South African presence in Gabon 
related to the DFA's technical assistance and development/investment projects, Bongo ex-
pressed concern over the visibility of Safair aircraft during the stopover at Libreville airport. 
In July 1975, Boyazoglou wrote to Deputy Secretary Killen that Bongo had "emphasised the 
necessity for discretion".'11 Therefore, Safair' s stopovers were only permitted during the 
night, except on Thursday nights when "Libreville airport was overcrowded", as DFA reports 
reveal.812 The situation was to become even more critical from July 1977 to July 1978, when 
Bongo was the OAU Chairman. During the OAU Summit, he did not want Safair to land in 
Libreville in order to avoid accusations from fellow African leaders, and proposed Port Gentil 
and Franceville as altematives.8t3 Bongo, through Daniel, had previously suggested the 
'06 Landgren. 1989. Embargo Disimplemented, pp.53, 125, also 63-78, 95, 128r., 215. 
S07 <http://www.nobel.se/nobellalfred-nobellindustrialldolan>. 
so, ' re: Visit to the Gabon: 19 to 23 November 1976' , from Jan Boyazoglou to Brand Fourie, Paris, 3 Decem-
ber 1976,p.3 (DFA, 1/178/3, Vol. 9). 
S09 'Gabon: relations with South Africa and technical aid', from Anton Loubser, Pretoria, 2 October 1978, p . 1 
(DFA, 1117814, Vol. 16). 
' 10 're: Gabon - SAFAIR flights ', from Julian Thomas to Brand Fourie, Paris, 20 October 1975, p.l; ' re: Ga-
bon - SAFAIR', from Julian Thomas to Albie Burger, Paris, 20 November 1975, p.1 (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 7). 
' 11 'ils Gaboen besoek' , from Jan Boyazoglou to Brand Fourie, Paris, 26 July 1975, p.2 (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 
5). 
812 'Gabon', from Rae Killen, October 1975 (DFA, 1/178/3, Vol. 6); ' reo Gabon - SAFAIR', from Julian 
Thomas to Albie Burger, Paris, 20 November 1975 (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 7). 
813 'Gabon: landing rights for Safair', from Andre Jaquet to Anton Loubser, Pretoria, 23 February 1977; 
'Discussion with Mr J.P. Daniel ', from Rae Killen, Pretoria, 24 February 1977 (DFA, 111 78/4, Vol. 14). 
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Franceville option to Pretoria should a problem arise in the use of Libreville.'I' Pretoria's Sa-
fair deal with Bongo was only one element of what Rae Killen described as the "package".8J5 
This was supplemented by Bongo's interest in the air cargo carrier Affretair, a Gabonese 
company registered in Rhodesia,'16 and SAA's desire to obtain landing rights in Gabon. As we 
learn from an instructive secondary source, Jack Malloch established Air Trans Africa, the 
operator of Affretair, in May 1970. The South African-born pilot lived in Rhodesia and had 
already co-operated with President Bongo by flying Rhodesian support, via Gabon, to Biafra 
during the Nigerian Civil War.8J7 We now tum our interest to the other elements of what 
formed the ' package'. 
Gabon was almost entirely dependent on imported meat, offering the Department of For-
eign Affairs the ideal motivation to launch the OGAPROV project. One of Gabon' s principal 
meat suppliers was Rhodesia, against whom the UN had imposed the first mandatory eco-
nomic sanctions in 1966 to force a settlement of the UDI issue. During mid-l97S, Bongo 
openly admitted that he contravened these sanctions by importing Rhodesian meat.8i8 The 
airline cargo carrier Affretair, in which Bongo was averred to hold "a financial interest", as 
revealed in a DFA document,819 transported this commodity to Gabon, as we learn from 
Pean's illustrative work,''' then proceeding to European destinations with unknown purpose. 
The same source indicates that the Affretair planes, on their return trip to Rhodesia via Libre-
ville, were mostly empty and that this lack of economic viability was not in Bongo'S financial 
interest'2I In addition, given the economic sanctions against Rhodesia, the stop-over in Libre-
ville on the southbound journey also posed a political problem. To resolve this situation, 
Bongo approached Pretoria for assistance in pursuit of his personal interest in Affretair and 
the cargo carrier' s meat deliveries, while making use of Pretoria's support for Rhodesia at the 
time, the Safair deal and the already close ties between Libreville and Pretoria. The resulting 
intricacies are now examined. 
'I' 'Gabon', from Rae Killen, October 1975 (DFA, 111 78/3, Vol. 6). 
' IS 'Note ' , from Rae Killen, Pretoria, 19 July 1976 (DFA, 1/ 178/3, Vol. 8). 
' 16 'Freight Survey' , African Business 171, November 1992: 52; <http://www.planet.nulsWlshinecity/affretair>. 
'17 Pean. 1983. Affaires africaines, pp.80f., 83. 
'I' ' La majorite des pays membres de I'O.U.A. commercent avec la Rhodesie, Le monde 24 June 1975, p.3 ; 
'Gabon rejects Rhodesian trade allegations' , AFP Africa Service, 18 July 1975; ' Gabon denies sanction busting 
and detente', Pretoria News 22 July 1975 (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 5) 
81 9 'Notes on a meeting at 10.30 hours Friday, 8th August in S.A. Airways Boardroom, Air Terminal, Johan-
nesburg', August 1975, p.1 (DFA, 111 78/3, Vol. 6). 
820 Pean. 1983. Affaires africaines, p.84. 
821 Pean. 1983. Affaires africaines, p.84. 
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On 16 May 1975, Jack Malloch met SAA Planning Manager Frans Swarts in South Africa 
.and proposed a weekly Affretair cargo flight from Europe to Johannesburg, "wet-leased"'22 by 
SAA and in conformity with its "poolpartnership [sic 1 arrangements with carriers in 
Europe",823 and then onwards to Salisbury. Earlier that month, Monier-Vinard, on behalf of 
Bongo, had discussed the controversial aspect of traffic rights for cargo on the then J ohannes-
burg-Salisbury route with Brand Fourie, agreeing that Affretair would be apportioned traffic 
rights for a weekly flight'24 Probably in return for this concession, Bongo offered South Afri-
can Airways the use of Franceville airport as a technical stopover to and from Europe. All 
these elements were subsequently consolidated in an agreement signed by Air Trans Africa 
and SAA officials on 13 June 1975.'" Monier-Vinard, and later Daniel, acted as Bongo' s 
principal agents in this deal. Daniel later revealed that Bongo "had told him that he must help 
Affretair".826 Bongo used their services to resolve any problem, assuming that the French in-
telligence officials would impress both the foreign service and SAA officials. This is illus-
trated by the difficulties encountered by Affretair concerning the initial landing rights in Jo-
hannesburg, causing Monier-Vinard to contact Julian Thomas at the South African Embassy 
in Paris. Thomas then informed Secretary Fourie in Pretoria, who, in turn, intervened through 
SAA Chief Executive Pi Pienaar. '27 The matter was quickly resolved and Affretair made its 
first landing in Johannesburg on 17 July.'28 
Given that South African Airways had fulfilled its obligations vis-a-vis Affretair, their use 
of Franceville airport became the next item on the agenda. However, at the time, this airport 
was not capable of handling large aircraft and the provision of jet fuel could not always be 
guaranteed.'29 Therefore, based on its interest in extending SAA's landing and overflying 
network in Africa, Pretoria offered Gabon a loan of 3 million Rand "for a basic improvement 
822 In contrast to a dry-lease, this meant the lease not only of plane but also of the entire crew and making in-
surance arrangements. Interview with Pieter van Aswegen, 2 November 200 1. 
m ' Resume of discussions between Capt Jack M. Malloch of Air Trans Africa and Mr. F. Swarts of SA 
Airways : on 16 May 1975', p. l (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 5). 
824 Letter from Patrick Monier-Vinard to Brand Fourie, Libreville, 17 May 1975, pp. lf. (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 
5). 
82' 'Agreement between the South African Airways and AFFRETAIR companies', Salisbury, 13 June 1975 
(DFA, 11178/3, Vols. 5, 6); ' Resume of understanding reached between South African Airways and Air Trans 
Africa - Salisbury, 13th June, 1975 ', Salisbury, 13 June 1975, pp.l f. (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 5). 
826 'Use of Franceville airport: discussion at S.A.A. headquarters on 13 August 1975 between Mr. J.P. Daniel 
and Captain Pienaar and Mr. F. Swarts' , August 1975 (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 6). 
827 Letter from Julian Thomas to Brand Fourie, Paris, 26 June 1975, p.2; letter from Brand Fourie to Pi Pi-
enaar, Pretoria, 2 July 1975, pp.lf. (DFA, 1/178/3, Vol. 5). 
'28 ' i.s. Gabon aangeleenthede', from Jan Boyazoglou to Brand Fourie, Paris, 11 July 1975 (DFA, 1/178/3, 
Vol. 5). 
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of the Franceville airport complex" .830 This was to ensure adequate landing facilities for large 
SAA aircraft, such as the Boeing 747, used on the European routes. A promise was made to 
provide an additional 10 to 12 million Rand loan for the "development" of Franceville airport 
and the construction of "a small project" at Libreville airport by a South African company.831 
In late July 1975, Daniel, on behalf of Bongo, informed Brand Fourie and SAA Chief Execu-
tive Pienaar that a SAA Boeing 747 would be able to land at Franceville airport in early Au-
gust, but "discreetly, on a Sunday, and during dusk", again reflecting the cautious stance 
taken towards the foreign service officials. 'l2 However, SAA soon lost interest in co-operating 
with Affretair and the Franceville option for the following reasons. On 13 August, Pienaar 
and Swarts informed Daniel during a meeting in Johannesburg that they had lost faith in Af-
fretair, because it had concealed a similar arrangement with UTA, a French airline and SAA 
pool partner. Furthermore, the provision of sufficient jet fuel at Franceville airport was not 
guaranteed at all times and other pool partners complained about A ffretair undercutting cargo 
tariffs on the Europe-South Africa route.8J3 SAA's attitude endangered the entire package deal 
between Pretoria and Bongo, especially the Safair landings in Libreville as a stop-over for the 
transport of armaments for the South African military. 
As we argued initially, the importance of the Safair armament deliveries from Europe to 
the South African military cannot be minimised as an increase in its capacity was vital in view 
of the situation in southern Africa after Portugal's withdrawal. The subsequent developments 
suggest that the military therefore tried to pressurise both the foreign affairs ministry and 
SAA to sustain the Safair landings in Libreville. In particular, they appear to have approached 
Bongo's adviser, Daniel, who now intervened. On 17 August 1975, he phoned Jan Boya-
zoglou at the Paris Embassy and "appeared to be disillusioned" about SAA's waning interest 
in Franceville, according to the Agricultural Attache.'" Boyazoglou assessed the situation to 
be so critical that a complete breakdown in bilateral relations was feasible, writing to Secre-
'29 Letter from Julian Thomas to Brand Fourie, Paris, 26 June 1975, p.l; 'Re: supply of jet fuel to France-
ville', from Pi Pienaar to Jean-Pierre Daniel, Johannesburg, 30 June 1975, p.2; letter from Brand Fourie to Pi 
Pienaar, Pretoria, 2 July 1975, p.2 (DFA, 1/178/3, Vol. 5). 
830 ' i.s. Gabon aangeleenthede ', from Jan Boyazoglou to Brand Fourie, Paris, II July 1975, p.2 (DFA, 
1/178/3, Vol. 5) (translation from Afrikaans). 
831 'i.s. Gabon aangeleenthede', from Jan Boyazoglou to Brand Fourie, Paris, II July 1975 (DFA, 1/178/3, 
Vol. 5) (translation from Afrikaans); hand-written note from Jean-Pierre Daniel to Brand Fourie, Libreville, 24 
July 1975 (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 5) (translation from French). 
832 Letter from Jean-Pierre Daniel to Pi Pienaar, Libreville, 19 July 1975, p.l; hand-written note from Jean-
Pierre Daniel to Brand Fourie, Libreville, 24 July 1975 (translation from French); ' ils Gaboen besoek', from Jan 
Boyazoglou to Brand Fourie, Paris, 26 July 1975 (DFA, 1/178/3, Vol. 5). 
833 'Use of Franceville airport: discussion at S.A.A. headquarters on 13 August 1975 between Mr. J.P. Daniel 
and Captain Pienaar and Mr. F. Swarts', August 1975 (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 6). 
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tary Fourie and Deputy Secretary Killen: "I am lost in the matter and I do not know how I 
must handle it to have the least harm as a result"'3S However, due to their senior positions in 
the foreign service corps, F ourie and Killen adopted a pragmatic stance in order not to further 
damage the Gabon-South African relationship. They retained the 3 million Rand loan offer, 
the possibility of an additional 9 million Rand loan, the arrangement of the weekly Affretair 
flight to Johannesburg, the Safair deal in Gabon, while qualifying SAA's interest in the 
Franceville option by proposing the "principle of SAA eventually landing at Franceville, and 
with deviation rights at Libreville", the latter reflecting SAA's principal interest.'36 This news, 
forwarded via Daniel, was apparently to Bongo's satisfaction, as he authorised his Economics 
and Finance Minister'37 to sign the 3 million Rand loan agreement for the improvement of 
Franceville airport, with Pretoria on 13 September 1975.'38 The soft conditions of the loan 
comprised an interest rate of 4% and repayment in forty half-yearly instalments commencing 
on 1 January 1977; Pik Botha later approved Bongo's request for a two-year moratorium.'39 
DFA documents reveal the likely involvement of South Africa's engineering company, Rob-
erts Construction, in the planned construction of "aeroplane parking facilities and fuel storage 
tanks" at Franceville airport. Similar to Roberts Construction's interest in the construction of 
a railway line in Gabon during 1971172, the company's engagement in this project was 
probably also facilitated through the personal affiliation between Jan Boyazoglou at the Paris 
Embassy and Stephen Boyazoglou of Roberts Construction. In particular, Jan Boyazoglou and 
Killen were in co-operation with Daniel over the firm' s participation in the project at France-
ville airport,'" even though Boyazoglou's brief was the OGAPROV project. As the available 
DFA files up to 1979 contain no further documentation on this project, we doubt whether it 
834 'Visit of Jean-Pierre Daniel on Wednesday 13 August to South Africa', from Jan Boyazoglou to Brand 
Fourie, Paris, 18 August 1975, pp.lf. (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 6). 
835 'Visit of Jean-Pierre Daniel on Wednesday 13 August to South Africa', from Jan Boyazoglou to Brand 
Fourie, Paris, 18 August 1975, p.2 (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 6). 
836 ' reo Gabon arrangement with special reference to AFFRETAIR', from Jan Boyazoglou to Brand Fourie (to 
be opened by Rae Killen in Fourie' s absence), Paris, 25 August 1975 (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 7). 
837 'Pouvoirs' , from Omar Bongo, Libreville, 12 September 1975 (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 7). 
'38 'Second Draft of the 'Loan Agreement entered into by and between the Government of the Republic of 
South Africa and the Government of the Gabonese Republic', October (DFA, 11 178/3, Vol. 5); 'Gabon: relations 
with South Africa and technical aid', from Anton Loubser, Pretoria, 2 October 1978, p.1 (DFA, 11178/4, Vol. 
16). 
839 'Questions to be raised during Mr. J.P. Daniel 's visit during July 1979', from J. Williams, Pretoria, 28 
June 1979, pp.lf. (DFA, 1/178/3, Vol. 9). 
840 'Gabon: discussions on 8 August 1975 at S.A.A. headquarters', from Johan Pretorius, Pretoria, August 
1975; 'Notes on a meeting at 10.30 hours Friday, 8th August in S.A. Airways Boardroom, Air Terminal, Johan-
nesburg', August 1975 (DFA, 11178/3, Vol. 6); ' re: Gabon - Roberts Construction Co.' , from Julian Thomas to 
Nbie Burger, Paris, 21 November 1975 (DFA, 11178/4, Vol. 13; 11178/3, Vol. 7). 
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was ever realised. South African Airways never used Franceville airport due to the uncer-
tainty of jet fuel supply, but the airline was granted emergency landing rights in Libreville.84 ! 
In assessing Pretoria's co-operation with Bongo in the Affretair-Safair deal, one cannot 
escape the impression that Gabon's President was working to his own advantage. In his study 
on Gabon's relations with French, French journalist Pean aptly describes Bongo's ability to 
manipulate matters to his own advantage by stating that Bongo "had become master in the art 
of driving a wedge between each clan and to then profit from the conflict".842 In this instance, 
he linked the Safair landing rights that served the military to the DFA's interest in obtaining 
landing rights for SAA and his own interest in Affretair and meat transport. Obviously judg-
ing them to have significant political influence, Bongo kept his agreement with the military, 
while the offer of Franceville airport to SAA was only a token. Given the importance of the 
Safair armament deliveries for the military, Bongo more than likely calculated that they 
would pressurise the national airline in accepting the deal, providing Affretair with the re-
quested access to profitable air routes. In fact, South African Airways became something of a 
pawn in Bongo's plans, as Affretair did not adhere to the agreement with SAA and concluded 
a simultaneous air cargo arrangement with the French airline VIA. Apart from Bongo him-
self, the main beneficiary was Pretoria's military, as the Safair stopovers in Libreville allowed 
them to deliver parts for Armscor' s subsequent armament production. This factor contributed 
to the military's confidence in becoming directly involved in the Angolan war, a highly sig-
nificant step compared to its earlier and comparatively minor roles in the Congo during 1964 
and in the Nigerian Civil War five years later. The Angolan war has been mentioned above as 
the likely reason why Pretoria did not, eventually, participate in two schemes that aimed at 
strengthening Mobutu's position, even though they would have harmonised with Pretoria's 
desire to keep anticommunist Mobutu in power as an important Detente ally. An investigation 
into this war is necessary for this reason alone. It is furthermore of significance, as it high-
lights the policy differences and rivalries between BOSS and the military in the context of 
Pretoria' s current Africa policy, with important implications for South Africa's subsequent 
foreign relations with Africa. 
841 Telephone interview with Frans Swarts, 7 December 2002. 
842 Pean. 1983. Affaires africaines, p.245 (translation from French). Also Barnes, James Franklin. 2003. The 
Bongo Phenomenon: Power in Gabon, in Michael Charles Reed, James Franklin Barnes, eds. Culture, Ecology, 
and Politics in Gabon's Rainforest. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press: 309-331. 
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Angolan War 
Pretoria's Detente had been conceived in reaction to Portugal's withdrawal from Angola and 
Mozambique during 1974175. Its initiatives in settling the Rhodesia and S.W.A./Namibia is-
sues were an attempt to safeguard the security of South Africa' s white population and to si-
multaneously ease the strained relations with African states. In both Angola and Mozambique, 
however, the possibility of communist forces coming to power was imminent. Regarding Mo-
zambique, the Portuguese government recognised the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRE-
LIMO)'" as the only liberation movement and its leader, Samora Machel, led the country to 
independence on 25 June 1975.844 Once Portugal began retreating from Mozambique, the mili-
tary revived co-operation with South Africa's long-standing ally in Africa, Malawi, to ensure 
the security of both countries; as was noted in the earlier section on the Outward Movement, a 
Military Attache was accredited at the South African Mission in Lilongwe from its inception 
in 1967. A background report written by Under-Secretary Pretorius for Minister Muller's visit 
to Malawi on 15/16 July 1974 reveals the launch of Operation Dobbin. This project entailed 
the delivery of a patrol boat to ensure the security of Lake Malawi, common to both Malawi 
and Mozambique, and of training facilities for potential Malawi sailors at the South African 
seaport of Durban. The same report notes that a Malawi military team "had a very successful 
visit to the Republic to investigate possibilities of purchasing certain equipment", and the 
prospects seemed "favourable" that the SADF "will be able to supply the requirements indi-
cated by them". ' 4l Finally, a DFA report from circa October 1977 summarises: "Military co-
operation excellent with a very able Military Attache". '46 
While FRELIMO was unrivalled in Mozambique at the time of independence, three lib-
eration movements were opposed over who was to govern an independent Angola, with the 
generally western-oriented FNLA and UNIT A fighting the communist-Marxist MPLA (Fig-
ure 4). The Alvor Accord of 15 January 1975, stipulating a cease-fire among the liberation 
movements and setting November of that year as the independence date, was short-lived; in 
August, the FNLA-UNITA coalition declared war against the MPLA.'47 South Africa's na-
843 Frente de Liberta9ao de M09ambique. 
844 De Braganca, Aquino, Basil Davidson. 1988. Independence Without Decolonization: Mozambique, 1974-
1975, in Prosser Gifford, William Roger Louis, eds. Decolonization and African Independence: The Transfers of 
Power, 1960-1980. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press: 427-443. 
845 'Relations with Malawi: background for Minister's visit 15-16 July 1974', from Johan Pretorius, 5 July 
1974, p.5 (DFA, 1/158/3, Vol. 9). 
' 46 'Notas vir Minister se besoek', ca. October 1977, p.4 (DFA, 1/158/3, Vol. 16) (translation from Afri-
kaans). 
841 Somerville, Keith. 1986. Angola: Politics, Economics and Society. London: Frances Pinter; Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner. 
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tional intelligence and the military exploited this rivalry, hoping to bring a Pretoria-friendly 
liberation movement to power, and, in February 1975, established contact with both Holden 
Roberto and Jonas Savimbi, the FNLA and UNITA leader respectively. They became Preto-
ria's partners because of their anticommunist stance and because they gave assurances of their 
sentiments against SWAPO that fought for Namibia's independence. '48 In Washington, and 
parallel to these developments, the CIA was predisposed to support both the FNLA and 
UNIT A, but the US Congress "had no stomach for another intervention so soon" after the 
Vietnam debacle and banned all military assistance to any of the Angolan liberation move-
ments. '" To overcome this embargo, the State Department, specifically Secretary of State 
Kissinger, approached Zaire's Mobutu, seeing in him a force for political stability in Central 
Africa and an ally against the MPLA. In combining its interest in the FNLA and Mobutu, 
Kissinger'S support for the FNLA and circumventing the ban on military support to Angola's 
liberation movements, the CIA, according to South African military commentator Hilton Ha-
mann, arranged "for Zaire to supply armaments to the FNLA and then simply replenished 
Mobutu' s stocks";850 for this purpose, it launched a secret operation, code-named IAFEA-
TURE.'s! From Pretoria's side, BOSS appears to have co-operated with the US intelligence 
agency by aiding the FNLA. A BOSS report from 21 November 1974, made available to 
Brand Fourie, reveals that its support for the FNLA aimed specifically at appealing to Mo-
butu, Pretoria' s potential Detente ally: "Mobutu's policies ( ... ) are solely an expression of his 
ambition to playa leading role in Africa. The only curb to this ambition resides in his in-
capacity to play it alone".'52 Consequently, in the first half of 1975, and parallel to the Preto-
ria-Kinshasa interaction examined previously, BOSS officials met FNLA representatives on 
several occasions to discuss areas of possible support, and Mobutu "most likely knew of and 
approved these contacts", as stated by political scientist Thomas Callaghy.85J 
While BOSS sided with the northern-based FNLA in order to appeal to Mobutu within the 
context of Detente, the military favoured UNITA, whose predominantly southern support was 
possibly judged to be the safer option in protecting Namibia from SW APO incursions. There 
was also the possibility that they considered UNIT A stronger than the FNLA, making it more 
likely that this liberation movement would govern an independent Angola. The seemingly 
84' Gleijeses. 2001 . Conflicting Missions, p.277_ 
'49 Crockatt. 1995. The Fifty Years War, p .282; Kissinger. 1999. Years of Renewal, p.792. 
850 Hamann. 2001. Days of the Generals, pp.18f. Also Kissinger. 1999. Years of Renewal, p.802. 
,s! Gleijeses. 2001. Conflicting Missions, pp.282f. 
852 Letter from BOSS's Secretary for Security Information to Brand Fourie, Pretoria, 2 December 1974, with 
the attached document 'Zalre: Mobutu's attitude towards the RSA', 2 1 November 1974 (DFA, 111 12/3, Vol. 6). 
85J Callaghy. 1985. Zaire and Southern Africa, pp.74f. Also Kelly. 1993. America 's Tyrant, pp.216ff. 
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opposite approaches followed by BOSS and the military supplemented each other, however, 
as their combined support for the FNLA and UNIT A encircled the MPLA in the central part 
of Angola, enhancing the chances for its defeat. In June 1975, General Constand Viljoen,'S4 
Director General of Operations and Principal Staff Officer to the Chief of the SADF, and 
BOSS Head van den Bergh prepared a list of weapons for both Roberto and Savimbi and, 
after Vorster's approval, delivered this covert assistance to them in mid-July 1975. In his 
well-documented and source-based study, Gleijeses suggests that BOSS, due to its "notori-
ously close" relations with the CIA, had previously sounded out Washington so as not inter-
fere with US plans. '5S This supports the view, often advanced in these pages, that BOSS was 
working in line with the CIA over southern Africa. Yet, in late August 1975, the situation 
changed when Cuba sent military advisers to the MPLA in reaction to the assistance chan-
nelled by the US and South Africa to the FNLA through Zaire.'56 In response, South African 
troops were deployed into Angola, with the first soldiers arriving on 14 October 1975. Vor-
ster's decision brought to a head the conflict between the military and BOSS, aided by the 
foreign service officials in this instance, over Pretoria' s southern African policy. The discus-
sion of the related events is important, because it will assist us in understanding why P.W. 
Botha, then Minister of Defence, became Prime Minister three years later. 
Unsurprisingly, Foreign Minister Muller had opposed the move of sending South African 
troops to Angola, considering it a flagrant contradiction of South Africa's stance of non-
interference in the domestic affairs of another state, and fearing that "South Africa could en-
danger detente by fighting in a black African state and running the risk of being branded an 
aggressor by the OAU and the UN",'" according to Deon Geldenhuys. However, with refer-
ence to his weak profile, Gleijeses notes that Muller was "largely excluded from the deci-
sion".'58 Van den Bergh also opposed a direct military involvement, and following upon the 
desires of the CIA, favoured arms supplies to the FNLA through Zaire.'" In sharp contrast, 
the military advocated the idea of deploying troops, and the argumentation of the powerful 
Defence Minister P.W. Botha evidently gained the hearing of Prime Minister Vorster. The 
military proposed to intervene in Angola due to the conviction that South Africa 's security 
854 Director General of Operations and Principal Staff Officer to the Chief of the SADF (1974-76); Chief of 
the Anny (1977-79); Chief Commander of the SADF (1980-85). Harber and Ludmann. 1994. A-Z of South Afri-
can Politics, pp.152f. 
855 Geldenbuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.80; Gieijeses. 2001. Conflicting Missions, pp.276f., 291. 
'56 Gleijeses. 2001. Conflicting Missions, pp.259ff 
857 Geldenbuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.80. 
'58 Gleijeses. 2001. Conflicting Missions, p.298. 
'59 Gleijeses. 2001. Conflicting Missions, p.298. 
CHAPTER FOUR: PRIME MINISTER VORSTER, 1966-78 254 
was threatened should a communist government come to power in Luanda. In addition, we 
argue that they had the ambitious plan of becoming a continental power by fighting alongside 
the Western superpower, in a motivation similar to their involvement with France over the 
Nigerian Civil War. SADF General Viljoen confirms this assumption, by commenting that "it 
was good for South Africa to be cooperating with a big force like the U.S., even though it was 
clandestine" .860 Although this view later justified the military's argument that, by withdrawing 
from Angola, the US administration had betrayed them and the struggle against communism, 
Viljoen' s statement is probably not devoid of the truth. Notably, informed accounts suggest 
that Washington had sent mixed signals, giving some foundation to the military' s later feel-
ings of betrayal. Gleijeses, in particular, convincingly argues that while direct approval of 
Pretoria's invasion could not be proven, Washington had not discouraged it either and later 
collaborated with South African troops, contrary to what Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
testified before Congress and wrote in his memoirs.861 Another often-cited reason for the mili-
tary sending troops to Angola, and in similar fashion to the Nigerian Civil War, was the en-
couragement from African states, further supporting the notion that the military desired to 
attain the status of a continental power. 862 Notably, Gleijeses proposes that pleas for such an 
intervention had come from the Ivory Coast, Zaire, Zambia and even Senegal,863 while Gen-
eral Viljoen suggests that the military's decision to support UNIT A was the result of requests 
from Zaire and Zambia: 
I got the impression from P.W. Botha and Vorster that they saw the request from black 
Africa as the sign of a breakthrough ( ... ). It was a very important development because, 
ever since we 'd been involved with the Rhodesian situation, and because of the assistance 
we gave to the Portuguese in Mozambique and Angola, it had become clear to us in the 
military that the real issue for us would be to become part of Africa. The opinion-makers 
regarded this as a breakthrough. South Africa was starting to side with black Africa in-
stead of the colonial powers. This was perhaps the most important reason for participating 
in the whole effort, apart from the idea of combating communism.864 
While these statements cannot be verified, the previous section showed that Pretoria's interac-
tion with the Ivory Coast and Senegal continued beyond the Angolan war and only came to a 
standstill due to Pretoria' s intransigent attitude towards apartheid and the S.W.A./Namibia 
issue. This continued relationship suggests that P.W. Botha' s military invasion in Angola may 
have had their backing. Pretoria's contact certainly continued with Zaire's Mobutu, who was 
860 Cited in Gleijeses. 200 I. Conflicting Missions, p.297 . 
861 Gleijeses. 2001. Conj/icting Missions, pp.341, 389; Hamann. 2001. Days of the Generals, p.40; Kissinger. 
1999. Years of Renewal, p.820. 
862 Moorcraft. 1981. Africa's Super Power. 
863 Gleijeses. 2001. Conflicting Missions, pp.298, 327. 
864 Hamann. 2001. Days of the Generals, p.15. 
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a significantly motivating factor causing Prime Minister Vorster to become involved in An-
gola in the first place, even though the deepening of Zaire's economic crisis strained the dip-
lomatic and economic contact. By May 1977, the outstanding amount owed by Kinshasa, 
without interest, amounted to almost 11.9 million Rand. 865 Despite South African missions 
during 1977 "to call the attention of the Zaire authorities to the escalating unpaid debt", for-
eign service officer Jaquet concluded in July of that year that "no positive action to start re-
payment of amounts outstanding is expected" . 866 Later documentation shows that no repay-
ments took place until March 1979, when yet another South African delegation composed of 
representatives from the Departments of Industries and Cornmerce and Credit Guarantee vis-
ited Zaire "to press various bodies to repay outstanding lines of credit amounting to around 
R13 million" .'67 
Having explored the approaches of BOSS, the DFA and the military towards the Angolan 
war and the predominance of the latter in Vorster's decision to send troops, we now need to 
examine the subsequent developments, as this reveals a shift in the balance of power among 
the three state actors . In late December 1975, Vorster held three meetings related to the situa-
tion in Angola with Hilgard Muller, P.W. Botha, Hendrik van den Bergh and their senior offi-
cials, during which the BOSS and foreign service officials pushed through a decision for the 
phased troop withdrawal from Angola after 6 January 1976.86' Their strengthened bargaining 
position at this stage lay in the negative military situation in Angola; it became obvious that 
South Africa could not win the war. The FNLA offensive in the north had virtually collapsed, 
and South African troops and its ally, UNIT A, were still fighting MPLA soldiers with heavy 
Cuban and Soviet military support some three hundred kilometres to the south of Luanda. The 
capture of the capital was critical because the MPLA had declared Angola' s independence on 
II November 1975 and installed itself as the country' s government,'·9 but Washington un-
dermined Pretoria' s military plans. Crucially, on 19 December, Congress adopted the Clark 
Amendment, banning further covert military assistance to both the FNLA and UNITA, and 
the Ford administration appealed to Pretoria not to attack Luanda. '70 Washington' s changed 
865 'Unpaid exports made from South Africa to Zaire ', ca. May 1977, p.2 (DFA, 11112/3, Vol. 9). 
866 'Visit to Zaire: 10 to 12 July 1977', from Andre Jaquet, Pretoria, 19 July 1977, p.2 (OFA, 111 12/3, Vol. 9). 
867 'Official visit to Kinshasa, Zaire (4 to 7 March 1979), from R.G.C. Metcalfe to Brand Fourie, Pretoria, 8 
March 1979, p .1 (OFA, 111 12/3, Vol. 10). 
868 Geldenhuys. 1984. Th e Diplomacy of Isolation, p.82; Gleijeses. 2001. Conflicting Missions, pp.340f.; 
Hamann. 2001. Days of the Generals, p.41. 
869 Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation , pp.77f. 
870 Gleijeses. 2001. Conflicting Missions, p.341 ; Hallett, Robin. 1978. The South African Intervention in An-
gola 1975-1976, African Affairs 77, 308: 372. 
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attitude at this point in time was due to geo-political considerations that need closer examina-
tion, as it explains why South Africa's military felt betrayed by the US. 
Irrespective of what had motivated them to support the FNLA and UNIT A or the MPLA 
respectively, Washington and Moscow subsequently were at loggerheads for having broken 
the rules of Detente relevant to their relationship, specifically those laid down in the afore-
mentioned Basic Principles of Relations. In consequence, their respective engagements in the 
Angolan war led to the failure of the superpower Detente.'" In contrast, Washington and Bei-
jing had undertaken successful steps towards rapprochement. Importantly, in the midst of the 
Angolan war, Kissinger had gone to China in October and November 1975 to hold talks with 
the country's political leadership. S72 This was followed, on 3 December 1975, by a meeting 
between US President Ford and Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in Beijing in the presence of 
Kissinger and other high-ranking US and Chinese officials. S1J The Angolan war, in which Bei-
jing was also involved, was an important focus of the talks, as we know from a memorandum 
that Piero Gleijeses has declassified from the US National Archives'" Like the Americans, 
the Chinese channelled support to the FNLA through Zaire.'" While an extension of growing 
Sino-Soviet rivalry, Beijing's support for African liberation movements was also an expres-
sion of its ambition to establish its revolutionary credibility and thereby bolster its own global 
position.' 76 However, Deng Xiaoping realised this plan could be jeopardised as the FNLA was 
receiving concurrent support from the apartheid regime. Thus, in answer to Ford's and Kiss-
inger' s entreaties during the December meeting for Beijing's continued Detente co-operation, 
the Chinese leader declared: "We hope that through the work of the two sides we can both 
bring about a better situation there. The relatively complex problem there is the involvement 
of South Africa" .S77 In response to Deng' s concern, Kissinger blatantly stated: "We are pre-
pared to push South Africa out as soon as an alternative military force can be created", and 
President Ford added: "We had nothing to do with the South African involvement, and we 
811 Bowker. 1983. Superpower Detente, p.114; Crockat!. 1995. The Fifty Years War, p.282; Litwak, Robert S. 
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813 Gleijeses. 2001. Conflicting Missions, pp.330f. 
'" Available at <http://www.gwu.edul- nsarchivINSAEBBINSAEBB67/gleijeses4.pdf.>. 
' 71 Andresen, Fernando. 1997. The Origins of the Angolan Civil War: Foreign Intervention and Domestic Po-
litical Conflict. New York: St. Martin's Press; Ignatyev, Oleg K. 1977. Secret Weapon in Africa. Moscow: Pro-
gress Publishers: 112-133. 
816 Larrabee, Stephen. 1976. Moscow, Angola and the Dialectics of Detente, Th e World Today 32, 5: 175; 
Legum, Colin. 1976. The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa, Foreign Affairs 54, 4: 745-762; 
Ogunsanwo, A1aba. 1974. China's Polioy in Africa, 1958-1971. London: Cambridge University Press; Yu, 
George T. 1972. Peking' s African Diplomacy, Problems of Communism 21 , 2: 16. 
877 <http://www.gwu.edul- nsarchivINSAEBBINSAEBB67/gleijeses4.pdf.>, p.19 . 
CHAPTER FOUR: PRIME MINISTER VORSTER, 1966-78 257 
will take action to get South Africa out, provided a balance can be maintained for their not 
being in".s78 It appears, however, that Washington considered Detente with Beijing of such 
importance that it withdrew from Angola anyway, without replacing the South African pres-
ence. 
After this brief analysis of the Cold War implications on the Angolan war, we now pro-
ceed to the consequences of Pretoria's involvement. Possibly aware of the reasons behind 
Washington's departure from the Angolan war, Pretoria' s military withdrew its last troops on 
27 March 1976, with the bitter feeling of betrayal by the US administration.'79 P.W. Botha 
expressed this very pointedly in a statement before Parliament on 17 April 1978: 
I know of only one occasion in recent years when we crossed a border and that was in the 
case of Angola when we did so with the approval and knowledge of the Americans. But 
they left us in the lurch. We are going to tell that story: the story must be told of how we, 
with their knowledge, went in there and operated in Angola with their knowledge, how 
they encouraged us to act and, when we had nearly reached the climax, we were ruth-
lessly left in the lurch"· 
While the military complained about having been treated unfairly, they themselves were ac-
cused of having destroyed Pretoria's Detente plans in Africa, as is generally expressed in the 
secondary literature.' 81 Particularly strong criticism came from the foreign service officials, 
who had been powerless to stop P.W. Botha from sending troops to Angola. For example, 
career foreign service officer Donald Sole argues that they had "ruined" Pretoria's ambitions 
in Africa.'82 However, in the discussion of Pretoria's relations with, most notably, the Ivory 
Coast, Senegal and Liberia in the previous section, we revealed that they in no way suffered a 
setback because of the Angolan war involvement. Rather, Presidents Houphouet-Boigny and 
Tolbert were disillusioned over Pretoria's treatment of the black population in South Africa 
and its uncompromising attitude towards the S.W.A./Namibia issue. Regarding Senghor, he 
withdrew from contact with South Africa due to Vorster's non-reply to his request of a fact-
finding mission, on the advice seemingly given by the foreign service officials themselves. 
We therefore suggest that the military invasion in Angola conveniently served them in cover-
ing up the fact that their attitude had led to the failure of Dialogue and further, that they were 
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4851f. 
'81 Barber and Barratt. 1990. South Africa'S Foreign Policy, p.215; Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy oflso-
lotion, p.39; Geldenhuys. 1994. The Head of Government and South Africa's Foreign Relations, p.272; Legum. 
1980. South Africa in the Contemporary World, p.291; Thomas, Scott. 1996. The Diplomacy of Liberation: The 
Foreign Relations of the African National Congress since 1960. London: LB. Tauris: 246f. 
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unable to devise a suitable strategy that would have alleviated South Africa's international 
isolation and to convince the Prime Minister of its viability. 
This takes us to the end of the discussion on Pretoria's foreign relations with Africa during 
the second half of Vorster's premiership. Secret Diplomacy and Detente constituted the last 
two phases of the Outward-Looking Policy. This term was used to describe the Prime Minis-
ter's foreign policy towards Africa, and it is appropriate that the concluding section in this 
chapter provides an assessment of the results achieved during Vorster's twelve years as the 
country's political leader. 
Outward-Looking Policy: An Assessment 
Vorster's pragmatic policy approach led to heavy inter-departmental rivalries between the 
Departments of Foreign Affairs and Information, as well as between BOSS and the military 
over Pretoria's foreign relations with black Africa, resulting in four different approaches 
within the Outward-Looking Policy. In order to analyse the success of the Outward Move-
ment, of Dialogue, Secret Diplomacy and Detente respectively, it is helpful to summarise the 
activities by the different state actors on a country-by-country basis and in the order presented 
in this chapter (Table 5). Before examining their credentials individually, a few general re-
marks need to be made. Most importantly, none of the different policies had served to break 
South Africa's isolation, Pretoria's overarching objective in Africa. They produced short-term 
successes, discussed henceforth, but they "failed to produce any substantive and lasting politi-
cal benefits for South Africa".'" Based on the findings in this study, we are therefore in 
agreement with the secondary literature that the achievements of the Outward-Looking Policy 
in Africa were modest but did not lead to a modus vivendi with Africa. 884 
88' Sole. 1994. South African Foreign Policy Assumptions and Objectives from Hertzog to de Klerk, p.IIO. 
8830eldenbuys. 1994. The Head of Govemment and South Africa's Foreign Relations, p.27 I. 
. 84 Barber and Barratt. 1990. South Africa's Foreign Policy, pp.149f.; Breytenbach, W.J. 1977. South Africa 
Looks to Africa, pp.2f.; Geldenhuys. 1994. The Head of Government and South Africa's Foreign Relations, 
pp.27Iff.; Legum. 1976. Vorster's Gamble/or A/rica, p.29; Legum. 1980. South Africa in the Contemporary 
World, p.291; Mills, Gregory John Barrington 'Greg', Simon Baynham. 1990. Changing the Guard: South Afri-
can Foreign Policy Into the 1990s, A/rica Insight 20,3: 179; Olivier. 1982. South Africa 's Relations with Africa, 
p.285; Venter, D. 1980. South Africa and Black Africa, pp.13-21; Venter, D. 1980. Black Africa and the Apart-
heid Issue, pp.94-97; Venter, Denis. 1993. South Africa and Africa: Towards Reconciliation, Anmie a/ricaine, 
1992193: 398f. 
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Table 5: Results of the Outward-Looking Policy on a Country-to-Country Basis 
Country Actors Result 
.... Diplomatic relations after 1967; economic interaction; devel-'tl c Malawi DFA .. " opment/investment projects os e ~ .. 
.... > 
= 0 Madagascar DFA End of contact after coup d'etat against Tsiranana in 1972 0::;: 
Chad Military, End of contact due to political turmoil DFA 
" 
Gabon Military Military co-operation in the Nigerian Civil War; OGAPROV 
= OIl Military co-operation in the Nigerian Civil War; Houphouet-0 Ivory Coast Military 
-;; Boigny's pro-Dialogue statement in November 1970 Q Ghana Military End of contact after coup d' etat against Busia in 1972 
Uganda DFA End of contact after Vorster's refusal of aiurist delegation 
Mauritius DFA Landing rights for SAA; economic interaction 
Vorster visits the Ivory Coast in September 1974; technical land-
Ivory Coast, BOSS,DFA, ing rights for SAA; Houphouet-Boigny withdraws because of 
Senegal Information Biko ' s death and S.W.A./Namibia; Senghor withdraws be-
cause ofVorster' s non-reply over fact-fInding mission 
Liberia DFA Vorster meets with Tolbert in Liberia in February 1975; Tolbert 
,., withdraws due to S.W.A./Namibia 
" os C.A.R. DFA Development/investment proj ects and technical assistance, e 
0 experiencing mainly fInancial diffIculties 
-a Sudan BOSS Q -
.... Cameroon DFA -
" .. Comoros DFA Landing rights for SAA; end of contact after coup d' etat in 
" 
" 1975 
'" Madagascar BOSS -
Mauritius BOSS,DFA Landing rights for SAA; tourism 
Reunion DFA Landing rights for SAA 
Seychelles BOSS, In- Landing rights for SAA until early 1980s; tourism formation 
BOSS,DFA, Economic interaction; development/investment projects; co-
" Zaire Information, .... operation in the Angolan war c 
" 
military .... 
. " Gabon Military, Landing rights for Safair armament deliveries; restricted land-Q 
DFA ing rights for SAA 
Africa's political instability proved to be one obstacle to Pretoria's ambitions, with leadership 
changes often resulting in a reversal of policy by a specific country towards South Africa. 
This occurred in Ghana, Madagascar, the Comoros and, it may be added here, in the Central 
African Republic during September 1979. A more serious problem was the lack of co-
ordination and co-operation between the foreign affairs ministry, the Department of informa-
tion, BOSS and the military. In fact, the circumstances surrounding Pretoria's contact with 
Senegal and its engagement in the Angolan war vividly revealed that the different objectives 
and approaches of the former two state actors served to offset each other. The rivalry among 
the departments also made them prone to external manipulation, such as that most ably exer-
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cised by Gabon's Bongo, who played the military against the foreign service officials to his 
own advantage. Yet, these factors were comparatively minor reasons for the failure of Preto-
ria's Outward-Looking Policy. The major obstacle in placing rapprochement between South 
Africa and black Africa on a stable basis was the apartheid ideology, with the differing inter-
pretations of the Dialogue concept becoming an additional stumbling block. For Pretoria, it 
meant explaining apartheid to ill-informed African states, while retaining the domestic status 
quo. In contrast, those African countries that participated in Dialogue saw it as a means of 
instituting significant political change in South Africa. As long as Pretoria did not acknowl-
edge this fundamental reality, an amelioration of South Africa's continental and international 
standing was impossible. The only substantial concession Pretoria made was its withdrawal 
from Rhodesia, leading to the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980. In trying to resolve the 
S.W.A./Namibia issue, in a territory which was closer to South Africa's political nerve than 
Rhodesia, the initiated Turnhalle Conference was a deliberate attempt to temper African de-
mands. Thus, the more African states wanted Dialogue to confront the central issue at stake, 
apartheid, the less Pretoria was prepared to change. 
Indeed, in an analysis of their Africa approaches, it becomes apparent that the Depart-
ments of Foreign Affairs and Information, BOSS and the military were guided by the notion 
that the apartheid system as represented by white minority rule, was there to stay. In starting 
with the role of the foreign affairs ministry, its main achievement during the Outward Move-
ment was the establishment of relations with Malawi on an ambassadorial level, but this was a 
relatively unimportant country in terms of political influence on the African continent. The 
Department of Foreign Affairs' only other success was Vorster's visit to Liberia. Yet, in the 
issue of obtaining overflying and landing rights for South African Airways, the foreign ser-
vice officials did not achieve their principal goal of establishing an air corridor through Af-
rica. This was largely due to the attitude adopted towards African states that proved to be non-
conducive in establishing a working relationship. In particular, their perceived likeness to a 
development agency implied an unequal relationship and promoted disrespectful behaviour. 
In the case of Uganda, probably also Senegal, the foreign service officers ignored the presi-
dential requests to ascertain the situation of South Africa's majority by sending fact-finding 
missions. A speech of Minister Hilgard Muller to the Foreign Affairs Club in London in Sep-
tember 1975 is evidence of the somewhat arrogant attitude held by the foreign service offi-
cials in this regard: 
To the black African States the question of one-man-one-vote should not be such a burn-
ing issue as discriminatory measures which degrade the black man and impair his human 
dignity. After all, very few African States have a good record of franchise issues and it is 
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commonly recognized that there are more ways of ensuring an orderly, democratic soci-
ety.88' 
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In comparison, and due to its more verligte attitude, the Department of Information produced 
respectable successes with Vorster's visit to the Ivory Coast, meeting with both Houphouet-
Boigny and Senghor, two senior African leaders with significant influence in continental poli-
tics. At the same time, even Information Minister Mulder was not prepared to abandon the 
apartheid policy. In fact, we could see that there were serious rifts among the Afrikaner com-
munity over the issue of separate development and to what extent this should be taken, a 
struggle defined by the gap between what African leaders expected from South Africa and 
what the politicians could do in view of a possible white conservative backlash. In any case, 
Pretoria's concept of separate development did not transcend what became the homelands, 
whose promotion as Pretoria' s reform commitment towards the country's majority completely 
failed to impress African leaders. The Western governments also rejected the idea on the 
grounds that the homelands "did not fit the legal definition of self-determination required for 
recognition as an independent state".886 Consequently, the international community recognised 
neither the Transkei nor Bophuthatswana when Pretoria granted them 'independence' in 1976 
and 1977 respectively. The minute changes influenced by the Department of Information in 
supposedly ameliorating the so-called 'petty apartheid', meaning discriminatory harassment 
of the black population, were almost pathetic. In May 1975, for the first time in the country's 
history, a Coloured was promoted to the rank of Officer within the South African Defence 
Force.88' In February 1976, the Minister of Justice, Police and Prisons, James Thomas 
' Jimmy' Kruger, announced that the government granted sixteen hotels the right to rent out 
rooms to black and Coloured people without having to obtain prior special permission. How-
ever, these guests had to have a "good reputation" and were not allowed to dance in the ho-
te!.888 These steps were clearly not sufficient for Pretoria to sustain its Dialogue policy, a vain 
hope expressed by the Department of Information' s mouthpiece To the Point in January 1972: 
"it is the future of the so-called "petty apartheid" ( ... ) which will determine whether the pro-
dialogue states are justified in their undertaking".88' 
In contrast to the strategies employed by both the DF A and the Department of Informa-
tion, neither BOSS nor the military focused mainly on breaking South Africa' s isolation. 
Their prime concern was to safeguard the security of white South Africa. The Detente initia-
'" Cited in Legum. 1976. Varster 's Gamble/or Ajdea, p.28. 
886 Spence. 1977. Detente in Southern Afiica, p.15. 
887 Keesing 's Arehiv der Gegenwart, 1975, p19454. 
888 Keesing 's Arehiv der Gegenwart, 1976, p.19998 (translation from Gennan). 
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tive was van den Bergh's response to the new situation in which the Republic found itself in 
southern Africa after Portugal's retreat from both Angola and Mozambique. Together with the 
Secret Diplomacy of its partner, the Department of Information, with both the Ivory Coast and 
Senegal, this seemed to be a promising development that would lead to an improvement in 
South Africa's continental and international position. However, while the foreign service offi-
cials appear to have undermined the contact with Senghor, the military sabotaged its rival' s 
Detente by invading Angola. Yet, this did not make P.W. Botha and his men winners in the 
game. In fact, the military can be considered as the main loser during Vorster's premiership. 
They established a particularly fruitful co-operation with President Bongo of Gabon, but suf-
fered setbacks in both the Nigerian Civil War and the Angolan war. Incidentally, their in-
volvement in the former led to Pretoria's Dialogue policy, but this was not even counted to 
their credit. Crucially, the humiliating military withdrawal from Angola in all likelihood fur-
ther heightened the rivalry between them and BOSS, and even impinged on South Africa's 
domestic political arrangements. In fact, as indicated in Chapter 2, the Information Scandal 
served as a smokescreen to camouflage the serious struggle over Vorster's succession be-
tween the men from the Department of Information and BOSS, represented by Connie 
Mulder, and the military leader P.W. Botha. It was not only a fight for the political control of 
South Africa and the country' s future direction, but it was also over Pretoria's foreign rela-
tions with Africa. Thus, when, on 28 September 1978, the National Party caucus voted against 
Mulder, and for P.W. Botha as South Africa's next Prime Minister, it was a choice for a hard-
line politician. This had serious consequences for the course followed by South Africa during 
his leadership, and particularly for the country's foreign relations with Africa, the implica-
tions of which are examined in the following chapter. 
8" To the Point 29 January 1972: 46. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
The Military in Command: 
Prime Minister and State President Botha, 1978-89 
Securocrats 
The dominance of the military became the principal characteristic of P.W. Botha' s foreign 
policy making towards black Africa beyond southern Africa throughout the 1980s. This de-
scription also applied to South Africa's foreign relations elsewhere and every aspect of public 
policy. This represented a volte-face in the rivalry between the Departments of Foreign Af-
fairs and Information, national intelligence and the military that was central to Vorster's pre-
miership. In a continuation of the performance during his long incumbency as the Minister of 
Defence from 1966 to 1978, and as evidenced with direct military involvement in both the 
Nigerian Civil War and the Angolan war, P.W. Botha pursued a realist approach, with power 
and the use of force considered to be the only effective means to achieve political ends. In 
Africa, and as shown in the previous chapter, the military's primary concern was South Af-
rica's security after the country's cordon sanitaire had ceased to exist during 1974175 with 
both Angola's and Mozambique' s independence. In addition, Rhodesia's majority rule came 
closer and with it the likelihood of another Marxist-/communist-oriented country on South 
Africa's border. Thus, whereas independent Africa had previously been relatively far away 
from white South African political reality, it was now at its doorstep. In consequence, the 
need for Pretoria to devise an Africa policy became more imperative than ever before. 
In interpreting the dramatic events in the region in the second half of the 1970s set against 
the background of the Cold War, the military argued that South Africa would be Moscow's 
next target. Its analysis of the situation found expression in successive Defence White Papers 
published from 1975. In summary, they reasoned that the Soviet Union tried to conquer min-
eral-rich and strategically important South Africa in its attempt to achieve global communist 
domination. For that purpose, assistance was provided to both the Angolan and Mozambican 
governments, and in turn these 'proxies' supported the ANC, PAC and SWAPO, particularly 
by harbouring their military camps, allowing them to launch attacks on South Africa and Na-
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mibia, which Pretoria still considered to be part of the Republic. l This appraisal went by the 
label 'Total Onslaught', such as formulated by the Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan, in 
1980.' The corresponding reaction became termed 'Total Strategy',' comprising military and 
economic means to force the neighbours to succumb to Pretoria's hegemony. A central aspect 
of the military dimension was the support for both Angola's UNITA and the Mozambican 
National Resistance (RENAMO)' through the 1980s, aimed at undermining the communist 
governments in Luanda and Maputo respectively, and this approach to managing regional 
relations became known as Destabilisation.' Southern Africa now effectively constituted the 
region with South Africa as the regional power. Before discussing the relevance of the geo-
graphic area beyond this area in Pretoria's Africa approach, we need to consider the interna-
tional political setting within which South Africa's foreign policy towards Africa took place. 
Similar to Vorster's Detente policy in the mid-1970s, the military acted in a wider geo-
political framework, now characterised by the failure of rapprochement between Washington 
and Moscow and heightened Cold War tension. As a result, the military saw and presented 
"its role within the international system as the Southern African bulwark against communist 
aggression and on the side of the West in a 'war of proxy', between the United States and the 
former USSR".' Primary Military Intelligence documentation of the mid-1970s reveals that 
the Soviet presence in southern Africa was a real concern.' At the same time, however, the 
stance against communism and the presentation of South Africa as the last outpost of Christi-
anity, free market economy and Western ideas on the African continent became important 
arguments to appeal to the Western governments for political support. The aim of gaining 
political backing for activities pursuant to ensuring the survival of the whites in South Africa 
1 See White Paper on Defence and Armament Production. 1975. Pretoria: Department of Defence: 7; White 
Paper on Defence. 1977. Pretoria: Department of Defence: 6-10; White Paper on Defence and Armaments Sup-
ply. 1979. Pretoria: Department of Defence: I; White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply. 1982. Pretoria: 
Department of Defence: iii,4; White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply. 1984. Pretoria: Department of 
Defence: 1. 
2 Malan, Magnus Andre de Merindol. 1980. Die aanslag teen Suid-Afrika, ISSUP Strategic Review Novem-
ber: 3-16. 
3 Selfe, James H. 1987. The Total Onslaught and the Total Strategy: Adaptations to the Security Intelligence 
Decision-Making Structures under the P. W. Botha Administration. MA, University of Cape Town. 
4 Resistencia Nacional Moyambicana. 
, See, for example, Callaghy, Thomas M., Larry Wells Bowman. 1983. South Africa in Southern Africa: The 
Intensifj;ing of Violence. New York: Praeger; Chan. 1990. Exporting Apartheid; Ge1denhuys, Deon Johannes, 
Frank William Gutteridge. 1983. Instability and Conflict in Southern Africa: South Africa's Role in Regional 
Security. London: Institute for the Study of Conflict; Hanlon. 1986. Apartheid's Second Front; Jaster. 1986. 
South Africa and Its Neighbours; Johnson and Martin. 1986. Destructive Engagement; Minter, William. 1994. 
Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique. Johannesburg: University of 
the Witwatersrand Press; London: Zed Books. 
'McCarthy. 1996. Challenges for the South African Intelligence Community, p.65. 
7DoD, Group 2, Vol. I, HS111I1I17, Vol. 31; HSI411318,1 +2, Vol. 119; HS14113113, Vol. 120. 
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was especially successful with Ronald Reagan, the Republican US President from 1981 to 
1988, and Margaret Thatcher, the Conservative British Prime Minister from 1979 to 1990, 
both of whom decidedly favoured the white minority government for its hefty anticommunist 
stance. Reagan's Constructive Engagement policy ensured the maintenance of overtly 
fiiendly relations with South Afiica until the mid-1980s ' On her part, Thatcher described the 
ANC as a "typical terrorist organisation'" and saw South Afiica as a bulwark against commu-
nism and as a supplier of strategic minerals. I. In addition, the conservative German Chancel-
lor from 1982 to 1998, Helmut Kohl, also pursued a Pretoria-fiiendly policy, especially over 
its former colony, Namibia, which was still inhabited by a large population of German de-
scent." The one principal Western power that took an increasingly critical position towards 
apartheid during the 1980s was France, due mainly to the stance of Socialist President Fran-
yois Mitterrand (1981-95). In reversing earlier French policy, and acknowledging the need to 
support the anti-apartheid struggle, the ANC was given permission to establish an Exile Mis-
sion in Paris in 1981, serving the liberation movement as another base to promote Pretoria's 
international isolation to force it to abandon its racial policies. Furthermore, Mitterrand was 
the only European leader to refuse a meeting with P.W. Botha during his tour of Europe in 
May 1984 and, on 24 July 1985, four days after Pretoria imposed a partial state of emergency, 
Paris recalled its ambassador for eleven months." 
This international constellation impacted on the work of the Western Contact Group. Es-
tablished in 1977 and composed of France, Great Britain, the United States, Canada and Ger-
many, it was supposed to advance the independence of Namibia. 13 In April 1978, both Pretoria 
and SW APO accepted the Contact Group's Namibia Peace Plan and the UN Security Council 
endorsed it with Resolution 435 of 29 September 1978, foreseeing "the early independence of 
Namibia through free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations"." 
8 Baker, Pauline H. 1989. The United States and South Africa: TI,e Reagan Years. New York: Ford Founda-
tion; Coker, Christopher. 1986. The United States and South Africa, 1968-1985: Constructive Engagement and 
its Critics. Durham: Duke University Press. 
9 At the 1987 Commonwealth Summit in Vancouver, cited in Freeman, Linda. 1989. All but One: Britain, the 
Commonwealth and Sanctions, in Mark Orkin, ed. Sanctions Against Apartheid. Cape Town: David Philip: 144. 
10 Hanlon, Joseph, Roger Omond. 1987. The Sanctions Handbook. Harmondsworth: Penguin: 145. 
11 Paralso, Jean-Yves. 1995. Bonn et la question sud-africaine, Politique africaine 60: 34-43 . 
12 Bach. 1990. Un systeme autonome de relations, pp.20lf.; Darbon. 1990. Les rapports franco-sud africains 
depuis 1977, pp.234ff. , 238; Holland, Martin. 1988. The European Community and South Africa: European 
Political Co-operation under Strain. London: Frances Pinter: 35,70. 
13 Karns, Margaret P. 1987. Ad hoc Multilateral Diplomacy: The Contact Group and Namibia, International 
Organization 41, I: 93-123; Redekop, Clarence G. 1979. The Limits of Diplomacy: The Case of Namibia, Inter-
national Journal 35, I: 70-90. 
14 SIRES/435; Du Pisani, Andre. 1980. A Review of the Diplomatic Efforts of the Western Contacl Group on 
Namibia, 1976-1980. Johannesburg: South African Institute ofIntemational Affairs. (Occasional Paper) 
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However, as the two most important Contact Group countries, Great Britain and the US, saw 
in Pretoria an ally against the progress of communism in Africa, the Contact Group' s work 
became paralysed. Crucially, during a visit to South Africa in June 1981, US Assistant Secre-
tary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, introduced the idea of the Cuban Linkage. ls 
This was met with relief in Pretoria, because it stipulated that South Africa would only have 
to adhere to Resolution 435 once the Cuban troops had withdrawn from Angola. 16 The Cuban 
Linkage reflected Reagan's obsession with the fight against communism and consequently 
"construing every local mess as a test of global will", as proposed by the renowned American 
historian Schiesinger. 11 Washington' s approach led to the virtual disbanding of the Contact 
Group and brought to a halt the search for a settlement of the S.W.A./Namibia case by trans-
forming the problem into a Cold War one. In a sense, one could summarise the situation by 
saying that an international protective shield had replaced the regional cordon sanitaire. In-
deed, Pretoria's military felt so reassured that, only two months after Crocker's presentation 
of the Cuban Linkage, it launched Operation Protea in August and Operation Daisy in No-
vember 1981 against SWAPO. Crucially, in the aftermath of Operation Protea, Washington 
vetoed a draft resolution seeking to condemn Pretoria, France supported it and Great Britain 
abstained. 18 
The international backing for the South African government began to crumble from the 
mid-1980s, when the Reagan and Thatcher policies attracted both domestic and external criti-
cism. In the US, a growing anti -apartheid movement exerted increasing pressure and brought 
about the fall of what became known as the Constructive Engagement policy; 19 in October 
1986, Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act against the presidential veto.'o 
In addition, the US government recognised the African National Congress and, in early 1987, 
IS Crocker, Chester A. 1981. Namibia/Angola Linkages, Africa Report 26,6: 10. 
16 Berridge, Geoffrey R. 1989. Linkage, the United Nations and the AngolalNamibia Accords. Paper pre-
sented at the African Studies Association of the UK Symposium " Angola and Namibia - Past, Present and Fu-
ture", London, 29 September; Sulton, James. 1984. Linkage, Constructive Engagement and the Anatomy of 
American Foreign Policy towards Namibia. Paper presented at a seminar on the efforts of the international 
community to end South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia, Montreal, 23-27 July. 
11 Schlesinger, Arthur Jr. 1983. Foreign Policy and the American Character, Foreign Affairs 62, I: 7. On 
Schlesinger, see Who's Who in America, 1998, p.3835. 
18 Barber and Barratt. 1990. South Africa's Foreign Policy, pp.279f.; Du Pisani. 1988. Beyond the Barracks. 
19 D' Amato, James Vincent. 1988. Constructive Engagement: The Rise and Fall of an American Foreign 
Policy. PhD, University of South Carolina, Columbia; Thomson, Alex. 1995. Incomplete Engagement: Reagan' s 
South Africa Policy Revisited, Journal of Modern African Studies 33 , I: 83-101; Ungar, Sanford 1., Peter Vale. 
1986. South Africa: Why Constructive Engagement Failed, Foreign Affairs 64, 2: 234-258. 
20 Culverson, Donald R. 1999. Contesting Apartheid: Us. Activism, 1960-1987. Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press; Love, Janice. 1985. The Us. Anti-Apartheid Movement: Local Activism in Global Politics. New York: 
Praeger. 
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Secretary of State George Shultz officially received ANC President Oliver Tambo. 21 Margaret 
Thatcher's pro-Pretoria stance came under attack from Commonwealth states, while the pres-
sure exerted by the European Community was less significant and is not considered here." In 
October 1985, the Commonwealth Heads of Govemment Meeting in Nassau, on the Baha-
mas, overrode the British Prime Minister by supporting a wide range of sanctions against 
South Africa. 23 Importantly, it laid the foundation for the Eminent Persons Group, which, co-
chaired by Malcolm Fraser, former Australian Prime Minister (1975-83), and Olusegon Oba-
sanjo, former Nigerian President (1976-79), visited South Africa in May 1986 and met Nelson 
Mandela, among others. Even though it was not its purpose to make policy recommendations, 
the EPG shared a view that further anti-apartheid measures were necessary." Yet, the 
initiative failed due to Pretoria's military attacks in the region, as shown below. In addition, a 
follow-up discussion on the EPG report, dated June 1986, at the Commonwealth Meeting in 
Vancouver in October 1987 did not result in any action, because of Thatcher' s persistently 
favourable position towards the minority, evidenced by her above-cited statement of the ANC 
being a terrorist organisation, which was expressed on this occasion." Nonetheless, London's 
approach towards Pretoria underwent some change from 1987 onwards. In particular, with the 
appointment of Robin Renwick as Ambassador to South Africa from July 1987, the British 
government sought to convince the P.W. Botha government through quiet diplomacy that 
political reforms were necessary to alleviate the country's isolation." 
We have now seen that Pretoria's interest in Africa focused on the region and thereafter 
we outlined the geo-political power constellation over South and southern Africa during the 
1980s. While we showed that this impacted on South Africa's foreign policy towards the im-
mediate neighbourhood, we argue that the conduct of Pretoria's foreign relations with African 
countries beyond the region was equally influenced by these international developments. 
Based on the available documentation, it is particularly significant to note that the military's 
activities in this area took place predominantly in the first half of the 1980s. The evidence, to 
21 Pfister. 2003. Gateway to International Victory, p.58 . 
22 For this, see Holland. 1988. The European Community and South Africa. 
23 Ganguly, Shivaji. 1986. South Africa and the Commonwealth: From Nassau to London, India Quarterly 
42, 3: 309-328. 
" Mission to South Africa: The Commonwealth Report. 1986. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books for the Com-
monwealth Secretariat. Also Fraser, Malcolm, Olusegun Obsanjo. 1986. What to Do about South Africa, For-
eign Affairs 65 , I: 154-162. 
2S Freeman. 1989. All but One, pp.1 42-156; Hoskins, Linus A. 1990. Apartheid South Africa: The Conunon-
wealth Stand and US-British Collusion, A Current Bibliography on African Affairs 22, 1: 1-18; Ramphal, Shri-
dath. 1988. Reflections on 'Vancouver' , The Round Table 77, 305: 10-20. 
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be presented in this chapter, suggests that they felt more confident in undertaking action be-
yond the region until then, foremost under the protection shield of the US. In contrast, we will 
see that Pretoria's co-operation with Paris in Francophone Africa was insignificant during the 
1980s. In fact, DFA reports of February 1985 and January 1988 indicate that France even 
tried to undermine Pretoria' s activities there. In the first instance, Director Glenn Babb sug-
gested that "France's actions in Africa [are] aimed at frustrating South Africa's attempts in 
expanding our relations with French-speaking African countries"." Three years later, Senior 
Officer Paul Runge communicated to Babb from Cameroon that "France which as you know 
has watered down our influence in certain neighbouring countries"." 
Given the military's realist policy approach, the initiatives undertaken in African countries 
beyond South Africa's immediate neighbourhood did not aim at establishing diplomatic rela-
tions or breaking South Africa's isolation. Rather, they can be summarised into three catego-
ries, namely the gaining of access to the strategically located western Indian Ocean islands, 
the sale of armaments to finance the military involvement in the region and co-operation with 
President Bongo of Gabon, the military's long-standing friend. These three issues form the 
core of Pretoria's activities in black Africa beyond the region. In addition, and reflecting their 
perception of the military's role in these instances, rebel movements from several African 
countries considered it opportune to approach the South African government for assistance. 
Acknowledging the powerful position of the military in Pretoria's policy making, the follow-
ing section first outlines the relevance of the other state and non-state actors in South Africa's 
foreign relations with the geographic area of interest in this study. Subsequently, we explore 
the South African government's interaction with the countries of relevance. As the military's 
influence on P.W. Botha's foreign policy remained a constant feature throughout the 1980s, it 
is appropriate to organise the evidence in thematic sections that focus on the above-mentioned 
issues. We will begin with the least important aspect, namely the approaches of rebel move-
ments, while the other three categories are dealt with in the order presented above. 
26 Renwick, Robin. 1997. Unconventional Diplomacy in Southern Africa. Basingstoke: Macmillan: 109-158. 
Also Murray, Hugh. 1990. Persuasive Power [: Interview with Robin Renwick], Leadership South Africa 9, 2: 
18-21. 
27 'Relations with Francophone Africa', from Glenn Babb to Rae Killen, Pretoria, 16 February 1985, p.1 
(DFA, 111 01 /3, Vol. 3A). 
28 Report from Paul Runge to Glenn Babb, 6 January 1988 (DFA, 1/ 10113, Vol. 3A). 
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Assistants, Bystanders and Outsiders 
In this section we discuss potential roles that could be played by state actors other than the 
military in foreign policy making, as well as by relevant non-state actors. In doing so, we be-
gin with the supposedly predominant player in this domain, the Department of Foreign Af-
fairs. Although access to the DFA files after 1979 was partly limited, the available primary 
sources and the secondary material suggest that its activities beyond the region were signifi-
cantly reduced and became subordinate to the military's security considerations in the region. 
In particular, the DFA's Africa Division was restructured. As Pretoria continued to consider 
the homelands as independent states, they became part of the foreign affairs ministry's area of 
activity and the southern African countries were given more prominence with separate admin-
istrative entities (Chapter 2).29 Generally speaking, the military's predominance under P.W. 
Botha significantly curtailed the DFA's influence in foreign policy making, especially in 
South Africa's neighbourhood, causing political scientist Robert Jaster to describe its desig-
nated primary responsibility in this domain as "more formal than real".30 For instance, largely 
due to Foreign Minister Pik Botha's efforts, non-aggression pacts or cease-fire agreements 
were concluded with Swaziland in February 1982, Angola in February 1984 (Lusaka Accord) 
and Mozambique in March of that year (Nkomati Accord), with the latter being the most ac-
claimed success. The foreign service officers' motivation being that South Africa's regional 
problems could not be solved militarily, the accords stipulated that Pretoria would refrain 
from direct or indirect military engagement, in return for which these countries would no 
longer harbour military camps from South Africa's liberation movements.31 However, their 
hopes for a regional modus vivendi were short-lived, destroyed by SADF activities and in 
many ways resembling the situation in Angola during 1975, when the military intervention 
undermined Detente pursued by BOSS and the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Informa-
tion. In the present situation, the military violated both the Lusaka and Nkomati Accords by 
continuously supporting both UNITA and RENAMO respectively. In addition, on 19 May 
1986, in the presence of the Commonwealth Eminent Person Group in South Africa, air raids 
were conducted on the capitals of Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe.12 Together with the gov-
29 Foreign Affairs List. Pretoria: DFA. (January 1982, September 1986) 
30 Jaster. 1988. The Defence of White Power, p.3!. 
31 Mills and Baynham. 1994. South African Foreign Policy, 1945-1990, pp.27f.; Pottinger. 1988. The Impe-
rial Presidency, p.202; Seegers. 1996. The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa, p.232; Van Wyk, K. 
1991. Foreign Policy Orientations of the P.W. Botha Regime, p.5!. See also the literature in footnote 5 to this 
chapter. 
32 Geldenhuys. 1994. The Head of Government and South Africa 's Foreign Relations, p.282; Mills and 
Baynham. 1990. Changing the Guard, pp.176-188; Mills and Baynham. 1994. South African Foreign Policy, 
1945-1990, p.29; Pottinger. 1988. The Imperial Presidency, pp.202, 332, 374. 
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ernment's decision, on 12 June 1986, to extend the partial to a full state of emergency to quell 
the increasing political protest from the black population, Pretoria' s growing international 
isolation caused political scientist Jack Spence to suggest that Pretoria had retreated into its 
laager.JJ As will be examined in the final section of this chapter, this situation only changed 
towards the end of the 1980s, closely linked to the ending of the Cold War and with the De-
partment of Foreign Affairs consequently regaining its predominance. 
Returning to the DFA's endeavours in Africa beyond the region, we have previously ar-
gued that they were drastically reduced due to the military' s focus on southern Africa. This is 
vividly illustrated in a report from Deputy Director-General Killen to Pik Botha regarding the 
provision of technical assistance to Somalia in 1983: 
It is clear that the RSA does not have the necessary fmancial means at its disposal to pro-
vide development assistance to the rest of Africa to approximately or to the same amount 
as the assistance provided to the neighbouring countries. Therefore it is questionable 
whether the relatively small amount of development assistance that the Republic can 
spend in the rest of Africa makes a noteworthy difference to the decayed economies in 
those countries. South Africa cannot rescue Africa from its poverty." 
Even though Appendix D reflects an exponential rise of the Department of Foreign Affairs' 
budget after 1978, its activities in the African countries beyond the region were basically fro-
zen. Crucially, and in stark contrast to Vorster' s premiership, there is no evidence of any ma-
jor development/investment project. The DFA's only lever still to be applied was technical 
assistance, but this only occurred subordinate to and supplementing the military' s operations 
in countries of their interest. An important reason for Pretoria to refrain from involvement in 
large-scale development/investment projects was quite likely their pitiful lack of success in 
the past. Possibly with the exception of the Lilongwe Capital Project in Malawi, none of the 
others had achieved a measurable political benefit for Pretoria. This also applied to Operation 
Bokassa in the Central African Republic, which began during 1973174 as part of the Secret 
Diplomacy phase (Chapter 4), and it is appropriate to outline its outcome now. 
Operation Bokassa entailed two main components, namely the construction of Hotel Inter-
continental Bokassa and five hundred prefabricated houses. As illustrated in the previous 
chapter, little progress was made due to President Bokassa' s growing disinterest and this trend 
continued during the early days ofP.W. Botha' s premiership. Regarding the hotel project, by 
1979, additional requests from Bangui, inflation and other factors had multiplied its cost to an 
33 Spence, John Edward 'Jack'. 1987. Foreign Policy Retreat into the Laager, in Jesmond Blumenfeld, ed. 
South Africa in Crisis. London: Croom Helm: 155-175. 
34 'Verhoudinge tussen RSA en Somalie: beleidsbepaling t.o.v. die res van Afrika', vom Rae Killen to Pik 
Botha and Hans van Dalsen, Pretoria, 26 May 1983, p.4 (DFA, 1/99/19, Vol. 2) (translation from Afrikaans). 
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estimated 28 million Rand, with 11.7 million already disbursed. 35 While the financial aspect 
made the hotel project difficult, Bokassa's fall in September 1979 put an end to it. The atti-
tude of the new president, David Dacko, towards South Africa was very unstable; statements 
advocating diplomatic relations were followed by denials." In early December 1979, Under-
Secretary Loubser, Jan Bouwer from Credit Guarantee and two businessmen travelled to 
Bangui to ascertain the new situation, meeting Dacko and several of his ministers" During 
the talks, the new Minister of Public Works and Housing informed the South Africans that 
"although his Government felt that the hotel was very necessary for Bangui C .. . ), it was re-
garded as a prestige object and had to take lower rating in the urgent development needs of 
the country". Nonetheless, he asked Pretoria "to consider putting in money to complete the 
hotel as otherwise the project would have to be stopped and the whole structure would go to 
ruin". Yet, Bouwer noted "that there was a general feeling in South Africa that we had 
reached the limit of the financial resources we could allocate to this project"." Pretoria conse-
quently withdrew and the Hotel Intercontinental Bokassa is a five-storey ruin that presently 
still forms part of the Bangui landscape. l9 Concerning the prefabricated housing project, a 
C.A.R. mission visited South Africa in January 1979 and requested another 1.3 million Rand 
from Credit Guarantee to complete the remaining two hundred and six houses and a morato-
rium of two and a half years for the repayment of the previous IDC loans. Credit Guarantee 
considered the additional loan to be "very high" and that it was "unexpected and requires con-
sideration by the South African Ministers of Economic Affairs and Finance"." Nevertheless, 
the foreign service officers possibly still hoped for a successful outcome. Eventually, the ad-
ditional loan was granted and a new agreement concluded with the Societe Nationale 
d'Habitat CSNH), responsible for the construction of the housing project. However, during the 
visit to Bangui in December 1979, the South African delegation was informed that Maurice 
Methot, who had been instrumental in establishing contact with Pretoria in 1974 and was now 
Director of the SNH, would soon leave this organisation and that an investigation into mone-
35 'Intercontinental Hotel - Bangui, C.A.R. ', ca. November 1979, pp.l ff. (DFA, 11183/3, Vol. 10). 
,. 'Dacko retracts statement about South African tie', Washington Post 26 September 1979 (DFA, 11183/3, 
Vol. 10). 
31 'Visit to Bangui, Central African Republic, 3 December, 1979', from Jan Bouwer, December 1979 (DFA, 
11183/3, Vol. 10). 
" See 'Visit to Bangui, Central African Republic, 3 December, 1979' , from Jan Bouwer, December 1979, 
pp.lff. (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 10). 
19 <http://www.centrafrique.com/imagesBG.htm> shows a photograph of the unfinished hotel. 
40 'Record of discussions held at e.G. l.C., Johannesburg, on Wednesday, 24 January, 1979', p.l (DFA, 
11183/3, Vol. 9). 
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tary irregularities was imminent. It is worth quoting the report that Jan Bouwer from Credit 
Guarantee provided on the state of affairs regarding the project: 
We discussed stage-for-stage the agreement which we reached in January and which was 
embodied in the agreement in May according to which extension of repayments to us was 
granted and assistance promised to erect the remaining 200 houses provided that that par-
ticular programme was followed and the cash-flow was brought into order. None of these 
steps ( ... ) had been implemented by them [SNH]. ( .. . ) No payments had been made by 
Government, they had started to construct only 5 houses, tenants of houses were not pay-
ing their rents ( ... ) and no action was being taken against them, the 200 houses which the 
Government had taken are being left unoccupied and are deteriorating, looters are strip-
ping the houses and [are] also stealing from the supplies for the 200 houses to be erected. 
( ... ) I expressed our great disappointment and dissatisfaction ( ... ) that matters at SNH 
were completely disorganised and chaotic as far as the new arrangements with us was 
concerned.41 
In summary, Operation Bokassa was a complete failure, another venture for the South African 
government resulting in considerable financial wastage for projects that did not materialise 
and without gaining any political advantage. This gave the Rand Daily Mail ammunition with 
which to attack the government. On 13 October 1979, after the fall of Bokassa, the paper ex-
posed Operation Bokassa, arguing that Pretoria had wasted millions of taxpayer's money in 
the C.A.R." This report was taken so seriously that it elicited a prompt denial from Minister 
Pik Botha." In comparison, the foreign service corps probably found it harder to defend itself 
against the military that dominated South Africa's foreign policy making. If, as has been ar-
gued, the military was sceptical towards development/investment projects in Africa beyond 
the region, the outcome of Operation Bokassa was handed to them on a plate to substantiate 
their claim and such ventures therefore had to cease. 
While the DFA was prevented from pursuing development/investment projects in Africa 
beyond the region, the military allowed it to assist within its own operations by offering tech-
nical assistance, the few cases of which are examined in subsequent sections. Asked about 
any resulting tensions between the military and the foreign affairs ministry, Paul Runge and 
Neil van Heerden, both of whom were involved at a senior level in such activities in the 
1980s, tried to downplay this, but the foreign service officers' subordinate position can be 
read between the lines: 
Runge: There was a fair degree of co-operation and interaction. (".) I was talking to 
them, and they were talking to me. ( .. . ) If it hadn't been for military support, we couldn't 
41 'Visit to Bangui, Central African Republic, 3 December, 1979', from Jan Bouwer, December 1979, pp.2ff. 
(DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 10). 
42 'SA channelled millions to Bokassa, says paper', Rand Daily Mail 13 October 1979 (DFA, 1/183/3, Vol. 
10). 
43 'Sentraal-Afrikaanse Republiek: politieke ontwikkeling en Verhoudinge met Suid-Afrika', from Pik Botha, 
October 1979, pp.3f (DFA, 1/1 83/3, Vol. 10). 
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have run the aid programmes we had in Africa. Because we used their aircraft, we used 
their engineering services'4 
Van Heerden: Were there any agreements, disagreements or conflicts? Not really. Be-
cause from Foreign Affairs ' point of view, anything that promoted relations with Africa, 
as long as it's not a military thing, we were fine . ( ... ) Disagreement was mostly confined to 
not being informed. The foreign minister and the foreign minister's officials, always pushed 
him [P.W. Botha) and said "You can't allow the Defence Minister to do things offshore 
without him at least informing us". Because you as foreign minister have to have an overall 
view of what the hell is going on. Whereas P.W., egged on by his colonels and his generals, 
was fundamentally opposed to the idea of having to tell any other minister what he does. 
So that tension was there, but I don't think it is a major conflict in terms of objectives" 
Evidence that the foreign service officials had ill-feelings about them being sidelined by the 
military, assisted by the National Intelligence Service for reasons discussed below, is pro-
vided in correspondence from Deputy Director-General Rae Killen to Pile Botha of May 1983. 
In this brief he makes reference to uncoordinated activity in his department and the other two 
agencies in Somalia: 
It is an evidently unhealthy situation that the named departments concentrate on the fur-
therance of the tasks entrusted to the relevant department, i.e. information gathering, 
while paying little attention to the political aspects of government-to-government contacts 
which ( .. . ) is the responsibility of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Information. The 
result is a one-sided and half-hearted foreign policy towards the rest of Africa." 
Having outlined the Department of Foreign Affairs' subordinate position vis-a-vis the military 
during P.W. Botha' s era, we now tum to the other state actors formerly involved in Pretoria's 
foreign policy making. As has been stated in Chapter 2, the Department of Information was 
reintegrated into the Department of Foreign Affairs in 1980 and ceased to exist three years 
later. The Bureau for State Security, which had maintained a very prominent position during 
the Vorster premiership, became the Department of National Security in 1978 and the Na-
tional Intelligence Service in 1980, with Niel Barnard as its Director-General from June of 
that year. By choosing Barnard, P.W. Botha followed the advice of Kobie Coetsee, the Dep-
uty Minister in the Departments of Defence and of National Security between 1978 and 1980 
(Chapter 2), also in trying to avoid confrontation between the military and national intelli-
gence, such as surfaced in the Angolan war in late 1975 and on a personal level between Hen-
drik van den Bergh and P. W. Botha, then the Minister of Defence. This measure proved to be 
effective, as the available sources suggest that national intelligence only managed to playa 
small role in foreign policy making towards Africa during the interim period from 1978 until 
44 Interview with Paul Runge, 7 April 1999. 
4' Interview with Neil van Heerden, 7 April 1999. 
4' 'Verhoudinge tussen RSA en Somali;;: beleidsbepaling t.o.v. die res van Afrika', from Peter Killen to Pik 
Botha and Johannes van Dalsen, Pretoria, 26 May 1983, p.2 (DFA, 1/99/19, Vol. 2) (translation from Afrikaans). 
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until Barnard's appointment. We now examine the one significant activity during this time. It 
concerned oil shipment from Nigeria to South Africa, the only hard evidence of Pretoria at-
tempting to obtain the precious resource from Africa's largest oil-producing country in order 
to lessen the impact of oil embargoes. Such action was taken by the Arab states in 1973 and 
beyond, when they used the oil weapon against Israel's friends, such as South Africa. The 
only remaining oil supplier in this region was Iran until the fall of the Shah in 1979 (Chapter 
4). It is possible that the oil shipments from Nigeria in March and April of that year, both of 
which became public knowledge, are related to Iran no longer being able to supply the requi-
site oil to South Africa. In the first instance, the S.S. Jumbo Pioneer was prevented from load-
ing oil in Nigeria and transporting it to its presumed destination of Cape Town. One month 
later, the Lagos authorities seized the tanker, S.T. Kulu, owned by the South African Marine 
Corporation" and aIready loaded with crude oi!." Significantly, as we saw in Chapters 2 and 
4, both Safair and Luxavia were part of Safrnarine, serving Pretoria in an attempt to undercut 
both the aviation and military sanctions. The Nigerian government presented the two cases as 
an "apparent act of piracy", a "meticulously planned high powered propaganda campaign" by 
Pretoria to undermine Lagos' credibility to maintain a resolute anti-apartheid position." While 
this may have been the outcome, the Department of National Security's main interest was to 
obtain oil for South Africa. According to an intelligence document that verifies its involve-
ment in the second case, the tanker Kulu was registered in Panama, a safe haven for any such 
dubious activity, and on a long-term loan to the British-Dutch oil company BP. The report 
further states that the Kulu had called at a Nigerian port on ten previous occasions and with-
out any problems,50 at least partly substantiating secondary literature allegations of Nigerian 
businessmen, middleman and even government ministers facilitating such illicit oil transfers 
for personal gain.51 In retaliation to the BP's behaviour in this incident, and pretending to have 
a clean slate, the Nigerian government took over the company's assets in September 1979." 
"Jngpen and Ie Roux. 1996. Safmarine 50.1946-1996, pp.19, 29£ 
" Hengeveld and Rodenburg. 1995. Embargo, p.189; Klinghoffer, Arthur Jay. 1989. Oiling the Wheels of 
Apartheid: Exposing South Africa's Secret Oil Trade. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner: 46f.; Ojo. 1985. Oil Sanc-
tions and South Africa, p.241 ; Wilmot. 1989. Nigeria's Southern Africa Policy. 1960-1988, p.8; Africa Research 
Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical Series 16,3, 15 March-14 April 1979: 5048. 
49 ' South Africa 's Oil Game is Aimed at FalsifYing Nigeria's International Image', Nigeria: Bulletin on For-
eign Affairs 9, 5, May 1979: 3. 
'0 'Aanhouding 'Tanker Kulu ' in Nigeri;; ', from the Department of National Security, 23 May 1979 (DFA, 
11129/3, Vol. 6). 
51 Klinghoffer. 1989. Oiling the Wh eels of Apartheid, pp.45£; Wilmot. 1989. Nigeria's Southern Africa Pol-
icy, 1960-1988, p.lO; 'Shell Ships Nigerian Oil to South Africa ' , Nigeria: Bulletin on Foreign Affairs II , I, 
January 1981: 170ff.; Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical Series 16, 3, 15 March-14 
April 1979: 5048. 
52 'Obasanjo takes over BP', New African 145, September 1979: 47. 
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Apart from this example of national intelligence engagement in Africa beyond the region 
prior to Barnard's appointment as the NIS Director-General in 1980, evidence on the only 
other notable endeavour relates to the attempted coup in the Seychelles in 1981 that is dis-
cussed later in this chapter. 
Now turning to the role of South Africa's organised business sector, this was of minor 
relevance, with the South Africa Foundation making only one significant appearance in the 
DFA files, and this is discussed now. Thereafter, the files contain no evidence of any note-
worthy activity on their part in Africa beyond the region. Prior to leaving for Kenya on 1 May 
1979, both the Foundation's President and Director General, Basil Hersov and Peter Sorour, 
met Pik Botha and Deputy Secretary von Hirschberg on 28 April to inform them of their five-
day visit. The fact that this meeting took place is a further indication of the co-operative atti-
tude between the Foundation and the Department of Foreign Affairs, as noted in Chapter 4. 
Apart from Pik Botha' s complaint about Chris Barnard' s contact with Charles Njonjo, exam-
ined at the end of the previous chapter, the Minister and von Hirschberg showed interest in 
obtaining their assistance in one particular area. The latter suggested that, "if the opportunity 
arose", they "might enquire" whether Pretoria would be allowed to be accredited to the UN 
Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) with headquarters in Nairobi. For Pretoria, the estab-
lishment of such a mission "might be a convenient way of arranging a South African presence 
in Nairobi"." According to the travel itinerary made available to the DFA after their visit, 
Hersov and Sorour combined their own interests, not recorded in the files, with those of the 
foreign affairs ministry, meeting representatives from the private business sector, the Minis-
ters for Housing and Social Services, Tourism and Wildlife, as well as Habitat's Executive 
Director. S4 On their return, they duly briefed the Minister and von Hirschberg that Habitat 
"saw no reason why South Africa should not have a mission accredited", while they "encoun-
tered different reactions" from the Kenyan ministers, and that the Kenyan Minister of Foreign 
Affairs had "refused to see them". In their conclusion, Hersov and Sorour judged the visit to 
have been a success for the Foundation and suggested that the DFA should arrange "recipro-
cal visits of small business groups"." Maybe as a result of this proposal, two Kenyan busi-
nessmen visited South Africa from 2 to 7 December 1979 and Pik Botha hosted a dinner for 
them." It cannot be excluded that the mutually fruitful co-operation between the Foundation 
" 'Meeting between the Minister and Messrs Hersov and Sorour of the South Africa Foundation', from Carl 
von Hirschberg, Pretoria, June 1979, pp.1f. (DFA, 11135/3, Vol. 8). 
54 DFA, 11135/3, Vol. 8. 
" 'Meeting between the Minister and Messrs Hersov and Sorour of the South Africa Foundation', from Carl 
von Hirschberg, Pretoria, June 1979, pp.3ff. (DFA, 11135/3, Vol. 8). 
" DFA, 11135/3, Vol. 8. 
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and the Department of Foreign Affairs continued, but access to the DFA's Kenya files was 
restricted to the end of 1979. 
After having examined how the military's powerful position affected the activities of the 
DFA, national intelligence and the South Africa Foundation, a statement needs to be made on 
the Progressive Federal Party, whose role can be described as that of an outsider. In his study, 
Deon Geldenhuys notes that P.W. Botha strongly disliked the Progressives' foreign affairs 
ambitions. This was particularly the case since its leader, Colin Eglin, openly attacked the 
military's decision to send troops to Angola in October 1975 by declaring in Parliament in 
January 1976 that this had been "an error of political judgement ... which could seriously 
prejudice and jeopardise the future security of South Africa"." P.W. Botha's hostile attitude 
towards Eglin found expression in February 1979, when he bluntly told him in Parliament: 
"Don't you show your face in my office again", a warning he repeated three weeks later.58 
When Frederik van Zyl Siabbert became the PFP leader in 1979, the situation improved only 
for a short while, as Geldenhuys further notes.'9 Regarding the PFP's undertakings in Africa 
beyond the region, the available DFA files, some of them with limited access after 1979, do 
not contain any evidence. From secondary sources and correspondence with Colin Eglin we 
know, however, of the contact with Senegal. We saw in Chapter 4 that Eglin had established a 
close link with President Senghor during the 1970s, meeting him four times. This liaison con-
tinued even after Senghor's departure from the presidency in December 1980. In particular, 
Eglin informed us that, in 1982, he "had discussions with Pres Abdou Diouf [President from 
1981], whom I had previously met when he was Senghor's prime minister""o Later, in July 
1987, Slabbert organised a meeting in Dakar, "widely regarded as the beginning of the nego-
tiations process"," between sixty-one intellectuals from the Afrikaner corrununity and seven-
teen ANC representatives, among them Thabo Mbeki, South Africa's future president." The 
relevance of this event will be discussed at a later stage in this chapter. 
The preceding accounts detailed the roles of the Department of Foreign Affairs, national 
intelligence, the South Africa Foundation and the Progressive Federal Party, substantiating 
" Hansard, vol. 60, col. 104,27 January 1976. 
" Hansard, vol. 79, col. 460, 9 February 1979. 
'9 Ge1denhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.55. 
60 Correspondence with Colin Eglin, 13 and 15 January 2003. 
61 Harber and Ludmann, eds. 1994. A-Z of South African Politics, pp.136f.; Pfister. 2003. Gateway to Interna-
tional Victory, p.60. 
62 Slabbert, Frederik van Zyl. 1989. The System and the Struggle: Reform, Revolt and Reaction in South Af-
rica. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball: 181-194. Also Boraine, Alex. 1987. Dakar Report Back. Cape Town: Insti-
tute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa; Everett, Richard. 1987. Breaking out of the Cocoon, Africa 
Report 32, 5: 31-34; Giliomee, Hermann, Schlemmer, Lawrence, eds. 1989. Negotiating South Africa's Future. 
Basingstoke: Macmillan; Johannesburg: Centre for Policy Studies. 
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the dominance of the military foreign policy making towards Africa under P.W. Botha. With 
this in mind, the forthcoming four sections examine the interaction between the Pretoria gov-
ernment and African countries beyond the region. In following the thematic order proposed 
earlier, we begin by investigating the approaches made by several opposition movements in 
the hope of obtaining weapons. 
Contact with Opposition Movements 
South Africa's isolation within the international community, its outspoken anticommunist 
stance and its comparatively prosperous economy not only made Pretoria an interesting part-
ner for politically similarly-minded African governments. This also appealed to the groups 
and movements in Africa feeling alienated or suppressed in their home country and who re-
quired external military and financial assistance to bring about their desired political change. 
In many cases, tactics employed to elicit Pretoria's support included the proclamation of their 
own anticommunist stance and a promise that their control over a future government would 
ensure a more favourable position towards South Africa. 
The DFA files record such attempts in relation to three countries, namely Uganda, Ghana 
and Nigeria, and suggest that the Department of Foreign Affairs did not accede to any ofthese 
requests. This raises two questions we cannot answer due to the unavailability of military 
documentation. For one, it is not known whether additional approaches were addressed to the 
military, rather than to the foreign affairs ministry. Second, and contingent on this, it is uncer-
tain why the requests that will be presently outlined, fell into the domain of the foreign ser-
vice officials. Either the groups considered this to be the relevant channel, or the military 
handed them over due to a lack of interest. Although leaving many aspects open, the follow-
ing paragraphs provide an important insight into the attitude of the foreign service corps 
through the 1980s, which stood in stark contrast to that of the military. Following a lose 
chronological order, we now examine the case studies of Uganda, Ghana and Nigeria. 
Uganda 
Idi Amin came to power through a military coup against Milton Obote, Uganda's President 
from 1962 to 1971. Amin then ruled the country with an iron fist and a reign of terror. How-
ever, the military intervention of October 1978 into neighbouring Tanzania over a territorial 
dispute strongly weakened Amin's position and eventually led to his fleeing the country when 
Tanzanian troops, assisted by exile Ugandans, invaded Uganda in early 1979. In this context, 
the Committee on Uganda wrote to P.W. Botha, requesting "concrete support - militarily and 
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economically" in Amin's overthrow: "Your Excellency, we strongly urge your Government, 
by assisting us with the military raid, to demonstrate that your nation is still united in its de-
termination to meet its responsibilities and halt the spread of Communist dictatorship and 
Castroism by every means"." No further communication on the matter is contained in the 
files, but requests from other Ugandan movements continued even after Amin was toppled in 
April 1979. The most significant was that ofYusufu Lule in July 1982, who met Brand Fourie 
in Washington." Crucially, Lule briefly held political power in Uganda from April to June 
1979, then succeeded by Godfrey Binaisa. His discussion with Fourie revolved around his 
need to obtain assistance in returning to power. It is not recorded how Lule had established 
this contact, but it is relevant that Martin Aliker, who had been to South Africa in April 1978 
through the services of both Ned Munger and the South Africa Foundation (Chapter 4), was 
his confidant and adviser during his short presidency." Aliker possibly facilitated Lule' s con-
tact with Pretoria's foreign affairs ministry on this occasion. Regarding its decision on this 
matter, a later document cited below suggests that no assistance was provided. In a very simi-
lar case, during early 1985, Binaisa, Uganda's President from June 1979 to December 1980, 
requested the necessary material and military assistance from Minister Plenipotentiary Rusty 
Evans at the London Embassy to overthrow his successor, Milton Obote. In return for this, he 
promised to establish a South African trade mission and to grant SAA landing rights in Kam-
pala once he was in power.66 Binaisa again approached the same embassy, for the same pur-
pose, in March 1987.67 Whereas there is no conclusive answer as to the outcome of these re-
quests, by July 1984, Director Babb had already noted that support for either Binaisa or Lule 
could not be considered worthwhile: 
The opposition to President Obote is divided into multifarious groups ( ... ) most of whom 
have approached the RSA for help at one stage or another. C ... ) NI [=NIS] is unenthusias-
tic about helping them except in as much as we keep contact on a long-term basis. It is 
difficult to see anyone successor to Obote emerging and the two likeliest candidates Lule 
and Binaisa failed miserably when they held the reins of power, and to choose anyone 
would be a futile exercise.'s 
Importantly, Babb seems to have contacted the National Intelligence Service, indicating that 
there was a degree of co-operation with the foreign service officers, at least with some of 
them. As we will see later, Babb's name often surfaces in such situations, pursuing an asser-
63 DFA, 1/120/3, AJ 1979 . 
.. Document dated 18 August 1982 (DFA, 1/120/3, Vol. 1PL). 
" Munger. 1983. Touched by Africa, pp.355f., 377. 
66 ' Uganda: overthrow of President Obote', 29 July 1985, pp.2, 5 (DFA, 11120/3, Vol. 2PL). 
61 'Relations with the RSA ', 25 August 1987, p.8 (DFA, 1/120/3, Vol. 4). 
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tive foreign policy style and not hesitating to cross the border of diplomatic rules and dealing 
with issues that were previously the sovereign territory of the military and national intelli-
gence. His last statement in the above citation is an indication of this, deviating from the for-
eign service official ' s usual stance not to even consider any such involvement due to their 
policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. Fellow official Paul Runge 
described us Babb as an "absolute fireball", an "extremely enthusiastic person", the "major 
driving force for the Africa effort" and"the key Africa man in [the Department of] Foreign 
Affairs"." Regarding Babb's dealings with the NIS and the military, Runge further com-
mented: "he was very collaborative, but if you think he was the bridge into the military from 
the Foreign Affairs side, that could be, but he was the bridge for everything. Wherever there 
was action, he would talk to whoever to achieve the objective. He had a lot of relations with 
national intelligence".70 Reflecting his relevance in terms of political importance and close-
ness to the military, Babb became Member of Parliament for the National Party in 1989. Cru-
cially, he was so-called indirectly elected, meaning that the State President, then P.W. Botha, 
had chosen him, a privilege that was only accorded to one person in each of the then four 
provinces." 
The last recorded case of Ugandan opposition movements requesting assistance from Pre-
toria deserves special mention, because John Kazzora from the Ugandan National Resistance 
Movement made several approaches over a number of years. According to a report from Un-
der-Secretary Geldenhuys, he was a personal friend of former President Obote and a member 
of parliament during his presidency, and after 1971 , "Mr Kazzora assisted in making plans to 
get rid of President Amin".72 In 1984, Glenn Babb noted that Kazzora then went into exile in 
London, sought work as a lawyer and formed the above-mentioned movement." Other docu-
ments reveal that contact with Kazzora began in September 1978 through the London Em-
bassy, by meeting Rae Killen and Brand Fourie on several occasions." This culminated in 
April 1979, when he came to South Africa for discussions with Pik Botha, Defence Minister 
Malan and Brand Fourie. During talks with the latter, he raised the possibility of obtaining 25 
68 'John Kazzora: Ugandan National Resistance Movement' , from Glenn Babb, 23 July 1984, p.2 (DFA, 
11120/3, Vol. 2PL). Also 'Relations with the RSA', 25 August 1987, p.5 (DFA, 11120/3, Vol. 4). 
6' Telephone interview with Paul Runge, 18 January 2003 . 
70 Telephone interview with Paul Runge, 18 January 2003. 
" Information provided by courtesy from the Library of Parliament in Cape Town, January 2003. 
72 'Mr J. W.R. Kallora', from Hennie Geldenhuys to Brand Fourie, Cape Town, 23 April 1979, p.2 (DFA, 
11120/3, Vol. IPL) 
" 'John Kallora: Ugandan National Resistance Movement', from Glenn Babb, 23 July 1984, p.2 (DFA, 
1/120/3, Vol. 2PL). 
" DFA, 1/120/3, Vol. IPL. 
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million British Pounds, some 44 million Rand, of which 40% was designated for military 
support.75 Again, no final statement is possible on whether assistance was provided, but the 
records reveal that Kazzora made a renewed approach to the London Embassy during 1985. 
On 14 July 1985, after his meeting with Kazzora, Rusty Evans contacted the DFA's Director-
General for guidelines, and Killen replied in diplomatic style: 
After due consideration of many requests made to us by a wide spectrum of Ugandan op-
position groups last year, and having regard to our attitude of non-intervention, it is felt 
that no encouragement should be given to Kazzora. 76 
However, the name of John Kazzora appears again in the DFA documents after 1986, him 
now being the Personal Adviser to Yoweri Museveni, Uganda' s President from January 
1986.17 Most notably, Kazzora came to South Africa from 24 to 29 August 1986 to hold dis-
cussions with Pik Botha, Jannie Geldenhuys, the Chief of the SADF, Andries Putter, the Chief 
of Staff: Intelligence, homeland leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi and Piet Koornhof, now 
Chairman of the President's Council. According to a DFA report on this visit, "Mr Kazzora 
saw the purpose of his visit as establishing contact with the RSA, thus initiating a process of 
dialogue to facilitate the finding of solutions for South Africa's internal problems in an Afri-
can context". 78 The strong military presence indicates that they, and not the Department of 
Foreign Affairs, maintained the contact with Uganda. Their prime interest may have been 
motivated by advance knowledge about Ugandan plans to harbour training camps of the mili-
tary wings of both the ANC and PAC, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and the Azania People's 
Liberation Army (APLA) respectively. Such camps were, in fact, established in the later part 
of 1986, and according to a letter of January 1992 from then Director Justus de Goede to Di-
rector-General Neil van Heerden, some four hundred MK cadres had arrived in Uganda. 79 
Ghana 
The files also record that opposition movements from Ghana turned to South Africa for assis-
tance after Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings had ousted President Hilla Limann in December 
1981 , again suggesting that Pretoria did not comply with these requests. In the first instance, 
during 1982/83, the Campaign for Democracy in Ghana (CDG) contacted the South African 
Consul-General in Glasgow, Gideon Johannes Vol schenk, on several occasions. The main 
75 'Mr J.W.R. Kazzora', from Hennie Geldenhuys to Brand Fourie, Cape Town, 23 April 1979, p.3 (DFA, 
11120/3, Vol. IPL). 
76 Telex from Rae Killen to Rusty Evans, Pretoria, 22 July 1985 (DFA, 1/120/3, Vol. IPL). 
17 DFA, 1112013, Vol. 4. 
78 'Relations with the RSA' , 25 August 1986, p.5 (DFA, 11120/3, Vol. 4). 
79 Letter from Justus de Goede to Neil van Heerden, Pretoria, 29 January 1992 (DFA, 1/120/3, Vol. 7). 
CHAPTER FIVE: PRlME MINISTER AND STATE PRESIDENT BOTHA, 1978-89 281 
protagonist was Kofi Asiedu, who was the Director of the Britain-Africa Trade Organisation 
in Scotland. In October 1982, he introduced one of the CDG's leaders to Volschenk, a certain 
F. Badjie, a "confidant of ex-President Hilla Limann", as Volschenk reported to Director-
General van Dalsen. 80 Badjie complained that neither Great Britain nor the US were prepared 
to assist, that Israel was more positive, but "occupied elsewhere", and that Ghana' s 
neighbours were sympathetic towards their cause. As a means of increasing the appeal of his 
request, Badjie declared that "he would rekindle contact [with Pretoria] which has apparently 
been made before Rawlings ' coup", but Vol schenk merely gave the standard reply "that it 
was South Africa's policy not to interfere in other countries' domestic affairs", while promis-
ing to "report on our meeting to Pretoria". 81 Again, the files contain no further information, 
but according to a telex dated November 1982, Asiedu once again approached Vol schenk for 
the ammunition needed for a planned COUp.82 Following his dispatch to Pretoria, and unlike 
previous instances, the foreign affairs ministry informed national intelligence of the move, 
concluding with the request: "Your opinion as regards the activities of CDG and Mr K Asiedu 
would be appreciated"." There is no evidence of any follow-up, an impression substantiated 
by Volschenk's report to Pretoria of 8 February 1983, disqualifying any renewed approach 
from Asiedu as his "usual request for assistance".84 
The next recorded instance of requests for military and financial support dates from Octo-
ber 1983, when the Free Democratic Congress and the Ghana Democratic Movement con-
tacted the London Embassy, but Minister Plenipotentiary Evans informed Director-General 
van Dalsen that no such assistance was forthcoming: "It will be noted that the Embassy has 
endeavoured to discourage contact with these dissidents who have been clearly informed that 
they should not expect assistance or support from the RSA"." Finally, in February 1984, 
Kwasi Oppong-Addai, claiming to represent one hundred and fifty exiled Ghanains based in 
Togo, appealed to the London Embassy "for material and financial assistance" to overthrow 
Rawlings. However, as in the past, Rusty Evans reported to Pretoria, that "in view of our pol-
icy not to interfere in the domestic affairs of another sovereign state, no action has been 
taken"." Two months later, and verifYing the notion that Oppong-Addai's request was not 
acceded to, he again came to the embassy and this time tried to gain the Minister Plenipoten-
80 Letter from Gideon Volschenk to Hans van Dalsen, Glasgow, 6 October 1982, p.l (DFA, 11106/3, Vol. 7). 
81 Letter from Gideon Volschenk to Hans van Dalsen, Glasgow, 6 October 1982, p.2 (DFA, 1/106/3, Vol. 7). 
82 Telex from Gideon Volschenk, Glasgow, II November 1982 (DFA, 11106/3, Vol. 7). 
83 DFA, 11106/3, Vol. 7. 
&4 DFA, 1/106/3, Vol. 7. 
"Letter from Rusty Evans to Hans van Dalsen, London, 12 October 1983 (DFA, 11106/3, Vol. 7). 
" Letter from Rusty Evans to Hans van Dalsen, London, 15 February 1984 (DFA, 11106/3, Vol. 7). 
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tiary's support by proposing the launch of a magazine in Ghana to promote contact with 
South Africa, but Evans gauged that "the journal project would have little chance of success 
in Ghana",87 then leaving it at that. 
Nigeria 
In a relatively similar situation, two Nigerians, Enuma Mahmud-Okereke and J aja Anucha 
Wachukwu, approached Pretoria for armaments to topple the Lagos government, while offer-
ing to promote contact with South Africa. According to the files, Mahmud-Okereke was a 
journalist and owner of several businesses in Nigeria, while Wachukwu had been engaged in 
the country's politics as UN Ambassador (1960-61), Minister of Foreign Affairs (1961-65) 
and Aviation (1965-66)." They visited South Africa on 23 April 1980, meeting with DFA 
officials,89 while their letter to P.W. Botha of 30 April suggests that they also had contact with 
the military.90 This correspondence summarises their motivation in establishing contact with 
Pretoria, namely to obtain military assistance for a coup against President Alhaji Shehu Sha-
gari, proposing Okereke as the new president and Wachukwu his foreign minister. In return, 
they offered to launch the pro-Pretoria magazine Moment and to publish a similarly focused 
book with Pretoria' s financial support. They again came to South Africa from 2 to 14 August 
1980, this time proposing the establishment of a "liaison office" in London, in return for 
which they requested 1.23 million British Pounds, 2.23 million Rand at the time, for the pub-
lication of Moment and an unspecified amount for Wachukwu's presidential campaign in the 
forthcoming 1983 presidential elections.'1 To substantiate their sincerity and the claim of 
holding a stance favourable towards Pretoria, they circulated a copy of an interview given by 
Wachukwu to the Nigerian magazine The New Nation in August 1980, part of which read: " if 
I were the President of this country, I would persuade the rest of the rest of independent Afri-
can States to let us recognise South Africa, open embassies in South Africa"'2 The Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs took a cautious stance, however, as a report from Killen reveals: "The 
justification of financial support at this stage is not very strong. ( ... ) In order not to alienate 
the two Nigerians, however, we could show continued interest by endorsing their "normalisa-
tion campaign" by way of a message or indicating our willingness to receive a fact-finding 
87 DFA, 1/106/3, Vol. 7. 
88 DFA, 1/129/3, Vols. IPL, 7. 
89 DFA, 1112913, Vol. 7. 
90 Letter from Enuma Mahmud-Okereke to Pieter Willem Botha, 30 Apri11980 (DFA, 11129/3, Vol. 7). 
91 Letter from Rae Killen to Brand Fourie, Pretoria, 23 September 1980, pA (DFA, 111 29/3, Vol. IPL). 
92 The New Nation 3, 16, August 1980: 11 (DFA, 111 29/3, AJ 1980). 
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mission at a suitable time".9J The only substantial result of this contact was the DFA's finan-
cial contribution of 320,000 Rand to Mahmud-Okereke's publication OAU: Time to Admit 
South Africa, published in 1983." To ensure a wide dissemination and a second edition ofthis 
book, which appeared in 1986," the DFA provided an additional 200,000 Rand in 1985.% 
Having examined the relatively unproductive contact, at least from Pretoria's point of 
view, with three African states beyond the region, the following sections analyse three aspects 
central to the military's considerations. Following the order indicated earlier, we begin with 
the strategic concerns over the western Indian Ocean. 
Western Indian Ocean 
The previous chapter explored the geo-strategic importance of the western Indian Ocean dur-
ing the closure of the Suez Canal (1967-75), and especially after the oil crisis in late 1973, 
finding that this area remained of great significance even after the reopening of the Suez Ca-
nal, as newly built tankers were no longer in a position to take this route. Control in the entire 
Indian Ocean gained in importance after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979, rais-
ing Western fears over continued access to the oil reserves in the Persian Gulf. As a result, the 
"United States then adopted several measures designed to enhance its military presence in the 
Indian Ocean area and to enable it to react swiftly and flexibly should rapid deployment of 
added forces to the area become necessary", and Washington concluded agreements with 
Oman, Kenya, Somalia and Egypt!' The superpower competition further gained in intensity 
when Ronald Reagan became US President in 1981, because he interpreted every local con-
flict in terms of the East-West rivalry. In this context, he considered South Africa as an ally 
against communism in southern Africa, as we have already noted. Pretoria's military also 
showed an interest in the western Indian Ocean for strategic reasons and its involvement 
meant indirect support for the Western presence there, thus strengthening South Africa' s rela-
tions with the West, particularly with the United States. The subsequent accounts detail the 
military's endeavours to establish footholds on the Comoros, on Madagascar and on the Sey-
9J Letter from Rae Killen to Brand Fourie, Pretoria, 23 September 1980, pA (DFA, 11129/3, Vol. IPL). 
" Mahmud-Okereke, Enuma. 1983. OAU, Time to Admit South Africa. Benin City: El-Mahmud Mass Com-
munication of Nigeria. 93pp. 
" Mabmud-Okereke, Enuma. 1986. OAU, Time to Admit South Africa. Benin City: EI-Mahmud Mass Com-
munication of Nigeria. 189pp. (Second Edition) 
96 DFA, 1/129/3, Vols. 3PL, 12. A consultation of relevant library catalogues revealed tbat tbe book is, for 
example, available in the Library of Congress (Washington) and tbe British Library (London). 
97 Cooke. 1983. Strategic Considerations, p.256. Also Bowman. 1982. African Conflict and Superpower in-
volvement in the Western Indian Ocean, pp.93f 
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chelles, while Mauritius and Reunion are notable absentees. The previous chapter noted that 
the location of these two islands to the east of Madagascar made them comparatively less im-
portant in strategic terms. Regarding Reunion, we have also seen that South Africa's presence 
on this island during the 1970s was hampered by the French, preventing an intrusion into their 
territory. Given the increasingly strained bilateral relations between France and South Africa 
during Mitterrand's premiership, we propose that Paris was even less prepared to accept the 
idea of Pretoria establishing a link to Reunion. This assumption will be verified by an event 
related to the Comoros in 1986. What follows is a presentation of the available evidence on 
Pretoria's approach towards the Comoros, Madagascar and the Seychelles. 
Comoros 
Links between the military and French mercenary Bob Denard possibly date from the Nige-
rian Civil War, as suggested in Chapter 4, when both parties supported Biafra. Substantial co-
operation between South Africa's military and Denard revealed by the DFA files, however, 
can only be traced on the Comoros from 1979 and forms the subject of this case study on Pre-
toria's ambitions in the western Indian Ocean under P. W. Botha. 
The previous chapter revealed that Pretoria had provided some technical assistance to the 
Comoros in the first half of the 1970s. We also suggested, although not explicitly recorded in 
the DFA files, that the military may have held an interest due to the island' s geo-strategic po-
sition. The activities of both the Department of Foreign Affairs and the military on the Como-
ros after 1975 were determined by Bob Denard. In the first instance, when he overthrew the 
government of Ahmed Abdallah in 1975, technical assistance came to an end. Thereafter, 
President Ali Soilih ruined the island's economy, causing Denard to intervene again in May 
1978 and reinstate Ahmed Abdallah as the head of state. However, in effect, Denard's Presi-
dential Guard ruled the island for the next ten years and it could be considered as his personal 
fiefdom, Denard using in this instance his alias Said Moustapha M'hadjou. Given their pre-
sumed earlier contact and the new situation on the Comoros, the military grabbed the oppor-
tunity to establish a presence on the island with Denard' s help. There have been suggestions 
in the secondary literature that the Comoros served them as a listening post to monitor ship-
ping movements through the Mozambique Channel and to track ANC activities in Mozam-
bique and Tanzania, as well as a springboard from which to support RENAMO in Mozam-
bique." In addition, there have been allegations that the Comoros Islands were used "as a 
"Terrill, W. Andrew. 1986. The Comoro Islands in South African Regional Strategy, Africa Today 33, 213: 
62ff.; Venter, Denis. 1990. The Comorian Comitragedy: Final Curtain on Abdallahism?, Africa Insight 20, 3: 142£ 
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transshipment centre for South African arms, bartered for Iraqi crude"." These assumptions 
can only partly be substantiated, given the unavailability of archival documents from Military 
Intelligence and Defence, and because access to the relevant DF A files was limited to No-
vember 1980. What follows is a presentation of the available archival evidence, supplemented 
by Denard ' s autobiographies and secondary literature. 
In view of the new political arrangements on the Comoros, Deputy Secretary von 
Hirschberg noted in April 1979 that the advantages of renewed contact were "numerous",lOo 
the island, for example, becoming "an important stopover for SAA and a tourist haven for 
South Africans",lol as Rae Killen had already proposed in September 1978. According to a 
report from von Hirschberg after a mission to the Comoros in December 1979, the military 
was greatly interested in the archipelago for strategic reasons: 'The Comores [sic] are strate-
gically situated at the northern entrance to the Mozambique channel [ sic] and are thus ideally 
located for surveillance operations. Defence are keenly interested and have established a pres-
ence on the main island for which they have been prepared to pay a substantial fee in the form 
of uniforms for the Presidential guard [sic] and, for the present, a portion of the latter's sala-
ries" .102 As a result of these assessments, both actors subsequently aimed at establishing a 
foothold on the island, with the military clearly taking the lead and the foreign affairs ministry 
joining in the attempt. Thus, the South African group to have the first recorded meeting with 
Denard on the Comoros on 29 October 1979 was composed of three Military Intelligence of-
ficials, Colonel Martin Knotze, a Miss Williams and a Mr. Barbour, while the DF A was only 
represented with von Hirschberg. 103 Since the military and the diplomatic activities on the 
island were separate, we first have a look at the former, with little primary information avail-
able. 
Based on Denard's memoirs, Colonel Knotze acted as the DMI contact to the Comoros lO4 
and was, for example, present at a meeting between Deputy Director-General Killen and De-
.. Newsletter on the Oil Embargo against South Africa 23, Second Quarter 1991: 3. Also De Quaasteniet, 
Tom, Paul Aarts. 1995. Putting Money Over Mouth, Profit Over Principle: Arab and Iranian Oil Sales to South 
Africa, in Richard Hengeveld, loap Rodenburg. 1995. Embargo: Apartheid's Oil Secrets Revealed. Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press: 273; Weinberg. 1994. Last of the Pirates, pp.9f. 
100 'Proposed invitation of Comoros Head of State to visit South Africa', from Carl von Hirschberg, Pretoria, 
29 April 1979, p.1 (DFA, 11203/3, Vol. 3) . 
101 ' Relations with Comoros', from Rae Killen, Pretoria, 27 September 1978, p.4 (DFA, 11203/3, Vol. 3). 
102 'Visit to the Comoros Islands, 4-7 December 1979' , from Carl von Hirschberg to Brand Fourie, Pretoria, I 
May 1980, p.3 (DFA, 1/203/3, Vol. 4). 
103 'Meeting between Mr von Hirschberg and Colonel Denard', from Carl von Hirschberg, Pretoria, 30 Octo-
ber 1979 (DF A, 1120313, Vol. 4). 
104 Lunel. 1991. Bob Denard, pp.567, 587; Weinberg. 1994. Last of the Pirates, p.107 . 
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nard on the island on I September 1980,105 when the latter proposed a petroleum products-
against-crude oil exchange between the Comoros and South Africa. In addition, Killen noted: 
"Mr Denard said that in the event of sanctions against South Africa, [the] Comoros would be 
willing to help out by supplying goods that might be in short supply".'06 While the petroleum 
products would very probably have come from South Africa's oil-from-coal plants, Sasol I 
and Sasol II (Chapter 4), the Comoros did not have any oil fields and the crude oil evidently 
had to come from elsewhere. Regarding the oil deal, Pretoria's relevant government agency 
showed some interest, as Glenn Babb reported back to Killen: 
The Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs says it has no objection to the arrange-
ment and will grant permits to oil companies exporting the petroleum products to the 
Comoros. It is up to the Comoros and Mr Denard to arrange for the exchange via a regis-
tered South African oil company. 107 
Even though no other documents were available on this matter, this suggests that the Comoros 
may well have been used as a trans-shipment centre for oil, while the DFA files contain no 
indication of weapon deals. Above all, the military had entered a mutually beneficial agree-
ment with Denard, the latter allowing them to establish a "presence on the main island", in 
return for which they paid "a substantial fee in the form of uniforms for the Presidential guard 
[sic] and, for the present, a portion of the latter's salaries", according to von Hirschberg' s 
above-cited report. lOS This is confirmed by Denard, who reveals that Pretoria's financial assis-
tance to the Presidential Guard for 1985 and 1987 was 4.5 and 6 million Rand respectively. l09 
In fact, the purpose of the Presidential Guard, which can also be referred to as Denard's pri-
vate army, was to safeguard President Abdallah, as von Hirschberg described vividly after the 
visit to the Comoros in December 1979: "They are capable of keeping Abdallah in power in 
all circumstances other than a foreign backed coup attempt". I 10 The great significance of this 
and other military involvement on the Comoros, and once again emphasising their leading 
role there, may be deduced from President Abdallah's visit to South Africa in April 1983, and 
his meeting with P.W. Botha, with whom he also signed a secret Memorandum of Under-
lOS 'Comoros: discussion with Mr Denard', from Rae Killen, Pretoria, 18 November 1980, p.1 (DFA, 
11203/3, Vol. 4). 
106 'Comoros: discussion with Mr Denard', from Rae Killen to Hennie Geldenhuys, 18 November 1980, 
pp.lf. (DFA, 11203/3, Vol. 4). 
107 'Supply of petroleum products to the Comoros', from Glenn Babb to Rae Killen, 20 November 1980 
(DFA, 1/203/3, Vol. 4). 
lOS ' Visit to the Comoros Islands, 4-7 December 1979', from Carl von Hirschberg to Brand Fourie, Pretoria, 1 
May 1980, p.3 (DFA, 1/203/3, Vol. 4). 
109 Denard. 1998. Corsaire de fa repub/ique, pp.340ff.; Lunel. 1991. Bob Denard, pp.566, 592; Weinberg. 
1994. Last of the Pirates, pp.108f. 
110 'Visit to the Comoros Islands, 4-7 December 1979', from Carl von Hirschberg to Brand Fourie, Pretoria, I 
May 1980, p.2 (DFA, 11203/3, Vol. 4). 
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standing, as indicated by Denard. 11l Upon our recent enquiry with the Department of Foreign 
Affairs on the contents of this memorandum, they were not prepared to comment, however, or 
even to acknowledge its existence.1I2 In addition to Abdallah' s visit, Defence Minister Malan 
went to the Comoros on 4/5 December 1986Y' In the light of the strained bilateral French-
South African relations at the time - the French Ambassador had returned to South Africa 
only six months previously after an absence of eleven months due to Pretoria's imposition of 
the partial state of emergency - Paris condemned this ministerial visit. It is possible that 
France had not overtly criticised the South African presence on the Comoros until then, be-
cause this did not hamper their use of Mayotte, while it may have feared that Malan' s publi-
cised visit would impact negatively on the relations with its other former colonies. In any 
event, the military's activities on the Comoros, the little available evidence of which has now 
been presented, appear to have been to their satisfaction, whereas this did not apply to the 
same extent to the foreign service officials, whose endeavours we now examine. 
As has been mentioned above, they were interested in the Comoros as a stopover for 
South African Airways en route to the Far East and as a tourist destination. During his discus-
sion with Denard on 29 October 1979, von Hirschberg queried what they could offer in re-
turn, to which Denard replied "cattle breeding, agriculture, fishing and tourism".114 In order to 
assess the situation, von Hirschberg led a mission to the Comoros from 4 to 7 December 
1979, joined by Jan Hendrik Hofrneyr, Director of the Animal and Dairy Science Research 
Institute; Julian Thomas, the former Agricultural Attache at the Paris Embassy, who worked 
on the OGAPROV agricultural project in Gabon in the early 1970s and now was with the 
DFA's Agricultural Technical Services; Southern Sun Director Peter John Venison; and an 
unspecified representative from the Department of Industries, Division of Sea Fisheries. 1IS 
Finding the socio-economic situation on the Comoros deplorable, and due to southern Africa 
constituting the focus of South Africa's involvement, von Hirschberg concluded that the cost 
for technical assistance with any meaningful result was outside of Pretoria's capacity. Regard-
ing tourism as a possibility in promoting contact between the two countries, he stated that the 
"absence of suitable beaches on the islands has also ruled the Comores [sic lout as a tourist 
II I Denard. 1998. Corsaire de 10 rlipub/ique, pp.356f. 
112 Telephone conversation with Marie Jacobs from the Treaty Section of the DFA's Legal Department, 18 
November 2002. In consequence, the Memorandum is not contained in the work of Kalley. 2001. South Africa's 
Treaties in Th eory and Practice, 1806-1998. 
113 Denard. 1998. Corsaire dela rlipub/ique, p.371 ; Lunel. 1991. Bob Denard, p.600. 
114 'Meeting between Mr von Hirschberg and Colonel Denard' , from Carl von Hirschberg, Pretoria, 30 Octo-
ber 1979, p.2 (DFA, 1/203/3, Vol. 4). 
115 'Mission to Comoros 4-7 December 1979', to Carl von Hirschberg, ca. November 1979 (DFA, 1/203/3, 
Vol. 4). 
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attraction",''' suggesting that a development/investment project in this sector was not com-
mercially justified. In consequence, all that remained was von Hirschberg's recommendation 
of a "small Ogaprov project", with costs for the first three years estimated at 350,000, 
250,000 and 100,000 Rand.ll7 This seemed a worthwhile investment for Pretoria, because 
Abdallah had heard of the OGAPROV project in Gabon and was "keen to develop the cattle 
industry to reduce their dependency on imported meat if not entirely to eliminate imports".'" 
It appears that Abdallah knew of the OGAPROV project through Bob Denard. According to 
journalist Pean's account, Gabon's President Bongo had "lent" the French mercenary to Ab-
dallah so that he could come to power. In return, Affretair, the air cargo carrier in which 
Bongo held a vested interest (Chapter 4), was allowed to use the Comoros as a stopover for 
deliveries to and from the Seychelles. l19 
As no other primary sources are available on the agricultural project on the Comoros, the 
remaining information is derived from Denard's memoirs. According to them, for reasons that 
are not mentioned, the Sangani "pilot farm" appears only to have been launched in 1983, 
comprising six hundred hectares and being administered by the Presidential Guard, with ac-
tual costs to Pretoria of 200, 400 and 600 thousand Rand in 1984, 1985 and 1987 respec-
tively.12. Equally based on Denard's account, in the mid-1980s, Sol Kerzner' s firm World 
Leisure Group Limited nevertheless became involved in the establishment of the Galawa Ho-
tel and the renovation of the Itsandra Hotel, with Denard himself selling private land to World 
Leisure Group Limited and mediating the negotiations. 12I The amount involved was some 50 
million Rand, with the Industrial Development Corporation providing, and Credit Guarantee 
insuring, the credit. 122 While the reasons for Kerzner's undertakings at this stage are not re-
corded, this reflected his current expansion strategy due to limited possibilities in South and 
southern Africa (Chapter 2), an argument supported by the parallel developments on Mauri-
tius. Incorporated in February 1983, and with Sol Kerzner as its Director, Sun Resorts Lim-
ited expanded on that island and took over the management of an existing casino resort and a 
116 'Visit to the Comoros Islands, 4-7 December 1979', from Carl von Hirschberg to Brand Fourie, I May 
1980, p.3 (DFA, 11203/3, Vol. 4). 
117 ' Visit to the Comoros Islands, 4-7 December 1979', from Carl von Hirschberg to Brand Fourie, Pretoria, 1 
May 1980, p.5 (DFA, 11203/3, Vol. 4) . 
II' 'Visit to the Comoros Islands, 4-7 December 1979', from Carl von Hirschberg to Brand Fourie, I May 
1980, p.4 (DFA, 11203/3, Vol. 4). 
119 Pean. 1983. Affaires africaines, p.l72 (translation from French). 
12. Lunel. 1991. Bob Denard, p.591; Weinberg. 1994. Last of the Pirates, p.112. 
121 Denard. 1998. Corsaire de fa repub/ique, p.382; Lunel. 1991. Bob Denard, pp.588f; Weinberg. 1994. 
Last of the Pirates, p.187. 
122 Africa Research Bulletin: Economic Series 27, 9, 16 September-15 October 1990: 10107; Weinberg. 
1994. Last of the Pirates, p.187. 
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tourist hoteL '23 Although they had obtained landing rights on the island already in 1975, and 
linked to this development, South African Airways began to fly South African tourists to the 
Comoros from July 1983 (Chapter 4). In order to make these flights economically viable, they 
were an extension of the service to Blantyre. In addition, and given the substantial Muslim 
population on the Comoros, the planes then flew members of this religious group to Jeddah, 
the place of pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia. 12' Returning to Sun Resorts Limited, by 1984, it had 
negotiated with the Mauritius government over a fourth hotel '" and in the following years 
increased the number of managed holiday resorts to five. 126 In this context, political scientist 
Bowman suggests that Kerzner held a passport of Mauritius from 1986 and that he was re-
lated to "murky operations of certain local businesses",'" a proposal which seems credible in 
the light of Kerzner' s activities in South Africa itself, as indicated in Chapter 2. Given 
Kerzner's legal activities to ban his biography from being published, no attempt was made to 
obtain his view on that. 
On the Comoros, and in contrast to World Leisure Group Limited and the military, the 
Department of Foreign Affairs became increasingly sceptical towards Abdallah. For instance, 
in November 1982, the island was granted the right to open a Trade Mission with diplomatic 
status in Pretoria, without a reciprocal privilege being accorded to the South Africans. Fur-
thermore, on the occasion of the OAU's 40th Anniversary Meeting in 1985, Abdallah 
strongly attacked the Pretoria government. In consequence, and apparently also due to dete-
riorating relations with Denard, the Department of Foreign Affairs steadily withdrew from the 
Sangani farm project. According to Denard, Glenn Babb argued that "this must simply be 
considered as the logical consequence of the general feeling that prevails, i.e. that the time has 
passed of giving and aiding and to only receive slaps in return". '28 Thus, judging from the 
listing of DFA files pertaining to the project, South Africa's involvement ceased in July 
1989.129 The final straw causing Pretoria to withdraw from the island, was Abdallah' s assassi-
nation in November 1989, when the foreign service corps, now favoured by President de 
Klerk, had the upper hand, and these developments are examined in the following chapter. 
123 Rogerson. 1990. Sun lntemational, pp.347f.; <http://www.semdex.com/companY.Jlrofile/sun.htm>. 
124 Correspondence with Frans Swarts and Gert van der Veer, II February 2003. 
125 Sun International. 1985. p.17. 
126 <http://www.sunresort.com>. 
127 Bowman. 1991. Mauritius, p.96. 
128 Lunel. 1991. Bob Denard, p.613 (translated from French). On the above, see Lunel. 1991. Bob Denard, 
pp.567, 583f., 587, 608f., 616f., 620; Denard. 1998. Corsaire de la repub/ique, pp.356f., 379, 389f.; Hartley, 
Aidan. 1990. Paradise Lost, Africa Report 35, I: 39; Weinberg. 1994. Last of the Pirates, pp.lllf., 136f., 186f. 
129 The files in DFA, 1/203/4/2 undoubtedly contain the relevant documents. 
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Even though sparingly documented, the above account of Pretoria's involvement on the 
Comoros during the 1980s confirms the military' s strategic interest in this western Indian 
Ocean island and that they took the lead, with the Department of Foreign Affairs following. A 
similar situation prevailed in relation to Madagascar, where the even less substantial archival 
evidence is presented as follows. 
Madagascar 
The South African activities on Madagascar that began during the Outward Movement in the 
second half of the 1960s were abruptly halted in June 1972, when the Marxist Ratsiraka came 
to power through a military coup. The intelligence interest subsequently displayed by the Bu-
reau for State Security (Chapter 4) persisted with the military. Thus, in mid-June 1979, the 
Chief of Staff: Intelligence, Pieter van der Westhuizen, assessed the situation in Madagascar 
as follows: 
At present Madagascar does not pose a military threat to the RSA. When, however, one 
considers the increasing activity of the USSR, Cuba and other East European countries on 
the island, as well as the fact that Madagascar is attempting to extend her influence to the 
remaining Indian Ocean islands, the long term threat to the RSA and the Western world is 
intensifying progressively. ( ... ) It is recommended that the RSA should make a final at-
tempt to win the goodwill of the Ratsiraka Government by rendering economic assis-
tance. Only after such an attempt has failed, should the RSA consider supporting the re-
sistance movements, preferable on the condition that two or more of the movements form 
a coalition. This coalition must then prepare a detailed plan of how they intend to over-
throw the Government, the means they have at their disposal, as well as their require-
ments as far as the RSA is concerned. 130 
There is no indication that the military undertook any such activities, however, in all likeli-
hood because Madagascar was the only western Indian Ocean island that "maintained armed 
forces of any size".131 It is possible that such considerations influenced the military's in-
volvement in an attempted coup on the Seychelles in 1981, the details of which are now ex-
amined. 
Seychelles Coup 
The previous chapter examined the Bureau for State Security'S ambition of bringing pro-
Western James Mancham to power on this geo-strategically important island by launching 
Operation Playboy to support him in the run-up to the country's independence elections of 
June 1976. Mancham won these elections and chose Albert Rene as his Prime Minister, but 
only a year later, Rene ousted Mancham with the help from both Tanzania and China. Even 
130 Letter from Pieter van der Westhuizen, 14 June 1979 (DF A, 1I115/3, Vol. lPL). 
131 Cooke. 1983. Strategic Considerations, pp.251, 274-280. 
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though Pretoria lost this ally in the western Indian Ocean at the time, there was renewed inter-
est from the military during the P.W. Botha era, and this is examined in the following ac-
count. 
Similar to the situation described in the previous section, detailing the approach of opposi-
tion movements to Pretoria with requests for assistance in coming to power, the files reveal 
several attempts by Seychelles groups in exile after 1979 to obtain support in overthrowing 
President Rene. In January 1979, such a request was made through the Paris Embassy by "a 
movement of Seychellois in exile", but adhering to the diplomatic code of conduct, a later 
DF A report states "that under no circumstances could we become involved in the internal 
affairs of another country".!32 In April 1979, a representative of the Seychelles Government in 
Exile, Albert G. D'Offey, approached the Department of National Security. He had worked 
for the Seychelles Ministry of Foreign Affairs during Mancham's Presidency and emigrated 
to Durban in South Africa after Rene's coup in June 1977. However, the national intelligence 
agency, according to the same DFA report, "was not interested in following up the contact". 133 
In mid-November 1979, President Rene accused South African and French mercenaries of 
having fomented protests on the Seychelles in an attempt to overthrow him, reacting with the 
imposition of a dusk-to-dawn curfew. "' The available documents provide no indication that 
Pretoria pursued such attempts at the time, but it is possible that Rene was aware of the at-
tempts from exile groups to obtain foreign assistance for a plot and that he knew about the 
plans of a parallel visit of Bob Denard and Carl von Hirschberg to MaM towards the end of 
November, as revealed in a DFA telex.!ll Prior to this visit, the DMI's Brigadier Daan Ham-
man and Colonel Martin Knotze had organised a meeting with Denard in South Africa. In 
view of Rene's coup allegations against Pretoria, the foreign service officers tried to avoid 
further embarrassment and the telex to von Hirschberg reads: "You will appreciate that visit 
of Denard to S.A. next week plus his presence and yours the following week in Mahe [sic] 
could be used negatively if it became known. Suggestion is not that visits be cancelled but 
that they be handled with extreme discretion. In the meantime it is suggested that you may 
132 ' Seychelles', ca. February 1980, p.2 (DFA, 111 94/4, Vol. 1). 
133 'Seychelles' , ca. February 1980, p.2 (DFA, 11194/4, Vol. I). Also 'Beplande staatsgrep in Seychelle', 
from the Secretary of the Department of National Security to Brand Fourie, Pretoria, 19 April; 'Beplande staats-
grep in Seychelle' , from Carl von Hirschberg to Brand Fourie, Pretoria, 2 May; ' Beplande staatsgrep in Sey-
chelle ' , from Hennie Geldenhuys to Carl von Hirschberg, Cape Town, 15 May 1979 (DFA, 11194/3, Vol. 3). 
" , See the Reuters and Associated Press news agency reports from 16 to 18 November 1979 (DFA, 11194/3, 
Vol. 3). Also Cooke, Melinda W. 1983. Seychelles, in Frederica M. Bunge, ed.Indian Ocean: Five Island Coun-
tries. Washington, DC: The American University: 220. 
m Telex to Carl von Hirschberg, Pretoria, 19 November 1979 (DFA, 1/194/3, Vol. 3). 
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consider it advisable to issue calm denial of Rene's allegations".136 It is not recorded whether 
the respective meetings finally took place, but there is no indication to the contrary. In any 
case, while the above-mentioned telex reveals that von Hirschberg's planned meeting with 
Denard was related to the DFA's interest on the Comoros, subsequent developments suggest 
that Hamman's and Knotze's involvement formed the basis for the attempted Seychelles coup 
on 25 November 1981. 
Before proceeding to these developments, and given the DMI's contact with Denard, it is 
necessary to examine why the coup plan was not executed by the French mercenary, but by 
Mike Hoare, whom we met in Chapter 3, in the context of Pretoria's military activities in the 
Congo in the first half of the 1960s. Significantly, whereas Denard had continued with merce-
nary activity from the 1960s through the 1970s, Hoare appears to have remained inactive after 
his Congo engagement, working as an accountant in the Far East, sailing in the Mediterranean 
and thereafter settling in Durban. ll1 In addition, by 1981 he had reached the advanced age of 
sixty-two. l38 Having interviewed Denard in the early 1990s, Samantha Weinberg suggests that 
one of Hoare's motives may have been simple competition with his French counterpart: "One 
of the aspects that must have rankled most bitterly, was that his despised rival, Colonel Bob 
Denard, was still sitting happy and wealthy on the nearby, larger, more populous Comoros".139 
Another noteworthy factor was that the Durban area had become home to many former Rho-
desian soldiers, several of whom had fought alongside Hoare in the Congo in the early 1960s 
and nine of whom accompanied him to the Seychelles. The most famous of these was 
Jeremiah 'Jerry' Puren. 14O It is therefore possible that informal contact existed between the 
Seychelles exile movement and Hoare, and that this prompted him to action. The ensuing 
paragraphs outline the events surrounding Hoare's attempted coup, with particular attention 
being paid to the question of Pretoria's role therein. In addition to the secondary material, the 
main source used here are the testimonies heard at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
on this matter. 
On 25 November 1981, Hoare and forty-two of his men boarded a Royal Swazi aircraft at 
Manzini, Swaziland's international airport, under the guise of tourists. On their arrival at 
Mahe International Airport, a customs officer discovered the weapons in their luggage and 
136 Telex to Carl von Hirschberg, Pretoria, 19 November 1979 (DFA, 1119413, Vol. 3). 
137 Hoare. 1989. The Road to Kalamata, back cover. 
138 Slum, William. 1995. Killing Hope: U.S Military and CIA lnterventions since World War II. Monroe, 
ME: Common Courage Press: 267. 
139 Weinberg. 1994. Last of the Pirates, p.206. 
140 See his autobiographic account on the Katanga involvement: Puren, Jeremiah 'Jerry', Srian Pottinger. 
1986. Mercenary Commander. Galago: Alberton. 
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this led to a brief gun-battle during which one of Hoare's men was killed and another one de-
fected. Realising that the coup had failed, Hoare and most of his men hijacked an Air India 
plane that had landed during a scheduled stopover on a flight from Harare to Bombay. Presi-
dent Rene, who had meanwhile been advised of developments, gave permission for the plane 
to take off for South Africa.''' The evidence from Hoare' s own account and the relevant hear-
ings at the TRC, in contrast to what the above-mentioned files indicate, suggest that Martin 
Dolinchek, a Durban-based Department of National Security agent, had approached Hoare in 
the first half of 1979.'42 This validates Pik Botha's claim that neither national nor military 
intelligence informed the Department of Foreign Affairs to the full extent of their involve-
ment from the outset, referring to the Seychelles coup as one example of their "must know 
principle" whereby "certain matters were so delicate, sensitive, and risky, that the number of 
people who ought to know about it must be limited".''' Importantly, the secondary sources 
also indicate that national intelligence initiated the Seychelles coup plans, but that these were 
taken over by Military Intelligence sometime during 1979 after some infighting between the 
two units. This serves as another example to illustrate that the period from the end of van den 
Bergh' s BOSS in 1978 to P.W. Botha's appointment of Niel Barnard as the NIS Director-
General in June 1980, saw disputes over respective areas of responsibility between national 
and military intelligence. Thereafter, however, and reflecting the co-operation between NIS 
and the military, as suggested in Chapter 2, Dolincheck remained liaison officer for the NIS, 
while Brigadier Hamman and Colonel Knotze were in charge of the DMI operation and or-
ganised the provision of necessary armaments to Hoare and his men.'44 The TRC's report 
states that "there is prima facie evidence of high-level state involvement in this operation", 
but it could not come to a final conclusion whether "this operation was undertaken on the in-
structions of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the heads of the relevant 
intelligence agencies". It continues that this "cannot, however, absolve them of representative 
responsibility for the fact that senior National and Military Intelligence officers and senior 
officers of the SADF were involved"l 45 Furthermore, the TRC report cites the findings of the 
141 See Hoare, Mike. 1986. The Seychelles Affair. New York: Bantam Press: 59-91; Rogers. 2000. Someone 
Else's War, pp.155-173. <http://www.contrast.org!truthlhtmVseyche11es.htm1>. contains the submission of the 
Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa to the TRC in November 1997, listing the names of all men involved. 
142 TRC o/South Africa Report. Vol. 2. 1999. pp.161f.; Hoare. 1986. The Seychelles Affair, pp.22f., 26,125. 
Also Ellis. 1996. Africa and International Corruption, pp.l72f. 
143 Interview with Pik Botha, 20 April 1999. 
144 TRC 0/ South A/rica Report. Vol. 2. 1999. p.163; Hoare. 1986. The Seychelles Affair, pp.22f., 26, 125. 
Also Ellis. 1996. Africa and International Corruption, pp.l72f. 
<http ://www.contrast.org!trutblbtmVseyche11es.htm1>. referring to the Rand Daily Mail and The Guardian , both 
24 May 1982. 
145 TRC o/South Africa Report. Vol. 2. 1999. p.161. 
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UN Commission of Inquiry into the Seychelles coup, established on 15 December 1981,146 
which argued that "if responsible ministers were not at least aware of what was going on, this 
indicates both a remarkable lack of control by the South Afiican government over its own 
agencies and a lack of awareness that is hard to reconcile with the tight and effective control 
exercised by the security authorities in South Africa".'47 
Prime Minister Botha tried to minimise the damage for Pretoria; on 29 July 1982, he 
claimed before Parliament that "neither the South African government, the Cabinet, nor the 
State Security Council were aware of the coup" ' " In addition, the plans of the Progressive 
Federal Party to establish a parliamentary commission of enquiry were blocked, P.W. Botha 
prevented any further investigation by invoking national security legislation and Hoare was 
only reluctantly put on trial after international pressure. 14' Finally, during the court case, 
Hoare and the men that had returned to South Afiica immediately after the coup attempt were 
not permitted to give evidence, as Defence Minister Malan invoked a security law barring 
them from providing "evidence on matters concerning their involvement in SADF operations 
prior to 24 November 1981 " '50 Hoare was sentenced to ten years imprisonment for hijacking, 
defined as the unlawful interference in the smooth operation of civil aviation in terms of the 
Civil Aviation Offences Act (No 10 of 1972).' 51 The application of this law is an indication 
that Hoare either did not have the South Afiican nationality and/or was not a member of the 
SADF or its Reserve, because only then was the Defence Act of 1957 valid, as it specifically 
dealt with mercenary activity (Chapter 3). However, Hoare did not serve the full sentence and 
was released on 6 May 1985, as part of an amnesty declared by State President Botha.15' Of 
the more than forty other men put to trial, only nine were convicted and given a minimum 
sentence of five years, but they were all released conditionally after six months.'" The six 
men who had remained behind after the coup plot, among them agent Dolincheck, were ar-
rested and sentenced; four of them received the death penalty, but Pretoria paid a ransom of 3 
million US Dollars and the six prisoners could return to South Afiica on 23 July 1983.''' This 
146 Security Council Resolutions 496 (15 December 1981) and 507 (28 May 1982). 
147 Cited in TRC of South Africa Report. Vol. 2. 1999. p.163 . 
148 TRC of South Africa Report. Vol. 2. 1999. p.160. 
'49 Frankel. 1984. Pretoria 's Praetorians, p. 130; Jaster. 1986. Th e Defence of White Power, pp.136f.; TRC of 
South Africa Report. Vol. 2. 1999. p.160. 
150 Rogers. 2000. Someone Else's War , p.179; TRCofSouth Africa Report. Vol. 2. 1999. p.160. 
15' Botha, C.B. 1993. Soldiers of Fortune or Whores of War?, p.86. 
15' Hoare. 1986. The Seychelles Affair, pp.190-195. 
15' TRC of South Africa Report. Vol. 2. 1999. p.160; Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural 
Series 20, 7,1 -31 July 1983: 6909. 
'" TRC of South Africa Report. Vol. 2. 1999. p.162; Ellis. 1996. Africa and International Corruption, p.173; 
Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series 20, 7,1-31 July 1983: 6909. 
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evidence indicates that Pretoria did not really have to be concerned with international reac-
tion, especially given the backing from Washington which considered the Seychelles of stra-
tegic importance, as "the site of a US Air Force installation, officially described as a satellite 
tracking station" since 1963, as former CIA agent William Blum informs us.' ss In fact, on 10 
May 1982, The New York Times suggested that Hoare had met an official from the US Central 
Intelligence Agency prior to the coup to inform him of the plans. '" Both Washington and 
London had voted for the establishment of the UN Commission of Inquiry into the Seychelles 
coup, but the report it produced did not propose any specific action against Pretoria, and it is 
reasonable to assume that such proposals would have been vetoed by them. ' l7 Thus, it was 
sufficient for Pretoria to show initial severity toward the perpetrators to appease the situation. 
As Hoare put it: " It had become obvious to me in the few weeks since the operation that the 
government was obliged to have us tried in the full glare of world publicity and that they 
would be at pains to show that South African courts were part of an independent judicial sys-
tem free from any governmental interference" ."8 Once the situation had abated, the sentences 
of Hoare and his fellow perpetrators were ameliorated. 
Despite the coup's failure and the outcry from the international community that the Sey-
chelles was another example of Pretoria's military action in pursuance of its Total Strategy, 
the intelligence agencies retained their interest and involvement in the Seychelles according to 
secondary sources. Now, however, the "dealings focused on banking interests and unorthodox 
fmancial institutions that drew in the Seychelles Prime Minister and Minister of Defence",'59 
leading political scientist Stephen Ellis to state that "in matters of strategic deception, the 
South African secret services had made considerable advances since the ham-fisted bribery of 
the Department ofInformation and the 1981 mercenary fiasco". '''' 
The Seychelles coup of 1981 is the last recorded instance of South African military en-
gagement in the western Indian Ocean during P.W. Botha's era, which, as has been stated 
above, took place against the background of intensified Cold War developments in this re-
gion. This proactive involvement, relatively far from South Africa' s borders, shows their pre-
occupation, shared by Washington, that the communist threat came not only from Angola and 
Mozambique, but also from this direction. In addition to these strategic considerations, a cen-
III Blum. 1995. Killing Hope, p.267. Also Franda. 1982. Th e Seychelles, pp.l, 51 , 75, Illf , 117f 
116 'Trial Gives Peek at South African Intelligence Web ', The New York Times 10 May 1982, p.2. 
117 Security Council Resolutions 496 (IS December 1981) and 507 (28 May 1982). 
118 Hoare. 1986. The Seychelles Affair, p.ll!. 
119 Seegers. 1996. The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa, p.209. 
160 Ellis. 1996. Africa and International Corruption, p.176. 
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tral theme in the military's undertakings in Africa beyond the region, presented in the next 
two sections, was a keen interest in selling surplus arms. In contrast to the earlier account of 
opposition movements approaching Pretoria for such support, what follows is an examination 
of similar interaction, but taking place on a government-to-government level with both Soma-
lia' and Sudan after 1984. 
Armament Sales 
Armscor had been created in 1968 to counter the impact of the 1963 UN voluntary arms em-
bargo, while its role as an armament producer was discussed in connection with Safair deliv-
eries to South Africa, via Libreville, prior to the Angolan war (Chapter 4). Due to Pretoria's 
growing involvement in regional wars after 1975 and in view of the 1977 UN mandatory arms 
embargo, Armscor gained in importance as the provider of the necessary weaponry to the 
military. The need to develop ever more advanced weapons, in fact, not only rendered the UN 
weapons embargoes obsolete, but made Armscor "South Africa one of the world's largest 
producers of armaments, and led to the development of some of the world's finest weapons 
and military equipment".''' Thus, during the early 1980s, when faced with "economic prob-
lems due to rising production costs, excess capacities, and a drop in domestic demand",I62 
Armscor initiated arms exports to mitigate these problems. This also impacted on Pretoria's 
foreign relations with African countries beyond the region. This section examines the interac-
tion with both Somalia and Sudan after 1984, where armament sales constituted the essence 
of contact. Given the military's leading role in this contact, the documents in the DFA files 
did not always provide conclusive information on the outcome of certain activities. These 
gaps could be bridged through correspondence with Glenn Babb, Director in the Africa Divi-
sion at the time and key figure among the foreign service corps in the present context. 
Somalia 
We initially provide the background necessary to understanding South Africa's endeavours in 
Somalia post-1984. The DF A files do not record any relevant interaction between the two 
countries from Somalia's independence in July 1960 until the late 1970s,l63 possibly because 
South Africa was engaged elsewhere on the continent. Furthermore, the Marxist orientation of 
Somalia's President from October 1969, Siad Barre, was incompatible with Pretoria' s anti-
161 Hamann. 200 I. Days of the Generals, p.161. 
162 <http://www.cia.gov/nic/ graphicslbattilega/south _africa. pdt>, p .6. 
16J DFA, 11144/3, Vol. 1. 
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communist stance, posing an obstacle in the way of contact. In a situation similar to that in 
Angola during the mid-l 970s, Somalia became a Cold War zone when Barre began to side 
with Moscow, offering the Soviets the port of Berbera in the Gulf of Aden, important for sur-
veying oil tanker and other ship movements to and from the Suez Canal, in return for military 
equipment and training. With this support, Barre invaded the Ogaden region, which forms the 
border with Ethiopia, in mid-1977. However, in the second half of that year, Moscow 
switched its support from Somalia to Ethiopia. Consequently, Barre lost the war that had crip-
pled the country 's economy, a situation exacerbated by the drought and famine of the 1970s. 
Consequently, he severed all ties with Moscow and expelled the Soviets from Berbera. In his 
search for new military and fmancial assistance, Barre found support from the United States 
after 1980/81, benefiting from Reagan's obsession with communism, mentioned earlier in this 
chapter and as confirmed by the then US Ambassador to Somalia: "As much as anywhere else 
on the continent, in the Hom of Africa U.S. policy is heavily influenced by East-West consid-
erations".164 Within this new policy framework, Barre also approached South Africa and this 
developing relationship is now outlined. In view of the Cuban and Soviet presence in 
neighbouring Ethiopia and South Yemen, Mogadishu considered Pretoria as a potential part-
ner because of its own war against the communist forces in Angola since the mid-1970s. In 
fact, after a visit to Somalia in February 1984, Glenn Babb reported: "They see in us a col-
league fighting the same battle and need our expertise and material, but more importantly our 
support" .1" Furthermore, during the stay of another South African delegation in Somalia in 
May of that year, the Somali Defence Minister declared that the "RSA and Somalia have the 
same aggressors". 166 
An important person in establishing contact between the two countries was Hassan Wehe-
lie, a Somali citizen and businessman, whom Babb referred to as the "trusted go-between" in 
correspondence with US. I6' His role as the Pretoria-Mogadishu middleman from the late 1970s 
was based on the directorship of two Johannesburg-based trade and finance companies, and 
documents dated 1984 reveal that he applied for permanent residence in South Africa. I6' We-
164 Patterson, Donald K. 1985. Somalia and the United States, 1977-83: The New Relationship, Gerald J. 
Bender, James S. Coleman, Richard L. Sklar, eds. African Crisis Areas and u.s. Foreign Policy. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press: 202. 
16' 'Report on visit ofa delegation to Somalia, 11-15 February 1984', from Glenn Babb, 21 February 1984, 
p.13 (DFA, 11144/3, Vol. 3). 
166 'Besoek Somali~se afvaardiging: samesprekings met Minister van Verdediging en Adj Minister van 
Buitelandse Sake op 19 mei 1984', 21 May 1984, p.4 (DFA, 11144/3, Vol. 4) (translation from Afrikaans). 
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helie's initial contact with Pretoria was with Military Intelligence; Colonel Martin Knotze 
asked Rae Killen to meet Wehelie. At a recorded meeting, held in Knotze's presence on 14 
February 1980, Wehelie explained that the Somali government was particularly interested in 
obtaining arms from South Africa, an initiative which was endorsed by Knotze who "indi-
cated that DMI were anxious to visit Somalia to see what could be done in the way of assis-
tance".16' According to Killen's report of September 1980, however, the Department of For-
eign Affairs was cautious regarding "too close a contact with Somalia as they probably would 
want large financial support and the sale of arms to that country could jeopardise our relations 
with Kenya because of the troubled border situation between Kenya and Somalia"Po Possibly 
due to this concern, a later document reveals that, in 1981, "the State Security Council de-
cided that Somalia was not a priority, but that the possibility for contact should be explored at 
a later point".J7J Wehelie again sought contact with Pretoria in mid-1982, by which time the 
border conflict between Kenya and Somalia had been resolved, and met Glenn Babb in Au-
gust 1982. Based on Babb's report, the foreign affairs ministry now showed a keen interest in 
interaction with Somalia in order to obtain overflying rights for South African Airways and to 
establish "political collaboration (eg [sic 1 the exchange of intelligence) ( ... ) of mutual benefit 
to both parties particularly in view of the heightened activity of the Soviet Union".172 How-
ever, as will be presently shown, the military's interest in selling arms to Somalia became the 
dominant aspect of contact, with the Department of Foreign Affairs' ambitions being com-
paratively peripheral. 
According to our correspondence with Glenn Babb, his meeting with Wehelie in August 
1982 triggered "several visits, meetings with Barre and the Vice-President" ,173 leading to 
President Barre's invitation, in January 1984, to both Pik and P.W. Botha to visit Somalia. 
While the latter's response is not contained in the files, Pik Botha acknowledged the invita-
tion in February, but stating that he could not come "at this stage" due to "pressing obliga-
tions at home and long-standing arrangements abroad"/ 74 possibly referring to the negotia-
tions with Mozambique over the Nkomati Accord. At the same time, he proposed sending an 
official delegation to Somalia, and this took place from 11 to 15 February 1984. Reflecting 
169 'Somalia: discussion with Mr Hassan Wehelie ', from Rae Killen to Brand Fourie, Pretoria, 14 February 
1980, p.2 (DFA, 11144/3, Vol. 1PL). 
170 'Contacts with Somalia' , from Rae Killen to Pik Botha, 4 September 1980 (DFA, 11144/3, Vol. 2). 
171 'Verhoudinge tussen RSA en Somali~: beleidsbepaling I.o.v. die res van Afrika', from Rae Killen to Pik 
Botha and Hans van Dalsen, Pretoria, 26 May 1983, pA (DFA, 1199119, Vol. 2) (translation from Afrikaans). 
172 'Somalia', from Glenn Babb to Rae Killen and Jan Wentzel, Pretoria, 3l August 1982, p.2. Also 'Aid to 
Somalia', from Rae Killen to Hans van Dalsen, 11 March 1983, p.2 (DF A, 11144/3, Vol. 2). 
173 Correspondence with Glenn Babb, 20 January 2003. 
174 Draft letter from Pik Botha to Siad Barre, February 1984 (DFA, 1/144/3, Vol. 3). 
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Pretoria' s varied interests in Somalia, the members of the delegation were Glenn Babb, 
Brigadier Hamman, Mike Killin from NIS, and SAA Chief Director for Flight Operations 
from 1979 to 1986, Jacobus Gustavus 'Gus ' Schoeman; Wehelie acted as the go-between. 
Talks were held with President Barre, Lieutenant General Mohamed Ali Samatar, who was 
First Vice-President and Minister of Defence, the head of the Somali intelligence agency, the 
Minister of Finance, the Deputy Minister of Water and Mineral Resources, as well as the 
Minister of the Criminal Investigation Department. 175 We will see that the sale of armaments 
to Somalia constituted the key theme in the discussions, once again supporting the argument 
that Pretoria' s activities in Africa beyond the region during the 1980s were guided primarily 
by military interests. Related to this was the initiative of the National Intelligence Service that 
maintained close links with the military at the time. In particular, during the talks of NIS 
agent Kiihn with his Somali counterpart they "agreed to a meeting between a South African 
representative and their [=Mogadishu'sJ man in Rome to establish a permanent liaison sys-
tem".I76 As we will see below, the ambition of SAA to obtain overflying and/or landing rights 
became linked to that of the military, while the following issue stood in the shadow of these 
arrangements. 
Reference is made to the interest expressed by the Somali Deputy Minister of Water and 
Mineral Resources in joint economic ventures, with a particular focus on mineral resources. 177 
Probably in an attempt to strengthen its bargaining position to achieve the main goal of over-
flying rights, Director Babb, in Wehelie' s presence, held separate meetings with representa-
tives from the mining companies Gold Fields (South Africa) l18 and Anglo American on 24 
April 1984, to gauge their level of interest. Babb expressed a keen interest in their co-
operation, while also clarifying to the Anglo American representatives that Pretoria "could do 
not much more than create a favourable climate within which the private sector could operate 
but would welcome inputs from the private sector". I79 Interest from Gold Fields (South Af-
rica) was limited, as the London branch was responsible for any initiative in that part of Af-
rica. l80 The discussion with Theodore Ludwig Pretorius and Stefan Adolf Waldemar Lands-
175 'Report on visit ofa delegation to Somalia, II-IS February 1984' , from Glenn Babb, 21 February 1984, 
p.11 (DFA, 111 44/3, Vol. 3). 
176 'Report on visit ofa delegation to Somalia, II-IS February 1984', from Glenn Babb, 21 February 1984, 
p.1 I (DFA, 1/144/3, Vol. 3). 
177 'Verhoudings met Somalie', from Rae Killen to Hans van Dalsen and Pik Botha, April 1984, p.2 (DFA, 
11144/3, Vol. 3). 
178 <http://www.goldfields.co.za>. 
179 'Meeting with Anglo-American: Somalia' , from Glenn Babb to Rae Killen, 24 April 1984, p.1 (DFA, 
11144/3, Vol. 4). 
180 'Meeting with Gold Fields, from Glenn Babb to Rae Killen, 25 April 1984 (DFA, 1/144/3, Vol. 4). 
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berg, the Anglo American Deputy Technical Director (Mining) and their Metal Studies Con-
sultant respectively, proved to be more fruitful. After being informed of the investment condi-
tions and the nature of the minerals, Pretorius concluded that "he would take the matter up 
with his Board", although he did "not know what the outcome would be and said some mem-
bers of the Board, because of experiences in Zaire and Zambia, were fundamentally opposed 
to ventures in Africa", as Babb reported to Rae Killen.1S 1 While the Zaire reference was to the 
SMTF project, examined in Chapter 4, which Anglo American abandoned in 1984 due to 
huge 10sses,l82 the Konkola Copper Mine project in Zambia posed geological problems ac-
cording to information we obtained from Stefan Landsberg, l83 and this project was eventually 
halted in January 2002. Given these two unprofitable investments, Landsberg and the multina-
tional 's Executive Director, Michael Spicer, stated independently from each other that Anglo 
American never became involved in Somalia. l84 
Let us now return to Pretoria' s main interest in contact with Mogadishu, namely armament 
deliveries. After the mission to Somalia in February 1984, Babb noted: "Military collabora-
tion is the most important facet of our future relations".lss In this context, a report from Dep-
uty Director-General Killen to his superiors, Director-General van Dalsen and Pik Botha, re-
veals that by December 1983, the State Security Council had approved 250,000 Rand for hu-
manitarian aid and 300,000 Rand for the supply of light weapons and ammunition to Soma-
lia. l86 It is a reasonable assumption that the SSC presented these grants as a gesture of good-
will, hoping to establish a foothold in this arms market, the importance of which is evidenced 
by the fact that discussion on Somalia reached this important decision-making organ. It is 
rather likely that Armscor was the driving force, as we have seen that the arms producer faced 
economic difficulties at the time and sought export markets for its surplus arms. In fact, Kil-
len's above-mentioned report suggests that Armscor's keen interest in Somalia was motivated 
by the hope of reaching markets in the Middle East. l87 ill the subsequent developments, now 
181 'Meeting with Anglo-American: Somalia', from Glenn Babb to Rae Killen, 24 April 1984, p.3 (DFA, 
lI l44/3, Vol. 4). 
182 Whyte. 1997. Taking a Chance on Zaire; <http://www.tenke.comltenkelhistory.html>. 
183 Telephone interview with Stefan Landsberg, 4 December 2002. See also Cunningham, SinJon. 1981. The 
Copper Industry in Zambia: Foreign Mining Companies in a Developing Country. New York: Praeger. 
184 Interview with Michael Spicer, 7 April 1999; telephone interview with Stefan Landsberg, 4 December 
2002. 
ISS ' Report on visit ofa delegation to Somalia', 11-15 February 1984', from Glenn Babb, 21 February 1984, 
p.12 (DFA, lI144/3, Vol. 3). 
186 'Verhoudings met Somalie', from Rae Killen to Hans van Dalsen and Pik Botha, April 1984, p.3 (DFA, 
1/144/3, Vol. 3). 
187 'Verhoudings met Somalie', from Rae Killen to Hans van Dalsen and Pik Botha, April 1984, p.5 (DFA, 
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outlined, the military included the foreign service officers in its attempt to obtain a beneficial 
package deal from Mogadishu. 
The discussions began during the visit of a Somali delegation to South Afiica from 17 to 
19 May 1984, comprising the First Vice-President and Minister of Defence, Samatar, the 
Deputy Minister of Minerals and Water Resources, Somalia's Ambassador to Mozambique, 
Yusuf Hassan Ibrahim, and the heads of both the Somali armed forces and national intelli-
gence. The South African counterparts were Defence Minister Malan, the Chief of Staff: In-
telligence, Pieter van der Westhuizen, Brigadier Hamman, the DFA's Deputy Minister, Louis 
Nel, Glenn Babb, the SAA Chief Executive, Gert van der Veer, and the NIS officials van der 
Merwe and Kemp; Wehelie was again the go-between. The presence of Louis Nel is astonish-
ing, as the DF A Deputy Minister, a post established in August 1982, generally did not playa 
role in negotiations, but concerned "himself largely with liaison between Government and the 
media" .I88 Queried about Nel's present and subsequent role, Babb explained to us in con·e-
spondence: "the Africa policy was almost entirely driven by officials with politicians being 
the stalking horses for the objectives of expanding relations and having a figure to place in the 
meetings and carry things to Cabinet. Nel's tenure as Deputy Minister was always on a knife-
edge and his political decisions were more dictated by his own precarious position that by a 
genuine interest in the Africa venture". 189 
On the second day of their visit, the Somali military representatives spent the entire day at 
Armscor, where they were shown a range of weapons and dealt with officials from Nimrod,l90 
a division created in 1982 to promote arms exports. l91 After the inspection, Samatar held talks 
with both Defence Minister Malan and DFA Deputy Minister Nel to find common ground on 
the previously mentioned package deal. Malan's offer included a 10 million Rand loan to 
Somalia for their purchase of South Afiican weapons at the following conditions: a soft loan 
of 2.4 million Rand, repayable over ten years, for the Somalis to finance a required 23% de-
posit, plus a normal loan for the remaining sum at an interest rate of 10.5%, to be repaid over 
five years. This offer had been negotiated prior to the Somali visit between Armscor, the 
SADF, the Treasury and Credit Guarantee, again underlining the military' s leading role. 
South Afiican Airways promised an additional 10 million Rand if Somalia granted the airline 
overflying rights. However, as such rights for Somalia alone were worthless without similar 
188 De Beer, J.H. 1998. integration of the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Information in 1980 and Ad-
justmentsupto 1993,p.119. 
189 Correspondence with Glenn Babb, 20 January 2003. 
190 ' Programme' , 16 May 1984 (DFA, 11144/3, Vol. 4). 
191 Beri, Ruchita. 2000. Indo-South Africa Defence Cooperation: Potential and Prospects, Strategic Analysis: 
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA 23, 10: 1691 ; Landgren 1989. Embargo Disimplemented, pp.182f. 
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agreement from both Sudan and Egypt, Samatar was requested to use its influence in helping 
to secure them. Nel reassured him that SAA would not fly to Israel on that route "if that cre-
ated difficulties" due to the Arab hostility towards that country due to Tel Aviv's Middle East 
policy. In return, the Somalis offered a base for the stationing of a DMI officer, with the pro-
viso that only civilian dress could be worn, and they extended the offer to the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and the NIS. In addition, Samatar promised that President Barre would make 
use of his close friendship with Egyptian President Hosny Mubarak to secure overflying 
rights for SAA.'92 
Yet, the Barre government was not satisfied with the outcome of the discussions and re-
quested softer loan conditions. While South Africa's military subsequently juggled the figures 
to ensure a successful conclusion to the deal, again showing the high importance they attrib-
uted to it, Deputy Minister Nel also gave the arrangement strong support. The South Africans 
made a number of further visits to Somalia in their quest for a resolution to the dilemma. In 
June 1984, Nel presented a new offer with a soft loan of 3 million Rand, providing for the 
deposit, at 5% interest and repayable over ten years, a 500,000 Rand grant from the SADF 
and the remaining loan of 6.5 million Rand at 6% interest, to be repaid over twelve years. I93 
This was followed by another visit on 4/5 July, with Glenn Babb, Hamman from DMI, a SAA 
representative and Wehelie participating. Nel was supposed to be part of the group, but did 
not join eventually, possibly in reflection of his relatively low genuine interest in African mat-
ters, as suggested by Babb above. The mission's offer stood firm regarding the grant from the 
SADF, while the soft loan with 5% interest was now only repayable over fifteen years and the 
6.5 million Rand loan had to be repaid over eight years, but at an interest rate of 10.25%. In 
addition, SAA offered to provide aiD million Rand loan at 6% interest, in return for Somali 
overflying rights and the undertaking to secure the same permission from both Egypt and Su-
dan. The new proposal again did not meet the Somali expectations and Samatar expressed 
disappointment both at the amount of the credit and the repayment facilities. While Babb re-
plied that he deplored Somalia's rejection of the package deal, he noted that Pretoria did not 
view this as an "offence" and that bilateral relations would nevertheless continue. I9' Yet, sub-
sequent developments and the evidence presented below on interaction with Sudan suggest 
192 On the above, see 'Besoek Somali~se afvaardiging: samesprekings met Minister van Verdediging en Adj 
Minister van Buitelandse Sake op 19 mei 1984' ,21 May 1984, pp.5f.; ' Visit of Lt.-Gen. Ali Samatar, First Vice-
President of Somalia', from Glenn Babb to Rae Killen, 22 May 1984, pp.4ff., 8f. (DFA, 11144/3, Vol. 4). 
193 'Somalia: visit by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs', from Glenn Babb to Rae Killen, 25 June 1984, 
p.1 (DFA, 11144/3, Vol. 4). 
19' 'Verslag van besoek aan Somali., 4-5 julie 1984', from Glenn Babb, 10 July 1984, pp.2f. , 6 (DFA, 
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that the deal was never struck, because the Somalis demanded more than they could offer for 
Pretoria to bid higher. 
On II July 1984, motivated quite probably by a keen personal interest in promoting closer 
relations between the two countries, businessman and go-between Wehelie again approached 
Babb. He emphasised the importance of the deal for both sides, highlighting the Somali over-
flying rights and indicating that he would make an attempt to obtain the same from both 
Egypt and Sudan. He further claimed that Barre would use his influence to promote the South 
African case in Africa and the Arab world, '" probably trying to lure Pretoria with the prospect 
of obtaining oil from there. Wehelie's case appears to have gained the hearing from the for-
eign service officials; Deputy Minister Nel met Rae Killen and Glenn Babb on 23 August, 
arguing that the DFA should offer the 3 million Rand loan at no interest, declaring that it 
would save SAA some 40 million Rand for jet fuel per annum. However, Killen replied that 
SAA's savings would only amount to 10 million Rand, as overflying rights for Sudan were 
estimated at 30 million Rand. '" The last record in the files suggests that SAA nevertheless 
considered participation with a more substantial offer so as not to endanger the entire package 
deal, particularly Arrnscor's keen interest in armament sales, but that it still needed time to 
make calculations. Possibly with the intention to convey the new offer, Louis Nel planned on 
travelling to Somalia again in early September, but this trip was cancelled. In a telephone 
conversation with Glenn Babb, the Deputy Minister argued "that his decision had been caused 
by political developments over which he had no control and were not related to SAA's re-
quest for more time", to which Babb warned "that this would put us in a very bad light in the 
Somali Government's eyes". 197 In any case, the package deal never materialised. Chief Execu-
tive van der Veer recently revealed to us that SAA never gained overflying rights for Soma-
lia'" and Armscor did not make any armament deliveries to Somalia. With hindsight, Glenn 
Babb argued that Barre "turned out to be more rapacious than we had imagined. Somalia 
would never have been in a position to be a client of ARMSCOR - it was almost a bankrupt 
state. ( ... ) The armoured cars offered were of the contemporary use of the SADF. Repayment 
for all this might have come out of the overflight rights had we ever got to that point". 199 
195 'Verhoudings met Somalie', from Glenn Babb to Magnus Malan, 12 July 1984, pp.2f (DFA, 1/144/3, Vol. 4). 
196 ' Vergaadering oor toekomstige optrede: samewerking met Somalie', from Glenn Babb, 28 August 1984 
(DFA, 1/144/3 , Vol. 4). 
197 ' Somalia: cancellation of visit' , from Glenn Babb to Rae Killen and Magnus Malan, 4 September 1984, 
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Sudan 
After the examination of Pretoria's contact with Somalia, mainly promoted by the military 
and centring around Armscor armament sales, the following paragraphs document that the 
relationship with Sudan was closely linked to this. In a similar pattern to the interaction with 
Somalia, middleman and maverick Francis Arthur Nzeribe established and maintained the 
Pretoria-Khartoum liaison. Nigerian of origin, Nzeribe had been Biafra's ambassador during 
the Nigerian Civil War and subsequently made his "wealth from oil, arms trade, banking, and 
insurance business", as indicated in a DFA report. 2oo By 1985, he owned the London-based 
firm Fanz Organisation Nigeria Ltd., with offices in Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra 
Leone, and a budget of 58 million British Pounds. In the political arena, he served as a mem-
ber of Nigeria' s Senate from 1979 to 1983. His name first appears in the DFA files in No-
vember 1980, when Nzeribe proposed to the South African Ambassador in London, Stefanus 
Jacobus Marais Steyn, that his country finance an oil refinery in Benin in return for which it 
would receive 60% of the refined products, but the Department of Foreign Affairs did not 
approve this scheme.20! It was only after 1984 that Nzeribe played a substantial role as the 
middleman between South Africa and Sudan, introduced to the foreign service officers by 
Jimmy Kruger, the Minister of Justice, Police and Prisons from 1974 to 1979.202 In correspon-
dence, Glenn Babb, who again played an important role subsequently, provided the back-
ground to these developments: "Nzeribe took almost all the initiatives - he got in contact with 
Jimmy Kruger himself, latching on to the latter's unforgivable "Biko's death leaves me cold" 
imagining (perhaps correctly) that despite his political career's limbo he would still have in-
fluence with the boys in the Cabinet - and so it turned out to be: Kruger approached [PikJ 
Botha, only too pleased to be in the loop again, and convinced [PikJ Botha that we should 
receive him as he had important recommendations to make about Africa".203 Apart from his 
own financial interests, Nzeribe's appearance as the middleman probably owes his role to the 
severe drought in Sudan and the flaring up of conflict between the ethnically and politically 
opposed movements from north and south Sudan. In particular, as we will see, Colonel Gaafar 
al-Nimieri, Sudan's President since 1969, showed some interest in drought relief, but was 
200 'Hoofinan F.A. Nzeribe', 18 January 1985, pp. lf. (DFA, 11129/3, Vol. 12) (translation from Afrikaans). 
For the following, see Onyeama, Dillibe. 1984. African Legend: The Incredible Story of Francis Arthur Nzeribe. 
Enugu, Nigeria: Delta Publications; Buck, Roland. 1980. ChiefNzeribe: Tycoon International, African Business 
21: 71,73; ' Is Nzeribe Bankrupt?', West Africa 3014, 23 February 1987: 354ff. 
201 Letter from Glenn Babb, II December 1980 (DFA, 11129/3, Vol. 8); telex from Pretoria to the South Af-
rican Embassy in London, 6 January 1981 (DFA, 11129/3, Vol. 1\). AIso DFA, 1118113, Vol. 1. 
202 'Background document: Republic of the Sudan', 1992, p.17 (DFA, 11163/3, Vol. 8). 
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keenly interested in obtaining South African anns, quite likely necessary to oppose the Suda-
nese People' s Liberation Anny (SPLA) in the south of the country. In this context, Nzeribe 
offered his services, as he "claimed to have good relations in the Sudan and undertook to try 
and improve relations between the two countries",'" as a later DFA report states. 
According to the files, the foreign service officers did not show an interest in Nzeribe at 
the time, maybe feeling that his assistance was not required in achieving their main goal, 
namely SAA overflying rights for the Sudan. In particular, as has been shown above, almost 
parallel negotiations were conducted with Somalia to the same end. This left only Egypt out-
standing in the quest for a comprehensive air corridor necessary to shorten the distance to 
Europe, and according to middleman Wehelie, President Barre intended using his influence in 
both Sudan and Egypt to bring about SAA overflying rights there. In July 1984, the SAA's 
Chief Executive, van der Veer, wrote to the Director General of Sudan's Department of Civil 
Aviation to obtain landing rights,'" supported by the Department of Foreign Affairs' simulta-
neous offer of relief aid to Khartoum.'06 However, these activities do not seem to have borne 
any fruit and only gained in momentum in late 1984, when Nzeribe and the military entered 
the scene. Nzeribe came to the Republic from 29 November to 6 December 1984, holding 
talks with Pik Botha, Mineral and Energy Affairs Minister Daniel Wynand Steyn and Defence 
Minister Magnus Malan. In the discussions with Pik Botha, Nzeribe asked for financial assis-
tance to run a publishing house in Nigeria, whose magazines would promote a pro-Pretoria 
stance. To Steyn, Nzeribe offered oil supply from his refinery in Saudi Arabia and to facilitate 
contact with Sudan. During the talks with Malan, he stated that he was in a position to act as a 
salesman for South African weapons, taking as a commission the difference in price he would 
buy and sell them for respectively.'" 
After these initial meetings, Pretoria displayed serious interest in the possibility of Nzeribe 
establishing contact with Khartoum. Regarding the idea of a publishing house in Nigeria, and 
according to our correspondence with Glenn Babb, Pik Botha was "impressed" by Nzeribe's 
"swashbuckling style" and opted for this proposal.20' Babb further indicated that "money was 
to be put at his [Nzeribe'sJ disposal under the control of the DFA", but that the go-between 
"ran away with the funds" at a later stage, when he, himself had already been posted to Can-
204 'Background document: Republic of the Sudan', 1992, p.17 (DFA, 11163/3, Vol. 8). 
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ada.2.' Thus, Babb' s successor as the Director of the Africa Division, lohan Marx, reported in 
October 1985 that the possibility of a publishing house in Nigeria had been abandoned.2l • In 
contrast, according to a report from Director Babb of 1 February 1985, the State Security 
Council had declared SAA's ambitions in Sudan a top priority: "Sudan is of active strategic 
interest for South Africa. The SSC has decided that all possibilities must be investigated to 
establish a way for SAA through Africa and the Government was even prepared to offer So-
malia a considerable amount to convince Sudan to accord SAA overflying rights".211 Even 
though not recorded in this document, but judging from later developments, it seems likely 
that the SSC considered armament sales at least as important, trying to link the two as in the 
Somali case. Probably related to the SSC decision and invited by the military, as the list of 
contacted people suggests, Nzeribe went to South Africa from 2 to 8 February 1985, again 
holding separate talks with Ministers Malan, Steyn and Pik Botha, the latter in Babb's pres-
ence. While expressing caution over arms deliveries that were not on a government-to-
government basis, as this entailed the risk of its own weapons being used against South Africa 
itself, Malan made it clear that "ARMS COR C •. ) is looking to get rid of redundant stock", 
which was in line with their current business strategy. Nzeribe mentioned having a list of ten 
African countries interested in purchasing from South Africa's surplus arms production and 
allayed Malan's fears by stating that he would "only sell to countries miles from RSA bor-
ders" .212 During the rest of his stay, Nzeribe made direct contact with Armscor and they com-
piled a list of arms ready for sale.213 In discussing the oil issue, Minister Steyn displayed little 
interest due to previously negative experiences with middlemen. In contrast, the talks with 
Minister Botha on SAA overflying rights and relief aid were productive;214 in early February 
1985, the DFA provided 350,000 Rand to combat the drought and to promote the airline's 
cause.215 However, after a meeting with President Nimeiri on 2 March 1985, Nzeribe reported 
to the Minister Plenipotentiary Evans at the London Embassy, that the President was "not 
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overly impressed" by the amount of drought aid received from South Africa. 216 This is not 
surprising, because Khartoum was primarily interested in acquiring South African weaponry, 
as further emanates from Nzeribe's report back to Evans. In addition, Evans reported to Preto-
ria that Nzeribe had "suggested that as a further indication of serious intent on our part, one 
aircraft of equipment be donated in the near future", suggesting, as a "practical proposition", 
that Arrnscor might assist in restoring a defunct arrununition factory in Sudan.217 
Babb was then in contact with Colonel Johan H. Pretorius from Military Intelligence, 
"who indicated that there is a strong possibility that the SADF could manage to provide a load 
of outdated stock and would be interested in (1) the operation of a flight through Africa to 
Khartoum and (2) a meeting with their brother officers in Sudan", as he later reported to Kil-
len and Magnus Malan.'" However, Pretoria's efforts in obtaining SAA overflying rights 
through armament deliveries and relief aid came to naught when Nimeiri was toppled on 6 
April 1985. In a subsequent interview with Babb, Nzeribe argued that he "did not feel that the 
coup had ended our chances of ameliorating relations with that country",219 but the documents 
do not reveal any further interaction until the early 1990s.220 
This takes us to the end of the aspect of the military's ambition to sell Arrnscor's surplus 
armament production. As mentioned in the case of Somalia, Arrnscor was hoping to use these 
Muslim countries as stepping-stones to find markets in the Middle East with their signifi-
cantly greater absorbing capacity, and it is obvious that the sale of weapons would have gen-
erated some income to finance Pretoria' s wars in southern Africa. Yet, as so often was the 
case, the political fragility of African politics thwarted Pretoria's plans for interaction with 
Sudan. In contrast, the deal with Somalia failed because Barre probably judged South Africa's 
international isolation to be such that Pretoria would be prepared to go at any length to break 
it. An additional problem was the role of middlemen in these activities, as the interaction did 
not take place between two actors, but three. Importantly, these go-betweens obviously pur-
sued their own financial interests, trying to benefit from a Pretoria that they perceived to be in 
dire straits, and this factor rendered contact somewhat unreliable. A different situation pre-
vailed in the following and final account of military activity in Africa beyond the region. In 
21 6 'Donation to Sudan: report back by ChiefNzeribe', from Rusty Evans to Hans van Dalsen, to the attention 
ofGlerm Babb, London, 7 March 1985, p.1 (DFA, 11 163/3, Vol. 2PL). 
217 'Donation to Sudan: report back by ChiefNzeribe' , from Rusty Evans to Hans van Dalsen, to the attention 
ofGlerm Babb, London, 7 March 1985, p.2 (DFA, 11163/3, Vol. 2PL). 
218 'Sudan: ChiefNzeribe', from Glenn Babb to Rae Killen and Magnus Malan, 27 March 1985, p.2 (DFA, 
11163/3, Vol. 2PL). 
219 ' Sudan', from Glenn Babb, 19 April 1985, p.1 (DFA, 11163/3, Vol. 4). 
220 'Background document: Republic of the Sudan ', 1992, p.17 (DFA, 11163/3, Vol. 8). 
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this instance, co-operation took place with President Bongo of Gabon, with whom Pretoria 
had maintained a long-standing friendship dating from the Nigerian Civil War. 
Co-operation with Gabon 
Pretoria's close link with Gabon was primarily rooted in military co-operation, for instance 
with the Safair landing arrangements in Libreville prior to the Angolan war, strengthened by 
the Department of Foreign Affairs' provision of technical assistance, with the OGAPROV 
agricultural project being of key importance in this regard (Chapter 4). Given Bongo' s impor-
tance both to the military and the foreign affairs ministry, the latter holding a keen interest in 
overflying rights for SAA, they assisted him on at least four occasions in the period from 
1980 to 1986, by providing military assistance to Chad (1980-81 and 1982-83), as requested 
by Bongo, by constructing a military installation in Gabon itself (1983-85) and with an in-
volvement in Equatorial Guinea after 1986. These examples are now examined in tum. 
Chad,1980-81 
Before outlining Pretoria's military engagement in Chad at Bongo's request, it is important to 
briefly provide information on the complex framework within which this took place so as to 
comprehend the scope of its activity. As illustrated in the previous chapter, the SADF had 
tried to establish a foothold in Chad during the mid-I 960s. This became difficult due to the 
political instability in Chad throughout the 1970s, caused by the tensions between the north 
and south. We also mentioned that the northern-based and Libya-supported Frolinat launched 
military attacks against President Tombalbaye after 1966. In 1972, Libya annexed the min-
eral-rich Aouzou Strip, the border area between Chad and Libya. Three years later, Tombal-
baye was assassinated in a military coup d'etat, masterminded by General Felix Malloum. 
The new government was paralysed by a split within the Frolinat rebel ranks, namely between 
Goukouni Oueddei, who continued to co-operate with Tripoli, and Hissene Habn~, who op-
posed Libya's role in Chad. In an attempt to strengthen the government, Presiderit Malloum 
appointed Habre as Prime Minister, but a power struggle erupted between them soon after-
wards. As a result, in March 1979, Habre-loyal Frolinat forces overthrew Malloum and this 
led to turmoil. At around the same time, Colonel Wadal Abdelkader Kamougue formed his 
own government in southern Chad, adding to the country' s political crisis. By August 1979, 
African mediation brought about a transitional government of national unity, presided over by 
Oueddei, and with Habn~ and Kamougue as members. However, fighting between the two 
archenemies resumed, with Oueddei, supported by Libya, forcing Habre out of N'Djamena in 
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March 1980.221 It was in the aftermath of this situation that President Bongo approached the 
South Africans for assistance. 
Judging from Pean's work, Bongo was supportive of Kamougoue's move in southern 
Chad to flex his muscles against Paris, due to disagreement over Franyois Mitterrand's policy 
towards Gabon.222 In particular the initiatives of the French President curtailed the effective-
ness of Bongo' s influential network, for example evidenced in the "brutal sacking"'" of Mau-
rice Robert, the French Ambassador to Gabon, in 1981; Robert had been Bongo's confident 
from the Nigerian Civil War (Chapter 4). Based on a report of November 1980 from Deputy 
Director-General Killen, Bongo's adviser, a certain Colonel Jules, who worked for the French 
intelligence agency SDECE,224 had come to South Africa in late October to discuss Pretoria' s 
assistance to Kamougoue.'" According to the same report, Colonel Jules met Minister Pik 
Botha, but evidence presented below suggests that he also talked to Military Intelligence. It 
seems that Jan Boyazoglou from the Paris Embassy, who was in charge of the OGAPROV 
project, played a role in initiating Pik Botha's meeting with Bongo's adviser. Probably after 
separate discussions among the military and the foreign service officers, Boyazoglou and 
Brigadier Daan Hamman from Military Intelligence met on 24 November 1980, together with 
Brand Fourie and in the Director-General's office.226 It appears that Pik Botha had given an 
assurance to Colonel Jules to make a contribution with "goods worth about R200 000" and to 
"send a team of experts to investigate the position on the ground".227 Judging from this and 
another document, these "goods" would have comprised "medical equipment", such as pro-
posed by Boyazoglou,'" as well as military supplies, as Killen wrote: " It would therefore 
seem that we should obtain a special allocation for R200 000 which would then enable us to 
include the weapons and ammunition". In addition, Pik Botha had spoken to Defence Minister 
Malan about it "and got his support for this offer".'" Yet, during the meeting of24 November 
in Fourie's office, it became clear that Military Intelligence, according to Brigadier Hamman, 
221 Ngansop, Guy Jeremie, Philippe Decraene. 1986. Tchad, vingt ans de crise. Paris: L'Harmattan. 
222 Pean. 1983. Affaires africaines, pp.137f, 262; Sery. 1986. Le grand retour des barbouzes, pp.23ff 
22J Faligot and Krop. 1985. Lapiscine, p.231 (translation from French). 
224 Pean. 1983 . Affaires africaines, p.lIS. 
225 ' Proposed help to Colonel Kamougue via President Bongo' , from Rae Killen, Pretoria, 28 November 1980 
(DFA, 11184/3, Vol. IPL). 
226 'Military aid to Col Wadal Abdel Kamouge : Chad separatist movement', from Glenn Babb to Rae Killen, 
Pretoria, 24 November 1980, and other documents in DFA, 1/184/3, Vol. IPL. 
227 ' Proposed help to Colonel Kamougue via President Bongo' , from Rae Killen, Pretoria, 28 November 1980 
(DFA, 1/184/3, Vol. IPL). 
228 'Col Kamougw!: Chad', from Glenn Babb to Rae Killen and Jan Wentzel, Pretoria, 23 June 1981 , p.l 
(DFA, 1/184/3, IPL). 
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"had no funds", causing Deputy Director Babb to note: "It therefore seems that we are to foot 
the bill".230 In piecing these fragments of infonnation together, it appears that the Department 
of Foreign Affairs tried to impress Bongo by supplying Kamougue with medical supplies, in 
the belief that the military would be interested in sending arms and take over the delivery 
costs. While the primary sources do not record what exactly was delivered and by whom this 
was paid, Babb' s report from June 1981 notes that the material was supplied at the request of 
President Bongo: "The original decision to help Col Kamougue was taken in order to satisfy 
Pres. Bongo".231 Yet, towards mid-1981, Pretoria became increasingly sceptical towards Ka-
mougue, when it became evident that he was striving towards the fully-fledged secession of 
southern Chad. Such a move would not have been acceptable either to the central government 
in N'Djamena or the OAU, which insisted on the territorial integrity of African states, as 
stated in Chapter 4. To further support Kamougue could therefore not be in the DFA's interest 
and Babb recommended the cessation of support to Kamougue, arguing that to "become fur-
ther emeshed in an intractable situation beyond the requirements of our relations with Gabon, 
would not bring any real benefit to US".232 We could not establish what happened thereafter, 
because the relevant DF A files contain no further documents on the matter and Babb did not 
comment when queried about it. 
Chad,1982-83 
In late 1982, the military took a decided stance and, following a request from Bongo, pro-
vided military assistance to Chad in early 1983. The political situation in Chad had changed, 
however, as Hissene Habre had ousted Goukouni Oueddei in June 1982, forcing him to with-
draw to the north. Oueddei continued to receive Libyan support, while Kamougue fled the 
country. To avert a further deterioration of the situation, the OAU deployed a peacekeeping 
operation in early 1982.233 As a point of relevance pertaining to Pretoria's subsequent assis-
tance to Habn~, it should be noted that the French mercenary Denard provided the help of 
seven officers who facilitated the Frolinat leader's accession to power. The Department of 
229 'Proposed help to Colonel Kamougue via President Bongo' , from Rae Killen, Pretoria, 28 November 1980 
(DFA, 11184/3, Vol. IPL). 
230 'Military aid to Col Wadal Abdel Kamouge : Chad separatist movement ', from Glenn Babb to Rae Killen, 
Pretoria, 24 November 1980, and other documents in DFA, 11184/3, Vol. IPL. 
2lI 'Col Kamougue: Chad', from Glenn Babb to Rae Killen and Jan Wentzel, Pretoria, 23 June 1981 (DFA, 
11184/3, IPL). 
2J2 See 'Gabon and Chad', from Glenn Babb to Rae Killen and Jan Wentzel, Pretoria, 27 April 1981, p.2; 
'Col Kamougue: Chad', from Glenn Babb to Rae Killen and Jan Wentzel, Pretoria, 23 June 1981, pp.lf. (DFA, 
11184/3, IPL). 
233 Mayes, Terry M. 2002. Africa's First Peacekeeping Operation: The OAU in Chad, 1981-1982. New 
York: Praeger. 
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Foreign Affairs was aware of this, as two DF A reports mention it, making reference to Remy 
Destrieux, Denard ' s alias used in Chad.234 Ris role aside, Chad became a hot spot during the 
Cold War. In particular, with Reagan as US President, the Central Intelligence Agency began 
to support Habre during 1981 in his attempt to overthrow President Oueddei and to curb the 
influence of Moscow-supported Libya. 2l5 Even though Mitterrand shared that concern, he pur-
sued the approach of supporting the OAU peacekeepers and of detaching Oueddei from 
Libya.236 Concern over the increasing communist influence in Chad was one reason for Preto-
ria's involvement in support of President Habn~, as illustrated by a letter from Pik Botha to 
him in October 1982: 
The threats to the progress of our continent come from the struggle for domination by a 
superpower, the problems of malnutrition, economic retrogression and disease. The South 
African govermnent has often declared its commitment to the African continent where it 
has a vast role to play. South Africa and Chad themselves are facing common enemies 
and have mutual interests therefore to defend.237 
In addition, in their report from June 1982 to Glenn Babb, Director Wentzel and Deputy Di-
rector-General Killen list a range of other considerations motivating Pretoria to assist Habre. 
First, the "good relations" between Habre and President Bongo of Gabon; second, "the possi-
bility of exchanging intelligence with Chad interests the SADF in view of its proximity to 
Libya"; third, the apparent discovery of oil in the north of Chad, "which is in the process of 
being exploited", was appealing because the embargoes made it otherwise difficult to obtain; 
fourth, Habre's "friendship with Sudan", where Pretoria attempted to obtain overflying rights 
for SAA to form an air corridor together with Somalia and Egypt. Given these considerations, 
they recommended consultation "with the SADF on the possibility of sending a message to 
Chad to form a channel of communication and to find grounds for mutual understanding", 238 a 
role subsequently filled by the French mercenary Denard. As mentioned, he assisted Habre in 
assuming power during June 1982, probably at Bongo's request; Denard, under the pseudo-
nym of Gilbert Bourgeaud, had served as an adviser to Gabon's President since 1971.239 In 
234 'Chad: relations with Pres. Hiss/me HabrO', from Rae Killen and Jan Wentzel to Glenn Babb, Pretoria, 24 
September 1982; 'Balansstaat: verhoudings met Tsjaad', 8 November 1982, p.3 (DFA, 11184/3, Vol. lPL). 
23' Lemarehand, Rene. 1985. The Crisis in Chad, in Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman, Richard L. Sklar, 
eds. African Crisis Areas and u.s. Foreign Policy. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press: 248; Nolut-
shungu, Sam Clement. 1996. Limits of Anarchy: Intervention and State Formation in Chad. Charlottesville, VA: 
University Press of Virginia: 156. 
236 Lemarehand. 1985. The Crisis in Chad, p.248. 
237 Letter from Pik Botha to Hissene Habre, Pretoria, ca. October 1982 (DFA, 11184/3, Vol. IPL). 
238 'Chad: relations with Pres. Hissene HabrO', from Rae Killen and Jan Wentzel to Glenn Babb, Pretoria, 24 
September 1982. Also 'Balansstaat verhoudings met Tsjaad', 2 August 1982 (DFA, 1I184/3, Vol. 1PL). 
239 Faligot and Krop. 1985. La piscine, p.343 ; Foeeart. 1997. Foccart parle. Vol. JI, p.259 (note I); McNa-
mara. 1989. France in Black Africa, p.181 ; Pean. 1983. Affaires africaines, pp.12, 287; Weinberg. 1994. Last of 
the Pirates, pp.58ff. 
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addition, and as seen earlier in this chapter, Pretoria's military had acted in fruitful co-
operation with Denard on the Comoros since 1979. Thus, in their report of June 1982, 
Wentzel and Killen note that Denard had "offered to take to Mr Habn: a letter from us ( .. . ) in 
which we ( ... ) express interest in future contact"."o Subsequently, Military Intelligence took 
the initiative, because of their organisational means and their vested interest in the project that 
also received mention in the June 1982 brief: "According to Brig. Hamman, the SADF is ex-
amining the possibility of providing a small amount of aid since Chad will in all probability 
be purchasing hardware from US".'41 This was in obvious reference to Armscor's interest of 
selling surplus weaponry production, as we have seen in the preceding section. 
It appears that Denard took the communication to Habn:, as he thereafter requested arms 
supplies from South Africa in December 1982."2 Given the military's interest, Brigadier 
Hamman and Colonel Jurie Bosch, together with the requisite ammunition, flew to 
N' Djamena on 23/24 February 1983. During a stopover in Libreville, they discussed the mis-
sion with Bongo's old and new security advisers, Colonel Jules and Colonel Philippe Cauvin 
respectively.243 This was an indication that Bongo, as in the case of Pretoria's support for Ka-
mougue during 1980/81, was a crucial factor in the military' s decision to support Habn:. The 
documents do not provide details of the ammunition delivered, but, according to Denard, 15 
tons were transported in a SADF aircraft."4 Military Intelligence had invited Glenn Babb to 
join the mission, as the plane also contained equipment to the OGAPROV project in Gabon, 
but he did not go for the following reason: "After consultation with Mr Killen, Col Bosch was 
informed that I would not be accompanying the flight. Col Bosch reiterated the invitation and 
expressed disappointment that our Department would not be represented".'" This example 
demonstrates that the military went into areas that were not permitted to the foreign service 
corps, because of its policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries. At 
the same time, while Killen strictly adhered to this policy, Babb would have joined, had it 
been for him to decide, otherwise he would not even have discussed the matter with his supe-
nor. 
240 'Chad: relations with Pres. Hiss;,ne Habn, ', from Rae Killen and Jan Wentzel to Glenn Babb, Pretoria, 24 
September 1982 (DFA, 11184/3, Vol. 1PL). 
" I 'Cbad: relations with Pres. Hissene Habre ', from Rae Killen and Jan Wentzel to Glenn Babb, Pretoria, 24 
September 1982 (DFA, 11 184/3, Vol. 1PL). 
242 DFA, 11 184/3, Vol. 1PL. 
"3 'Chad' , from Glenn Babb to Rae Killen and Jan Wentzel, Pretoria, 25 February 1983 (DFA, 1/184/3, Vol. 
2PL). However, Glenn Babb informed us that "Jules & Cauvin were fal se names provided by the French Presi-
dency's Africa bureau". Correspondence with Glenn Babb, 20 January 2003. 
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245 ' Cbad ', from Glenn Babb to Rae Killen and Jan Wentzel, Pretoria, 25 February 1983 (DFA, lI 184/3, Vol. 
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We indicated above that Pretoria's activity in support of Habre took place in the Cold War 
context and with the likely knowledge of Washington. This supplemented their shared inter-
ests in southern Africa under the umbrella of the Constructive Engagement policy. The role of 
France, however, is an important aspect we still need to consider. In stark contrast to the Ni-
gerian Civil War, there was no co-operation between Paris and Pretoria, mirroring President 
Mitterrand's increasingly hostile stance towards South Africa. Even though Pretoria was 
aware that Habre had French support,"6 there is no evidence that activities were co-ordinated. 
Notably, the French intelligence only launched Operation Manta,'" supportive of Habre 
against Libya, in August 1983. This underlines the earlier argument that the US and France 
differed over the policy applicable to Chad,'" with South Africa now siding with its new ally. 
Project Canteen, Gabon 
Unaffected by all this was the military's relationship with Gabon, as is evidenced by the third 
example of their assistance to Bongo. While the previous accounts were based on primary 
sources, the Weekly Mail & Guardian revealed this case study in March 1995. According to 
journalistic research, the military's Project Canteen involved the construction of a "military 
base"."9 After an initial denial of the paper's report, the Department of Defence admitted that 
the project "was undertaken jointly by Arrnscor and the SADF. The SADF ( ... ) undertook the 
planning and construction of sleeping quarters, ablution blocks, a light workshop, a water 
tower and an aircraft hangar. The operation took six months and was completed in November 
1985, with the total number of personnel involved numbering about one hundred, and fi-
nanced by a loan of 2.3 million Rand that had been "facilitated by the Department of Foreign 
Affairs on a government-to-government loan basis", as the paper stated.250 
We queried both Glenn Babb, Director of the Africa Division during 1984/85, and Paul 
Runge, the DFA's Project Liaison Officer in Libreville during 1985/86, about what they knew 
of Operation Canteen, and a somewhat fuller picture of the setting within which this took 
place emerged. They both were not familiar with the military's code-named project, but judg-
ing from their statements, Operation Canteen was linked to the Department of Foreign Af-
246 ' Balansstaa!: verhoudings met Tsjaad', 8 November 1982, pp. l, 3 (DFA, 1/184/3, Vol. lPL). 
247 Buijtenbuijs, Robert. 1995. French Military Interventions: The Case of Chad, in Anthony Kirk-Greene, 
Daniel C. Bach, eds. State and Society in Francophone Africa since Independence. New York: St. Martin's 
Press: 213-227; Gibour, Jean. 1985. A Closer Look at Operation Manta, African Defence Journal 62: 58ff., 63, 
66,69. 
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fairs' OGAPROV project.251 In particular, it seems that the above-mentioned facilities served 
the military crews when delivering material necessary for the agricultural project or as a stop-
over for deliveries elsewhere in the area. 
Equatorial Guinea 
Similar to the previous case study, the evidence now presented on the military's activity in 
Equatorial Guinea after 1983 once more underlines their close contact with President Bongo 
of Gabon. It appears that his close relationship with the Equatorial Guinea's President since 
1979, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, motivated Bongo to seek renewed co-operation 
with Pretoria's military, which, for its part, appears to have been interested in establishing a 
listening post in this part of Africa. Significantly, a similar situation had prevailed during the 
Nigerian Civil War, when Fernando P6, a small island belonging to Equatorial Guinea, served 
as a staging post to fly weapons from Gabon into Biafra (Chapter 4). 
The earliest trace of a military interest in Equatorial Guinea is recorded in a discussion 
between Deputy Director Babb and Colonel Bosch from Military Intelligence in June 1982. 
According to Babb' s report, Bosch "expressed extreme interest. He had had the intention of 
going there himself, since from a logistical point of view and also because of the SADF's re-
lations with Gabon, the SADF would like to establish a working relationship with that coun-
try".252 However, this ambition only seems to have been activated after Colonel Cauvin, 
Bongo's Security Adviser, visited South Africa from 14 to 18 November 1983. In his report 
on the meeting with Cauvin, Rae Killen stated: "President Bongo has given special instruc-
tions to Col. Cauvin to approach the Hon. Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information con-
cerning Equatorial Guinea. Aid EG [Equatorial Guinea] , which is one of the most impover-
ished countries on earth, is the subject on which Col. Cauvin has been instructed to inter-
vene". Bongo was "particularly anxious that we involve ourselves in EG", both because of his 
friendship with President Obiang and the Fang population in Equatorial Guinea, with whom 
he was "attempting to form an alliance in view of the large Fang population in Gabon", as 
well as because of his concern over the Soviet presence there and his wish, shared by Obiang, 
"to break away from their yoke".2" Thus, almost identical to the request for the T6 planes in 
the aftermath of the Nigerian Civil War (Chapter 4), Bongo appealed to Pretoria with refer-
ence to anti-communism and was again successful. Given the restricted access to the relevant 
'" Telephone interview with Paul Runge, 18 January 2003; correspondence with Glenn Babb, 20 January 
2003. 
252 'Report' , from Glenn Babb, 18 June 1982 (DFA, 1/207/3, Vol. 1). 
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DFA files to February 1984, the last recorded contact with Equatorial Guinea is the visit of a 
South African five-man delegation from 12 to 15 December 1983. This mission, probably a 
follow-up of Cauvin's visit to Pretoria in November, was led by Glenn Babb and consisted of 
government officials from the Agriculture and Fisheries departments, a representative from 
the state-owned petroleum company, Soekor, and a Mr. de Wet from the National Intelligence 
Service. 254 While it is indicated that they met with President Obiang, the content of their dis-
cussions is not recorded in detail. However, the secondary literature reveals that South Africa 
became involved in a cattle-breeding project from 1986, and it is probable that the foundation 
for this engagement was laid in those days. Significantly, the agricultural project was situated 
on Bioko island, named Fernando PO until 1979 and site of the capital Malabo. 
According to information on the Internet, the project began with some two hundred cattle 
and forty sheep, and still existed in 1990, albeit independently and without South African par-
ticipation.'" Interviewed in 1999, Neil van Heerden, Deputy Director-General when the pro-
ject began, commented: "It was really a project that you could be excited about beyond de-
scription. C •.• ) These were not just Mickey Mouse projects".'56 Yet, due to the island's short 
distance of some two hundred kilometres to Nigeria, and especially the oil-rich south eastern 
region, the Bight of Biafra, both Nigerian authors and the ANC claimed that Pretoria's pres-
ence on Bioko pursued military-strategic objectives, namely intelligence gathering aimed at 
destabilising Nigeria and gaining access to the country' s oil resources.''' From its side, Lagos 
saw this as a proof of Pretoria's Destabilisation strategy applied to southern Africa. Although 
it consequently concluded a non-aggression pact with President Obiang in February 1987, the 
Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ike Nwachukwu, described the South African presence 
as a "threat" to Nigeria's security after a visit to Equatorial Guinea in early May 1987.''' 
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When queried about these allegations, Neil van Heerden countered that the "prime motiva-
tion" for the agricultural project had been "a political one",25' a claim that can be backed by 
internal reports of March and September 1987 from the Nigeria files , providing no indication 
of military activity."" In addition, a recent study by a Nigerian researcher suggests that the 
Nigerian press exaggerated the situation,'6l serving as an indication that Lagos's concern over 
South Africa's presence on Bioko island may have been caused by domestic pressures. At the 
same time, given Pretoria' s secret military and intelligence activities in other African coun-
tries beyond the region, revealed in this study, and the above-mentioned interest displayed by 
both the NIS and the SADF, it would not be surprising if the project was used for intelligence 
gathering purposes. A pointer in this direction was the conclusion of a contract between the 
two countries in 1987 "for the construction of a satellite tracking station", as reported in sec-
ondary sources.'·' Based on the available evidence, a conclusive statement on Pretoria's true 
intentions cannot be given, while it appears that Nigerian pressure on President Obiang re-
sulted in South Africa' s withdrawal from Equatorial Guinea by mid-1988. '63 
These case studies on Pretoria' s activities related to Gabon show that Bongo, probably 
apart from President Banda in Malawi, was Pretoria' s most constant partner in Africa beyond 
the region, the basis for which was laid in the late 1960s during the Nigerian Civil War. The 
military, in particular, seem to have been satisfied with their contact. On the other hand, 
Bongo maintained a relatively low-key diplomatic profile and was not keen on publicising 
contact with Pretoria. In consequence, the Department of Foreign Affairs did not achieve one 
of its principal aims, namely the establishment of official relations. As Glenn Babb described 
the situation in retrospect: "Bongo, being what he was, was only interested in using us as an 
instrument to help his pals in the region. C ... ) Military aid was important to Bongo who once 
had SADF helicopters used for an election".'64 In addition, SAA never obtained overflying 
rights from Chad either, thus preventing it from establishing an air corridor across Africa. ,., 
However, even the military' s short-term gains were tenuous and certainly did not serve to 
break South Africa's international isolation. In fact, the military' s realist perceptions and their 
'>9 Interview with Neil van Heerden, 7 April 1999. 
'60 ' Ekwatoriaal-Guinee : Nigeri~se beheptheid met RSA betrokkenheid', from Johan Marx to Neil van Heer-
den, 26 March 1987, p.2 (DFA, 11129/3, Vol. 3PL); telex from Hilton Lack (DFA Liaison Officer for the pro-
ject) to Johan Marx, Malabo, 24 September 1987 (DFA, 11129/3, Vol. 14A). 
'.1 Obadore, Ebenezer. 2001. Constructing Pax Nigeriana? The Media and Conflict in Nigeria-Equatorial 
Guinea Relations, Nordic Journal of African Studies 10, I : 80-89. 
26' 'Telecommunications Contract', Africa Research Bulletin: Economic Series 25, 3, 30 April 1988: 9063. 
263 'New Aid Package', Africa Research BIIlletin: Economic Series 25, 5, 30 June 1988: 9132. 
2.4 Correspondence with Glenn Babb, 20 January 2003. 
2., Telephone interview with Frans Swarts, 7 December 2002. 
CHAPTER FIVE: PRIME MINISTER AND STATE PRESIDENT BOTRA, 1978-89 317 
use of force to resolve the country's domestic and regional conflicts resulted in more town-
ship violence and police repression. In addition, Pretoria was still embroiled in several mili-
tary conflicts in southern Africa, all of which contributed to South Africa's increasing pariah 
status. Two central issues still prevented Pretoria from joining the international community as 
a respected member, namely its illegal occupation of Namibia and the domestic apartheid 
policy. However, in the context of the rapprochement between Washington and Moscow after 
1986, ending the Cold War in the second half of the 1980s, the two superpowers aimed at a 
resolution of the S.W.A./Namibia issue. These developments decisively impacted on Preto-
ria's foreign relations with black Africa in the fmal phase of P.W. Botha's statesmanship and 
this is examined in the final section to this chapter. 
End of Cold War 
At the outset to this chapter, we emphasised the importance of the Cold War for Pretoria's 
military in conducting a realist approach, especially in the region, sustaining a war in Angola, 
supporting RENAMO in Mozambique and occasionally launching military attacks against 
other neighbouring states. As has been argued, their activities in the countries beyond the re-
gion also took place in the leeway of Western protection, particularly from the US administra-
tion in Washington. Yet, the increasing domestic and external pressure from the mid-1980s on 
both Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher respectively, curtailed their ability to unreserv-
edly support P.W. Botha. However, it was the waning Cold War that crucially impacted on 
South Africa,266 and particularly on Pretoria's foreign relations with Africa, and these devel-
opments are now explored. 
In particular, there was a growing realisation by both Reagan and his Soviet counterpart, 
Mikhail Gorbachev, that superpower involvement in regional conflicts inhibited the im-
provement of bilateral relations between them, such as expressed in the Reykj avik Summit in 
Iceland on 11 October 1986. Crucially, in the context of his reform policy, Perestroika, Gor-
bachev stated that "the Soviet Union has no special interest in southern Africa", 267 and the 
266 Barber, James. 2000. South Africa's Political Miracle: The International Dimension, South African Insti-
tute of International Affairs 7,1: 51-71; Daniel, John. 1996. Comment: A Response to Guelke's 'The Impact of 
the End of the Cold War on the South African Transition', Journal of Contemporary African Studies 14, I: 100-
104. 
267 Gorbachev, Mikhail. 1988 . Perestroika: New Thinkingfor Our Country and the World. New York: Harper 
and Row: 173. Also Lefebvre, Jeffrey A. 1996. Moscow's Cold War and Post-Cold War Policies in Africa, in 
Edmond J. Keller, Donald Rothchild, eds. Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty 
and Regional Security. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner: 211 f.; Legum, Colin. 1991. Gorbachev's Politics on South-
ern Africa, in Owen Ellison Kahn, ed. Disengagement from Southwest Africa: The Prospects for Peace in An-
gola and Namibia. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers: 62. 
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resolution of the conflicts in southern Africa was among the topics at the Washington Summit 
from 8 to 10 December 1987 between the two world leaders.268 An important stumbling block 
in this area was South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia, which had become tied to the 
Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola through the Cuban Linkage that Washington had intro-
duced during 1981. In the light of the new developments between the US and the Soviet Un-
ion, however, the deadlocked situation began to improve269Washington, and particularly 
Chester Crocker, now became the mediator between Angola, Cuba and South Africa.270 With 
the gradual demise of the Cold War, the military's predominance in Pretoria's foreign policy 
making declined and the foreign service corps regained influence. As was shown, they had 
been the driving force in concluding non-aggression pacts and cease-fire agreements with 
Swaziland in 1982 and Angola and Mozambique in 1984, but the military subsequently un-
dermined these accords with their realist policy approach. Given the new international politi-
cal order, however, the Department of Foreign Affairs now took the lead in the Namibia ne-
gotiations and the country's eventual independence was primarily its achievement.27 ! Without 
going into the details, these talks took place during 1988, resulting in the Namibia Accords, 
signed by the three relevant parties at the UN Headquarters in New York on 22 December 
1988. While Havana agreed to withdraw its troops from Angola, Pretoria committed itself to 
applying Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978, shelved after the introduction of the Cu-
ban Linkage, ending its presence in Namibia and allowing the United Nations to organise and 
monitor the country' s independence elections. The date set for the transition process was I 
April 1989, the elections were held in November of the same year and the independence cele-
bration took place on 21 March 1990.212 
This event significantly improved Pretoria's foreign relations with African countries be-
yond the region. With the Namibia Accords, Deon Geldenhuys aptly argues, South Africa had 
taken "a giant step towards removing a major source of conflict with the international com-
268 Crocker. 1993. High Noon in Southern Africa, p.362. . 
269 Berridge. 1989. Linkage, the United Nations and the AngolalNamibia Accords; Clough, Michael. 199 \. 
The Namibia-Angola Settlement and the Future of United States-Soviet Competition in the Third World, in 
Owen Ellison Kahn, ed. Disengagement from Southwest Africa: The Prospects for Peace in Angola and Na-
mibia. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction: 167-178; Freeman, Chas Jr. 1989. The Angola/Namibia Accords, For-
eign Affairs 68, 3: 126-141 ; Jaster, Robert Scott. 1990. The 1988 Peace Accords and the Future of South-
Western Africa. London: Brassey's for the International Institute for Strategic Studies; Lefebvre. 1996. Mos-
cow's Cold War and Post-Cold War Policies in Africa, pp.206-226. 
270 Crocker. [993. High Noon in Southern Africa. 
27\ Namibian Independence and Cuban Troop Withdrawal. 1989. Pretoria: Department of Foreign Affairs. 
272 Dreyer, Ronald F. 1993. Namibia and Southern Africa: Regional Dynamics of Decolonization, 1945-90. 
London: Kegan Paul; Saxena, Suresh Chandra. 199\. Namibia and the World: The Story of the Birth of a Nation. 
New Delhi: Kalinga Publications. 
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munity, black African states in particular".273 Neil van Heerden, DFA Director-General at the 
time and closely involved in the Namibia negotiations, referred to them as the "watershed 
event of the year", which gave the "green signal" for further contact with Africa, among them 
the Congolese Republic.274 While access to the Congolese file was restricted to the end of 
1979, former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, reveals in 
his autobiography that the country's President, Sassou Nguesso, took a pro-active role, ar-
ranging meetings between him and the leaders of Gabon, the Ivory Coast and Zaire, all of 
whom, like Pretoria's military, supported the pro-Western UNITA in Angola.'" Significantly, 
on 13 December 1988, the relevant parties concluded the Brazzaville Protocol in the Congo-
lese capital, the breakthrough after ten rounds of bargaining that led to the signing of the Na-
mibia Accords nine days later.276 Undoubtedly linked to these developments, P.W. Botha offi-
cially met with both President Mobutu in Zaire on 1 October 1988 and with President 
Houphouet-Boigny in the Ivory Coast two weeks later.277 In effect, the two African leaders 
were the military's interlocutors from old times, dating back to the Angolan war and the Nige-
rian Civil War respectively. In addition to the presidential meetings, Pretoria had an Ambas-
sador, Albert Warnich, stationed in the Ivorian capital from September 1988.278 Incidentally, 
in discussions with Neels Muller from the DFA archive, we discovered that Ambassador 
Hermann Hanekom279 headed the under-cover Liaison Office in Kinshasa from September 
1989,280 concurrently being accredited to the Congolese Republic. In subsequent correspon-
dence with us, Hanekom confirmed the impression that the soon-to-be concluded Namibia 
Accords removed an important stumbling block in Pretoria's contact with Africa, and the 
aforementioned three countries in particular. 28 1 
Parallel to the international developments that impacted on South Africa's position in the 
region, bearing great significance for its standing on the continent, South Africa' s domestic 
situation had also changed considerably in the second half of the 1980s. Most notably, the 
273 Geldenhuys. 1994. The Head of Government and South Africa's Foreign Relations, p.284. 
274 Interview with Neil van Heerden, 7 April 1999. On his role in the negotiations, see Crocker. 1993 . High 
Noon in Southern A/rica, pp.386-390, 404ff., 432-439. 
275 Crocker. 1993. High Noon in Southern Africa, pp.348, 438. 
276 Kaela, Laurent C.W. 1993. Behind Linkage Diplomacy: The Brazzaville Accord Revisited, Transafrican 
Journal a/History 22: 122-1 41. 
277 Schoeman, Elna, Chris Schoeman. 1993. South Africa's Foreign Relations in Transition, 1985-1992: A 
Chronology. Johannesburg: South African Institute ofintemational Affairs: 217,221; Smit. 1989. South Africa 
and Black Africa, pp.127f. 
278 Yao. 1992. Le dialogue Yamassoukro - Pretoria, p.7; Yao. 1991. Cote d'Ivoire - Afrique du Sud, p.146. 
279 See Appendix A for his biography. 
280 The Liaison Office became official during 1991, and it is then listed in the Foreign Affairs List (Pretoria: . 
DF A) of September 1991. 
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banned African National Congress had risen to such a prominent position that Pretoria could 
no longer ignore it. In particular, during 1987, the ANC entered into an alliance with the 
country' s largest trade union, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), and 
the United Democratic Front (UDF), a coalition of a wide range of groups from civil soci-
ety.'" Building on this power base, in the course of the 1980s, the ANC had gained regional, 
continental and eventually international acceptance as South Africa's leading liberation 
movement, thus winning against the rival P AC.'83 Acknowledging this situation, a number of 
rapprochement meetings took place from 1985 to 1990 between representatives of South Af-
rican big business, the Afrikaner intelligentsia and ANC representatives.284 Two highly sig-
nificant events took place in Zambia (September 1985) and in Senegal (July 1987). Regarding 
the former, three top leaders of the Anglo American Corporation, Chairman Gavin ReIly and 
Directors Tony Bloom and Zach de Beer, joined by South Africa Foundation Director General 
Peter Sorour, met ANC President Tambo and other leading figures from the ANC and its 
other partner, the South African Communist Party (SACP). Frederik van Zyl Slabbert was the 
initiator ofthe other meeting at which ANC representatives held discussions with intellectuals 
from the Afrikaner community. Slabbert had resigned as the leader of the Progressive Federal 
Party and as the party' s Member of Parliament in February 1986, feeling that "I was wasting 
my time in Parliament",'" as he put it in his memoirs and as we discussed in Chapter 2. He 
subsequently co-founded and directed the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South 
Africa that organised the 1987 Dakar meeting. Regarding the choice of Senegal as hosting 
country, this was not connected to the links Colin Eglin had established during his party lead-
ership (Chapter 4). Rather, Slabbert indicated in correspondence with us that his long-
standing friend Breyten Breytenbach, the South African writer who was exiled in Paris from 
the 1960s, had established this link.286 In this context, we recall that Breytenbach was jailed 
upon his clandestine return to South Africa in 1975 and that this caused President Senghor to 
intervene with Prime Minister Vorster (Chapter 4). Of relevance in the present instance, 
Breytenbach was on the Board of France Libertes, the Paris-based Foundation established by 
Danielle Mitterrand, the wife of the French President, in 1986 with an engagement for the 
'81 Correspondence with Hermann Hanekom, 24 January 2003. 
282 Baskin, Jeremy. 1991. Striking Back: A History ofCOSATU. London: Verso; Seekings, Jeremy. 2000. The 
UDF: A History of the United Democratic Front in South Africa, 1983-1991. Cape Town: David Philip. 
283 Pfister. 2003. Gateway to International Victory, pp.59f. 
284 Waldmeir. 1997. Anatomy ofa Miracle , pp.39-106. 
28' Slabbert. 1987. The Last White Parliament, p.182. 
286 Correspondence with Frederik van Zy1 Slabbert, 10 February 2003. On their friendship, see Slabbert. 
1987. The Last White Parliament. 
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protection of human rights.'" According to Slabbert, Danielle Mitterrand was close to the 
Senegalese President, Abdou Diouf, "and this is how we settled on Dakar. I only met [him] 
once we got there but [ we] have since become good friends and he gave us diplomatic immu-
nity for the Goree Institute['88! to promote Democracy, Development and Culture in Africa".'" 
The above-mentioned encounters in Zambia and Dakar were a diplomatic coup for the 
ANC, as we have concluded elsewhere: 
While the Anglo initiative helped to remove the business community's suspicion that the 
ANC was an unreasonable and communist-dominated party, the Dakar meeting allayed 
fears that all the ANC was interested in was to ' kill the Boer'. These two meetings were 
of crucial importance, as they reflected the status the ANC had achieved among important 
segments of South Africa's white society. There can be little doubt that this contributed to 
Pretoria's realisation that this liberation movement could no longer be ignored and 
wished away.'90 
The domestic, regional and international changes that have now been outlined necessitated a 
change in South Africa' s political leadership. In particular, the end of the Cold War required 
other policies than the use of military force to resolve the country's problems. In conse-
quence, and his deteriorating health aside, P.W. Botha was no longer considered fit to rule the 
country. As has been mentioned in Chapter 2, the Broederbond, the secretive Afrikaner or-
ganisation with significant influence on Pretoria's policy decisions, appears to have acknowl-
edged the need for change and it is likely that this was a factor in Frederik Willem de Klerk 
becoming the country' s new State President in September 1989. This change in leadership 
had considerable consequences for both South Africa's domestic situation and external rela-
tions. The consequences for Pretoria's foreign policy towards Africa, in particular, are exam-
ined in the next chapter. 
"7 <http: //www.france-Iibertes.fr/intro.htrn>. 
"8 The idea for the creation of the Goree Institute, named after an island off Dakar that was used during the 
slave trade, was first articulated by President Abdou Diouf during the 1987 Dakar meeting. It was eventually 
established in June 1992 and Tania Slabbert, daughter of Frederik van Zyl Slab bert, was among the first staff 
members oftbe Goree Institute. See <http://www.goreeinstitute.org>. 
28' Correspondence with Frederik van Zy1 Slabbert, 10 February 2003 . 
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CHAPTER SIX 
New Diplomacy: 
State President de Klerk, 1989-94 
Preliminaries 
After more than ten years, military domination in both South Africa's domestic and foreign 
policy came to an end when President Frederik Willem de Klerk brought a very different po-
litical style to Pretoria and broke fundamentally with the apartheid ideology of his National 
Party. De Klerk's ascendancy to the presidency became possible due to P.W. Botha's deterio-
rating health situation and given the new international political context after the Cold War. In 
particular, after a stroke on 18 January 1989, P.W. Botha withdrew as the leader of the Na-
tional Party. On 2 February, de Klerk became his successor after winning against Pik Botha, 
Constitutional Affairs Minister Chris Heunis and Finance Minister Barend du Plessis. How-
ever, reflecting divisions within the NP caucus over the country's future political leadership, 
de Klerk defeated du Plessis in the third round with a narrow majority of 69 to 61 votes. ' 
While the positions of State President and NP leader had so far been held by the same person, 
P.W. Botha now abandoned this principle and fiercely opposed stepping down as the coun-
try's executive. Thus, de Klerk first had to push through the notion of reuniting the posts 
again, a proposal that the NP Federal Council approved in March 1989. Yet, even now P.W. 
Botha was adamant in his position. As a result, it took another five months until de Klerk 
could be elected and sworn in as Acting State President on 15 August 1989, and it was only 
one month later that he was unanimously elected State President and eventually inaugurated 
on 20 September.' 
Whereas P.W. Botha had relied on his military advisers in formulating foreign policy, de 
Klerk was guided principally by the advice from the foreign service corps, to be explained by 
his inexperience in foreign policy making on the one hand, and none of his ministerial portfo-
, De Klerk. 1998. The Last Trek, pp.130, 134; Riley, Eileen. 1991. Major Political Events in South Africa, 
1948-1990. Oxford: Facts on File: 218f. 
' De Klerk. 1998. The Last Trek,pp.138f. , 146f£ 
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lios having dealt with security matters on the other. In the domestic arena, he presented him-
self as the reformer, symbolised by his announcement, in February 1990, to release Nelson 
Mandela after twenty-seven years of imprisonment. However, while the reasons for de 
Klerk' s moves are discussed in the ensuing section, he was not in a position to unilaterally 
impose the reforms on the majority. Rather, de Klerk had to acknowledge the position of the 
African National Congress as the leading and internationally recognised liberation movement, 
and it therefore became imperative for him to engage Mandela's organisation in a process of 
negotiations. 
These negotiations form the background to this chapter, but the main concern is to explain 
how this related to Pretoria's foreign relations with black African states beyond the region. In 
trying to unravel the links between the two issues, we argue that the negotiations were a tacti-
cal power play between the two main political opponents, the ANC and the South African 
government. In this bargaining, each group wished to achieve a particular outcome that will 
be discussed in the subsequent section on the negotiations, with both parties trying to manage 
the balance of power to their own advantage. This was the key feature of the rivalry among 
the actors. ' In this context, the diplomatic support from African states became a vital element, 
an issue to which the secondary literature has given insufficient attention. This is especially 
true for the developments following the Boipatong massacre of 17118 June 1992, which deci-
sively changed the course of the negotiations, as we shall see. With this premise serving as the 
basis, the present chapter comprises four sections. It begins by exploring the starting point and 
goals of both sets of actors at the outset of the talks in early 1990, followed by an investiga-
tion into the key issues pertaining to the negotiations until mid-1992, the relevance of the Af-
rican continental dimension therein and developments post-Boipatong. 
New Diplomacy 
In order to investigate the motivation prompting both the South African government and the 
ANC to enter into negotiations after 1990, the emphasis first falls on de Klerk' s position, be-
cause it was due to his efforts that they became a reality. Chapter 2 referred to de Klerk' s 
speech at the opening of Parliament on 2 February 1990, lifting the ban on the ANC and other 
opposition movements, as well as announcing Mandela's forthcoming release. Attempting to 
explain his unexpected reforms, we argued that de Klerk was guided by pragmatism, ac-
'Bacharach, Samuel B., Edward J. Lawler. 1980. Power and Politics in Organizations: Social Psychology of 
Conflict, Coalitions and Bargaining. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass; Bacharach, Samuel B., Edward J. Lawler. 
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knowledging that apartheid as a state ideology could no longer be maintained. In addition, as 
seen in the previous chapter, with the demise of the Cold War during the second half of the 
1980s, political pressure for change even came from the governments in both London and 
Washington. It is important to state at this point, however, that it was never de Klerk's inten-
tion to simply hand over white political power to the country's majority. As late as August 
1991 , he vehemently rejected a "winner-takes-all" model, based on "one man, one vote" elec-
tions, as "the worst possible" scenario for South Africa,' as this would mean an overwhelming 
majority for the ANC, excluding the whites from any meaningful role in politics. While it was 
not de Klerk's ambition to retain apartheid, his negotiation strategy was to retain the political 
initiative in Pretoria's hands, enabling him to shape the post-apartheid order by wresting from 
the ANC as many concessions as possible for the white minority. This argument is supported 
by the following description of de Klerk's strategic principles, based on an analysis of his 
initiatives between 1990 and 1992: 
It is to maintain the initiative so that Pretoria can force previously banned organisations to 
compromise on a whole range of issues that, in turn, will enable the government to realise 
its goal of entrenching a constitution that will guarantee the protection of minority or 
group rights. Not only will the winning of concessions from the opposition strengthen the 
hand of the government, it will also weaken the opposition who will then have the diffi-
cult task of selling such compromises to their constituencies.' 
De Klerk's strategy in the talks with the ANC also found expression in Pretoria's foreign pol-
icy. This had the dual aim of ending South Africa's international isolation and strengthening 
the minority government's domestic bargaining position. To achieve this end, as will be 
shown, he made overseas visits to explain the reform initiative so that sanctions would be 
lifted. In his ambition to end South Africa's isolation, de Klerk considered the amelioration of 
relations with Africa as a crucial element. In his autobiography, he states: "We also had to 
break out of our international isolation, and in particular improve our relations with our im-
mediate neighbours in southern Africa and in the continent as a whole. C ... ) It was for this rea-
son that my first visits as state president were to countries in Africa".' Later, he argues that he 
had "enthusiastically supported" Vorster's Outward-Looking Policy of the 1970s: "Its main 
theme was that South Africa's future was inextricably linked to Africa and that South Africa's 
route to the international cornmunity ran through its neighbours to the north".' In his early 
4 Cited in Geldenhuys and Kotze. 1991. FW de Klerk, p.35. 
'Sarakinsky, lvor Harold. 1992. South Africa: Changing Politics and the Politics of Change, in Larry Benja-
min, Christopher Gregory, eds. Southern Africa at the Crossroads? Prospects for Stability and Development in 
the 1990s. Rivonia: Justified Press: 151. 
' De Klerk. 1998. The Last Trek, p.156. 
7 De Klerk. 1998. The Last Trek, p.48. 
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Africa endeavours, de Klerk benefited from the progress made by his predecessor, P.W. 
Botha, in establishing contact with both Zaire and the Ivory Coast (Chapter 5). Thus, while 
holding the position of Acting State President, de Klerk met President Mobutu in Zaire on 25 
August 1989, discussing developments related to the situation in Angola.' Subsequently, de 
Klerk's first presidential visit abroad took him to the Ivory Coast on 112 December 1989. Dur-
ing the eight hour meeting with President Houphouet-Boigny, they discussed mutual rela-
tions, including technical assistance to develop the Ivorian gold mining industry, the reform 
initiatives in South Africa and the peace plan for Angola' A few months later, and in line 
with the kind of technical assistance provided during Vorster's premiership, Pretoria helped in 
the establishment and management of the Abokouamekro Game Park near Yamassoukro, the 
Ivorian political capital from 1983, as requested by the Ivorian President. 1O Shortly thereafter, 
in November 1990, Ambassador Colin Paterson replaced Albert Wamich as the Head of the 
South African Mission in Abidjan, and in September 1992 he inaugurated what now was an 
embassy." Given the ambassadorial presence in the Ivory Coast, no further presidential meet-
ings took place. In fact, we shall see that de Klerk's political priorities in Africa beyond the 
region were elsewhere and only one South African ministerial delegation visited the Ivory 
Coast until 1994. 
In his foreign policy making towards Africa, de Klerk took the advice of the foreign ser-
vice officials, which steadily re-emerged from their subordinate position during the P.W. 
Botha era, particularly due to the influence of Pik Botha and Neil van Heerden, as we will see 
below. An early illustration of their new standing was South Africa' s co-operation with the 
French mercenary Denard on the Comoros, which the military had begun in 1979. By July 
1989, the foreign affairs ministry had halted its involvement in the Sangani farm project on 
the island, but the financial and military support for Denard's Presidential Guard continued 
(Chapter 5). Then, on 26 November 1989, President Abdallah was assassinated under unre-
solved circumstances, even though Denard was a suspect. It served to bring to a head the ri-
valry between the Department of Foreign Affairs and the military over whether or not to 
maintain a presence on the Comoros. The view of the former prevailed under de Klerk and, on 
4 December, within days of this event, Pretoria announced that all assistance for the Presiden-
'Keesing's Archiv der Gegenwart, 1989, p.33713. 
9 Africa Research Bulletin: Economic Series 26,12,31 December 1989: 9263; Africa Research Bulletin. Po-
litical Series 26, 12, IS January 1990: 9507ff.; Placca, Jean Baptiste. 1989. Houphouet - De Klerk: jusqu'ou ira 
Ie dialogue?, Jeune Afrique 1509,4 December: 18-21; Schoeman and Schoeman. 1993. South Africa's Foreign 
Relations in Transition, 1985-1992, p.303. 
10 Correspondence with Colin Paterson, 7 January 2003; Kalley. 2001. South Africa'S Treaties in Theory and 
Practice, 1806-1998, p.588. 
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tial Guard would cease. I' A relevant development in international law may have strengthened 
the DFA's argument to withdraw from the Comoros, namely the UN attempts aimed at out-
lawing mercenary activity. In December 1980, the General Assembly had established an Ad 
Hoc Committee to make specific proposalsl3 and its work now came to a close. In December 
1989, the General Assembly adopted its draft for an International Convention against the Re-
cruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries. I. Thus, South African support for any 
mercenary activity would have henceforth brought it into disrepute. However, once Paris and 
Pretoria had pressured Denard to withdraw from the island, and mirroring the close links that 
existed between him and Pretoria's military, a Safair aircraft flew Denard and twenty-five 
members of his Presidential Guard to South Africa on 15 December 1989. Denard was 
granted temporary residence rights in the Republic until he left for France on 2 February 
1993.1' The two hotels on the Comoros, managed by Sol Kerzner's World Leisure Group 
Limited, also subject to the political volatility, were opened briefly during 1989, but closed 
again in the wake of President Abdallah's assassination. 16 While some secondary sources con-
tain contradictory information regarding Kerzner's commitment to remain on the island,17 the 
Africa Research Bulletin reveals that, in mid-September 1990, the South African government 
and World Leisure Group Limited signed a loan agreement to re-Iaunch the defunct hotel de-
velopment scheme. 18 
After this excursion to the Comoros as an example of the DFA's growing influence on de 
Klerk's foreign policy making, we now examine Pretoria's general approach towards the con-
tinent. The earlier citation from his autobiography suggests that de Klerk was inspired by 
Vorster's Outward-Looking Policy in the shaping of the current relations with Africa, with an 
emphasis on the diplomatic aspect and the use of economic leverage. In implementing this 
approach, he found strong support from Pik Botha and the minister' s confidant, Neil van 
Heerden, Director-General from 1987. In 1989, van Heerden formulated the principles of for-
eign relations with Africa that became known as 'New Diplomacy' , underlining South Af-
II Correspondence with Colin Paterson, 7 January 2003. 
12 Lune!. 1991. Bob Denard, p.633; Denard. 1998. Corsaire de fa n!pl/bUgue, pp.406f.; Weinberg. 1994. Last 
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18 Africa Research Bulletin: Economic Series 27, 9, 16 September-I 5 October 1990: 10107. 
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rica's aspiration to be both part of Africa and a regional power with a substantial development 
capacity. i9 Resembling the argumentation of the Minister of External Affairs in the early 
1960s, Eric Louw, he stressed South Africa's willingness to provide technical and scientific 
expertise, while great importance was now attached to trade and commerce." In devising Pre-
toria's Africa policy, de Klerk21 and Pik Botha" adhered to van Heerden's ideas, an indication 
of the latter's influential position. The application of the New Diplomacy was facilitated by 
the fact that the African continent experienced both economic and political marginalisation 
after the end of the Cold War. The formation of trade blocs, especiaUy in Europe," required 
"African solutions to African problems", as political commentator Dave Peterson aptly sum-
marised the new situation.24 Importantly, this meant closer economic co-operation, and this 
made South Africa an attractive partner as the leading African country in terms of economic 
performance. A letter sent to thirty African heads of state and government on 23 May 1991, 
within days of the OAU Summit held in Abuja, Nigeria's new capital after December of that 
year, verifies that de Klerk made specific use of these developments to appeal to African 
leaders: 
Abuja 91, Mr President, will take place against a backdrop of dramatic changes in the in-
ternational environment, of shifts in economic patterns and in power balances which pro-
vide both challenges and opportunities for our Continent. The emergence of a unified 
European market in 1992, coupled with changes in Eastern and Central Europe and in the 
USSR, represent potential threats to continued economic investment and involvement in 
Africa by the industrialised countries. There is a school of thought !bat Africa runs the 
risk of being marginalised. We in Africa should urgently consider steps to counter this 
19 Van Heerden, Neil Peter. 1989. South Africa and Africa: The New Diplomacy. Pretoria: University ofPre-
toria, Institute for Strategic Studies. Also Vale, Peter. 1992. South Africa's 'New Diplomacy', in Glenn Moss, 
Ingrid Obery, eds. From 'Red Friday' to CODESA. Johannesburg: Ravan Press: 424-435; Van der Westhuizen, 
Janis. 1998. South Africa ' s Emergence as a Middle Power, Third World Quarterly 19, 3: 440f. 
20 Van Heerden. 1989. South Africa and Africa, pp.7ff. 
21 De K1erk, Frederik Willem. 1990. Address by the State President at the Opening of the Second Session of 
the Ninth Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, Cape Town, 2 February 1990. Pretoria: Bureau for Infor-
mation: 4; De K1erk, Frederik Willem. 1991. Address by the State President at the Opening of the Third Session 
of the Ninth Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, Cape Town, 1 February 1991. Pretoria: Bureau for In-
formation: 23f. Also Geldenhuys. 1994. The Head of Government and South Africa's Foreign Relations, 
pp.286f.; Kromberg, Marlene. 199 I. SA's Return to the International Scene, RSA Policy Review 4, I: 30, 39. 
22 Van Wyk, Alta. 1992. Pillars of Co-operation in Africa: Interview with R.F. Botha, RSA Policy Review 5, 
4: 28-35. 
" Ake, Claude. 1996. The Marginalization of Africa: Notes on a Productive Confusion. Lagos: Malthouse 
Press; Collier, Paul. 1997. The Marginalisation of Africa in the World Economy. Oxford: Centre for the Study of 
African Economies; Kappel, Robert. 1996. Africa's Marginalisation in World Trade: A Result of the Uruguay 
Round Agreements, Intereconomics 31 , I: 33-42; KUhne, Winrich. 1990. Africa and the End of the Cold War: 
The Needfor "New Realism ". Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik; Onwuka, Ralph rheanyi, Timothy 
Milton Shaw, eds. 1989. Africa in World Politics: Into the I990s. Basingstoke: Macmillan; Thomas, Scott. 1998. 
Africa and the End of the Cold War: An Overview ofimpacts, in Sola Akinrinade, Amadu Sesay, eds. Africa in 
the Post-Cold War International System. London: Frances Pinter: 3-27. 
24 Peterson, Dave. 1998. Finding African Solutions to African Problems, The Washington Quarterly 21 , 3: 
149-158. 
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tendency. We are experiencing a new era of peace, free from superpower rivalry, with the 
prospect of resolving the internal conflicts in Southern Africa. The time for isolation and 
mistrust has passed. ( ... ) We believe that it has become imperative that co-operation in all 
fields of development be established to safeguard and advance our common interests." 
328 
South Africa had much to offer in this regard. Technical expertise aside, its manufactured 
goods were low in price in comparison to international products, they were suitable for Afri-
can conditions and the South African market was in relative proximity." As a result, trade 
figures in Appendixes B and C show a significant increase in economic interaction between 
South Africa and African countries beyond the region after 1988/89. South African export, in 
particular, experienced a strong upswing and we will see that the prospering trade relations 
became an essential lever used by Pretoria to establish political contact with these countries. 
We have now outlined Pretoria's negotiation position and that it attributed the improve-
ment of its foreign relations with Africa a high priority. Having argued previously that the 
negotiations and the African continental dimension were interrelated, it is important to now 
discuss the ANC's comparable situation in this regard. To begin with, although it gradually 
learnt how to pursue a diplomacy ofliberation during the exile period,27 the ANC clearly did 
not have the experience of a government in conducting politics. In addition, in spite of having 
secret contacts with the South African government dating from the mid-1980s," the ANC was 
relatively unprepared for de Klerk's announcements in February 1990 and the necessity to 
subsequently engage in a direct confrontation with Pretoria at the negotiation table. In fact, we 
argue that it still pursued a strategy that focused on the struggle against apartheid, rather than 
having any well thought-out ideas of a post-apartheid South Africa, apart from the mandatory 
non-racial structure of society. The ANC's guiding document was the Discussion Paper on the 
Issue of Negotiations, dating from June 1989.29 This document openly declared the organisa-
"Letter from Frederik Willem de Klerk, Cape Town, 23 May 1991 , pp.3f., contained in the Cameroon, Libe-
ria and Nigeria files (DFA, 1110113, Vol. 4; 1113/3, Vol. 6; 11129/3, Vol. 19), while a document in the Sudan file 
reveals that the document was sent to thirty African heads of state and government: 'Background document: 
Republic of the Sudan', 1992, p.19 (DFA, 11163/3, Vol. 8). 
"Davies, Robert H. 1996. South Africa's Economic Relations with Africa: Current Patterns and Future Per-
spectives, in Adebayo Adedeji, ed. South Africa and Africa: Within or Apart? Cape Town: Southern Africa De-
velopment Research Institute; London: Zed Books; Ijebu-Ode: African Centre for Development and Strategic 
Studies: 167; Esterhuysen, Fair and Leistner. 1994. South Africa in Sub-Equatorial Africa, p.66; Kerdellonton. 
1989. Afrique, pp.47-58; Lowe Morna, Colleen. 1991. The Pariah's New Pals, Africa Report 36, 3: 29; Owoeye, 
Jide. 1994. What Can Africa Expect from a Post-Apartheid South Africa?, Africa Insight 24, I: 44; Vale, Peter. 
1993. Confusion, con flit et compromis: la politique africaine de I' Afrique du Sud, Annee africaine. 1992193: 
378f.; Venter, Denis. 1992. South Africa and Africa: Towards Reconciliation, in Albertus Johannes 'Albert' 
Venter, ed. Foreign Policy Issues in a Democratic South Africa. Johannesburg: Professors World Peace Acad-
emy: 61. 
27 Thomas. 1996. The Diplomacy of Liberation. 
"Waldmeir. 1997. Anatomy ofa Miracle, pp.39-106. 
29 Reprinted in Legum, Colin. 1989. Republic South Africa: End of President Botha's Rule, Beginning of the 
de Klerk Era, Africa Contemporary Record, 1988-89: 8671 If. 
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tion' s willingness to talk to the South African government. However, it stipulated that five 
conditions had to be met, prior to holding substantial negotiations on South Africa' s political 
future. These were the unconditional release of all political prisoners and detainees; the lifting 
of bans and restrictions on all proscribed and restricted organisations and persons; the re-
moval of troops from the townships; the ending of the state of emergency and the repeal of all 
legislation circumscribing political activity; and the cessation of political trials and political 
executions. Crucially, the African National Congress had the diplomatic support of the Afri-
can community of states and this was an important advantage over the Pretoria govemment in 
the negotiations. Most importantly, on 21 August 1989, the OAU Ad Hoc Committee on 
Southern Africa had endorsed the ANC's above-mentioned position paper at a meeting in 
Zimbabwe and the document subsequently became known as the Harare Declaration. 30 It was 
the most comprehensive and detailed statement by African states since the adoption of the 
Lusaka Manifesto three decades earlier (Chapter 4).31 In addition, the African Group at the 
United Nations ensured that the General Assembly endorsed the same document on 14 De-
cember 1989." 
Having examined the starting positions of the main contenders prior to the negotiations 
that began in early 1990, with particular attention being paid to the relevance of African dip-
lomatic support, the following section provides an analysis of the negotiations up until the 
Boipatong massacre took place in June 1992. It is important to have this framework in order 
to provide an understanding as to why and how the African continental dimension became so 
pivotal after this event. 
Negotiations 
As noted above, the ANC had indicated its willingness to hold talks with Pretoria in June 
1989, but it was both de Klerk's February 1990 speech and Mandela's release that made the 
subsequent negotiations possible. The ensuing bargaining led to South Africa' s first democ-
ratic elections in April 1994 and can be divided into three phases, namely the ' Talks about 
Talks' from February 1990 to October 1991, the Convention for a Democratic South Africa 
(CODESA) until May 1992 and the Multiparty Negotiation Process until December 1993. 
Following the argument raised at the outset of this chapter, the period until the Boipatong 
30 Reprinted in Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly 3, 3, 1989/90: 19f. 
31 Venter, D. 1992. South Afiica and Afiica, p.58. 
32 Declaration on Apartheid and the Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa (UN document AlS-
16/ 1989). 
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massacre constitutes the focus, because Pretoria's foreign relations with the African countries 
beyond the region were only of crucial significance up to mid-1992. The complexity of the 
negotiations is analysed elsewhere," with a relatively brief survey of the power struggle suf-
ficing for the purpose of this study. Emphasis is placed on those developments that are rele-
vant in Pretoria's foreign relations of interest to us. 
During the Talks about Talks, the ANC was outmanoeuvred, as Pretoria had the upper 
hand from the outset. With his unexpected announcement in February 1990, de Klerk capital-
ised on the lack of preparedness by the liberation movement. He seized the political initiative, 
permitting him to define both the terrain and pace of the negotiations.J4 In the Groote Schuur 
Minute of 4 May 1990" and in the Pretoria Minute of 6 August 1990,36 the government pres-
sured the ANC into making substantial compromises, particularly the suspension of the armed 
struggle that had "tremendous emotional and symbolic value in terms of its mass appeal" .37 At 
the same time, de Klerk' s negotiators had only partly fulfilled the ANC's demands itemised in 
the Harare Declaration. In fact, the only precondition fully implemented was the lifting of 
bans and restrictions on all proscribed and restricted organisations and persons. Other than 
that, the state emergency still applied in the province of Natal, not all troops had been with 
withdrawn from the townships, political trials continued and fundamental differences existed 
over the question of who constituted a political prisoner. Thus, six months after Mandela' s 
release and the unbanning of the ANC, de Klerk was in a position to show the white electorate 
that there was no danger of the ANC taking power through the means of force and that the 
government had not surrendered any political power. On the other hand, the ANC could not 
produce any significant achievements to its followers. As a result, on the occasion of the ANC 
National Consultative Conference from 14 to 16 December, criticism came from the grass-
roots level, with members expressing "their extreme frustration over the organisation's failure 
to achieve visible progress"." Increasingly sceptical voices also came from the allied CO-
SA TU and SACP, arguing that mass action as their preferred bargaining option had been ne-
JJ Very useful are Friedman, Steven. 1993. The Long Journey: South Africa's Quest for a Negotiated 
Settlement. Johannesburg: Ravan Press; Friedman, Steven, Doreen Atkinson, eds. 1994. The Small Miracle: 
South Africa 's Negotiated Settlement. Johannesburg: Ravan Press. See also Bernath, Abdul Samed, compo 1992. 
The Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) : A Select Bibliography, Southern African Update 7, 
2: 1-22; Bernath, Abdul Samed, compo 1993. The Multi-Party Negotiating Process: A Select Bibliography, 
Southern African Update 8, 2: 33-87. 
J4 Sarakinsky. 1992. South Africa, pp.\37-142. 
J5 Reprinted in Southern Africa Record 59/60, 1990: 133f. 
36 Reprinted in Southern Africa Record 59/60, 1990: 135[[ 
37 Sarakinsky. 1992. South Africa, p.145. 
" Haysom, Nicholas. 1992. Negotiating a Political Settlement in South Africa, in Glenn Moss, Ingrid Obery, 
eds. From "Red Friday" to CODESA. Johannesburg: Ravan Press: 31. 
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glected. Already on 2 July 1990, COSATU had launched a general strike to put pressure on de 
Klerk to halt the violence in Natal, suggesting that this was an orchestrated attempt together 
with Pretoria's friend and homeland leader, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, to undermine the ANC's 
standing there." Regarding the Communist Party' s view, Raymond Suttner, Member of the 
SACP Central Committee and Head of the ANC Department of Political Education, com-
plained in November 1990: "The talks up to now have not involved the masses. ( ... ) Where 
there is a blockage, with the govemment reneging on its agreements, we realise again that we 
must strengthen mass action to make sure our goals are realised" .40 Thus, Pretoria success-
fully put strains on the ANC-COSATU-SACP alliance and thereby weakened the ANC's bar-
gaining position in the negotiations. 
Parallel to these developments, the international dimension became an important arena in 
the tactical power play. Supplementing the strategy of outwitting the ANC in the negotiations, 
de Klerk travelled to thirty countries from 1990 to mid-1992 with the goal of ending South 
Africa's international isolation (Table 6), while Nelson Mandela paid visits to forty-nine 
countries in order to maintain the sanctions against Pretoria (Table 7). A comparison of their 
destinations reveals a common concern over the support from specific countries. Particular 
importance was attributed to France and Great Britain, with both de Klerk and Mandela trav-
elling there twice, while de Klerk even went to London a third time. The relevance of these 
two countries hinged on their role as permanent members of the UN Security Council. Great 
Britain's support was furthermore considered important as it was the leader of the Common-
wealth, while that of France was probably also sought due to its influence in Francophone 
Africa. We examine de Klerk's and Mandela's journeys to African countries later in this 
chapter, and for the moment it suffices to note that de Klerk's international anti-sanctions 
campaign was the more successful of the two. His reforms were welcomed during his visits to 
European capitals and Washington in May and September 1990 respectively. The view pre-
vailed that the changes were irreversible and many countries considered the lifting of sanc-
tions against South Africa." In anticipation of later developments, the European Community 
lifted its 1986 sanctions in April 1991, the US Congress abolished the 1986 Comprehensive 
"Baskin. 1991. Striking Back, pp.425f. 
40 Cited in Jeffery, Anthea J. 1991. Forum on Mass Mobilisation. Johannesburg: South African Institute of 
Race Relations: 44. 
41 Schlemmer, Lawrence, Robin Lee. 1991. From Confidence to Caution and Beyond, in Robin Lee, Law-
rence Schlemmer, eds. Transition to Democracy: Policy Perspectives, 1991. Cape Town: Oxford University 
Press: 260f. 
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Anti-Apartheid Act in July and Japan removed its anti-apartheid measures in June and Octo-
ber 1991'2 
Table 6: De Klerk 's Journeys Abroad (1990 - June 1992)" 
9-26 May France, Greece, Portugal, italy, Belgium, Great Britain, Germany, Switzerland, Spain 
14 August Madagascar 
1990 23-25 September United States 
11-14 October Portugal, Great Britain 
21-25 October Luxembourg, Netherlands, Senegal 
22-24 April Denmark, Great Britain 
1991 8 June Kenya 
9-16 November Israel, Taiwan 
1-10 February France, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland 
1992 9-10 April Nigeria 1-8 June Russia, Japan, Singapore 
22-23 June Spain 
Table 7: Mandela 's Journeys Abroad (1990 - June 1992)" 
1990 
1991 
1992 
8 March Tanzania 
10-21 May Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Nigeria, Zimbabwe 
8 June - Geneva (UN), Germany, Luxembourg, Italy, Vatican, Netherlands, Canada, United 
18 July States, Ireland, Great Britain, Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique 
10 September Uganda 
13 October Kenya 
15 October - India, Indonesia, Australia, Japan, Malaysia, Brunei, Great Britain, France 
7 November 
15-17 February 
31 May 
10 June 
25 July -
7 August 
Gabon 
Nigeria (OAU Conference of Ministers) 
Belgium 
Spain, Jamaica, Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil 
5-6 November Ghana, Ivory Coast 
3-5 December United States 
17-20 January Tunisia, Libya, Morocco 
1-5 February France, Denmark 
18-20 May Norway 
17 June Malawi 
The international dimension aside, the question of culpability for the domestic violence that 
climbed to unprecedented levels, with thousands of black South Africans being killed, became 
another factor that increasingly impacted on the course of the negotiations. At the outset of 
the talks, there was no indication of government and security force involvement. Due to his 
reform initiative, de Klerk retained the status as the "man of integrity" in the eyes of the inter-
42 Schoeman and Schoeman. 1993. South Africa 's Foreign Relations in Transition, 1985-1992, pp.366, 387; 
Keesing 's Archiv der Gegenwart, 1991, pp.35618, 35892, 36223. 
43 Schoeman and Schoeman. 1993. South Africa 's Foreign Relations in Transition, 1985-1992, pp.316f, 325-
328, 368f., 417, 433-436,456, 459. 
44 Schoeman and Schoeman. 1993. South Africa 's Foreign Relations in Transition, 1985-1992, pp.31O, 316, 318-
321 , 324, 327-332, 352,375,377, 391-395, 415, 421,428,433f, 455,459. 
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national community, such as described by Mandela on the day of his release from prison." 
During the second half of 1990, however, the ANC started accusing de Klerk of pursuing a 
double agenda, negotiating while simultaneously fomenting the violence to weaken the ANC. 
In particular, as mentioned above, the government was accused of co-operating in this attempt 
with Inkatha leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi, who was at loggerheads with the ANC. As a re-
sult, on 5 April 1991, the ANC leadership addressed an open letter to de Klerk. They de-
manded specific action against the violence before 9 May, while expressing doubts about his 
true motives: "The government's inaction [against the violence] calls into serious question its 
true intentions and sincerity regarding the entire peace process and the democratization of 
South Africa"." In other words, if the government's response was judged to be insufficient, 
this would verify the thesis that de Klerk used the negotiations as a smokescreen to undermine 
the ANC's standing in the negotiations. This was precisely the strategy followed by the ANC-
COSA TU-SACP alliance, breaking off the negotiations on 18 May by stating that "de Klerk 
has not demonstrated any willingness to end the violence"." In effect, this meant that the vio-
lence had replaced differences on political matters as the pivotal issue of the talks, permitting 
the ANC to seize the initiative for the first time since February 1990.48 On 2 July 1991, at its 
first National Conference on South African ground, the ANC also managed to close its inter-
nal ranks and to smooth over differences with the alliance partners, resulting in a strengthened 
bargaining position. Finally, on 19 July, the ANC received a further boost when the ' Inkatha-
gate' scandal made international headlines. According to documents published simultaneously 
in South Africa' s The Weekly Mail and its British partner, The Guardian, Pretoria had sup-
ported Inkatha both financially and with the supply of weapons after February 1990. This 
caused de Klerk's international prestige to plummet considerably, while the ANC's standing 
in the negotiations improved." As a result, the two political rivals signed the National Peace 
Accord (NPA) on 14 September 1991, which can be seen as the outcome ofthe ANC's April 
ultimatum. At the time, de Klerk' s reaction had been to hold a peace conference on 23/24 
" The entire speech is reprinted in Clark, Steve, compo 1993 . Nelson Mandela Speaks: Forging a Democ-
ratic, Nonracial South A/rica. New York: Pathfmder: 23-28. 
46 Cited in Clark. 1993. Nelson Mandela Speaks, p.90. 
"Cited in Mkhondo, Rich. 1993. Reporting South A/rica. London: James Currey; Portsmouth, NH: Heine-
mann: IO!. 
48 Pfister, Roger. 1997. Violence During South A/rica's Political Transition (1990-1994): Perceptions and 
Their Instrumentalisation. Paper presented at the 16th Biennial Conference of the South African Historical Soci-
ety, University of Pretoria, 6-9 July; Pfister, Roger. 1995. Perzeptionen der 'black-an-black violence' in 
Siida/rika und deren Bedeutung im Demokratisierungsprozess (Februar 1990 - April 1994). MA, University of 
Bern. 
49 Pfister. 1997. Violence During South AjNca 's Political Transition (1990-1994); Pfister. 1995. Perzeptionen 
der 'black-an-black violence' in Sudafrika und deren Bedeutung im Demokratisierungsprozess (Februar 1990 -
April 1994) . 
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May with a wide range of representatives from political parties and civil society. However, 
the ANC alliance boycotted this meeting, arguing that de Klerk's proposals were not condu-
cive to a curbing of the violence. 50 Thereafter, the ANC's withdrawal had more than likely 
resulted in political pressure on de Klerk and the liberation movement was now in a position 
to push through its concerns in preparatory meetings to the NP A. In particular, ten of the 
thirty-three pages of the National Peace Accord dealt with the role of the security forces, forc-
ing Pretoria to acknowledge at least partial responsibility for the violence.51 Another success 
for the ANC was that the NP A provided for the establishment of a commission to investigate 
the causes of the violence; it subsequently became known as the Goldstone Commission, 
named after its well-respected head, Judge Richard J. Goldstone. On the whole, thus, the NPA 
reflected a more equal bargaining power between the ANC and the government, and the nego-
tiations were subsequently resumed. In effect, the talks that led to the NPA have appropriately 
been described as a "dry run for the forthcoming multi-party negotiations"." 
In continuing with a presentation of the relevant developments in the negotiations, neces-
sary to an understanding of the importance of the African continental dimension therein, the 
Convention for a Democratic South Africa I convened on 20/21 December 1991. This meet-
ing of nineteen political parties and organisations ended the phase of Talks about Talks and 
ushered in the start of substantial negotiations on South Africa' s political future. The give-
and-take bargaining took place in five Working Groups. However, the success of the entire 
negotiation process depended on the progress made in Working Group 2, mandated with the 
task of Constitutional Principles and a Constitution-making BodylProcess, because the new 
constitution would determine the political power sharing arrangement post-apartheid. Current 
polls indicated that the ANC would achieve majority rule in "one man, one vote" elections, 
allowing it to shape South Africa's future to its liking, while raising fears among the minority. 
Consequently, de Klerk's negotiators tried to ensure some sort of say for the white population. 
In an attempt to restrict the ANC's political influence in a post-apartheid South Africa, they 
pushed for the fragmentation and decentralisation of power at the legislative and executive 
50 Haysom. 1992. Negotiating a Political Settlement in South Africa, pp.33f 
51 The NP A is reprinted in Race Relations Survey, 1991192, pp.522-556. Also Pfister. 1995. Perzeptionen der 
'black-on-black violence' in Siidafrika und deren Bedeutung im Dernokratisierungsprozess (Februar 1990 -
April1994). 
" Africa Confidential 32, 19,27 September 1991: 8. 
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levels, in contrast to which the ANC demanded a parliament directly elected by the people 
and a strong central government. 53 
After almost half a year of debate, CODESA II convened on 15/16 May 1992 and the ne-
gotiation results were presented to both the domestic and international audience. All of the 
Working Groups, except Working Group 2, had successfully concluded their discussions. 
Even though some progress had been made, a fundamental difference on the future constitu-
tional model persisted; the government "still wanted a slow transition to power sharing", 
whereas the ANC "still wanted a quick majority rule".54 At this decisive moment, de Klerk 
again held a strong bargaining position. On 17 March 1992, the white electorate had endorsed 
his reform process in a referendum that he had announced on 20 February." The insightful 
political magazine SouthScan commented on this move that by "manufacturing a contest 
against the advocates of continued white domination, de Klerk's image-makers C ... ) were able 
to pose de Klerk as the champion of the other side"." The result of the referendum strength-
ened de Klerk's negotiation position, as described by political scientist James Hamill: "The de 
Klerk government, its confidence now almost fully restored following last year's Inkathagate 
scandal, C ... ) seems to believe that it is once more in a position from which it can control the 
pace and direction of the country's reform process"." In addition, de Klerk was applauded 
internationally for his reform commitment," and we will see later in this chapter that it was a 
key event in motivating Lagos to invite de Klerk to come to Nigeria. The ANC, on the other 
hand, was again on the losing end. By the beginning of June 1992, therefore, the government 
seemed to have successfully outmanoeuvred the ANC. Major apartheid laws had been abol-
ished, but the prospect of the ANC finally coming to power in South Africa was still remote. 
For the ANC, the "book of apartheid" was not yet closed, no matter how successfully the 
South African government tried to reassure the international community to the contrary." 
53 Friedman. 1993. The Long Journey, pp.61-69; Ottaway, Marina. 1993. South Africa: The Struggle for a 
New Order. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution: 97-106; Welsh, David. 1991. The Outlook for a Democratic 
South Africa, International Affairs 67, 4: 743-748. 
54 Friedman. 1993. The Long Journey, p.84. Also Spitz, Richard, Matthew Chaskalson. 2000. The Politics of 
Transition: A Hidden History of South Africa 's Negotiated Settlement. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University 
Press: 19,25. 
55 Haysom. 1992. Negotiating a Political Settlement in South Africa, p.42. 
"SouthScan 7,15/16,17 April 1992: 120. 
" Hamill, James. 1992. President de Klerk's Options, Contemporary Review 260, 1517: 291. Also Ottaway, 
Marina. 1994. The March 1992 Referendum, in Helen Kitchen, J. Coleman Kitchen, eds. South Africa: Twelve 
Perspectives on the Transition. Westport, CT: Praeger, for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
Washington: 119-134. 
58 Geldenbuys, Deon Johannes. 1992. The Foreign Factor in South Africa' s 1992 Referendum, Politikon: 
South African Journal of Political Science 19, 3: 45-63; Keesing's Archiv der Gegenwart, 1992, p.36590. 
"Hamill. 1992. President de Klerk's Options, Contemporary Review, p.291. 
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In this politically tense situation, with the entire negotiation process hovering on the brink 
of collapse, the Boipatong massacre occurred on the night of 17/18 June 1992, with forty 
people losing their lives in this township south of Johannesburg, and this proved to be the 
turning point. This made international front-page news that unanimously presented Pretoria as 
the main culprit. On 21 June, in an address to the residents of Boipatong, ANC President 
Mandela announced his intention of requesting a special UN Security Council meeting;'O two 
days later the ANC leadership broke off the negotiations. The ANC's decision to call upon the 
United Nations to become involved in the South African crisis served two purposes. First, it 
was an ideal opportunity to regain the support of the international community. As South Afri-
can political commentator Stanley Uys aptly argued: "If evidence is produced to substantiate 
the ANC's repeated allegations of government "complicity" in the violence, international 
opinion will turn against President de Klerk. Government "complicity", or even failure to act 
expeditiously against the violence, is the one factor that could reactivate public opinion 
world-wide and bring it back into the South African arena as a decisive influence"." In fact, 
Mandela had already threatened to ask both the OAU and the UN to send observers to moni-
tor the violence when he toured the Johannesburg township of Alexandra in April 1992.62 
Probably judging that this would not find support among the international community, how-
ever, the ANC leadership refrained, even though numerous publications by local and interna-
tional human rights organisations and newspaper reports since 1990 had suggested that a gov-
ernment-orchestrated 'Third Force' colluded with Inkatha in stirring the violence against the 
ANC. It was the Boipatong massacre, then, that provided the ANC with what it termed as 
solid proof of its allegation that Pretoria deliberately fuelled the violence in order to weaken 
the movement's negotiation position. With the international media coming to the same con-
clusion, the liberation movement could be quite certain of gaining international support in its 
request for the deployment of observers.6J Second, the ANC's decision to request a Security 
Council meeting was a compromise within its own ranks and between the alliance partners, in 
60 Clark. 1993. Nelson Mandela Speaks, p.179. 
" Uys, Stanley. 1992. The ANC's International Standing, SA Foundation Review 18, 7: 2. Also Waldmeir. 
1997. Anatomy of a Miracle, pp.194-218. 
62 Africa Research Bulletin: Political Series 29, 4, I-3~ April 1992: 10553. 
6J Pfister. 1997. Violence During South Africa's Political Transition (1990-1994); Pfister. 1995. Perzeptionen 
der 'black-on-black violence' in Sudafrika und deren Bedeutung im Demokratisierungsprozess (Februar 1990 -
April 1994), pp.I-63. 
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essence between those favouring negotiations and the more radical elements that preferred 
mass action as a means of bringing the ANC to power.64 
Prior to discussing the ensuing developments, we first need to examine the African conti-
nental dimension within the context of the ANC-government negotiations. It has been men-
tioned several times previously that Africa's diplomatic support in this process was important 
and it proved to be a pivotal factor at this particular point in time. 
Outreach Into Africa 
Having stated that external support was an essential aspect of the negotiations, we specially 
mentioned both de Klerk's and Mandela' s visits to both France and Great Britain, and argued 
that the two leaders attributed a similarly high priority in gaining the support of the African 
community of states. Given the focus of this study, we presently focus on Pretoria' s endeav-
ours to establish contact with the black African countries beyond the region. The next section 
examines the ANC's undertakings to this end, and we will see that the developments follow-
ing the Boipatong massacre brought to a head the competition between the liberation move-
ment and the South African govemment in the quest for Africa's diplomatic support. 
Judging from later evidence, the de Klerk government appears to have pursued a two-
pronged, and sometimes overlapping Africa strategy. On the one hand, Pretoria was eager to 
secure the support of the Organisation of African Unity through the presidents of both Uganda 
and Nigeria in their position as the consecutive OAU Chairmen during the period July 1990 to 
June 1992. This becomes the focus later in this chapter, but we now examine the other aspect 
of Pretoria's approach towards Africa, namely its intention of broadening the contact network 
through means of economic interaction. It has been stated earlier that President de Klerk ad-
hered to the ideas of Prime Minister Vorster's Outward-Looking Policy, namely to provide 
African countries with technical assistance and support for development/investment projects. 
The world had changed since Vorster's days, however, and the concept of such aid was found 
rather ineffective in advancing socio-economic progress in Third World countries.·s In addi-
tion, as we have seen, Africa became increasingly marginalised within the international com-
munity from the late 1980s, requiring it to find its own solutions to stimulate development. As 
a result of these two trends, Pretoria sought to engage with the continent primarily through 
64 A/rica Confidential 33, 14, 17 July 1992: 2; Anstey, Mark. 1992. Mediation in the South African Transi-
tion: A Critical Review of Developments, Problems and Potentials, Geneve-Afrique 30, 2: 149; Maphai, Vincent 
Thabane. 1993. Prospects for a Democratic South Africa, International Affairs 69, 2: 226f. 
.s Ake. 2001. Development and Underdevelopment, pp.218-221 ; Ris!. 2003 . The History o/Development. 
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trade and other economic exchange, in all likelihood hoping that this would eventually result 
in political contact. It had good reason to believe in such a possibility. In particular, we will 
see below that the national airline, South African Airways, was granted landing and overfly-
ing rights in many African countries. We begin with a tour d'horizon on South Africa's eco-
nomic interaction with those countries until mid-1992, when the Boipatong massacre signifi-
cantly undermined Pretoria's foreign relations with Africa, where we had to rely on informa-
tion from secondary sources due to limited access to the DFA files after 1979. 
Economic Co-operation 
In June 1990, Malawi government officials came to South Africa to sign a trade agreement 
between the two countries, replacing the one dating from 1967 (Chapter 4)." Two months 
later, on 14 August and "accompanied by a retinue of businessmen", de Klerk inaugurated the 
air link with Madagascar when he flew to the island to conclude a bilateral air transport 
agreement and probably held economic talks." Another agreement followed in April 1991 
that laid the basis for the establishment of a South African Trade Mission in the capital, Anta-
nanarivo." On 13 December 1990, the Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs and Public 
Enterprises, Dawid Jacobus 'Dawie' de Villiers, led a South African delegation to the Ivory 
Coast, discussing political reforms and bilateral relations with President Houphouet-Boigny.69 
On 21 January 1991, a group of seven people went to the Congolese Republic, which, rele-
vantly, was also a small oil producer. 70 The secondary source from where we have this infor-
mation, indicates that this delegation was headed by a "senior DFA official", but we estab-
lished in correspondence with Hermann Hanekom, then Ambassador based in Kinshasa and 
accredited to neighbouring Brazzaville since 1989 (Chapter 5), that he had merely acted as a 
facilitator. 7l While he did not comment on the nature of the business delegation's visit, the 
Shipping Research Bureau, established in 1980 to monitor the oil sanctions against South Af-
rica," suggests that technical assistance for oil exploration as an area co-operation was dis-
66 Kalley. 2001. South Africa's Treaties in Theory and Practice, 1806-1998, p.587. 
67 Africa Research Bulletin: Economic Series 27, 8, 16 August-15 September 1990: 10075; Kalley. 2001. 
South Africa's Treaties in Theory and Practice, 1806-1998, p.587. 
68 Africa Research Bulletin: Political Series 28, 4, 1-30 April 1991: 10074; Foreign Affairs L ist. Pretoria: 
DF A. (September 1991, September 1992); Kalley. 2001. South Africa's Treaties in Theory and Practice, 1806-
1998, p.590. 
69 Africa Research Bulletin: Political Series 27, 12, 1-31 December 1990: 9928f.; Schoeman and Schoeman. 
1993. South Africa's Foreign Relations in Transition, 1985-1992, p.337. 
70 Schoeman and Schoeman. 1993. South Africa's Foreign Relations in Transition, 1985-1992, p.341 , referring to 
' SA visitto Congo', The Citizen 25 January 1991. 
71 Correspondence with Hermann Hanekom, 24 January 2003. 
" Klinghoffer. 1989. Oiling the Wheels of Apartheid, p. l0. 
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cussed.7l The same source suggests that the supply of this resource featured in the talks that 
Minister de Villiers held during his visit to the oil producer Gabon in February 1991. 74 This 
probably followed the stay of a Gabonese delegation, comprising President Bongo's daughter 
and his Personal Adviser, in South Africa the previous month, also meeting with President de 
Klerk.75 While the above-mentioned exchanges involved African countries with which Preto-
ria had had some kind of relationship in earlier years, contact with Togo was new. In early 
November 1990, the Department of Foreign Affairs confirmed that it had established a "rep-
resentation of interests" in the capital Lome.76 More than likely as a result of this, the Togo-
lese Ministers of Planning and Mines, and of State Enterprise and Industry came to South 
Africa from 3 to 12 March 1991, also meeting Dawie de Villiers with whom they evidently 
discussed economic matters. The two ministers also invited interested parties from South Af-
rica, singling out the South African Foreign Trade Organisation, to come to Togo;77 the par-
ticularly important role of SAFTO in supplementing Pretoria's diplomatic outreach into Af-
rica will be discussed later in this chapter. Then, from 22 to 27 April 1991, Chief Director 
Christo Prins led a South African government delegation to Sao Tome e Principe, discussing 
SAA landing rights, tourism and agriculture.78 A particularly important country within Preto-
ria's plan to approach African countries through the backdoor of economic interaction was 
Kenya, where Minister Pik Botha paid a visit on 30 November 1990. Undoubtedly as a result 
of his meeting with President Daniel arap Moi, SAA was granted a weekly flight to Nairobi 
from December 1990." Pretoria's contact with the political and economic heavyweight in 
African affairs intensified, leading to de Klerk's visit to Kenya on 8 June 1991. Most notably, 
during the discussions with arap Moi, he presented his vision of four main African economic 
regions, namely North, West, East and southern Africa, formed around Egypt, Nigeria, Kenya 
and South Africa as respective engines of growth, with the purpose of stimulating economic 
7l Newsletter on the Oil Embargo against South Africa 23, Second Quarter 1991: I. 
74 Newsletter on the Oil Embargo against South Africa 23, Second Quarter 1991: 2. Also Lowe Morna. 1991. 
The Pariah's New Pals, p.29. 
75 Sehoeman and Sehoeman. 1993. Sozilh Africa'S Foreign Relations in Transition, 1985-1992, p.341; Yao. 1992. 
Le dialogue Yamassoukro - Pretoria, pp.5f. 
76 Africa Research Bulletin: Economic Series 27, II, 1-30 November 1990: 9890; Africa Research Bulletin: 
Political Series 27, II, 1-30 November 1990: 10180. 
77 Sehoeman and Sehoeman. 1993. South Africa's Foreign Relations in Transition. 1985-1992, p.358. 
78 Sehoeman and Sehoeman. 1993. South Africa 's Foreign Relations in Transition, 1985-1992, p.369 .. 
79 Africa Research Bulletin: Economic Series 27, 11 , 16 November-IS December 1990: 10195; Africa Re-
search Bulletin: Political Series 27, II, 1-30 November 1990: 9889; Lowe Morna. 1991. The Pariah's New Pals, 
p.29. 
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growth on the African continent.80 What can in all likelihood be considered as a direct out-
come of this visit, a Kenyan business delegation came to South Africa on 4 September 1991 
to explore future economic ties,'! This kind of contact eventually resulted in Daniel arap Moi 
paying an official one-day visit to South Africa on 9 June 1992, thus representing the climax 
of Pretoria's contact with Nairobi." 
We presently remain engaged in the discussion on Pretoria's ambition of strengthening its 
presence on the African continent through increased economic interaction. Given the link be-
tween external support and the domestic negotiations, such as we have argued previously, 
Pretoria's initiatives in Africa aimed at bolstering its bargaining position in the talks. The 
above information was derived from secondary sources and could therefore provide only rela-
tively little indication of political implications, notably landing rights for SAA. In contrast, 
the following case studies that relate to Sudan and Cameroon are based on primary DF A 
documents and reveal a clear connection between economic interaction and Pretoria's politi-
cal goals. These two examples further show that Pretoria's foreign relations with Africa dur-
ing the de Klerk era were conducted in a manner similar to the DFA's activities during Vor-
ster's Outward-Looking Policy, although the foreign service officials appear to have learnt 
from past experiences, presently only becoming involved in worthwhile projects. 
Sudan and Cameroon 
We have seen in the previous chapter that Pretoria was in contact with Khartoum through the 
mediation of maverick Nzeribe from 1984 to the fall of President Nimeiri in April 1985, with 
armament sales to Sudan and overflying rights for SAA constituting the key issues. A similar 
situation characterises the present contact that was prompted by a meeting between Deputy 
Director-General Rusty Evans and General Omar Hassan al-Bashir, the head of Sudan's mili-
tary government from 1989, during Namibia's independence celebration in Windhoek in 
March 1990. Evans was particularly well suited for interaction with this country, as he had 
knowledge of Sudan due to the dealings with Nzeribe during his days as the Minister Plenipo-
tentiary in London (Chapter 5). The Windhoek encounter was followed-up when Evans vis-
ited Khartoum in January 1991, with subsequent contact focussing on military assistance, 
SAA overflying rights and economic interaction." In February 1991, and probably linked to 
80 Africa Research Bulletin: Economic Series 28,5,16 May-15 June 1991: 10398; Africa Research Bulletin: 
Political Series 28, 6,1-30 June 1991: 10157; Geldenhuys. 1994. The Head of Government and South Africa's 
Foreign Relations, p.287. 
81 Schoeman and Schoeman. 1993. South Africa's Foreign Relations in Transition, 1985-1992, ppAOlff. 
" Schoeman and Schoeman. 1993. South Africa's Foreign Relations in Transition, 1985-1992, pA58. 
"'Background document: Republic of the Sudan', 1992, p.17 (DFA, 11163/3, Vol. 8). 
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Evans' stay in Sudan, SAA Chief Executive Gert van der Veer requested the granting ofland-
ing rights." This was necessary to close the Zaire-Sudan-Egypt air corridor, because both 
Egypt and Zaire had already granted these rights during 1989 and during the first half of 1990 
respectively." Judging from de Klerk' s letter of August 1991 to President al-Bashir, in which 
he welcomed Khartoum's decision to grant overflying rights to SAA,86 the above-mentioned 
air route created a viable option to fly diagonally across the African continent. Later DF A 
documents reveal the payment of 188,400 US Dollars per month for the Sudanese overflying 
rights,87 but we could not establish for how long SAA made use of this route. An important 
person in this context, and indicating the military dimension of the contact, was Elfatih Erwa, 
Sudan's Defence Minister. He met Pik Botha and SAA Executive Director van der Veer in 
April 1991 and this was followed by two reciprocal visits later that year." Given the mili-
tary 's contact with Sudan during the P.W. Botha era and judging from later developments, it 
is possible that they undertook more activities than those recorded in the DFA files . 
In any case, a South African and Sudanese delegation paid almost parallel reciprocal vis-
its. From 18 to 22 September 1991, the Sudanese Minister of Energy Affairs and Natural Re-
sources, President al-Bashir' s Economic Adviser and the Deputy General Manager of Sudan 
Airways came to South Africa. They held meetings with representatives from the parastatal 
oil companies Sasol and Soekor, SAA, the mining firm Genmin" and Engen, the private pe-
troleum company.90 On 12 August, de Klerk had informed President al-Bashir of "a visit to 
Sudan of high-level South African representatives in the fields of transport, mineral prospec-
tion, aviation technology and energy".91 This mission, led by Chief Director Christo Prins, 
took place from 22 to 24 September and included four representatives each from SAA and 
Spoomet, the former South African Railways,92 two each from Atlas Aircraft, a subsidiary of 
84 Letter from Gert van der Veer to the Director General of Sudan's Department of Civil Aviation, Johannes-
burg, 8 February 1991 (DFA, 11163/3, Vol. 6) . 
" Correspondence with Frans Swarts and Gert van der Veer, II February 2003; Africa Research BlIlIetin: 
Economic Series 27, 7, 16 July- IS August 1990: 10057; Smit. 1989. South Africa and Black Africa, p.128. 
86 Letter from Frederik Willem de Klerk to Omar Hassan al-Bashir, Pretoria, 12 August 1991 , p.1 (DFA, 
1/163/3, Vol. 6). 
87 ' Invoice', from the Director General of Sudan's Department of Civil Aviation to South African Airways, 
Khartoum, 18 January 1992; fax from Elfatih Erwa to Uys Viljoen (Deputy Director, North and East Africa), 
Khartoum, 4 April 1992 (DFA, 1/ 163/3, Vol. 8). 
" 'Background document: Republic of the Sudan' , 1992, p.18 (DFA, 1/163/3, Vol. 8). 
" Genmin: Financial Mail Corporate Report. 1989. Johannesburg: Financial Mail. 
90 ' Programme for visiting Sudan Minister of Energy Affairs and Natural Resources', September 1991 (DFA, 
1/163/3, Vol. 7). 
91 Letter from Frederik Willem de Klerk to Omar Hassan al-Bashir, Pretoria, 12 August 1991, p.1 (DFA, 
11163/3, Vol. 6) . 
92 Renamed in 1990. <http://www.spoornet.co.za>. 
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arms producer Armscor, and the firm Engen and one each from the South African Air Force 
and Genmin." The participation of the various private and parastatal companies reflected Pre-
toria's strategic thinking at the time, one that capitalised on its economically strong position. 
The motivation for the different firms and government agencies to enter into contact with Su-
dan is not recorded, but can be deduced from subsequent documents. According to Deputy 
Director-General Derek Auret's correspondence with Minister Erwa after the South African 
mission's visit to Sudan, Soekor and Engen showed "a great deal of interest" in exploring the 
potentially rich oil fields in the south of the Sudan." Later briefs, however, suggest that no 
investment was forthcoming without indicating the reasons." Spoomet's intention to "upgrade 
the existing railway network in Sudan"96 was discussed with al-Bashir's Economic Adviser in 
South Africa in February 1992, but this idea was not taken any further due to the lack of 
available financing. 97 Solely the involvement of Atlas Aircraft produced a concrete result. 
They provided expertise to restore ten helicopters to working order and to upgrade the air-
force base in Khartoum, but this was only possible due to cross-financing from the fees paid 
by SAA for overflying rights in Sudan." Thus, reminiscent of events in the mid-1980s, the 
military and SAA tied up a package deal that, under the present circumstances, was success-
fully concluded. In contrast to this situation, where Sudan' s economic interest was related to 
SAA obtaining overflying rights, Pretoria's economic interaction with Cameroon not only 
achieved the same privilege for SAA, but became linked to a diplomatic goal in the proper 
sense of the word, and we now explore these developments. 
In early 1991, Pretoria was approached for assistance in a Hydroelectric Project named 
after Gustav Nachtigal, who had declared Cameroon a German Protectorate in 1884. This 
project was aimed at providing electricity for the port city of Douala and for the running of an 
aluminium-from-bauxite smelter. We learn from the files that the German company Siemens 
was in charge of the engineering, while the financing came from the Bayerische Vereins-
bank." On 18 January 1991 , the Director-General of Siemens' South Africa representation 
"'Technical delegation to the Sudan', August 1991 (DFA, 1116313, Vol. 6). 
" Letter from Derek Auret to Elfatih Erwa, Pretoria, 18 October, p.l, and letter of 6 November 1991 (DF A, 
1116313, Vol. 7). 
95 'Besprekingspunte: gesprek met Minister Elfatih Erwa, Staatsminister in die Presidensie van Soedan' , from 
Uys Viljoen to Derek Auret, 5 November 1992, p.4 (DFA, 1116313, Vol. 8). 
96 'Background document: Republic of the Sudan', 1992, p.18 (DFA, 1116313, Vol. 8). 
97 'Besprekingspunte: gesprek met Minister Elfatih Erwa, Staatsminister in die Presidensie van Soedan ' , from 
Uys Viljoen to Derek Auret, 5 November 1992, p.2 (DFA, 111 6313, Vol. 8). 
98 'Background document: Republic of the Sudan', 1992, p.18; 'Besprekingspunte: gesprek met Minister EI-
fatih Erwa, Staatsminister in die Presidensie van Soedan ', from Uys Viljoen to Derek Auret, 5 November 1992, 
p.2 (DFA, 1116313, Vol. 8). 
" DFA, 111 0113 , Vois. 4, 5. Bayerische ~ Bavarian. 
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wrote to President de Klerk: "The government of Cameroon confirms its intention to carry out 
this operation. It would be appreciated if a participation of your government, together with the 
banks of your country, your industrialists and your advanced technology, could assist in the 
carrying out of this project".loo He was probably influenced by Pretoria' s New Diplomacy in 
Africa that revolved around the provision of technical and economic assistance. The files do 
not contain de Klerk's reply to this enquiry, but rather, contain a relevant letter to Cameroon's 
President Paul Biya, dated 20 February 1991. According to this correspondence, Biya had 
made the same request to de Klerk on the same day as the Director-General of Siemens Cam-
eroon. In reply, South Africa's President stated: "I welcome your proposal ( ... ), for I firmly 
believe that there is a growing need for closer cooperation between African countries as re-
gards their economic development". 101 The letter further indicates that this response would be 
hand-delivered to Biya by the Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs, de Villiers, who com-
bined the visit to Cameroon with that to Gabon, mentioned earlier, in February 1991. Due to 
its expertise, South Africa's electricity parastatal Eskom became involved in the Nachtigal 
Project. The documentation is relatively thin on subsequent developments, revealing two 
meetings between representatives of the Departments of Trade and Industry, Foreign Affairs 
and Finance, Eskom, Credit Guarantee, Siemens and the Bayerische Vereinsbank during June 
and July 1991 to assess the project's feasibility.l02 The DFA files further contain material 
whereby the Canadian firm Consortium Hydro Quebec International103 had originally shown 
some interest in the Nachtigal Project, but then withdrew due to Cameroon' s dire economic 
situation. I04 Their decision appears to have influenced the South Africans, who then did not 
become involved for similar reasons. In fact, a letter from Eskom' s Engineering Proposal 
Manager to the Bayerische Vereinsbank from 20 August 1991 reveals: 
It became evident from feedback provided by the Department of Foreign Affairs and the 
CGIC [=Credit Guarantee 1 that, due to political uncertainties and the present high finan-
cial risk in the Cameroon, an involvement and required fmancing from South Africa, is 
100 Letter from Hans-Werner Welsch to Frederik Willem de Klerk, Yaounde, 18 January 1991 (DFA, 
1/101 /3, Vol. 4). 
101 Letter from Frederik Willem de Klerk to Paul Biya, Cape Town, 20 February 1991 , p.1 (DFA, 11101 /3, 
Vol. 4). 
102 'Cameroon Hydro-Electric Project Nachtigal' , from W.A. Niemann (Eskom Engineering Proposals Man-
ager, Johannesburg) to Eric Hirsch (Representative Office for Southern Africa, Bayerische Vereinsbank, Park-
lands), Johannesburg, 20 August 1991. Also 'Cameroon: internal political situation', from Catherina Gertruda 
van der Walt (DFA) to Justus de Goede, Pretoria, 6 August 1991, p.3 (DFA, 1/101 /3, Vol. 5). 
103 <http://www.hydro.qc.ca>. 
104 DFA, 1/10 113, Vol. 5. 
CHAPTER SIX: STATE PRESIDENT DE KLERK, 1989-94 
not advisable. The CGIC ( ... ) stated that they will not be prepared to guarantee the financ-
ing and would not support a recommendation for underwriting to the Government. 10' 
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This situation remained unchanged, despite a visit to South Africa, from II to 13 August 
1991 , by Cameroon's Minister of Industrial and Trade Development, accompanied by his 
Secretary General and four businessmen. They emphasised the importance of the Nachtigal 
Project to South Africa's new Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs, George Shepstone 
Bartlett. Possibly in an attempt to lure the South Africans into the project, the report on this 
visit reveals that the Cameroon Minister conveyed Yaounde's decision to grant South African 
Airways landings rightS. I06 Pretoria's non-participation in the Nachtigal Project notwithstand-
ing, later documents indicate that the bilateral contact continued, especially in the economic 
sphere with political connotations. Most significantly, more than one hundred South African 
businessmen were present at the Seminaire International pour Ie Dialogue et la Cooperation 
(SmCO) '91, held under the auspices of President Biya from 30 October to 2 November 
1991.107 
Parallel to this event, Deputy Director-General Derek Auret visited the Republic of 
Congo, Cameroon, the Ivory Coast, Cape Verde and Senegal from 26 October to 2 November 
1991 , also attending smco '91. 108 The main purpose of his West Africa tour, however, was 
to enlist African diplomatic support for South Africa's readmission to the Food and Agricul-
tural Organisation during the upcoming annual meeting of this UN agency in Rome. The re-
port on Auret's journey notes that he "made special reference to South Africa' s intention to 
seek readmission to the F AO" during the meetings with the Prime Ministers of both the Con-
golese Republic and Cape Verde, as well as the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Ivory 
Coast, Cameroon and Senegal. 109 Derek Auret did not gain much political support, however. 
The Cape Verde Prime Minister merely stated "that his Government will give positive con-
sideration to South Africa's request", and the Senegalese Foreign Minister indicated "that 
Senegal would not take the lead in the acceptance of such an application but that support ( ... ) 
10' 'Cameroon Hydro-Electric Project Nachtigal ' , from W.A. Niemann (Eskom) to Eric Hirsch (Bayerische 
Vereinsbank, ParkJands), Johannesburg, 20 August 1991, p.1 (DFA, 11101/3, Vol. 5). 
106 ' Report on a visit by The Hon Rene Owona, Minister ofIndustrial and Trade Development of the Repub-
lic of Cameroon to South Africa from 11 to 13 August 1991 ', from the Programmer (Africa) of VIP Visits, 
pp.2f. (DFA, 1110 113, Vol. 5). 
107 DFA, 111 0113, Vol. 5. 
108 Schneider, Martin. 1991. Outlook for Trade [: Interview with Derek Auretl, Leadership South Africa 10, 
6: 46-51. 
109 ' Visit by the Deputy Director-General to West Africa: 26 October to 2 November 199 I ', p. I (DFA, 
1/103/3, Vol. 5). 
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could be forthcoming""· Cape Verde's comparatively favourable stance can be explained by 
the country's long-standing contact with South Africa due to SAA's use ofIlha do Sal (Chap-
ter 4). In contrast, de Klerk's one-hour talk with President Abdou Diouf in Dakar on 25 Octo-
ber 1990" 1 does not appear to have been successful in changing Senegal's sceptical position 
dating back to the days of President Senghor (Chapter 4). The only clear indication of diplo-
matic support came from Cameroon's Foreign Minister, Jacques Roger Booh Booh, who said 
"that Cameroon will support and encourage the application both amongst African countries as 
well as in international fora".ll2 While we do not know the context within which Auret's ap-
proach took place in the other countries, it is reasonable to argue that Yaounde's pro-active 
stance in this matter was motivated by its economic interest in contact with Pretoria. In par-
ticular, hopes of obtaining South African support in the Nachtigal Project may have still re-
mained, as Derek Auret indicated in the talks with Minister Booh Booh "that other sources of 
investment would have to be looked at, but that ESKOM should be use for its expertise and 
also from a development point ofview".ll3 During the FAO meeting in November, Cameroon 
kept its promise of diplomatic support for Pretoria's readmission, as reported by Glenn Babb, 
then Ambassador to Italy and Permanent Representative to the F AO, to Deputy Director-
General Jeremy Shearar. According to Babb's feedback, there was dissension among the 
ranks of African countries on the issue of Pretoria's return to the FAO and Cameroon's Am-
bassador, who was simultaneously the leader of the African Group in this forum, "asked in a 
spirit of co-operation that South Africa withdraw its application".II' After consultations with 
Pretoria, Babb followed the advice of Cameroon's Ambassador, but Shearar drew a positive 
conclusive from the exercise: 
The Department does not consider the exercise to gain readmittance [sic 1 to the FAa to 
have heen a failure. Our application was not rejected out of hand: those countries, or 
groups of countries, that could not support it, went out of their way to settle the issue 
amicably; a few years ago, this would not have happened. We thus experienced a surpris-
ingly large measure of goodwill, much of it from unexpected quarters. But above ail, 
II . 'Visit by the Deputy Director-General to West Africa: 26 October to 2 November 1991 ', pp.3, 5 (DFA, 
11103/3, Vol. 5). 
III Africa Research Bulletin: Political Series 27, 10, 1-31 October 1990: 9855. 
11 2 'Visit by the Deputy Director-General to West Africa: 26 October to 2 November 1991 ', pp.3ff. (DFA, 
11103/3, Vol. 5). 
II' 'Visit by the Deputy Director-General to West Africa: 26 October to 2 November 1991', p.5 (DFA, 
111 03/3, Vol. 5). 
II' 'The outcome of South Africa's application for readmission to FAO', from Jeremy Shearar to all Heads of 
Mission, Pretoria, 13 November 1991, p.2 (DFA, 11101/3, Vol. 6). 
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valuable experience was gained on the manner in which countries should be lobbied to 
support our aspirations in this regard. ll s 
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The principal argument of this chapter is that competition over external support became an 
important factor during the negotiations between the ANC and the government, and that both 
sides paid special attention to the African continental dimension. We have so far seen in this 
section, that Pretoria's corresponding undertakings relied principally on the use of economic 
leverage in what we consider as one element of its strategy. In the case of Madagascar, 
Kenya, Sudan and Cameroon, this resulted in concrete politico-diplomatic successes such as 
arap Moi's visit to South Africa, landing/overflying rights for SAA in all four countries and 
support from Cameroon for Pretoria's ambition in returning to the FAO. We earlier men-
tioned that Pretoria's strategy of winning African support entailed a second aspect, namely the 
targeting of the OAU. Contact with Ethiopia, the host of the OAU headquarters, does not ap-
pear to have been sought until mid-1992, possibly due to the political turbulence in this coun-
try, with rebels fighting the central government. The only relevant DFA source in this context 
is Derek Auret' s correspondence with Director-General van Heerden of30 July 1992, stating: 
" it is felt that, given the important role which Ethiopia plays in East Africa as well as its im-
portance as the seat of the OAU, contact should be taken up with the interim government as 
soon as possible".116 However, we now reveal significant activities on the part of Pretoria to 
secure the backing of Uganda and particularly Nigeria, the OAU Chairs from July 1990 to 
June 1991 and the following year respectively. The accounts also document an involvement 
of the National Intelligence Service, which had become a powerful player during P.W. 
Botha's era, and we shall see that this now led to friction with the foreign service officials. 
Uganda and Nigeria 
The first recorded contact between Pretoria and Kampala after 1990 is NIS Director-General 
Niel Barnard's visit to Uganda on 3/4 July 1990. He held a two-hour discussion with Presi-
dent Museveni on his way back to South Africa from the visit to Nigeria, discussed below. 117 
Uganda's position as the OAU Chair aside, the interest displayed by intelligence stemmed, in 
all likelihood, from the training camps that Kampala harboured for the armed wing of both the 
ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe, and the PAC, Azania People's Liberation Army. As revealed by 
a DFA source in the previous chapter, these camps were established in late 1986. This contra-
liS 'The outcome of South Africa's application for readmission to FAO', from Jeremy Shearar to all Heads of 
Mission, Pretoria, 13 November 1991, p.4 (DFA, 1/101/3, Vol. 6). 
116 Letter from Derek Auret to Neil van Heerden, Pretoria, 30 July 1992 (DFA, 1/79/3, Vol. 4). 
117 Letter from Niel Barnard to Neil van Heerden and Frederik Willem de Klerk, 18 July 1990 (DFA, 
11120/3, Vol. 6) . 
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dicts the secondary literature that erroneously suggests that such developments had only taken 
place after the conclusion of the Namibia Accords in December 1988, stipulating that the 
ANC had to close the MK training camps in Angola.J18 Barnard's meeting with Museveni, 
then, presumably had three purposes. First, his report to President de Klerk and DFA Direc-
tor-General van Heerden indicates that South African domestic matters were discussed, sug-
gesting that in all probability Barnard was promoting de Klerk's reforms.'" Second, and re-
lated to this, Barnard may have tried to convince Museveni to close the MK camps, claiming 
that in view of the reforms the MK's armed struggle against Pretoria was now redundant. This 
closure would serve to weaken the ANC's position. Third, the discussions may have provided 
de Klerk with ammunition to put pressure on the ANC to abandon the armed struggle, arguing 
that this was irreconcilable with conducting "peaceful negotiations", such as foreseen in the 
Groote Schuur Minute of 4 May 1990. We do not have the knowledge if any reference to 
Uganda was made in the ANC-govemrnent discussions at the time, but we have seen earlier 
that the ANC agreed to the Pretoria Minute of 6 August 1990, and the cessation of the armed 
struggle. Apart from the interest in contact with Uganda related to the MK camps, the subse-
quent developments suggest that de Klerk was eager to meet Museveni in his capacity as the 
OAU Chair. The idea for this meeting, however, came from the same John Kazzora who had 
approached the South African Embassy in London several times from the late 1970s in order 
to obtain assistance to topple the Ugandan leadership. He even came to South Africa in Au-
gust 1986 as Museveni's Personal Adviser (Chapter 5). According to a report dated 28 Sep-
tember 1990, Kazzora felt that a meeting de Klerk-Museveni "somewhere in Europe" would 
be "appropriate at this time" ."0 A later document indicates that de Klerk planned to meet 
Museveni in London, at the end of his visits to Portugal and Great Britain (Table 6). Yet, this 
did not materialise "due to private circumstances on the part of Museveni", as noted in the 
same DF A report.'" Thereafter, Pretoria does not appear to have undertaken any diplomatic 
activity in organising a presidential meeting during Uganda's OAU Chairmanship, probably 
because Museveni maintained a pronounced stance in favour of sanctions against South Af-
rica until further moves towards the dismantling of apartheid were made, as reported in a 
"' Frankel, Philip Harry. 2000. Soldiers in a Storm: The Armed Forces in South Africa 's Democratic Transi-
tion. Boulder CO: Westview Press: 57; Mugyenyi, Joshua B., Larry Anthony Swatuk. 1997. Of "Growth Poles" 
and "Backwaters" : Emerging Uganda-South Africa Relations, in Larry Anthony Swatuk, David Ross Black, eds. 
Bridging the Rift: The New South Africa in Africa. Boulder CO: Westview Press: 160, 
" ' Letter from Niel Barnard to Neil van Heerden and Frederik Willem de K1erk, 18 July 1990 (DFA, 
1/120/3, VoL 6). 
120 Letter from Pieter Schabort (First Secretary, Embassy, London) to Rusty Evans, 28 September 1990 
(DFA, 11120/3, VoL 7). 
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South African daily in March 1991. 122 This is in sharp contrast to Pretoria's intention of gain-
ing a foothold in Nigeria, whose government showed a significant openness in liasing with 
South Africa. The related undertakings are now examined. 
In order to understand the high importance of contact with this West African state, we 
need to remind ourselves of Nigeria's position in continental politics and towards apartheid in 
particular. In the period under review here, Nigeria was one of Africa's most powerful states 
in terms of economic and military capacity, as well as political influence in African affairs. 123 
It was also reputed to be a generous supporter of Africa's liberation movements, providing 
especial assistance to those in southern Africa in their struggle against Pretoria,l24 while both 
South Africa's ANC and PAC enjoyed accreditation from 1975. Furthermore, Nigerian for-
eign ministers had the distinction of chairing the UN Special Cornmittee against Apartheid for 
twenty-one of the thirty-one years of its existence.12S The evidence outlined below reveals that 
Pretoria fairly successfully applied two strategies in an attempt to convince Lagos that bilat-
eral contact was to Nigeria's advantage. First, emphasis was placed on the economic dimen-
sion and the prospect this held for both countries and the African continent. In doing so, Pre-
toria capitalised on Nigeria's interest in gaining a foothold in the South African market that 
was promising for export,126 and we later discuss that the activity of the South African Foreign 
Trade Organisation in this regard was an important factor. Further to this issue, de Klerk' s 
above-mentioned concept of four African economic regions envisaged Nigeria as West Af-
rica's economic powerhouse. Within Pretoria's second strategy to gain access to the Lagos 
government, de Klerk and Pik Botha used Nigeria'S aspirations for continental leadership to 
121 Letter from Herbert Beukes (Deputy Director-General) to Pik Botha, 9 October 1990 (DFA, 11120/3, Vol. 
7). 
122 The Citizen 13 March 1991. 
123 For example, Feustel, Sandy. 1977. Nigeria: Leadership in Africa, Africa Report 22, 3: 48ff.; Herskovits, 
Jean. 1975. Nigeria: Africa's New Power, Foreign Affairs 53, 2: 314-333; Sinclair, Michael R. 1981. Nigeria: 
From Isolation to African Leadership, International Affairs Bulletin 5, 3: 2-14. 
124 For example Aluko, Olajide. 1982. Nigeria and Southern Africa, in Gwendolen Margaret Carter, Patrick 
O' Meara, eds. International Politics in Southern Africa. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press: 128-147. 
12' For example Agbogu. 1983. Nigeria's South African Policy since 1960; Akinyemi. 1994. Origins, Articu-
lations and Continuities in Foreign Policy and Foreign Policy Formulation; Reddy, Enuga S. c1994. United 
Nations Special Committee against Apartheid: Selected Statements and Other Press Releases. 
126 Akinyerni. 1994. Origins. Articulations and Continuities in Foreign Policy and Foreign Policy Formula-
tion, pp.211-217. Also Dare, Olatunji. 1991. Pretoria-Abuja-Cairo Axis, Africa Forum 1, 2: 50ff.; Inegbedion, 
John. 1997. Problems and Prospects for Nigerian-South African Relations and Their Implications for Africa' s 
Economic Renaissance, in Larry Anthony Swatuk, David Ross Black, eds. Bridging the Rift: The New South 
Africa in Africa. Boulder, CO: Westview Press: 204; Owoeye. 1994. What Can Africa Expect from a Post-
Apartheid South Africa?, p.44; Owoeye, Jide, Charles Ukeje. 1996. The Organised Private Sector and the Reali-
ties of Change in Nigeria-South Africa Relations, Scandinavian Journal of Development Alternatives and Area 
Studies 15, 3/4: 265-278; Schneider, Martin. 1991. African Axis [: Interview with Olusegun Obasanjo], Leader-
ship South Africa 10,3: 24ff.; Shaw, Timothy Milton, Clement Emenike Adibe. 1994. South Africa, Nigeria and 
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their advantage, particularly during the OAU Chairmanship. They flattered Ibrahim Badamasi 
Babangida, President from August 1985, in correspondence and meetings by commending 
him on his statesmanship and by underlining the country's seminal role in African and inter-
national politics. 
An initial contact between the two countries was made when de Klerk had an unofficial 
meeting with his Nigerian counterpart during Namibia's independence celebrations in March 
1990. 127 However, the National Intelligence Service was instrumental in establishing signifi-
cant interaction between Pretoria and Lagos. In fact, the DF A files contain communication to 
and from Lagos that was intercepted by NIS, suggesting that they had at least one official sta-
tioned there from April 1984. 128 How this came about is not known due to the non-availability 
of archival sources from their side. Yet, the text of a NIS document, dated 16 November 1984 
and contained in a Top Secret DFA file, might serve as an indication: "During December 
1984, Nigeria will receive two C-130 aircraft from the RSA".I29 It is likely that there were 
secret dealings in operation between South Africa's and Nigeria's intelligence community, 
with the former providing these two Hercules military cargo planes to maybe buy their way 
into Nigeria. The fact that NIS could dispose of military aircraft possibly serves as an exam-
ple of close collaboration with the military at the time (Chapters 2 and 5). The DFA files con-
tain no further material on this matter. There is no mention of this in the secondary sources 
and we have unsuccessfully tried to obtain the views of the then NIS Director-General, Niel 
Barnard, as indicated in Chapter 1. In any case, based on its long-standing presence in Nige-
ria, NIS quite obviously had knowledge of the relevant channels through which to establish 
contact. Thus, on 112 July 1990, Barnard went to Lagos and held talks with Babangida on 
South Africa's domestic political situation. l30 Given that Barnard reported on this meeting to 
de Klerk, it can reasonably be assumed that his visit to Nigeria and then to Uganda was under-
taken at the request of his president. From a later document we learn that Barnard's messen-
ger duties were supplemented by similar activity by a certain General Mohammed,l31 referring 
to General Aliyu Mohammed Gusau, Lagos' man in charge of intelligence at the time and 
the Prospects for Complementary Regionalism After Apartheid, South African Journal of International Affairs 1, 
2: 1-18. 
127 Schoeman and Schoeman. 1993. South Africa's Foreign Relalions in Transilion, 1985-1992, p.311. 
128 Telex from Lusaka to Lagos on the visit of ANC President Oliver Tambo to Lagos, 10 April 1984 (DFA, 
11129/3, Vol. 2PL); report on the conference "Alternative Strategies for Eradicating the Apartheid System", 7-9 
November 1988, Lagos (DFA, 1/ 129/3, Vol. 15). Also documents in DFA, 1/129/3, Vol. 3PL. 
129 Telex No. 1022, numbered T311SNI0121014, 16 November 1984 (DFA, 1/129/3, Vol. 3PL) (translation 
from Afrikaans). 
130 Letter from Niel Barnard to Frederik Willem de Klerk, Pretoria, 6 July 1990 (DFA, 1/129/3, Vol. 6). 
131 Letter from Frederik Willem de Klerk to Ibrahim Babangida, Pretoria, 26 September 1991, p.1 (DFA, 
1/129/3, Vol. 20). 
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National Security Adviser to Nigeria' s President since 1999, Olusegun Obasanjo.'lZ However, 
all contact between Pretoria and Lagos, including that of the Department of Foreign Affairs, 
had to use intelligence channels, and this became an area of conflict with the foreign service 
officers, as we shall presently see. 
Parallel to the intelligence activities, they pursued their own lines of communication. This 
resulted in the visit of Olusegun Obasanjo, former and current Nigerian President, to South 
Africa on 26 July 1990, meeting, in this order, Pik Botha, Neil van Heerden and de Klerk.lJJ 
The previous chapter mentioned Obasanjo's Co-chairmanship of the Commonwealth Eminent 
Person Group that visited South Africa in May 1986 and it appears he struck up a friendship 
with Pik Botha in this context. l34 Thus, with his coming to Pretoria, the foreign service corps 
successfully reactivated its contact without any apparent NIS involvement. Obasanjo remi-
nisced on his 1986 visit, prior to informing Pik Botha of Nigeria's stance towards South Af-
rica. The Lagos government was eager to be "associated with the things happening in the 
RSA", while he wanted to "give encouragement for the SA Government to sustain the good 
being done" and "learn what Nigeria could do to help the process along".1ll In their state-
ments, the South Africans strongly promoted Pretoria' s interest in establishing closer contact 
with Lagos through economic interaction and explained their hopes for the Republic's partici-
pation in the OAD. Crucially, van Heerden suggested in his main message "that the OAD 
might now invite a South African delegation (not ANC or PAC or any of that sort) to go to 
the OAo as observers".1l6 De Klerk, in turn, expressed the hope that "South Africa could open 
a real dialogue with a country so important as Nigeria", emphasising the concept of Nigeria 
and South Africa promoting continental economic development. 137 Based on Obasanjo 's con-
cluding statement that he "had come on his own and on behalf of the Nigerian Government 
and President Babangida himself, who had an open mind on the subject of South Africa",1l8 
Pretoria could be quite certain that the content of the discussions would reach Lagos. In the 
132 <http://www.dailyindependentng.com/news/nn04003.htm1>. 
III 'General Obasanjo visit to the RSA', from Colin Paterson to Christo Prins, 9 August 1990 (OFA, 11129/3, 
Vol. 16). 
Il4 Interview with Pik Botha, 20 April 1999. Also Botha, Roelof Frederik 'Pik'. 1995. His South African 
Connection, in Hans d'Orville, ed. Leadership for Africa: in Honor of Olusegun Obasanjo on the Occasion of 
his 60th Birthday. New York: Africa Leadership Foundation: 55-69. 
IlS 'General Obasanjo visit to the RSA', from Colin Paterson to Christo Prins, 9 August 1990, p.2 (OFA, 
11129/3, Vol. 16). 
136 'General Obasanjo visit to the RSA' , from Colin Paterson to Christo Prins, 9 August 1990, p.3 (OFA, 
111 29/3, Vol. 16). 
137 ' General Obasanjo visit to the RSA' , from Colin Paterson to Christo Prins, 9 August 1990, pp.7f. (DFA, 
11129/3, Vol. 16). 
138 'General Obasanjo visit to the RSA' , from Colin Paterson to Christo Prins, 9 August 1990, p.9 (OFA, 
111 29/3, Vol. 16). 
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wake of and supplementing Obasanjo's visit, de Klerk wrote to Babangida, underlining that 
South Africa was "an African state with an African destiny", while again stressing the need 
for economic co-operation between the two "major economic powers in Africa".I39 Quite 
likely due to Obasanjo's visit to South Africa and Barnard's trip to Nigeria, Nigerian-South 
African relations received a positive spin-off. We will show that Babangida subsequently 
adopted a positive stance towards contact with Pretoria. A statement by Nigeria's Foreign 
Affairs Minister Ike Nwachukwu (1987-89,1990-93) to the Nigerian Society ofInternational 
Affairs in November 1990 reveals that de Klerk's economic concept, in particular, appealed to 
important members of the Nigerian government. He stated that "combining the South African 
know how and our resources, both human and material, should provide the basis for the re-
generation of our African homeland".I40 As for Obasanjo, he remained in contact with Pretoria 
both through correspondencel41 and in person, acting as something of the DFA's mediator. 
Most notably, the New York-based Africa Leadership Forum, founded in 1987 and chaired by 
Obasanjo,l42 organised a conference on "The Challenges of Post-Apartheid South Africa" in 
Windhoek that took place from 8 to 10 September 1991. 143 Immediately after this event, Oba-
sanjo and sixteen prominent Nigerians went to South Africa for two days, calling for an end 
to South Africa's isolation, as indicated in a secondary source. l44 Another avenue that the 
Department of Foreign Affairs pursued in establishing contact with Nigeria without NIS in-
volvement, was diplomatic exchange at the UN in New York. In an interview, Jeremy 
Shearar, South Africa's Ambassador there from 1988 to 1991, indicated that this began after 
the Namibia Accords in December 1988. Notably, he held several meetings with Joseph Nan-
ven Garba, the former Nigerian Foreign Minister (1975-78), who was Ambassador to the UN, 
Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid from 1984 and President of the UN 
General Assembly during 1989."5 This diplomatic link remained even after Garba's replace-
ment by Ibrahim Agboola Gambari in January 1990, who was also a former Foreign Minister 
139 Letter from Frederik Willem de Klerk to Ibrahim Babangida, Pretoria, August 1990, pp.l £ (DF A, 11129/3, 
Vol. 16). 
140 'SA welcomed', West Africa 3820,12-18 November 1990. 
141 Letter from 01usegun Obasanjo to Frederik Willem de Klerk, New York, 12 December 1990 (DFA, 
1/129/3, Vol. 16). 
142 <http://www.africaleadership.org>. 
143 DFA, 11129/3, Vol. 20 contains the relevant documentation. The proceedings were published: Mosha, 
Felix G.N. 1991. The Challenges of Post-Apartheid South Africa: Conclusions and Papers Presented at a Con-
ference of the Africa Leadership Forum, 8-10 September 1991, Windhoek, Namibia. New York: Africa Leader-
ship Forum. 
144 Schoeman and Schoeman. 1993. South Africa's Foreign Relations in Transition, 1985-1992, pA03. 
145 Telephone interview with Jeremy Shearar, 8 January 2003. See also Garba, Joseph Nanven. 1993. The 
Honour to Serve: Reflections on Nigeria's Presidency of the 44th UN. General Assembly. Ibadan: Heinemann 
Educational Books. 
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(1983-85) and now represented Nigeria at the UN and chaired the UN Special Committee 
against Apartheid. ' 46 In fact, Shearar mentions that the contact intensified in the wake of de 
Klerk's February 1990 speech. Apart from discussions related to South Africa's position at 
the UN, the two diplomats discussed the political situation in South Africa,'47 while a corre-
spondence from Shearar to Gambari in April 1991 reveals that the diplomats tried to appeal to 
Nigeria by placing the emphasis on "the need to combine our efforts to confront the compel-
ling development needs of Africa". 148 
After this initial and successful process of establishing contact between Pretoria and Lagos 
through diplomatic and intelligence channels, we now see that the South African government 
promoted its reforms to ensure closer access to this West African state. Nigeria' s diplomatic 
backing promised to open doors simultaneously to the OAU, chaired by President Babangida 
from July 1991 to June 1992, and the Commonwealth, whose Secretary-General since July 
1990 was Eleazar Chukwuemeka 'Emeka' Anyaoku, a distinguished Nigerian diplomat. '49 
Pretoria's aim of gaining recognition for its reform policy from the OAU by way of Nigeria, 
was strengthened by a press statement issued on 19 April 1991 by the Nigerian Permanent 
Mission to the UN in New York. It sent an unambiguous signal by reproducing Ibrahim Ba-
bangida's statement of 12 April. This made it quite clear that Nigeria would support the lifting 
of sanctions within the ranks of the OAU, while setting standards for Pretoria: "I wish to reit-
erate that we ( ... ) would be fully prepared to promote and undertake initiatives at the forth-
coming OAU Summit to lift sanctions on South Africa if the remaining apartheid laws are 
abrogated by May, 1991".1S0 What follows suggests that Pretoria felt the Nigerian govern-
ment's pulse so as to make those changes that would make the most appeal to Lagos. Signifi-
cantly, the DFA files contain a telex, dated 14 May 1991 , sent from the Belgian Embassy in 
Lagos to Brussels. This message had been intercepted by the National Intelligence Service, lSI 
documenting that they still retained a prominent position in the Pretoria-Lagos contact, while 
sharing some information with the foreign service officials. Crucially, the telex contains the 
Belgian perception of the Nigerian govemment towards the political situation in South Africa: 
146 <http://www.un.orglNews/ossg/sg/stories/gambaribio.html>. 
147 Telephone interview with Jeremy Shearar, 8 January 2003 . 
148 Letter from Jeremy Shearar to Ibrahim Gambari, New York, 18 April 1991 (DFA, 11129/3, Vol. 18). 
149 Johnson, Phyllis. 2000. Eye of Fire: A Biography of Chief Emeka Anyaoku, Commonwealth Secretary-
General. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press; London: Turnaround; Lyon, Peter. 2000 . 'Ex Africa Semper Aliquid 
Novi ' : A First Biography of Emeka Anyaoku, The Round Table 89, 355: 407ff. 
ISO Press statement from the Nigerian Permanent Mission to the United Nations, New York, 19 April 1991 , 
(DFA, 1/129/3, Vol. 18). Also Schoeman and Schoeman. 1993 . South Africa's Foreign Relations in Transition, 
1985-1992, p.366. 
lS I The files also contain a telex from the Algerian Embassy to Algiers, Lagos, 12 June 1991 (DFA, 1/ 12913, 
Vol. 19). 
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"Nigeria stands for the following position: Sanctions should be maintained until the Pretoria 
Government abrogates three laws, the Population [Registration] Act, the Group Areas Act, 
and the [Native] Land Act".IS2 De Klerk being the pragmatist that he was, he usually timed the 
actions for them to achieve the maximum effect and utmost political gain, such as is apparent 
in this instance. We have already cited his letter of 23 May 1991 , sent to thirty African heads 
of state and government within days of the OAD Summit in Nigeria, emphasising South Af-
rica's preparedness to promote economic co-operation with Africa. In the same letter, he 
equally stressed that Pretoria continued with its domestic reforms and underlined his "total 
commitment to the cause of bringing violence under control and ensuring that the political 
process leading to a new constitutional order in South Africa remains on track".I53 To give 
substance to his apartheid reform claim, and possibly with knowledge of the above-mentioned 
telex intercepted by NIS, de Klerk now undertook activities to repeal three central pillars of 
the racial system. While he had announced the abrogation of these acts in February 1991, it 
was only on 5 June that de Klerk repealed both the Group Areas and the Native Land Act. I" It 
is likely that the delay in taking this action was due to dissension in Cabinet on the speed of 
these reforms, but the above-described circumstantial evidence also suggests that the timing 
was related to the OAD Summit which was held from 2 to 5 June. Whether Nigeria neverthe-
less lobbied for Pretoria's cause despite this late action is uncertain, but we know that the 
OAD Summit decided not to advocate the lifting of sanctions by the international community, 
obviously judging de Klerk's reforms as insufficient. 1SS 
The OAD's standpoint notwithstanding, the political exchange between de Klerk and Ba-
bangida remained unaffected and in the hands of national intelligence. Significantly, on 17 
June 1991, the same day on which the Population Registration Act was repealed,I" Babangida 
reassured de Klerk of his continued support in a message conveyed by Niel Barnard: "Pres 
Babangida request that Dr Barnard convey his congratulations to Pres de Klerk for the bold 
steps taken by repealing the apartheid laws. Pres Babangida would also like Dr Barnard to 
bring under the attention of Pres de Klerk, to be assured that he will do anything he can to 
assist Pres de Klerk in achieving his goals".157 On 17 September 1991, three days after the 
1S2 Telex from the Belgian Embassy to Brussels, Lagos, 14 May 1991 (DFA, 1/129/3, Vol. 19). 
IS3 Letter from Frederik Wmem de Klerk, Cape Town, 23 May 1991, p.4 (DFA, 1/101/3, Vol. 4; 1/ 13/3, Vol. 
6; 11129/3, Vol. 19). 
154 Lodge, Tom, et al. 1991. All, Here and Now: Black Politics in South Africa in the 1980s. Cape Town: 
David Philip: 394. 
155 Schoeman and Schoeman. 1993. South Africa 's Foreign Relations in Transition, 1985-1992, p.375. 
156 Lodge, et al. 1991. All, Here and Now, p.394. 
157 Letter from Niel Barnard to Frederik Willem de Klerk, containing Ibrahim Babangida's message of 17 
June 1991, Pretoria, 19 June 1991 (DFA, 1/129/3, Vol. 4PL). 
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conclusion of the National Peace Accord, Babangida commended de K1erk for this important 
initiative in curbing the violence,lss indicating that the ANC's accusations of govern-
mentlInkatha involvement in the violence had not hampered the Pretoria-Lagos link. In the 
knowledge of this backing, as well as Anyaoku's position as the Commonwealth Secretary-
General, de Klerk replied to Babangida's latest correspondence on 26 September. Lobbying 
for Nigeria's support in view of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Summit to be held 
in Harare from 16 to 22 October was obviously behind this move: 
I would like to propose that the fIrst such meeting [between Babangida and de KlerkJ 
took place in Abuja before the forthcoming Commonwealth Conference. Accordingly I 
suggest that I arrive on October 13, 1991, accompanied by my Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs . ( ... ) I have no doubt that a visit by you to South Africa, after the Commonwealth 
Conference, which could include meetings with Mr Mandela and Chief Buthelezi, can 
make an important contribution towards the peaceful political process in South Africa. 159 
Babangida did not act on de K1erk's proposal, and neither their meeting nor Babangida's visit 
to South Afiica materialised. While the reasons for this are not recorded, it is possible that 
there was disagreement within the Nigerian government over the country's attitude towards 
Pretoria. In particular, while formerly supportive of economic co-operation with South Afiica, 
as seen above, Foreign Affairs Minister N wachukwu had stated on 1 August 1991 that Lagos 
would lobby the United States, the European Community and Japan to maintain economic 
sanctions against South Afiica. l60 Whether Nigeria's representatives lobbied for Pretoria' s 
cause at the Commonwealth Summit is therefore uncertain. The Commonwealth leaders de-
cided to lift sanctions in the fields of sports and cultural contact, as well as tourism, but the 
final communique after the Summit declared that the removal of the remaining measures was 
conditional on the establishment of a transitional government. 161 
In continuing with this analysis of Pretoria' s endeavours to gain Nigerian backing for its 
domestic reforms and providing an entree into both the OAU and the Commonwealth, the 
next correspondence from de Klerk to Babangida in the DFA files is only dated 11 February 
1992. It contains a resume of the political developments in South Afiica since CODES A 1,162 
while this relative silence probably resulted from Pretoria' s lack of success in gaining Abuja' s 
active diplomatic support. This is substantiated by UN Ambassador Vernon Steward's state-
IS8 Letter from Ibrahim Babangida to Frederik Willem de Klerk, Lagos, 17 September (DFA, 1/129/3, Vol. 
21). 
159 Letter from Frederik Willem de Klerk to Ibrahim Babangida, Cape Town, 26 September 1991, p.1 (DFA, 
111 29/3, Vol. 20). 
160 Scboeman and Schoeman. 1993. South Africa's Foreign Relations in Transition, 1985-1992, p.393. 
161 Reprinted in Southern Africa Record 63, 1992: 27-48. 
162 Letter from Frederik Willem de Klerk to Ibrahim Babangida, Cape Town, II February 1992 (DFA, 
1/ 129/3, Vol. 4PL) . 
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ment made during a meeting in February with his Nigerian counterpart that developments 
during 1991 "seemed to have come to naught" . He therefore proposed the visit of "an official, 
if not a Minister, C ... ) to Nigeria for discussions", a suggestion to which Gambari "fully 
agreed". 163 With his statement, Steward indirectly expressed the discontent among the foreign 
service corps that all communication had to be channelled via the National Intelligence Ser-
vice, and given that they had not achieved any concrete diplomatic result to date, this led to 
interdepartmental friction as to who should take the lead in promoting contact. Yet, while the 
NIS had the advantage of having been stationed in Nigeria for a long time, it seems that not 
only the Nigerian government, but even its diplomatic corps, was divided regarding contact 
with Pretoria and this did not augur well for diplomatic relations between the two countries. 
As an indication of this, Ambassador Steward's meeting with his Nigerian counterpart had 
taken place in a cordial atmosphere, whereas Minister Nwachukwu still proposed sanctions. 
However, we now see that South Africa' s foreign affairs ministry managed to establish itself 
vis-a-vis the NIS. In examining its activities henceforth, we need to recall that these took 
place within the wider framework of the negotiations between the ANC and the government, 
and Pretoria's overarching goal was to have the external support to strengthen its bargaining 
position. The present investigation into the relationship with Nigeria is therefore particularly 
important because Abuja's backing proved to critical within the context of the UN Security 
Council meeting called after the Boipatong massacre, which we will subsequently examine. 
The documents in the DFA files suggest that late February and early March 1992 proved 
to be a transition period in the struggle between the Department of Foreign Affairs and na-
tional intelligence over contact with Nigeria. In a letter of 3 March 1992 to Babangida, de 
Klerk accepted his invitation to come to Abuja, stating that this offer had been transmitted to 
him by the Nigerian High Commissioner in Botswana, Ambassador Alaba Ogunsanwo.l 64 
While a later report from Deputy Director-General Auret indicates that this served as the for-
eign affairs ministry's principal channel of communication, I" he revealed in an interview with 
us that this connection had originally been established by the NIS,I66 thus explaining why Ba-
bangida's original invitation to de Klerk is not contained in the DFA files. However, and indi-
cating that the NIS was now replaced as the transmission centre, it was Derek Auret who took 
163 'UN: discussion with Ambassador Gambari (Nigeria)', from Vernon Steward, New York, 24 February 
1992, p.2 (DFA, 1/129/3, Vol. 4PL). 
164 Letter from Frederik Willem de K1erk to Ibrahim Babangida, Pretoria, 3 March 1992, p.1 (DFA, 1/129/3, 
Vol. 4PL) . 
16' 'Amptelike besoek aan Nigeri~', from Derek Auret to Neil van Heerden, II March 1992, p.1 (DFA, 
11129/3, Vol. 21). 
166 Telephone interview with Derek Auret, 20 March 2002. 
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de Klerk's letter of acceptance to Abuja, as had been suggested by Minister Pik Botha. l67 The 
Deputy Director-General visited Nigeria from 7 to 11 March 1992, meeting with Babangida 
in a "very relaxed and friendly atmosphere". He informed the president of the white referen-
dum on de Klerk' s reforms, argued that the allegations regarding Pretoria's involvement in 
the violence were not correct and flattered Babangida by stating that South Africa would like 
Nigeria to play an important role in the reform process. l68 Regarding de Klerk' s visit to Nige-
ria, several documents indicate that this was contingent on the outcome of the referendum of 
17 March 1992,169 in which the white electorate was asked whether they supported de Klerk's 
refonns. On the day after the favourable outcome of the referendum to de Klerk, the Nigerian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press statement stating that the ""Yes Vote" (oo.) has now 
removed a major obstacle to the efforts to transform South Africa from a racially segregated 
country to a non-racial, united and democratic society". l7o For Babangida, this evidently sig-
nalled that South Africa's reform process was irreversible and, on 23 March, Ambassador 
Ogunsanwo confirmed that de Klerk's visit could take place on 9/10 April. l7I Before discuss-
ing this coup for Pretoria's diplomatic endeavours, we need to consider the important role that 
South Africa' s business community played in the run-up to this event. While we previously 
discussed Africa's considerable interest in establishing economic interaction with South Af-
rica, we noted earlier in this section that Nigeria was particularly eager in this regard. The 
ensuing developments suggest that Pretoria capitalised on the economic factor at this point in 
time to achieve political goals. 
Notably, the delegation that accompanied de Klerk during the visit to Abuja on 911 0 April 
comprised the key representatives of South Africa's business sector. In particular, these were 
Adriaan Sarel 'Attie' du Plessis, President of the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut during 1991192, 
Wim Holtes, Chief Executive of the South African Foreign Trade Organisation, and Jan Hen-
drik 'Hennie' Viljoen, President of the South African Chamber of Business (SACOB) during 
1992.172 Judging from the DFA files, however, SAFTO was the most significant participant in 
167 Letter from Pik Botha to Frederik Willem de Klerk, Pretoria, 3 March 1992 (DFA, 1/129/3, Vol. 4PL). 
168 ' Amptelike besoek aan Nigeri~ ' , from Derek Auret to Neil van Heerden, I I March 1992, pp.4f. (DFA, 
111 29/3, Vol. 21) (translation from Afrikaans). 
169 Letter from Pik Botha to Frederik Willem de Klerk, 27 February; letter from Derek Auret to Johannes 
Petru Roux (Director-General, State President ' s Office), Pretoria, 2 March; letter from Frederik Willem de Klerk 
to Ibrahim Babangida, Pretoria, 3 March 1992 (DFA, 1/129/3, Vol. 4PL). 
170 ' Statement of the Affirmative Result of the Negotiating Process in South Africa', Ministty of Foreign Af-
fairs, Abuja, 18 March 1992 (DFA, 11129/3, Vol. 21). 
17 1 Letter from Alaba Ogunsanwo to Derek Auret, Gaborone, 23 March 1992 (DFA, 1/129/3, Vol. 21). 
172 Inegbedion. 1997. Problems and Prospects for Nigerian-South African Relations and Their Implications 
for Africa's Economic Renaissance, p.203 ; Van Wyk, Alta. 1992. Significant Breakthrough in Nigeria, RSA 
Policy Review 5, 4: 38. 
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ticipant in this instance and within the framework of Pretoria's foreign relations with black 
Africa beyond the region more generally at the time. This impression was confirmed to us by 
both Attie du Plessis and Hennie Viljoen, who stated that the AHI and SACOB as umbrella 
organisations for their members had not been active in the part of black Africa of interest to 
us until then. 17J In contrast, we have noted earlier in this chapter that the delegation from Togo 
that had visited South Africa in March 1991 specifically asked for a SAFTO mission to come 
to their country, mirroring the reputation of this business association. Furthermore, a report, 
dated November 1992, on Pretoria's relations with Ghana from Carel Wessels, Chief Director 
for Africa, to Derek Auret reveals: "SAFTO has received an invitation to participate in a 
manufactured goods fair in Accra early next year".!14 In addition to these two examples, 
SAFTO played a highly significant role in the run-up to the Nigerian visit, and this is now 
examined. 
SAFTO had not displayed any particular interest in undertakings in African countries be-
yond South Africa's immediate neighbourhood during the 1960s and 1970s, probably deem-
ing the area to be economically unattractive. This picture began to change during the first half 
of the 1980s; its 1981 /82 Annual Report found that South African export to Africa was 
"growing because of reliability, fast delivery and relatively low transport costs". 17S As early as 
1980, SAFTO had established the African Business Development Group (ABDG), only the 
second such "area service" to be created after the Asian Market Monitor, indicating a growing 
interest in the African market. !76 Five years later, SAFTO formed the Africa Intelligence Ser-
vice to provide in-depth market information on African countries. 177 Optimism began out-
weighing SAFTO' s earlier scepticism on trading opportunities in Africa by the mid-1980s, 
such as reflected in the 1986/87 Annual Report: "South Africa' s exports to Africa have risen 
consistently over the last few years, although South African exporters are usually wary of 
selling on anything other than a cash or short-term credit basis".!78 Significantly, the next An-
nual Report states: "Relations between South Africa and Africa are primarily determined by 
economic factors ( .. . ). Last year, we called for a more visionary approach to South Africa' s 
I7J Correspondence with Attie du Plessis, 24 January 2003; telephone interview with Hennie Viljoen, 26 
January 2003. 
174 'Ghana: prospects for economic and political relations with South Africa ' , from Carel Wessels to Derek 
Auret, 17 November 1992 (DFA, 1/106/3, Vol. 13). 
17S SAFTO: Annual Report, 1981/82, p.6. 
176 SAFTO & the State of SA Trade. 1984. p.9; ' Opportunities for Africa ' , Finance Week 20-26 June 1991: 
21-24. 
177 'Soaring Trade with Africa', SAFTO Exporter 22,9, September 1985: 7. 
!78 SAFTO: Annual Report, 1986/87, p.5. Also SAFTO: Annual Report, 1984/85, p.4. 
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relations with Africa; it seems that such an approach is now being implemented".17' The 
ABDG was a "very effective" and "very successful" group, which "did better than any of the 
others,,,I 80 according to SAFTO's Wim Holtes, and the SAFTO Annual Report of 1994/95 
further claims: " [the ABDG) is widely recognised as one of the world's most powerful group-
ings of business interests focused on Africa".I'1 Holtes, who stated in an interview to have had 
"a great interest in Africa,,, I" and Paul Runge, who ran the ABDG from May 1989 to 1991 
and then the Africa and Europe section until 1997, were the driving forces behind SAFTO's 
work in Africa in the late 1980s. Runge, whom we mentioned in the previous chapter as the 
foreign service official with several postings related to West Africa during the 1980s, now 
maintained a personal link between the traders and the DFA. In particular, he was rather close 
to Director-General van Heerden, who had formulated Pretoria's New Diplomacy that fore-
saw the strengthening of trade and commerce, and we argue that SAPTO became something 
of an implementer of the foreign affairs ministry's approach towards Africa, and Nigeria in 
particular. In fact, the SAPTO Annual Report 1991192 suggests that the "opening up of this 
market [Nigeria) to South African companies" had strong political implications, since "the 
psychological effect of establishing business relationships with this leader on the African con-
tinent cannot be underestimated".I83 As an indication that the co-operation between SAFTO 
and DFA was mutually beneficial, Runge followed van Heerden to the South Africa Founda-
tion in 1997 and became its Director. The activities of SAPTO's Africa Business Develop-
ment Group in Nigeria in early 1992 were of great significance, supplementing Pretoria' s am-
bition of winning over this powerful West African country.l84 Crucially, the DFA files contain 
considerable documentation that we now examine, indicating that Runge kept them informed 
of SAFTO's activities. l85 Runge paid a "pilot visit" to Nigeria from 15 to 20 March 1992, to 
"examine first-hand an important new market and to provide practical feedback to the 
ABDG", to "set up logistics for a confidential South African trade delegation to visit Lagos 
from 3 to I 0 May 1992" and to "canvass for Nigerian participation in the SAFTO Africa con-
179 SAFTO: Annual Report. 1987188, ppAf Also SAFTO: Annual Report, 1989190, p.5; 'Viable Markets in 
Africa ', SAFTO Exporter 24,9, September 1987: 7; 'Power Boost to SA's Link with Africa', SAFTO Exporter 
28, 2, January 1991 : 2; 'SA Companies Bounce Back Into Africa', SAFTO Exporter 28, 6, June 1991: 4. 
180 Interview with Wim Holtes, 31 March 1999. 
1' 1 SAFTO: Annual Report, 1994195, p.19. 
I"lnterview with Wim Holtes, 31 March 1999. 
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185 Various documents inDFA, 11129/3, Vol. 21. 
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ference scheduled for 28 and 29 April 1992".186 Significantly, Olusegun Obasanjo, an impor-
tant contact for the foreign affairs ministry with Nigeria, attended this conference; Runge is 
seen in a photograph with him on this occasion. i87 Following Runge's initial visit and this 
event, a 'Special SAFTO Group' visited Nigeria from 10 to 17 May, a week later than 
planned and only after the Department of Foreign Affairs, on behalf of SAFTO, had "obtained 
official approval for the visit to take place" from the Nigerian authorities. I" Even though 
these last two developments took place after de Klerk' s visit to Nigeria, they are nonetheless 
an illustration of the especially close liaison between DFA and SAFTO, in facilitating and 
assisting each other's tasks. 
On the issue of de Klerk's Abuja visit on 9/10 April, the DFA files contain relatively little 
documentation, an indication that the NIS managed, once more, to somewhat relegate the for-
eign service corps to the background in maintaining contact, as suggested by a report dated 12 
August 1992 from Director Justus de Goede to Derek Aure!: "We are using a channel which 
is not a Foreign Ministry one. We have little choice in the matter, but it seems clear to us that 
the Nigerian Foreign Ministry is happy to keep this distance" .I" Nonetheless, one of the 
documents in the DF A files contains the issues to be raised in the talks between Babangida 
and de Klerk. This brief verifies several of the above points, namely that economic interaction 
and the role played by SAFTO in this context were important, and that the DFA-NIS rivalry 
over who was to take the lead in communication remained a contentious issue. In particular, 
the agenda item "Specific Points" lists "Normalisation of trade and other relations", "Over-
flight rights for SAA", "Facilitation of SAFTO-delegation visit - 3 to 10 May 1992" and 
"Channel of Communication" .190 It is not known whether all ofthese points were raised, as the 
only other relevant document in the DFA files, summarising the ninety-minute talk between 
Babangida and de Klerk, merely notes that South Africa's domestic political developments 
were discussed.I '1 According to secondary sources, the oil issue surfaced, speculating that 
186 'Discussion items for Nigeria', March 1992; 'Proposed list of items for bilateral discussions with Nigeria', 
from Paul Runge to Wim Holtes, Johannesburg, 7 April 1992 (DF A, 11129/3, Vol. 21). 
187 SAFTO: Annual Report, 1991192, p.6; ' SAFTO's Africa Conference Hailed as a Breakthrough ' , SAFTO 
Exporter 29, 4, April 1992: I; ' SAFTO Seminar Breaks Ground in Africa', SAFTO Exporter 29, 4, April 1992: 
10f. ; 'Nigeria Visit Sets Scene for Future Trade', SAFTO Exporter 29, 4, April 1992: II. 
I" 'Note verbale' , to A1aba Ogunsanwo, Pretoria, 16 April 1992 (DF A, 1/129/3, Vol. 22). 
189 ' Relations with Nigeria ', from Justus de Goede to Derek Auret, 12 August 1992, p.2 (DFA, 11129/3, Vol. 
24). 
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Nigeria might become a future supplier of oil to South Africa.'92 The main emphasis in the 
Joint Communique at the end of the visit, however, was again on South Africa's internal 
situation, focusing on both Babangida's and de Klerk's concern over the violence. The eco-
nomic aspect of the talks is only mentioned in the last paragraph, underlining that "close re-
gional cooperation was essential for economic growth and progress".'9J The little information 
on the content of the talks notwithstanding, this venture into Nigeria was a tremendous break-
through for Pretoria's Africa policy,'94 and a DFA report of 25 May 1992 records that rela-
tions between Nigeria and South Africa had "made significant progress" since de Klerk's 
Abuja visit.'9S 
We have now concluded the investigation into South Africa' s foreign relations with black 
African states beyond the region from 1990 to mid-1992. The information we provided 
showed that the economic lever played a very important role in Pretoria's endeavour to pro-
mote contact with some of these countries. This was relevant in the wider context of strength-
ening the bargaining position in the negotiations with the ANC and particular attention was 
paid to the OAU Chair countries of Uganda and Nigeria. During an interview, in March 1992, 
with the RSA Policy Review, a magazine issued by Pretoria's Bureau of Information, Minister 
Pik Botha boasted that an entry into the OAU might be possible: "It is important for us to gain 
membership of the organisation, and as I said earlier on, I would like to see South Africa tak-
ing its rightful place in the OAU this year [1992] still"."6 By way of diplomatic backing from 
the OAU, Pretoria appears to have hoped that the sanctions would completely crumble, thus 
achieving its central foreign policy objective of returning to the international community. 
Never before had Pretoria seen itself so close to achieving this goal. We have already men-
tioned de Klerk' s important visits to Paris, London and Washington between 1990 and 1992 
(Table 6), but contact was also established with Moscow, the former archenemy and a perma-
nent member of the UN Security Council. South Africa and the Russian Federation had estab-
lished consular contact on 9 November 1991 , extended to full diplomatic relations on 28 Feb-
ruary 1992, during the visit of Andrej Kosyrev, the Russian Foreign Minister, to South Af-
'92 Hengeveld and Rodenburg. 1995. Embargo, p.190; Newsletter on the Oil Embargo against South Africa 
24, Third Quarter 1991: 2; 27, Second Quarter 1992: 327; Africa Confidential 33, 10, 17 April 1992. 
193 'Joint Communique', Abuja, 10 April 1992, p.2 (DFA, 11129/3, Vol. 21). 
"4 Interview with Neil van Heerden, 7 April 1999. Also Qunta, Vuyisa. 1992. De Klerk in Abuja: New Hero 
or New Morality?, Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly 5,9: 13; SouthScan 7, 22, 5 June 1992: 167; 
West Africa 3892, 20-26 April 1992: 664. 
'95 'Suid-Afrika se verhouding met Nigerie' , from Anton Nel (DFA) to Marinus Leonard te Water Naude 
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rical 97 This was followed by President de Klerk's meeting with his counterpart, Boris Yeltsin, 
in Moscow on 1/2 June 1992, discussing a South African loan of 100 million Rand and Preto-
ria's possible readmission to the UN General Assembly. l98 In 1999, Neil van Heerden admit-
ted that it was Pretoria' s goal to secure the support of the permanent Security Council mem-
bers in re-entering the United Nations as a fully fledged member: "Whether we specifically 
aimed at the five permanent [Security Council] members? Yes, of course, that was always in 
the back of one 's mind".I99 Regarding the People's Republic of China, the fifth permanent 
Security Council member, South African newspapers revealed that Minister Pik Botha had 
paid a secret visit to Beijing, at the beginning of his trip to Taiwan, Australia and New Zea-
land in October 1991, to discuss the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations.2oo Three 
months later, on 21 February 1992, China's Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, came to South 
Africa during his Africa toUr.201 Finally, during the visit to Moscow, Tokyo and Singapore in 
early June 1992 (Table 6), de Klerk hoped to make a stopover in Beijing, but this did not ma-
terialise despite strong lobbying from Pretoria, as suggested by the well-informed SouthScan 
magazine2 02 Nonetheless, on his return on 8 June, de Klerk stated: "South Africa is back in 
the international community. This time I am more convinced of it than ever before". 203 
Having proposed that the external dimension was of vital relevance to the negotiations 
between the ANC and the govemment, we now resume the analysis of the developments after 
the Boipatong massacre of 17/18 June 1992. It was at this particular juncture that both the 
external and domestic dimension came together so critically. It will be recalled that this event 
had caused the ANC to break off the talks, arguing that the Pretoria government fuelled the 
violence to weaken the black organisation, and it now requested a special meeting of the UN 
Security Council to discuss the political crisis. 
Post-Boipatong Developments 
The weeks following the Boipatong massacre saw a flurry of diplomatic moves. The ANC's 
goal was the re-imposition of international pressure on Pretoria, while the government aimed 
197 Keesing's Archiv der Gegenwart, 1991, pp.36223, 36668; Africa Research Bulletin: Political Series 29,3 , 
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at refuting both the accusation that it was not committed to negotiating the demise of apart-
heid and that it was responsible for fomenting the violence against the ANC. The principal 
activities took place on the fringes of the OAU Summit in Dakar, in Abuja and in New York, 
where the UN Security Council convened on 15 and 16 July 1992 at the request of the African 
National Congress. We now explore these developments. 
The township massacre almost coincided with the timing of the OAU Conference of Min-
isters from 22 to 27 June, followed by the Heads of State and Government meeting in Dakar 
from 29 June to 1 July. In trying to capitalise on this, the ANC requested the OAU to draft a 
resolution that condemned Pretoria for submission to the UN Security Council.204 Even though 
the OAU had recognised the ANC as South Africa' s principal liberation movement and en-
dorsed its negotiation Discussion Paper in the Harare Declaration, mentioned above, Man-
dela' s organisation could not rely on this backing because, as we have seen, Pretoria had 
managed to make significant inroads into Africa. In fact, and reflecting the high priority the 
ANC attributed to continental diplomatic support, twenty of the forty-nine countries visited 
by Mandela until mid-1992 were in Africa (Table 7). A closer look at the individual destina-
tions suggests that the choice was guided by three goals. First, in similar vein to Pretoria's 
strategy, primary importance appears to have been attached to lobbying for OAU support, 
with Mandela going to Uganda in September 1990 and attending the Conference of Ministers 
prior to the OAU Summit in Nigeria in June 1991. Second, and recognising the country' s po-
litical influence in African political matters, Mandela paid two visits to Kenya, which again 
resembled Pretoria's priorities. Third, with his visits to Nigeria in May 1990 and to Gabon, 
the Ivory Coast and Ghana in the course of 1991 , Mandela tried to broaden the ANC's diplo-
matic network in Africa by securing the support of those countries critical towards the recog-
nition of the liberation movement or of those that had not allowed the ANC to establish a 
presence during the exile period. 205 The two Francophone African countries had not supported 
the ANC, but rather advocated Dialogue with Pretoria, while Ghana had favoured the PAC 
over the ANC due to its policy of black exclusivity. The latter also applied to Nigeria, even 
though the ANC had an Exile Mission there.'06 Despite all these activities, the ANC had to 
undertake significant diplomatic efforts to rally the African community of states at the OAU 
Summit in Dakar in furthering its goal of increasing Pretoria's political isolation. This was 
204 Chabbra, Hari Sharan. 1997. South African Foreign Policy: Principles, Options, Dilemmas. New Delhi: 
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necessary tactic given President de Klerk's Abuja breakthrough in April 1992. This motivated 
the Africa Research Bulletin to comment: "For the ANC this marks a major and almost total 
defeat in an area which, six months before - when the movement won widespread agreement 
to delay further normalisation until an interim government - seemed to have been uncontested 
ANC turf".'01 Reflecting the great significance attached to the Dakar meeting, Mandela him-
self flew to Senegal, despite health problems and against the advice of his doctor to rest,'O' 
and urged Africa' s leaders to think again before "hastily re-establishing relations with Preto-
ria" .'09 In addition to its president, the ANC was represented by nine relatively high-ranking 
representatives, most notably Thabo Mbeki, Head of the ANC Department of International 
Affairs (DIA) from 1989 to 1993.210 
Before we examine the OAU Summit's decision regarding the situation in South Africa, 
we need to discuss the parallel developments in Abuja because, in this instance, the Pretoria 
government tried to rally diplomatic support through Nigeria's assistance. In furtherance of 
his African leadership ambition, as mentioned earlier, President Babangida convened UN 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and South African government representatives in 
Abuja on 27 June 1992. On this day, two separate rounds of talks were held between Boutros-
Ghali, Pik Botha and RoelofPetrus 'Roelf Meyer, Pretoria' s chief negotiator in the talks with 
the ANC, on the one hand, and between President Babangida, Foreign Minister Nwachukwu, 
Pik Botha and Roelf Meyer on the other. Also present at both meetings were Deputy Director-
Generals Jeremy Shearar and Derek Auret, UN Ambassador Vernon Steward and Deputy Di-
rector Anton van Dalsen, the son of former Director-General Hans van Dalsen. The violence 
issue dominated both talks, with Pretoria again rejecting any culpability. Only one day prior 
to the Abuja meetings, de Klerk and Pik Botha wrote to their Nigerian counterparts. However, 
again indicating that presidential communication went through the NIS, only the latter's cor-
respondence with Nwachukwu is contained in the DFA files and this reads: "The charges of 
Government complicity in the tragedy in Boipatong or in any other instance of killing, are 
without any substance whatsoever. (oO.) How can it now be argued that we as a Government 
wish to foment violence, knowing what the result would be both at home and abroad?"21I 
While questioning the legal justification for action by the UN Security Council, Pretoria left 
room for compromise: "If the Security Council feels that it needs to be reliably informed on 
'01 Africa Research Bulletin: Political Series 29, 4, 1-30 April 1992: 10527. 
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events in South Africa, the Government would certainly be prepared to assist by participating 
in any meeting in this respect".212 Pretoria's officials adopted the same stance during the talks 
with Boutros-Ghali, Babangida and Nwachukwu. Pik Botha argued that the ANC used Boipa-
tong "to make unpleasant propaganda" and as an "opportunity to cancel Codesa and proceed 
with mass action". He lay all blame for the violence on the black organisation and presented a 
picture of ethnic violence: "It should be pointed out that there is only fighting where there are 
Zulus and Xhosas".2Il The arguments were repeated during the meeting with the UN Secre-
tary-General, with both Pik Botha and Roelf Meyer emphasising Pretoria's steps to curb the 
violence and its cornmitment to negotiations, such as evidenced in the March 1992 referen-
dum.'14 In response, Boutros-Ghali stated "that he was willing to assist in trying to find a solu-
tion to the problems", but also indicated that he had lost some of his faith in Pretoria due to its 
handling of the violence: "The question that comes to mind is how it is possible that with all 
its infrastructure and means, the SA Government is still unable to cope with such acts of vio-
lence after two years. This leads to possible international perceptions that there is something 
fishy going on".'" In contrast, Babangida confirmed his support for de Klerk: "Nigeria will 
continue to talk to its brothers to encourage them to negotiate. The position of President de 
Klerk is appreciated and there is faith in his sincerity".216 
We now return to the OAU Heads of State and Government meeting in Dakar, to assess 
the success of both the ANC's and Pretoria's endeavours in securing African diplomatic sup-
port. In fact, the outcome of the OAU Summit revealed whether or not de Klerk's New Di-
plomacy in Africa had been effective. While we do not know what position the Nigerian 
President took in Dakar, the ANC's networking in Africa had evidently found acceptance by 
the majority of states as the draft resolution prepared by the Conference of Ministers was 
212 Letter from Pik Botha to Ike Nwachukwu, Pretoria, 26 June 1992, pp.2, 7 (DFA, 1/129/3, Vol. 23). 
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adopted by the heads of state and government.217 In addition, on 2 July 1992 and on behalf of 
the African Group, Madagascar formally requested a special meeting of the UN Security 
Council to discuss the Dakar resolution.2I ' While to date, Pretoria's initiatives in Africa had 
not produced any substantial diplomatic achievements, its fairly intensive contact with Abuja 
bore some fruit in the context of the Security Council debates on 15/16 July. Notably, a com-
parison between the OAU draft resolution and what eventually became Security Council 
Resolution 765, shows that the sections in which Pretoria was accused of being responsible 
for the violence and the Boipatong massacre were either strongly toned down or deleted in 
their entirety.'19 Crucially, according to the both well-informed magazines, Africa Confiden-
tial and SouthScan, these alterations were due to the lobbying of both Pretoria's newly-gained 
and old friends, Nigeria and Great Britain.220 The consequences of the Security Council meet-
ings of 15/16 July were significant for South Africa's subsequent political development. Most 
importantly, Resolution 765 requested the UN Secretary General to send an envoy to investi-
gate the situation in South Africa. Boutros-Ghali chose Cyrus Vance,'" the former US Secre-
tary of State (1977-80) who also acted as Boutros-Ghali's personal envoy to other crisis areas 
of the world during 1991192, namely Yugoslavia and Nagorno-Karabakh.222 From 22 to 31 
July, Vance consulted with the relevant parties and groups involved in South Africa's political 
transition process. Based on his findings, Boutros-Ghali submitted a report to the Security 
Council. The discussion of this document on 17 August led to Resolution 772 that stipulated 
the creation of a UN Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) and based on which fifty 
observers were deployed to South Africa in early September.22l 
Thus, in analysing the developments after the Boipatong massacre, the ANC's strategy of 
capitalising on this event can be considered as successful. It managed to raise the necessary 
African diplomatic support to re-establish international pressure on Pretoria. With the pres-
217 Chabbra. 1997. South African Foreign Policy, pp.47f.; Shabazz. 1992. Report on the OAU Dakar, Senegal 
Summit Conference, p.21; West Africa 3903, 6-12 July 1992: 1134. 
218 UN document S/24232 (2 July 1992). 
219 See the OAU draft resolution (UN document S/24232, 2 July 1992, pp.2f.) and SlRES1765 (16 July 1992). 
220 Africa Confidential 33, 10, 19 June 1992: 21f.; 33 , 14, 17 July 1992: I; SouthScan 7, 22, 5 June 1992: 162; 
7,28,17 July 1992: 209. 
221 UN documents S/PV.3095 and 3096 (15 and 16 July 1992), SlRES1765 (16 July), S/243 14 (20 July 1992). 
222 On Vance, see Who 's Who in America, 1998, p.4422. 
22J UN documents SIPV.3107 (17 August), SIRESI772 (17 August), S/24541 (10 September 1992). See Ai-
cardi de Saint-Paul, Marc. 1996. Les Nations Unies et I' Afrique du Sud, Afrique contemporaine 180: 224f. ; 
Boutros-Ghali. 1994. Introduction, pp.104-107; Cassette, Jacqueline. 1993. United Nations Observer Mission in 
South Africa: A Significant Event, South African Yearbook of International Law, 1992193 18: 1-23; Guelke, 
Adrian Blanchard. 1994. The Development of External Mediation, in John D. Brewer, ed. Restructuring South 
Africa. New York: St. Martin's Press: 137-142; Ndulo, Muna B. 1995. United Nations Observer Mission in 
South Africa (UNOMSA): Security Council Resolutions 772 (1992) and 894 (1994) and the South African Tran-
sition: Preventive Diplomacy and Peacekeeping, African Yearbook of International Law 3: 205-238. 
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ence of UNOMSA in the country, the ANC had won some assurance that the South African 
government could no longer sabotage the negotiation process, such as Mandela had accused 
de Klerk of doing after the Boipatong massacre. Between 1990 and 1992, the South African 
government had accepted international fact finding missions from Amnesty International, the 
International Cornmission of Jurists and even the OAU,2" but the deployment of a permanent 
international observer mission was altogether a different matter. Pretoria considered this as 
external interference in its domestic affairs, something that it had always resisted. As late as 
23 April 1992, President de Klerk stated: "South Africa is a sovereign state C ... ). Demands for 
international involvement C ... ) are C ... ) rejected by the government".22S Therefore, the direct 
involvement of the international community in the South African transition process repre-
sented a major victory for the ANC. At the same time, it was a defeat for de Klerk, because he 
could no longer procrastinate on rapid political change, as he had previously done, in his at-
tempt to secure as many concessions as possible for the white minority. Unnoticed by the 
general public at the time and despite the public hostility between the South African govern-
ment and the ANC after the Boipatong massacre, their chief negotiators, Roelf Meyer and 
Cyril Ramaphosa respectively, met behind the scenes to work out a deal acceptable to both 
parties. The result of this process was the signing of the Record of Understanding on 26 Sep-
tember 1992.226 This put an end to the antagonism that had so far characterised the relation-
ship between the government and the ANC. Consequently, the Multiparty Negotiation Proc-
ess proceeded unhindered until December 1993, even though the violence continued, and 
South Africa's first democratic elections were finally held from 26 to 29 April 1994. 
We do not need to examine the above-mentioned developments more closely, given that 
the African continental dimension no longer played a significant role in the negotiations. The 
days of soliciting their support were over. In particular, the DFA files for those twelve coun-
tries where access was granted until September 1993 or beyond do not record any relevant 
interaction post-Boipatong. Judging from secondary sources, the remaining months of white 
rule became something of a handing over period. In fact, and similar to the behind-the-scene 
talks between the negotiators of both the ANC and the government after the Boipatong mas-
sacre, a degree of co-operation also appears to have taken place between officials from the 
224 Kempton, Daniel Robert, Lebona Mosia. 1992. The International Community in South Africa's Transition 
to Non-racial Democracy, International Affairs Bulletin 16,2: 16; Africa Research Bulletin: Political Series 29, 
5, 1-31 May 1992: 10564; Facts and Reports 22, J, 15 May 1992: 2; West Africa 3896, 18-24 May 1992: 853. 
m The Guardian 24 April 1992. On Pretoria's stance, see Heunis, Jan Christiaan. 1986. United Nations Ver-
sus South Africa: A Legal Assessment of United Nations and United Nations Related Activities in Respect of 
South Africa. Johannesburg: Lex Patria: 260-293. At the time, Heunis was Minister for Constitutional Develop-
ment and Planning. 
226 WaIdmeir. 1997. Anatomy of a Miracle, pp.207-218. 
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Department of Foreign Affairs and the ANC's Department of International Affairs.'" Most 
notably, when interviewed in 1999, Pik Botha confirmed suggestions made in the secondary 
literature that his department had funded several of Nelson Mandela's overseas trips?" 
Thus, the developments after June 1992 put a definitive end to de Klerk's ambition of 
gaining recognition for his reforms among the African community of states. In spite of all the 
undertakings from the Pretoria government to this effect, white South Africa could never find 
acceptance as a fellow African state until the country' s majority had been given the vote. This 
fundamental reality was the underlying cause for the renewed African diplomatic activity in 
the wake of the Boipatong massacre. De Klerk' s New Diplomacy approach towards Africa 
had brought about some concrete results, particularly overflying and landing rights for South 
African Airways, the establishment of missions in Madagascar and Togo, diplomatic support 
from Cameroon in the forum of the FAO and notable meetings with the presidents of Kenya 
and Nigeria. However, and similar to Vorster's breakthroughs with his visits to the Ivory 
Coast and Liberia in 1974 and 1975 respectively, these were not substantial enough and more 
than thirty African states would not relinquish their anti-apartheid stand. Despite Nigeria's 
positive stance towards Pretoria during the UN Security Council meetings of 15/16 July 1992, 
the supportive role of the African community of states towards the ANC persisted. On 10 
May 1994, Nelson Mandela was sworn in as South Africa' s President, so terminating the last 
outpost of white minority rule on the African continent and subsequently putting South Af-
rica' s foreign relations with Africa on a sound basis. 
227 Alden, Chris. 1993. From Liberation Movement to Political Party: ANC Foreign Policy in Transition, 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Conclusion 
An examination of South Africa's foreign relations with the black African states beyond 
southern Africa constitutes the focus of this thesis. These relations took place within a frame-
work chartered by Pretoria's apartheid policy and the fundamental opposition to this ideology 
by African states. Consequently, although South Africa considered itself as an African state, 
the Organisation of African Unity could and did not grant South Africa membership. 
This study is written in an academic register called Diplomatic History. Most studies on 
the country's foreign relations are, in fact, a form of Diplomatic History, but these are seldom 
based on primary sources, notwithstanding that archival sources constitute a fundamental 
element of this academic discipline. However, in this work we had the advantage of access to 
different archives in South Africa, with the material from the Department of Foreign Affairs 
providing the core. In addition, we interviewed a number of people, former foreign service 
officials in particular, that were of relevance in shaping South Africa's foreign relations with 
Africa. At the same time, in the Introduction, we discussed the limitations of Diplomatic or 
other History in objectively uncovering the past and suggested the importance of using con-
cepts provided by other disciplines, like Political Science and its derivative, International Re-
lations, to explain developments in diplomatic history. In particular, and borrowing from the 
Political Science theory, both Chapters I and 2 noted that South Africa's foreign relations 
with the black African countries were the expression of Pretoria' s foreign policy-making pro-
cesses which are shaped by both domestic and external factors. Drawing from the study ofIR, 
we also suggested that South Africa had a higher socio-economic development and disposed 
of greater politico-military strength than the other African states. This inequality in status 
constituted an inherent factor in the Republic's interaction with these states. In ac-
knowledging the importance of both the Political Science and IR concepts for an understand-
ing of the evolution of South Africa' s foreign relations in this study, we will presently turn to 
discuss their relevance and how they impacted on the course of events. In doing so, we stipu-
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late that they are of such importance that South Africa's early post-apartheid foreign policy 
making was marked by continuity rather than change, as argued by Peter Vale in 1995. 1 
In both the Introduction and in Chapter 2, we proposed that South Africa's foreign policy 
towards black Africa resulted from an interplay of domestic, regional, continental and interna-
tional environments. The focus in this thesis is the first, since we stated at the outset of this 
study that our principal interest was the domestic perspective. We now discuss the role of 
both the state and non-state actors within the country; this distinction was introduced in Chap-
ter 2, called South Africa's Foreign Policy System. Regarding the state actors, we have ar-
gued throughout that competition and rivalry, but also a degree of co-operation, prevailed 
between the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Information, the military and national intel-
ligence. This intermittent conflict and co-operation gives credence to both the bureaucratic 
politics and the psychological models, which draw from the bureaucratic theory on foreign 
policy making and which are outlined in Chapter 2. These theories suggest that govemments 
are not homogeneous entities but, rather, involve departments and individuals that compete 
against one another, at certain times, and collaborate at others. Their goal is to gain maximum 
influence in charting the direction of a country's foreign policy. Our immediate task here is to 
explore how these different agencies fared over time, and for this purpose we begin with the 
Department of Foreign Affairs, the supposedly predominant foreign policy actor. 
Over time, this department was relegated to the background, notwithstanding an attempt to 
prevent such an outcome through the launching of an Interdepartmental Committee on Afri-
can Affairs in late 1954 (Chapter 2). Although intended to overcome bureaucratic tussles, this 
never functioned because the other departments were not prepared to relinquish their inde-
pendent axis to decision-making. Consequently, South Africa's foreign policy towards Afri-
can states in the early 1960s appears to be the only period during which the DFA was unri-
valled in conducting Pretoria's foreign policy. Certainly, officials from this ministry were not 
exposed to discernible bureaucratic competition in their later contact with the Central African 
Republic, Liberia, Malawi and Madagascar (Chapters 4 and 5). However, and this is a core 
finding of the study, they were never the sole players in the African countries to which this 
work has directed its attention. One reason for this was the stronger position, which will be 
discussed below, held by either the military, national intelligence or the Department of Infor-
mation. Above all, the Department of Foreign Affairs ' central approach in providing technical 
assistance and support for development/investment projects was not helpful in achieving the 
1 Vale, Peter. 1995. Continuity Rather than Change: South Africa ' s 'New' Foreign Policy, Indicator SA 12, 
3: 79-84. 
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Nationalist government's principal goal of breaking South Africa's isolation through greater 
acceptance by African states. This weakened the position of the DFA in the decision-making 
process, and made it vulnerable to interference from sister departments. 
The DFA's policy of applying the levers of both technical assistance and develop-
ment/investment projects had its roots in the 1950s, when South Africa participated in conti-
nent-wide organisations that focused on technical forms of co-operation. However, during the 
course of the 1960s, the independent African states gradually excluded South Africa from 
these bodies, despite its continued willingness to make a contribution. From the mid-1960s, 
we discerned that the foreign affairs ministry shifted from this multilateral approach, hoping 
to co-opt support by providing the same assistance on a bilateral basis. However, this strategy 
was not significant enough to convince targeted African leaders to establish relations with 
Pretoria. The attempt by the DFA to secure the support of Gabon's President Omar Bongo 
illustrates the unsuitability of a bilateral strategy based on technical assistance. Launching the 
OGAPROV agricultural project in Bongo's home area, notwithstanding Gabon's dire lack of 
meat production, proved ineffectual. In spite of attracting some of his attention, as we saw in 
Chapters 4 and 5, this president was far more interested in engaging with South Africa's mili-
tary because they could provide arms. As a result, on the 101 anti-apartheid sanctions resolu-
tions voted on by the United Nations General Assembly between 1962 and 1989, the Ga-
bonese Permanent Representative abstained only six times, giving his approval in all other 
instances.' A similar situation prevailed on the Comoros during the 1980s, where the DFA's 
participation in the Sangani farm project did not result in diplomatic recognition (Chapters 5 
and 6) or other forms of diplomatic support. Similarly, even though not constituting technical 
assistance per se, the DFA's offer of drought relief to both Somalia and Sudan in the mid-
1980s was seen as a friendly gesture by both Mogadishu and Khartoum respectively, but this 
did not marry with their immediate interests, obtaining weapons (Chapter 5). The depart-
ment's only engagement that we could judge as worthwhile was the upgrading and mainte-
nance of the airport on Cape Verde, in return for which South African Airways obtained land-
ing rights on the island (Chapter 4). 
An equally sobering conclusion must be drawn from the DF A's development/investment 
projects that differed from technical assistance insofar as it also involved private and parasta-
tal companies. The expertise of both South Africa's financial and industrial sector, and the 
growth of the country's economy during the 1960s and 1970s, afforded the DFA the ideal 
platform to engage with private and parastatal firms in developing partnerships. Here, too, the 
'Pfister. 1992. United Nations Sanctions against Apartheid, Appendix. 
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department favoured initiatives that were close to the heart of the targeted African leader. This 
was the case with the Lilongwe Capital Project, the Transgabonais railway and the Hotel In-
tercontinental Bokassa in the Central African Republic (Chapter 4). While eager to secure 
South Africa's participation, many African leaders exploited the DFA's sometimes desperate 
attempt to gain a foothold in black Africa. The only country to exchange ambassadors was 
Malawi in 1967, and the country's voting behaviour at the UN General Assembly was at least 
more supportive of Pretoria than that of Gabon; on the above-mentioned 101 anti-apartheid 
sanctions resolutions voted on between 1962 and 1989, Malawi cast a no-vote three times, 
abstained seventy times, while approving in twenty-eight instances.' Yet, on close inspection, 
this was a relatively unimportant country. When asked, in 1999, about this dearth of concrete 
results from the policy, Neil van Heerden downplayed disappointment: 
The need to break the isolation was quite a strong mental thing, to say 'here I am, in Ga-
bon'. ( ... ) It actually didn't always make economic sense. ( ... ) It was a thing of breaking 
the isolation. We certainly didn ' t get a regular return for the money, but this was as one 
would say in the Bible: it is bread on the water. You are putting the bread on the water 
and you are hoping that it will ( ... ) [be) an investment for the future. And you know full 
well that you would not get a one-to-one return.' 
The main purpose of these projects, then, according to the same former top foreign service 
official, was the provision of what he called "appetisers",' to promote South African accep-
tance among the African community of states· 
Pretoria's increased focus on southern Africa and South Africa's declining economic per-
formance in the 1980s aside, the ineffectiveness of the DFA's Africa approach caused the 
govemment of P.W. Botha to curtail both technical assistance and development/investment 
projects; this was shown in Chapter 5. In addition, the phllosophy behind the department's 
policy towards Africa underwent a change as the decade matured. Until the mid-1980s, inter-
national development assistance followed a Cold War logic; Third World countries received 
support from either the East or the West, primarily depending on their political ideologies and 
often without providing deep or even material returns. This changed with the end of the Cold 
War; development and technical assistance became increasingly linked to specific demands 
by the donor country. This applied to South Africa's assistance to African countries, too. Dur-
ing President F.W. de Klerk' s tenure, Pretoria used a lever that rested on reciprocal and mutu-
ally beneficial trade relations. Under the emerging circumstances of Africa's increasing eco-
' Pfister. 1992. United Nations Sanctions against Apartheid, Appendix. 
'Interview with Neil van Heerden, 7 April 1999. 
' Interview with Neil van Heerden, 7 April 1999. 
6 Interview with Paul Runge, 7 April 1999. 
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nomic marginalisation, these trade relations rendered the Republic an attractive partner for 
African states. In return, SAA obtained landing and overflying rights in several African coun-
tries and Pretoria was able to establish wider political contacts (Chapter 6). The Africa policy 
of the Department of Foreign Affairs thus took on a new and promising form towards the end 
of the period under review in this study. Previous efforts, however, resulted in rival govern-
ment departments challenging the DF A's dominance in foreign policy making. This had the 
effect of channelling Pretoria's foreign relations in different directions, developments we now 
tum to discuss. 
The military, through the South African Defence Force, was, after P.W. Botha became the 
assertive Minister of Defence in 1966, the primary actor to invade the DFA's domain. Later 
as Prime Minister and then as State President, Botha was influenced by the military, whose 
approach to diplomacy in Africa remained constant throughout the period under review. The 
principal aim of the military was not to end South Africa's isolation, but, guided by the realist 
interpretations of the world, to ensure the security of the white South Africa. This was mir-
rored in the military's initiatives in black Africa, where we have identified two chronological 
phases, one from the early 1960s to roughly the mid-I 970s, and the second period which fol-
lowed. During the first phase, the military's view corresponded with the ideas expressed in 
the Africa Charter of 1949, namely that South Africa would co-operate with the colonial 
powers to maintain Western control over Africa and to defend the continent against commu-
nism. The diplomatic historian Geoff Berridge makes the point repeatedly in his work on this 
subject.' The military's initial ambition to playa continental role was detected in the Congo 
crisis, when they provided, alongside the United States, assistance to western-oriented Katan-
gese Prime Minister Moise Tshombe (Chapter 3). In addition, as we have seen, the military 
gave at least tacit approval to a South African mercenary force because of their own limited 
capacity to participate in the unfolding war in the Congo. This situation began to change from 
1963 onwards, when France became South Africa' s main armaments supplier, seen in Chapter 
4; this strengthened the SADF's position in both domestic and foreign policy making. The 
fruitful bilateral relations between Paris and Pretoria were complimented, after P.W. Botha 
had become the Minister of Defence, by a working relationship over Francophone Africa. 
With strong networks deep into the continent, two French officials, Jacques Foccart and Jean 
Mauricheau-Beaupre, provided the South African military with direct access to two key lead-
ers, Presidents Bongo of Gabon and Felix Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast. Linked by 
overlapping interests in the Nigerian Civil War, France and South Africa, together with both 
' Berridge. 1992. South Africa, the Colonial Powers and "African Defence". 
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Gabon and the Ivory Coast, jointly provided military assistance to the Biafra secessionists. 
This represented the high point of Franco-white South African co-operation in African poli-
tics and diplomacy. South Africa's interests aimed at creating a military network with the po-
litically stable and anticommunist African states, preferably with French and pre-
revolutionary Portuguese support. This was confirmed in an interview with the military's rep-
resentative in Paris during the Nigerian Civil War, Neels van Tonder.' So, in September 1970, 
Prime Minister John Vorster offered to conclude non-aggression pacts with the independent 
African countries! Yet, changes in the international, regional and domestic environments in 
the mid-1970s undermined the military's plans. For one thing, Foccart left office in 1974 and 
Mauricheau-Beaupre also disappeared from the French foreign policy making circles, thus 
ending the military' s crucial links with Paris and their African clients. Second, the Lisbon 
coup of April 1974 and the impending independence of both Angola and Mozambique re-
moved Pretoria's cordon sanitaire; this compelled the military to concentrate on safeguarding 
South Africa's national security in its immediate neighbourhood, subsequently pursuing what 
became known as the Total Strategy. Finally, the Department of Information, in conjunction 
with the Bureau for State Security, became Pretoria's primary foreign policy actor, replacing 
the Department of Foreign Affairs. To this direction in the making of South Africa's foreign 
policy we now tum our attention. 
The privileging of both the Department of Information and the Bureau for State Security 
during John Vorster' s premiership followed upon the strong ties between Information Secre-
tary Eschel Rhoodie and BOSS head Hendrik van den Bergh, as well as the latter' s long-
standing and personal friendship with Vorster (Chapter 4). This particular access ensured that 
large budgets were put at the disposal of the Department of Information in order to launch 
what we have called Secret Diplomacy. This strategy to ending South Africa's isolation is 
best characterised as a "middle way" between the conventional diplomacy of the DF A, and 
the military's perspective which relied both on arms sales and close contacts with select coun-
tries. Information Minister Connie Mulder and his colleagues conducted then a "marketing 
foreign policy", to capture a phrase recently used by the young South African IR scholar Janis 
van der Westhuizen: "The concept of marketing power echoes many tenets familiar to stu-
dents of IR theory, but is ultimately too eclectic to firmly reside in anyone of the traditional 
paradigms. Although it rejects Realism's impoverished conception of power, marketing 
power redirects attention to the primacy of the state as a repository of a particular form of 
'Telephone interview with Neels van Tonder, 19 March 2002. 
9 Guelke. 1972. South African Foreign Policy in Africa, pp.271 f. 
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power".10 Van der Westhuizen suggests further that "[sJuccessful deployment of marketing 
power usually coincides with a well consolidated sense of national identity of which the USA, 
despite its overwhelming structural power, is probably the most celebrated example"." Sig-
nificantly, as outlined in Chapter 4, Eschel Rhoodie' s experience in the United States was an 
important contributing factor that led to the Department of Information's Secret Diplomacy; 
an approach to diplomacy that was supported by a net of verligte Afrikaner whose aim was to 
ensure the survival of the minority. A cornerstone of this approach in Africa, as well as else-
where, was to sell the concept of separate development as Pretoria's intention of reforming 
the apartheid policy. In comparison to the DFA's initiatives in securing breakthroughs to Af-
rica, the Department ofInformation's strategy proved to be more successful. Although bene-
fiting from the SADF's co-operation with the Ivory Coast over the Nigerian Civil War, the 
Department of Information managed to independently convince both the Ivorian and Senegal-
ese President that Pretoria wanted to "reform" apartheid. This led eventually to Vorster's visit 
to the Ivory Coast in September 1974 (Chapter 4) and his meeting with that country's presi-
dent, Houphouet-Boigny. This breakthrough into Africa influenced even the policy of the 
rival Department of Foreign Affairs. In particular, in Chapter 4 we discussed the DFA's imita-
tion of Secret Diplomacy which, undoubtedly, contributed to Prime Minister Vorster's meet-
ing with President William Tolbert's in Monrovia in February 1975. In particular, and follow-
ing an invitation from the DF A, the Liberian Ambassador to the UN in Geneva toured both 
Namibia and South Africa in December 1974, and the then homeland leader, Mangosuthu 
Buthelezi, met Tolbert in Liberia later that month. This flexible approach found a parallel 
expression in Transkei leader Kaizer Matanzima' s inclusion in the South African delegation 
to the UN General Assembly in late 1974, a development that the scholar of apartheid's for-
eign policy, Deon Geldenhuys, has called "multiracial diplomacy".12 After more than a decade 
of limited dealings with the independent African states, the DF A appears to have questioned 
its reliance on economic and technical leverage in achieving South Africa's diplomatic goals 
on the continent. 
The Department of Information's work was greatly facilitated by their co-operation with 
the national intelligence agency, BOSS. Charged with intelligence gathering to safeguard 
South Africa's national security, its activities included: monitoring the security situation in 
10 Van der Westhuizen, Janis. 2001. Marketing the 'Rainbow Nation': The Power of the South African Mu-
sic, Film and Sport Industry, in Kevin C. Dunn, Timothy Milton Shaw, eds. Africa's Challenge to International 
Relations Theory. New York: Palgrave: 70. 
I I Van der Westhuizen. 2001. Marketing the 'Rainbow Nation', p.70. 
12 Geldenhuys. 1984. The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.105. 
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the western Indian Ocean after the closure of the Suez Canal; securing South Africa's access 
to oil from Nigeria, for example; obtaining SAA's overflying rights in African countries; and 
arranging the security for high-level visits, such as that ofVorster to both the Ivory Coast and 
to Liberia (Chapters 4 and 5). Although not primarily briefed to break South Africa's interna-
tional isolation, some of BOSS's activities, of which the issue of overflying rights is a good 
example, coincided with Pretoria's primary foreign policy goals. BOSS's concern with South 
Africa's national security, coupled with the endeavours of its partner, the Department of In-
formation, in improving South Africa's public international standing, formed Pretoria's re-
sponse to the then current issues in the country's Africa policy. Complementing each other, 
the Department of Information was active in both the Ivory Coast and Senegal, while BOSS 
pursued the Detente objectives in southern Africa (Chapter 4). However, after the collapse of 
Portuguese colonialism, and the collapse of the cordon sanitaire around South Africa, the 
regional policy goals of national intelligence clashed with those of the military. The central 
point of division was how best to ensure white South Africa's immediate security following 
upon the establishment of Marxist governments in the neighbouring states of Angola and Mo-
zambique. The approach towards Angola was most controversial, with BOSS opting for indi-
rect support to the western-oriented and American-supported Angolan liberation movements 
through Zaire, whereas the military preferred direct military intervention. This struggle 
brought to a head the long-standing conflict between these two government agencies, personi-
fied by Hendrik van den Bergh and P.W. Botha respectively. In October 1975, the military 
succeeded in convincing Prime Minister Vorster of the necessity to deploy troops and thus 
won an important battle against BOSS (Chapter 4). But the invasion ended with a defeat and 
the troops were forced to withdraw, humiliated, from Angola in early 1976. The struggle for 
policy ascendancy between the military and national intelligence was not over, however. Its 
final showdown came after Vorster's resignation from the premiership in 1978. The principal 
contenders for succession were Information Minister Connie Mulder and Defence Minister 
P.W. Botha who, after Mulder was discredited as a result of the Information Scandal, became 
the country' s Prime Minister. This had long-term implications for Pretoria's foreign policy 
towards Africa because the military, in co-operation with national intelligence, became the 
dominant actor during the 1980s. The Department of Foreign Affairs was pushed deeper into 
the background, and it is to this period that we now tum. 
Following the demise of the Bureau for State Security in the wake of the Information 
Scandal, the national intelligence agency became the Department of National Security from 
1978 to 1980. During a transition period of two years, Kobie Coetsee, this department's Dep-
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uty Minister, restructured the national intelligence agency, eventually becoming the National 
Intelligence Service. Coetsee was also instrumental in influencing P.W. Botha to appoint Niel 
Barnard, a Professor in Political Science at the then University of the Orange Free State, as 
the NIS Director-General in November 1979, developments we explained in Chapter 2. Im-
portantly, Barnard shared P.W. Botha's politico-ideological views of the South African secu-
rity situation. Consequently, Barnard's appointment prevented confrontation between the 
military and national intelligence, as had surfaced in the Angolan war in 1975, and on a per-
sonal level between van den Bergh and the then Minister of Defence (Chapter 4). In conse-
quence, Chapter 5 documents close co-operation between the NIS and the military during the 
1980s. Following the collapse of the cordon sanitaire, and especially after Zimbabwe's inde-
pendence in 1980, the military's priority turned to southern Africa, with ventures beyond con-
centrating on four items: co-operation with Omar Bongo of Gabon; relations with the French 
mercenary Bob Denard; armament sales; and the presence in the western Indian Ocean which 
was seen, by some, as confirming the threat that the country faced from the Soviet Union. In 
these endeavours, both the military and national intelligence benefited from Cold War tension 
between Washington and Moscow. In many cases, but certainly not all, Pretoria could count 
on backing from the United States. Measured against its own goals, the military probably pur-
sued the most successful approach towards the black African countries beyond southern Af-
rica. In particular, and in stark contrast to the Department of Foreign Affairs, they secured 
themselves a stable partner in President Bongo. With the end of the Cold War, however, the 
military's dominance in foreign policy making waned, because their realist policies of power 
and the use of force were no longer found to be suitable to resolve the problems faced by 
South Africa's foreign policy makers. This development took place gradually. As a remainder 
of the military's dominance in the 1980s, and owing to the strong position established under 
P.W. Botha, the NIS retained its influence in contact with both Uganda and Nigeria into 1992. 
Nevertheless, the Department of Foreign Affairs steadily rose in prominence from the late 
1980s. This trend was further facilitated by the brief, but busy, presidency ofF.W. de Klerk, 
who preferred to rely on the advice of the foreign service corps, as explained in Chapter 6. 
This concludes our discussion of the policies of the different state actors and how changes in 
power relations between them affected the course of developments regarding South Africa's 
foreign relations with the black African states. But as we have seen, different non-state actors 
also played a role, and it is to these non-state actors that we now turn our attention. 
In Chapter 2, Table I on page twenty-two presents an overview of the players in which we 
are interested. First, however, a warning: as in all foreign policy processes, the Prime Minis-
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ter/State President and the government agencies formed the core of decision-making in South 
Africa. Non-state actors played only a peripheral role. Their relevance, which was most 
marked during the 1970s, waxed and waned. For the purposes of this discussion, it seems ap-
propriate to form four clusters, namely the Progressive Party and the Rand Daily Mail, the 
think tanks Africa Institute and South African Institute of International Affairs, the Broeder-
bond, and the business sector. 
The Progressive Party and the Rand Daily Mail, as wel1 as their progeny, shared a critical 
stance towards Pretoria's policies in general, including its foreign relations with Africa; this 
was shown in Chapters 4 to 6. With regard to the Progressive Party, its activities and interests 
in Africa were an expression of concern over South Africa's increased isolation. Colin Eglin, 
the party's leader from 1971 to 1978, and again between 1986 and 1988, went to several Afri-
can countries during the 1970s to offset the impression that all white South Africans sup-
ported apartheid. At the same time, his meetings with the relevant leaders were meant to 
strengthen the party' s political profile (Chapter 2). Eglin' s excursions drew, on occasion, 
somewhat heavy criticism from the country's minority leadership, as shown in Chapter 4. A 
further indication that Pretoria regarded Eglin as a serious player in politics, the South African 
government, through its network with France, ensured that both Eglin and Helen Suzman 
could not, as was intended, meet the Ivorian President in 1972 and thus intrude its worthwhile 
relations with Houphouet-Boigny (Chapter 4). During the leadership of Frederik van Zyl 
Siabbert until February 1986, we detected no comparable Africa activities by the Progres-
sives. As we discussed in Chapter 2, Siabbert came from the academia and never became a 
party-man. He withdrew from party politics during the internal crisis of the mid-1980s, feel-
ing that extra-parliamentary activities were more conducive to overcoming the apartheid sys-
tem. As the Director of the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa, he organ-
ised the Dakar meeting between members of the ANC and the Afrikaner intel1igentsia in 
1987, which is seen as a seminally important event that contributed towards the abolition of 
apartheid (Chapter 5). In this sense, Siabbert impacted significantly on the country's political 
development. The Rand Daily Mail also represented a critical voice towards Pretoria and ex-
posed developments within the country. It was the first newspaper to suggest that Vorster had 
gone to the Ivory Coast in 1974 (Chapter 4) and its reports led to the Information Scandal that 
eventually caused the Prime Minister's fall from power (Chapter 2). It also exposed the finan-
cial wastage in development/investment projects in the Central African Republic (Chapter 5). 
Later on, and following in the footsteps of the Rand Daily Mail, The Weekly Mail and then 
The Weekly Mail & Guardian revealed the military' s secret project in Gabon (Chapter 5) and 
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was responsible for uncovering what became Inkathagate in July 1991 (Chapter 6). The latter 
scandal seriously questioned President de Klerk' s commitment to peaceful negotiations with 
the ANC, undermining the National Party's international standing, and weakening its negotia-
tion position. Thus, both the Information Scandal and Inkathagate significantly changed the 
course of South African political developments. 
In turning to the role of both the Africa Institute and the South African Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs, the findings of this study on their activities justify us to consider them as think 
tanks, as defined in Chapter 2. Most notably, we recall that they are "relatively autonomous 
organizations engaged in the research and analysis of contemporary issues independently of 
government, political parties, and pressure groups".l3 Researchers from both the Africa Insti-
tute and the South African Institute of International Affairs published a number of studies on 
Pretoria's foreign relations with the African states beyond southern Africa. Most of this work 
on dates from the period between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s, much of which is in-
cluded in this study (Chapter 4), reflecting the peak in the government's outreach activity to-
wards these countries during the Vorster premiership. It may well be that they have added "to 
the wisdom of the attentive publics, diplomats and policy-makers", such as suggested in a 
forthcoming study on the role of institutes of international affairs, among them that of South 
Africa. I ' We only traced one instance in which one of the think tanks, namely the Africa Insti-
tute, was crossing the border of being solely "engaged in the research and analysis of contem-
porary issues independently of government", according to the above definition. Reference is 
made to the visit of both Africa Institute Director Joseph Moolman and Deputy Director Erich 
Leistner, who were joined by the Director of the South African Institute of International Af-
fairs , John Barratt, to both Senegal and the Ivory Coast in August 1974. Chapter 4 details that 
in this instance, and due to concurring politico-ideological views on the issue of separate de-
velopment, the Africa Institute members, and especially Moolman, were drawn into the policy 
network supportive of the Department of Information' s Secret Diplomacy, while Barratt's 
Institute retained its non-partisan character. A different assessment would have to be made of 
the Foreign Affairs Association and the Southern African Freedom Foundation. Founded and 
funded by the Department of Information, they were strongly supportive of both Secret Di-
plomacy and Detente. We do not discuss them here, however, because their status does not 
correspond to the notion of think tanks introduced above. 
l3 Stone. 2001. Think Tanks, p.15668. 
I' Pannar, Inderjee!. 2004. Institutes of International Affairs: Their Roles in Foreign Policy-Making, Opinion 
Mobilisation and Unofficial Diplomacy, in Diane Stone, Andrew Denham, Mark Garnett, eds. Think Tank Tradi-
tions: Policy Analysis Across Nations. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
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This work has certainly benefited significantly from Paul Williams'" recent thesis in out-
lining the profile of the Broederbond (Chapter 2), but to gauging its impact on Pretoria's Af-
rica relations from the DF A files is difficult. What we can conclude is that the Broederbond 
did not try to directly influence the Pretoria government regarding foreign policy making to-
wards the black African states. Instead, personal contact and informal networking influenced 
political decisions. Importantly, as indicated in Chapter 2, almost all Cabinet Ministers in the 
period under review were members of the Broederbond and thus shared its set of values. Im-
portant among these was the acceptance of the idea of white supremacy. This factor, it can be 
suggested, underpinned the approach of Pretoria's leadership towards Africa. The clearest 
evidence of the Broederbond' s indirect influence on Pretoria's foreign policy can be traced 
during the Detente period, when it constituted a core element of the policy network that pro-
moted this strategy. However, after the failure of Detente and P.W. Botha's rise to Prime 
Minister, the Broederbond's standing decreased, only to increase in status under de Klerk, 
who, in his autobiography, suggests that the organisation's views supported his move to un-
dertake the reforms of February 1990 (Chapter 2). This indicates that the Broederbond's 
thinking had changed during the 1980s. It now considered the continued suppression of the 
majority as detrimental to the aim of securing the survival of the minority, because this policy 
continuously severed the country's political and economic position. Consequently, the 
Broederbond viewed political reforms to be more conducive to ensure the minority's security. 
Our attention now turns to the final non-state actor which has engaged our interest, the 
business sector. In the context of South Africa's foreign relations with black Africa, it came 
close to the political locus of decision-making. In discussing its significance, we will further 
reply to two questions initially raised in Chapter 2, notably the relationship between business 
and apartheid politics, and the division between Afrikaner and English-speaking business. 
Concerning the latter, this study suggests that their importance varied significantly; English-
speaking business featured dominantly within Pretoria's approach towards the black African 
states, while the Afrikaner counterpart played a negligible role. On the part of organised busi-
ness, the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut undertook one sole independent venture to Africa be-
yond the immediate neighbourhood, namely to Malawi in 1969, while the Durban Chamber of 
Commerce dispatched five business missions between 1968 and 1979 (Chapter 4). The South 
African Foreign Trade Organisation and the South Africa Foundation, on the other hand, were 
very active, comparatively speaking, in Africa. Although not purely English-speaking institu-
tions, both had a strong basis in this business sector. Aside from the Afrikaner's limited in-
IS Williams. 2001. Intellectuals and the End of Apartheid, pp.86-1 17. 
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volvement, generally, in doing business, South Africa's foreign service officers seemed more 
at ease with English-speaking business. Significantly, and supporting this conclusion, the only 
significant engagement of private Afrikaner capital dates from the period during which the 
Department of Information and the Bureau for State Security dominated foreign policy mak-
ing. As we noted in Chapter 4, the fertiliser king Louis Luy! became part of their policy net-
work, while Bessemer Steel, owned by influential Afrikaner businessman Paul Hoogendyk, 
showed an interest in a project in Zaire in 1975. In contrast, English-speaking private firms 
were crucial in the development of the DF A's development/investment projects, especially 
during the Outward-Looking period of the 1970s. Here, two engineering and construction 
companies stand out: Roberts Construction was involved or showed interest in major railway 
line projects in Malawi (1970), Gabon (1973), the C.A.R. (1974) and Zaire (1975), while 
LTA was intimately connected to the housing and hotel projects in Gabon (1971-72) and the 
C.A.R. (1974), as well as the Zairean railway project (1975) (Chapter 4). 
Although both were representatives of English-speaking business, Southern Sun and Sol 
Kerzner's other hotel firms, as well as the Anglo American Corporation, must be viewed as 
cases apart. Southern Sun became part of the DF A's development/investment project ap-
proach with a hotel on Madagascar (1970-72) and Mauritius (1974-75) (Chapter 4). However, 
the principal activity of Kerzner's other hotel groups took place during the 1980s on both 
Mauritius and the Comoros (Chapter 5). These reflected Kerzner's expansionist strategy, we 
have suggested, that was unrelated to the foreign affairs ministry' s current policies, pursuing 
business and not political interests. The Anglo American mining conglomerate played in a 
different league altogether. As a multinational company, it did not need the assistance of the 
Pretoria government in implementing the strategies necessary to achieve its business goals in 
black Africa, although, as we have suggested in Chapter 4, their interests did at times overlap. 
Anglo American' s status more closely resembled that of a foreign policy actor similar in kind 
to national intelligence or the military, in effect a rival to, collaborating with, or acting against 
the foreign service corps. This study does not reveal any clashes of interest between the De-
partment of Foreign Affairs and Anglo American. Regarding collaboration between them, 
relatively minor exchanges with the DFA occurred in the early 1960s over the Congo (Chap-
ter 3), over Madagascar in the late 1960s (Chapter 4) and Somalia during 1984 (Chapter 5). A 
rather close relationship, however, evolved over the SMTF copper project in Zaire during 
1975, where Pretoria' s Detente policy coincided initially with Anglo American's mining in-
terests (Chapter 4). In this context, we recall that Harry Oppenheimer had openly supported 
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Pretoria's southern Africa approach. " Often, however, Anglo American went its own way. 
Notably, the secondary literature mentions mining operations in the C.A.R., in Gabon, in the 
Ivory Coast, in Liberia, Mauritania, Sierra Leone and Tanzania," but the DFA files do not 
contain any information on contact between the mining firm and the foreign affairs ministry 
in these cases. For example in Tanzania, and dating from the late 1950s, De Beers held 50% 
of the shares in the Williamson Diamond Mine,18 an engagement that was possible through 
contact on the highest level, as Anglo American Executive Director Michael Spicer explained 
in 1999: "The Tanzanians, of course, had a very strict policy towards South Africa. And yet, 
De Beers officials went backwards and forwards ( .. . ) with British passports. ( .. . ) And [Tanza-
nia's President] Nyerere and [Harry] Oppenheimer [were] close personal friends".I' Not only 
did Anglo American not require Pretoria to assist them, government involvement might even 
have rendered the multinational ' s efforts more difficult in view of Nyerere 's vehement anti-
apartheid stance. 
Let us now examine the nature of the relationship between the business sector and apart-
heid politics. In doing so, and by acknowledging their leading role, we concentrate on the 
English-speaking firms. In Chapter 2, by examining the hitherto unavailable evidence on 
South Africa's trade with sub-Saharan Africa, we statistically challenged the thesis advanced 
by Timothy Shaw and Roger Southall who explained Pretoria's Outward-Looking Policy in 
Africa as an expression of the country's political economy.20 Empirically, we have demon-
strated that the reverse applied; the Department of Foreign Affairs needed and profited from 
the knowledge and services of the business sector in its efforts to establish diplomatic contact 
with African countries. So much so that the state-controlled Industrial Development Corpora-
tion usually offered loans on soft conditions and the contracted Credit Guarantee Insurance 
Corporation insured the loans with the government's backing. Examples of soft loans were 
the Lilongwe Capital Project, the hotel on Madagascar, as well as the housing projects in the 
C.A.R. and Gabon, while Credit Guarantee insured the loan to finance Malawi's railway link 
16 Mentioned in Chapter 2, referring to 'Oppenheimer on benefits of detente ', Argus 15 May 1975 (ARCA, 
PV.59, File 43/3/ 1); 'Detente a boon [sic] - Oppenheimer', The Star 15 May 1975 (ARCA, PVA51 , File 
1/90/112). 
" Hocking. 1973. Oppenheimer and Son, pp.107, 284-288, 338f. , 407f.; Innes. 1984. Anglo American and 
the Rise oj Modern South AJrica, p.234; Jessup. 1979. Ernest Oppenheimer, p.205; Meinardus. 1980. Die 
AJrikapolitik del' Republik SiidaJrika, pp.360-366; Newbury. 1989. The Diamond Ring, pp.317f., 325, 331 , 358. 
18 Hocking. 1973 . Oppenheimer and Son, pp.2 19-222, 255, 339; Innes. 1984. Anglo American and the Rise oj 
Modern South AJrica, pp.234, 332; Jessup. 1979. Ernest Oppenheimer, pp.221f.; Knight, John, Heather Steven-
son. 1986. Williamson Diamond Mine, De Beers, and the Colonial Office: A Case-study of the Quest for Con-
trol, Journal oJModern AJrican Studies 24, 3: 423-446. 
I' Interview with Michael Spicer, 7 April 1999. 
20 Shaw. 1977. Kenya and South Africa; Southall. 1984. South Africa; Southall. 1999. South Africa in AJrica. 
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with Mozambique, although this involved 60% local content only, and not 70% as stipulated 
in its statutes. The IDC's loan policy and Credit Guarantee's deviation from its practice mir-
rored the importance Pretoria attributed to establishing and promoting diplomatic contact with 
those countries. Political criteria thus overruled the application of business conditions. 
The role of business in maintaining the apartheid system was an issue in the work of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission. However, when considering the forty pages devoted to 
this subject in its final report,'! and comparing them with the close on 2,800 pages in total, 
one cannot escape the impression that the TRC shied away from probing this delicate issue 
too deeply. Nonetheless, the TRC did introduce a helpful threefold classification of business 
culpability with apartheid: 
First order involvement: "Direct involvement with the state in the formulation of oppres-
sive policies or practices that resulted in low labour costs (or otherwise boosted profits) 
can be described as first-order involvement". 
Second order involvement: "However, a distinction needs to be made between those busi-
nesses that made their money by engaging directly in activities that promoted state re-
pression and those whose business dealings could not have been reasonably expected to 
contribute directly or subsequently to repression. Businesses that provided armoured 
vehicles to the police during the mid-1980s would fall into the former category". 
Third order involvement: "Finally, one can categorise third-order involvement as ordinary 
business activities that benefited indirectly by virtue of operating within the racially 
structured context of an apartheid society"." 
Business activities in black Africa may not have directly contributed to the oppression of the 
deprived in South Africa. Nevertheless, this categorisation is of some use to us because the 
participation of the private firms in the development/investment projects discussed in Chapter 
4 aimed at finding diplomatic acceptance by African states, and therefore potentially pro-
longed the apartheid system. While the government was dependent on their technical exper-
tise, the relevant companies benefited financially from these projects, while practically no risk 
was involved, as payment was usually forthcoming from the IDC, insured by Credit Guaran-
tee and reinsured by the Treasury. Without this mechanism, it is doubtful whether the South 
African private sector, with the exception of the powerful Anglo American Corporation, 
would have become engaged to the same extent on the economically unattractive and politi-
cally unstable African market during the days of the Outward-Looking Policy. 
This suggests that all the private companies examined in this study displayed an involve-
ment of the third order in the TRC's taxonomy, as they all profited from this aspect of the 
apartheid policy. Taking into account both the size and the financial value of the projects in 
21 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report. Vol. 4: Institutional and Special Hearings. 
1999. Basingstoke: Macmillan: 18-58. See also Nattrass, Nicoli Jean. 1999. The Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission on Business and Apartheid: A Critical Evaluation, African Affairs 98, 392: 373-391. 
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which they participated, and the close personal contact established with government officials, 
it could be further suggested that the engagement of both LT A and Roberts Construction was 
of the second order. This judgement can also be made on both the Credit Guarantee Insurance 
Corporation and Safmarine with its aviation subsidiary, Safair. The former was the key finan-
cial backer for the development/investment projects and without Credit Guarantee's support, 
the foreign affairs ministry could not have pursued its approach towards African countries. 
Importantly, the managers of this firm were obviously aware of the political connotations of 
their role; in correspondence, Klaus Oppenheimer, General Manager of Credit Guarantee 
from 1956 to 1965, commented on the firm's involvement as outlined in this study: "There is 
no doubt that (especially in later years) the export credit financing facility also played the po-
litical role that you have described"." An equally strong case of economic-cum-political asso-
ciation between private business and Pretoria was displayed in the case of Safrnarine, whose 
different entities were involved in sanctions-busting to their mutual advantage. We stated in 
Chapter 2 that Safmarine's airline subsidiary, Luxavia, circumvented the African overflying 
rights sanctions against South Africa, while Chapter 5 revealed that tankers from Safmarine, 
collaborating with national intelligence, secretly shipped oil from Nigeria to South Africa in 
the late 1970s. In addition, Safair served the military in a crucial manner, circumventing the 
arms embargo by flying armaments from Europe to South Africa via Libreville. On occasion, 
these flights also transported equipment necessary for the DF A's development/investment and 
technical assistance projects in both the C.A.R. and in Gabon (Chapter 4). In considering the 
last private firm, Anglo American's interaction over Zaire during 1975 was significant and of 
political importance, because it initially complemented Pretoria's Detente policy. This rela-
tionship, therefore, can also be rated, in applying TRC categorisation, as second order in-
volvement. This concludes our discussion based on the concept, embedded in orthodox Politi-
cal Science, of foreign policy making and the interplay of domestic and external factors, the 
former entailing the activities of state and non-state actors. We now briefly, and in conclu-
sion, explore the relevance of the International Relations premise whereby the structural ine-
quality among states is a factor in shaping the relationship between them (Chapter 2). 
The Introduction proposed that the interaction between unequal states could take the form 
of either dominance, hegemony or primacylleadership, reflecting a decrease in the importance 
of the use of power and force by the preponderant state. The same chapter showed that South 
Africa' s status on the African continent was that of a preponderant force. Chapters 4 and 5 
22 TRC of South Africa Report. Vol. 4. 1999. pp.24ff. 
" Correspondence with Klaus Oppenheimer, 26 March 2002. 
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demonstrated that Pretoria's approach towards the region from the mid-1970s was one of 
dominance, while beyond southern Africa it fluctuated. Capitalising on the country's prepon-
derance, the Department of Foreign Affairs was in a position to offer technical assistance and 
support for development/investment projects. The military's preponderant capacity enabled 
them to become involved in a war as far away as Biafra, later to provide armaments to both 
Chad and Gabon, as well as to establish a presence in the western Indian Ocean. Somewhere 
in-between the foreign service ministry and the military, the Department of Information and 
the Bureau for State Security followed a marketing strategy; this also relied on South Africa's 
preponderance. Although pursuing different goals and applying different levers, we have 
shown that the approach of the different state actors towards the countries beyond southern 
Africa rested on South Africa' s preponderant power and her geographical position. Yet, as 
emphasised in the Introduction, for a state to assume the role of a leader requires it to provide 
not only material resources, but also what we called normative/moral resources, such as a 
shared worldview. Even though Pretoria could offer technical assistance, support for devel-
opment/investment projects and supply arms, its apartheid ideology fundamentally clashed 
with the ideal of pan-Afiicanism as promoted by the Afiican states. As Denis Venter sug-
gested, consecutive white governments had no comprehension of the basic premise that 
"treating other people differently on the basis ofrace and treating them as inferior on the basis 
ofrace would not be acceptable" by African states." This, more than anything else, separated 
South Afiica and its foreign policy goals from Afiica. 
Crucially, the end of apartheid altered entirely South Africa's position on the African con-
tinent. Most importantly, several authors have stipulated that the Pretoria government was 
now in a position to attain middle power" leadership in both Afiican and international poli-
tics." Post-apartheid South Afiica fully participates in several multilateral organisations, most 
24 Interview with Denis Venter, 10 March 1999. 
2S On a discussion of the concept of "middle power", see Cooper, Andrew Fenton. 1997. Niche Diplomacy: 
A Conceptual Overview, in Andrew Fenton Cooper, ed. Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War. 
London. Macmillan: 1-24. 
26 Breytenbach, Wilhelmus Josephus 'Willie' . 1997. South Africa and Egypt: The Foreign Policies of Re-
gional Powers in Search of African Security, Africa Insight 27, 4: 274-278; Cilliers, Jakkie. 1999. An Emerging 
South African Foreign Policy Identity?, Africa Quarterly 39, I: 41-68; Schoeman, Maxi. 2000. South Africa as 
an Emerging Middle Power, African Security Review 9,3: 47f.; Solomon, Hussein. 1997. South African Foreign 
Policy and Middle Power Leadership, in Solomon Hussein, ed. Fairy Godmother, Hegemon or Partner? In 
Search of a South African Foreign Policy. Halfway House: Institute for Strategic Studies: 53-64; Solomon, Hus-
sein. 1998. Middle Power Leadership vs. Cooperative Leadership: Some Reflections on South Africa's Foreign 
Policy, African Journal of International Affairs and Development 3, I: 69-80; Vale, Peter. 1997. Understanding 
the Upstairs and the Downstairs: Prospects for a Post-apartheid Foreign Policy, in Andrew Fenton Cooper, ed. 
Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War. London. Macmillan: 197-214; Van der Westhuizen. 1998. 
South Africa's Emergence as a Middle Power, pp.435-455. 
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notably the Organisation of African Unity27 and the Southern African Development Commu-
nity (SADC)." Pretoria's multilateral involvement in resolving continental issues continues in 
many other places; in the Democratic Republic of Congo, for instance, while personal diplo-
matic efforts, particularly those of Nelson Mandela, were apparent in managing the conflict in 
the Great Lakes region in Central Africa.29 South Africa's preponderance on the African con-
tinent and its role as a middle power now permits it to playa respected and recognised role in 
world politics and, of particular interest to this study, in Africa.3• This demonstrates that South 
Africa's political destiny always has been and remains inextricably linked to the rest of the 
African continent, underlining the central argument of this study. While acceptance by Afri-
can states now proves to be essential in realising its ambition of attaining middle power status, 
diplomatic recognition was the vital key necessary for South Africa to break its international 
isolation during the apartheid era. 
27 African Union (AU) from 2002. 
" Known as SADCC until 1992. 
29 For an overview of the early relevant literature on these developments, see Pfister, Roger. 2000. South Af-
rica's Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy Towards A/rica. Iowa City, 10: University ofIowa Libraries. 
3. Schraeder, Peter J. 2001 . South Africa 's Foreign Policy: From International Pariah to Leader of the African 
Renaissance, The Round Table 90, 359: 229-243. 
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Appendix A. Biographies of Department of Foreign Affairs Officials 
Auret, Derek William 
1973-77. First Secretary, Permanent Mission to the United Nations, New York 
1978-82. Special Assistant to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs 
1982-85. Minister Plenipotentiary, Embassy, Bonn 
1985-87. Deputy Director, Africa Directorate (S .W.A./Namibia) 
1987-89. Chief Director, Overseas Countries Branch (North and Latin America, Middle 
East, Australasia and South East Asia) 
387 
1989-91. Chief Director, Overseas Countries Branch (Americas, Middle and Far East, Aus-
tralasia and Canada) 
1991 (January) -1995 (February). Deputy Director-General, Africa Branch 
Babb, Glenn Robin Ware 
1967. Cadet 
1967-69. S.W.A./Namibia Division 
1969-70. Third Secretary, Embassy, Paris 
1971. Second Secretary, Embassy, Paris 
1972-73. Head, East, West and Central Africa Section 
1974-75. Training Officer 
1975-77. Counsellor, Embassy, Paris 
1978-80. Counsellor, Embassy, Rome 
1980-83. Deputy Director, Africa Division 
1984-85. Director, Africa Division 
1985-87. Ambassador to Canada, Ottawa 
1987-89. Deputy Director-General, Africa DirectoratelBranch 
1989-91. Member of Parliament (National Party) 
1991-95. Ambassador to Italy, Rome, accredited to Albania, Malta and San Marino, as 
well as Permanent Representative to the Food and Agriculture Organisation, Rome 
Best, Norman John 
1946-51. Third Secretary, High Commission, Ottawa 
1951-55. Third Secretary, Embassy, Paris 
1955-58. Deputy Chief, Protocol 
1958-60. Head, Political Division (West) 
1960-65. First Secretary/Counsellor, Embassy, Cologne 
1966-68. Counsellor, Embassy, Brussels 
1968-70. Minister Plenipotentiary, Embassy, Paris 
1970-73. Under-Secretary, Africa Division (Rest of Africa) 
1973-78. Ambassador to Canada, Ottawa 
1978-80. Ambassador to Argentina, Buenos Aires 
Botha, Roelof F rederik 'Pik' 
1953-56. Cadet 
1956-60. Legation, Stockholm 
1960-63. Embassy, Cologne 
1963-66. Legal team in the S.W.A./Namibia case at the International Court of Justice 
1968. Under-Secretary 
1968-69. Head, S.W.A./Namibia and United Nations Section 
1970-74. Member of Parliament (National Party) for Wonderboom, Pretoria 
1974-77. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, New York 
1975-77. Ambassador to the United States, Washington 
1977 (April) - 1994 (April). Minister of Foreign Affairs 
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Boyazoglou, Jan George 
1969-79. Counsellor (Agricultural-Technical), Embassy, Paris 
1982-85. First Counsellor (Agricultural-Technical), Embassy, Paris and Embassy, London 
Burger, Albertus Beyers Fourie 'Albie' 
1957-58. Assistant Secretary, Politics and Economics Division 
1958. Consul, Consulate, Antananarivo 
1961-65. Ambassador to Belgium, Brussels 
1966-69. Under-Secretary, Africa Division 
1969 (October) - 1974. Ambassador to France, Paris 
1975-79. Ambassador to the European Commission, Brussels 
De Goede, Justus 
1967. Cadet 
1969-73. Vice Consul, Consulate-General, Beirut 
1973-75. Counsellor, Middle East Division 
1976-77. Parliamentary Office of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town 
1977 -81. Vice Consul-General, Embassy, Tokyo 
1981-83. Counsellor, Embassy, The Hague 
1983-86. Head, Training Division 
1987-90. Minister Plenipotentiary, Embassy, London 
1990-92. Director, Africa Branch 
1993-95. Head of Mission, Cairo 
1995-98. Ambassador to Egypt, Cairo 
Evans, Leo Henry 'Rusty' 
1969. Third Secretary, Embassy, Lisbon 
1972. Consul, Consulate-General, Rio de Janeiro 
1974-77. Consul-General, Consulate-General, Sao Paulo 
1979. Counsellor, Departmental Administration (Personnel and Training) 
1982. Minister Plenipotentiary, Embassy, Washington 
1983-86 (September). Minister Plenipotentiary, Embassy, London 
1986 (October) - 1990. Head, West Africa Section 
1990. Deputy Director-General, Africa Branch 
1992 (October) - 1997 (December). Director-General, Department of Foreign Affairs 
Fourie, Bernardus Gerhardus 'Brand' 
BCom, University of Pretoria 
MA, City University of New York 
1934-39. Office of the Controller and Auditor General 
1939. Legation, Berlin 
1940-46. High Commission, London 
1947-52. Permanent Mission to the United Nations, New York 
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Year 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Angola Benin Burkina Burundi Cameroon 
Cape Central African Central African Chad Comoros Congo Total Faso Verde FederationS Republic Export 
0.97 0.003 0 0.039 0.005 96.279 0.006 0.013 0 0.315 952 
0.957 0 0 0.043 0.053 0 85.519 0.001 0.0 15 0.007 0.329 946 
1.971 0 01 0 0.049 0 75.142 0.008 0.014 0.005 0.293 988 
2.503 03 02 0 02 0.002' 02 0' 0.9482 954 
2.491 0' 0' 0.001 ' 0.003' 0.001' 0.002' 0.009' 0' 0.099 974 
2.47 0' 0' 0' 0' 0' 0.004' 0.009' 0' 0.177' 1202 
2.113' 0' 0' 0' 0' 0.002' 0.003' 0.014' 0' 0.0663 1352 
4.709 0 0.001 0 0 0.03 0.007 0.014 0 0.202 1389 
6.399 0 0 0.008 0 0.Q75 0.006 0.002 0.004 0.095 1527 
0.005 0.013 1525 
0.001 0.002 1541 
0 0.045 2041 
16.308' 0.002 2421 
35.743 0 0 0 0.001 0.023 0.003 0 0.052 0.217 3350 
0 3990 
4542 
0 0 0 0.003 2.88 0 0.021 1.436 5683 
0 0 0 0 0.736 0.646 0 0.012 0.942 7333 
0 0 0.001 0.03 0.D28 1.179 0.009 0.277 1.611 148 11 
0 0 0 1.215 0.276 0 1.694 19915 
0 0.077 0.041 2.697' 0 1.524 0.669 18207 
1.449 0 0.598 0.069 0.D25 0 0.548 19189 
0.719 0 0.552' 0.D25 0.356 1 0 4.471 0.438 20620 
0.052 0 0.266 0.266 0 0.566 24868 
1.277 1.059 0.084 0.5 8. 144 0.023 0.163 0.007 5.481 2.149 36312 
0.061' 1.26 1.1 0.324" 12.956 0.499' 0.282< 0 2.225 42011 
1.618 0.1152 1.391' 4.528 14.231 0.7332 43671 
11.045 2.212 0.149 3.927 6.185 0.436 1.005 0.113 20.38 2.598 49724 
18.858 2.239 0 5.227 7.952 2.576 0.285 0 23.717 5.019 58199 
52.674 3.67 0.028 5.908 2.709 0.62 0.648 0 21.213 8.799 60929 
137.84 4.134 0 10.919 5.594 0.256 0.591 0 33.102 13.737 64355 
365.17 1.732 0.255 12.003 46.034 0.282 0.704 0 31.738 24.669 68997 
263.388 8.021 3.8 13.187 41.082 4.354 0.512 0 36.866 48 .744 8067 1 
311.835 2.901 1.483 24.2 15.384 2.969 0.983 0.041 39.752 32.011 90021 
Notes: 1: January-March; 2: January-June; 3: January-September; 4: January-October; 5: Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe. Sources DFA files; Foreign 
Trade Statistics and Monthly Abstract of Trade Statistics. Pretoria: Department of Customs and Excise, 1992; the IDC provided the figures 1988-94. 
Figures for South Africa 's total export and import: The Europa World Year Book. London: Europa Publications, 1961-94; The Statesman's Year-Book: 
Statistical and Historical Annual of the States of the World. London: Europa Publications, 1961-94. 
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Year Djibouti Equatorial Ethiopia Gabon Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea Guinea Bissau 
1961 0.019 0 0.041 0.017 0.01 0.029 0.009 0 
1962 0.012 0.008 0 0.023 0.00 1 0.006 0 0.003 
1963 0.02 0 0 .003 0.018 0.002 0.007 0 0.004 
1964 0.3293 0.0013 0.001 0.001 3 03 0.Ql5 0.005 
1965 0.0933 0' 0.001 3 03 03 0.0192 0.002' 0.D31 
1966 0.008' 0' 0' 0' 0.001 ' 0.002' 0' 0.002 
1967 0.238' 03 0.001' 0.0033 0.002 0.0543 0.001 1 0.0231 
1968 0 0.055 0.002 0.019 0.003 0.038 
1969 0 0.049 0.001 0.066 0.001 0.057 
1970 0.001 0.067 
1971 0.109 
1972 0.028 
1973 0.292 0.121 1 
1974 0.14 0 0.024 0.046 0 0.547 0.001 0.047 
1975 
1976 
1977 0.037 0.584 0.0021 
1978 0.125 0 0.075 0.22 0.001 2.153 0 0 
1979 0 0 0 1.599 0.523 0.071 0 
1980 0 0 0.035 0.036 0 
1981 0 0 0.127 0.14i 0 0 0.011 0 
1982 0 0.12 0 0.021 0 0.003 
1983 0 03 0.213 0 0.021 0 0 
1984 0 0.896 0.005 0.041 
1985 0 0.396 0.083 5.105 0.246 0.004 0.806 0 
1986 0.001 0.715' 0.557 7.748 0.096 0.098 8.44' 0' 
1987 0.882 0.023 7.574 0.0532 1.06 
1988 0 0.677 0.149 8.018 0 0.122 0.006 0 
1989 0 0.75 0.001 5.735 0 0. 11 0.08 0 
1990 0 0 1.155 7.57 0.003 0.247 0.14 0 
1991 0.001 0.336 2.222 9.226 0.319 4.6 18 0.166 0 
1992 0.423 10.023 0.749 13.989 3.508 21.799 1.241 0.141 
1993 0.229 4.49 3.863 21.966 1.248 49.477 1.807 0 
1994 0.445 0.116 16.411 13.463 1.346 80.922 8.951 0.296 
Notes: 1: January-March; 2: January-June; 3: January-September; 4: January-October 
Ivory Kenya Liberia Coast 
0.029 7,436 0.061 
0.156 5.451 0 
0.112 3.854 0 
0.09 0.051 0 
0.0893 0.029 01 
0.084' 0.027 ' 0 
0.0963 01 01 
0.077 0 
0.126 0.06 
0.05 
0.129 0.195 0 
1.433 
3.308 1.924 0.085 
3.364 1.981 0.D35 
2.089 1.778 
6.086 0 
0.018 
6.395 4.111 0 
0.002 
12.744 8.46 0 
21.223 0 
5.83 
26.802 5.402 0.018 
44.652 11.025 0.144 
48.774 24.953 13.3 
66.491 30.452 1.995 
83.462 151.04 0.671 
97.892 205.414 2.709 
52.833 664.723 0.254 
Madagascar 
0.401 
0.178 
0.2 
0.181' 
0.151 
0.052 
0.1741 
0.773 
1.357 
1.496 
1. 7 11 
1.654 
2.527 
0.911 
1.292 
1.176 
2.713 
0.154 
1.514 
4.97 
5.444 
7.812 
24.48 
53.084 
42.902 
53.498 
60.958 
68.471 
Total 
Export 
952 
946 
988 
954 
974 
1202 
1352 
1389 
1527 
1525 
1541 
2041 
2421 
3350 
3990 
4542 
5683 
7333 
14811 
19915 
18207 
191 89 
20620 
24868 
36312 
42011 
4367 1 
49724 
58199 
60929 
64355 
68997 
80671 
90021 
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Year Malawi Mali Mauritania Mauritius Mozambique Niger Nigeria 
196 1 3.494 9.775 0 0.14 
1962 0 4.174 12.132 0 0.01 
1963 0 3.482 13.734 0 0.03 
1964 0.832 0 2.722' I 1.6883 0' 0.02 
1965 l.J74 0' 0' 5.158 13.104 0' O.Ql' 
1966 2.2 0 0 ' 4.071 23.934 0' 0.06' 
1967 2.157' 0' 0' 3.974 26.406 0' 0.03' 
1968 4.105 0 0 4.078 30.199 0 0.04 
1969 6.919 0 0 3.359 33.674 0 0 
1970 5. 171 3.921 36.013 
1971 3.815 44 
1972 5.625 46.7 
1973 8.635 ' 8.081 71.6 
1974 19.314 0 0 13.177 61.5 0 0.42 
1975 28.561 56. 1 
1976 32.018 23.441 49.6 
1977 0 0 31.261 0 
1978 0 0 34.557 78.091 0 1.92 
1979 75.484 0 0 45.022 73.349' 0 0.77 
1980 62.6 0 47.288 0 1.89 
1981 52.747 0 0 35.204 182.5 12 0 1.98 
1982 0.01 0.01 0 1.08 
1983 0' 0.Q75 33.344 0 0.61 
1984 0 0.15 0 0 
1985 129.81 0.52 0.234 79.163 253.939 0.848 1.21 
1986 0.57 0.367 1.812 1.98 
1987 1.26' 0.046' 152.24 1.29 
1988 261.9 0.41 0.042 227.46 293.537 0.189 0.23 
1989 435 .36 3.26 0.024 205.29 300.588 0.074 1.02 
1990 420.18 0.43 0.024 316.25 464.663 1.706 1.28 
199 1 577.52 l.J4 0.944 379.88 690.013 0.973 2.82 
1992 697.98 2 0.538 391.61 678.262 0.047 5.86 
1993 593.053 5.55 0.208 470.932 964.534 0.732 40.658 
1994 622.067 11.054 0.041 541.318 1406.776 2.241 64.641 
Noles: I : January-March; 2: January-June; 3: January-September; 4: January-October 
Reunion Rwanda 
0.057 0 
0.221 0.043 
0.195 0 
0.592' 0' 
0.621' 0' 
0.295' 0' 
0.81' 0' 
1.481 0 
1.438 0.001 
1.992 
1.7 
2.098 
4.792 
6.789 0 
13.6 
16.94 0 
17.59 0.01 
29.08 0.014 
28.26 0.026 
25.83 0 
0.006 
34.22 0.036 
0.127 
48.96 0.22 
0.335 
71.54 0.562' 
82.44 0.253 
112.9 0.704 
128.7 0.386 
208.7 0.575 
181.3 8.17 
190.653 4.81 
147.407 11.084 
Sao Tome Senegal & Principe 
0.009 0.155 
0.009 0.425 
0.009 0.519 
0.01 ' 0.13 
0.009' 0.089' 
0.005' 0.001 ' 
0.009' 0.Ql5' 
0.081 0.013 
0.245 0.035 
0.031 0.263 
0.09' 
0.17 
0 1.066 
0 0.001 
0 0.01 
0 0 
0 
0 0.01 
0 
0 1.256 
0.356 3.007 
4.823 1.261 
7.543 2.37 
29.718 2.768 
14.752 3.973 
4.031 0.898 
8.671 2.549 
'- 4.95~ 5.132 
Total 
E'9!!'rt 
952 
946 
988 
954 
974 
1202 
1352 
1389 
1527 
1525 
1541 
2041 
2421 
3350 
3990 
4542 
5683 
7333 
14811 
19915 
18207 
19189 
20620 
24868 
36312 
4201 I 
43671 
49724 
58199 
60929 
64355 
68997 
80671 
90021 
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Year Seychelles Sierra Leone Somalia Sudan Tanzania Togo 
1961 0.037 0.104 0.01 0.002 1.009 0.019 
1962 0.06 0 0.003 0.002 0.644 0.042 
1963 0.09 0 0 0.008 0.447 0.03 I 
1964 0.082 0' 0.002 0.011 0.003 0.021 ' 
1965 0.148' 0.001' 0' 0' 0.003' 0' 
1966 0.083' 0' 0.001 ' 0' 0' 0' 
1967 0.211' 03 03 03 0.0233 0.0083 
1968 0 0 0 
1969 0.485 0.001 0 0 
1970 0.496 0 0.045 
1971 0.672 
1972 l.l9 
1973 
1974 1.841 0 0 0 0.181 0 
1975 0' 
1976 
1977 2.851 0 0' 0 
1978 3.978 0.009 0.243 0.005 0.404 0.001 
1979 6.09 0.021 1.997 0.746 1.717 0.004 
1980 6.761 0.061 0.86 0.522 0.025 0 
1981 7.803 0.048 0.005 0.494' 0.3 0 
1982 0.173 0.077 0.341 0.944 0 
1983 7.313 0.002 0.228 1.531 0.49i 0 
1984 0.042 0.QI8 4.351 0.239 0 ' 
1985 14.5 12 0.267 0.082 0.561 1.272 0.089 
1986 7.254 0.166 2.375 0.155' 
1987 23.132 0.505 0.805 3.571 
1988 30.612 0.607 0.433 3.274 1.594 5.988 
1989 41.661 0.444 2.769 11.69 3.102 0.519 
1990 45 .97 0.51 I 4.606 2.692 11.072 7.331 
1991 49.434 0.376 2.233 6.221 9.971 6.445 
1992 61.889 0.148 0 21.33 27.659 11.4 
1993 78.469 5.036 1.532 31.037 58.563 14.516 
1994 84. I 5 I 3.965 4.076 50.506 183.233 11.355 
Notes: I: January-March; 2: January-June; 3: January-September; 4: January-October 
Uganda Zaire Zambia 
1.32 6.455 
1.003 7.473 
0.001 6.139 
0.002 6.783 18.461 ' 
0' 3.784' 28 .033' 
0' 3.362' 25.926' 
0.001 3 2.7523 51.393 
5.106 79.191 
6.738 67.857 
0.077 8.036 60.322 
8.158 
10.795 
9.962 34.906 
0.006 24.638 51.379 
26.965 
40.86 
0 36.05 1 34.579 
0.112 54.589 
0.151 8.461 152.7 
0.161 144.59 
0.028 
0.214 61.574 
0 85.3 
0.01 162.471 220.37 
0.203 179.432 
0.52 199.809 
0.51 273 .362 
l.l46 214.097 994.96 
2.191 466.256 1167.4 
0.706 307.404 1608.6 
2.949 291.028 1112.2 
9.19 313.596 1307.156 
22.728 349.676 1158.676 
- - - - -- -- --- - -
Zimbabwe 
33.704' 
42.716' 
30.106' 
51.3923 
73.289 
72.893 
85.487 
87. 133 
169.85 
346.89 
403.75 
775.92 
998.28 
1 174.5 
1609 
1553.4 
1747.2 
2459.439 
Total 
Export 
952 
946 
988 
954 
974 
1202 
1352 
1389 
1527 
1525 
1541 
2041 
2421 
3350 
3990 
4542 
5683 
7333 
148 11 
19915 
18207 
19189 
20620 
24868 
36312 
42011 
43671 
49724 
58199 
60929 
64355 
68997 
8067 1 
90021 
~ 
"d 
~ 
~ 
tIl 
W 
'0 
00 
Year Angola Benin Burkina Burundi Cameroon Cape Central African Central African Chad Comoros Congo Total Faso Verde Federation' Republic Import 
1961 0.212 1005 > "0 
1962 0.857 0.001 0.005 0.185 0.001 26.678 0.043 0.953 1027 "0 
'" 1963 1.017 0 01 0.053 0 7.374' 0.002' 0.732 1214 
1964 0.88 0.001 0.65' 1556 
= c:>. 
~. 
1965 1.371 0.002' 03 03 03 03 0.0483 0' 03 0.631 ' 1758 (") 
1966 3.057 0' 0' 0' 0' 0' 0.006' 0' 0' 0.432' 1718 rJJ. 
1967 1.721' 0' 0' 0' 0.001 ' 0' 0.093' 03 0' 0.374' 1916 <:> 
= 1968 3.418 0 0 0 0.006 0 0.134 0.346 0 1.363 1878 ... =-
1969 3.399 0.001 0 0 0.003 0 0.224 0 0 2.125 2128 
1970 0.164 0 2543 
> ~ 
~. 
1971 0.084 0.013 2484 
.., 
~ 
1972 0.052 2813 = .... 
1973 4.553' 0.085 3275 
1974 8.745 0.003 0.002 0 0.0 12 0.003 0.093 0 0 5.72 4909 
.§ 
<:> 
1975 0.031 0 5562 
1976 5867 
1977 0.01 0 0 0 0.074 0 0 6.298 5141 
1978 0 0 0 0 0 0.136 0 0 3.95 6253 
1979 0 0 0 0.771 0.063 0.222 0 0 5.606 9904 
1980 0 0 0 0.008 1.536 0 7.708 14381 
... 
... ~ ~ 
<:> "0 
!3 ~ til 
- >< ~ .., 
:0:- n 
1981 0.039 0 0.025 0.002' 0 0.307 9.849 18430 > 
1982 0 0 0.175 0.015 0 0 5.336 18374 ::;> ~ . 
1983 0 0 0.7043 0.372 0.01' 5.884 0.15 5.81 16204 
.., 
l' 
1984 0 0 0 0.002 0.544 8.592 22075 ,... 
1985 0.Ql8 0 0 0.001 0.002 0.439 0.007 0 0.834 8.541 22691 'C ~ 
1986 0' 0.219 0.029 0' 0.011 0' 0' 4.302 6.975 26864 
1987 0 0 0' 0.133 0.263 2.985' 28673 
,... 
, 
'C 
"" 1988 0 0 0 0 0.175 0.101 0.027 1.985 0.192 12.473 39484 
,...., 
s· 
1989 9.923 0 0 0.008 0.219 0.077 0.002 0.084 0.194 17.344 44741 
1990 0.059 0 0.959 0.012 1.667 0.102 0.244 1.986 0.243 15.379 44125 2. 
== 1991 0.0 18 0.309 0 0.487 7.788 0.948 0.218 2.618 0.984 5.26 48209 ~. <:> 
1992 0.728 0.455 0.017 0.028 5.653 1.02 0.03 11.21 0.256 4.419 52514 
1993 1.13 16.286 3.311 0.146 8.997 0.116 1.285 19.72 0.295 2.218 59018 
= ~ 
1994 16.891 9.331 0.034 1.5 7.383 0.132 0.006 6.172 0.322 3.143 79471 = c:>. 
Notes: I: January-March; 2: January-June; 3: January-September; 4: January-October; 5: Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe ~ w 
"" 
"" 
Equatorial Ethiopia Gabon Gambia Ghana Guinea Year Djibouti Guinea 
1961 
1962 0 0 0.014 0.058 0 0.482 0.005 
1963 01 01 0.009 01 0 0.334 0.003 
1964 0.021 0.37 0 
1965 0' 0' 0.021 ' 0.155' 0' 0.2762 0.006' 
1966 02 02 0.012' 0.027' 0' 0.237' 0.004' 
1967 0.001 2 0' 0.0292 0.121 ' 0 0.171 2 0.00 I' 
1968 0 0.076 0 0.267 0.004 
1969 0 0.001 0 0.575 0.001 
1970 0.045 0.069 
1971 0.051 
1972 0.015 
1973 0.084 
1974 0.003 0 0.344 0.22 0 0.563 0 
1975 
1976 
1977 0.001 0.002 0.003 
1978 0 0 0.058 0.246 1.563 0.003 
1979 0 0 0.119 0.482 0.011 0.912 0.019 
1980 0 0.114 0.002 1.121 0 
1981 0 0 0.144 0.047' 0 0.86 0.027 
1982 0 0.12 0.002 0.239 0 
1983 0.001 0' 0.736 0 0.1 81 0 
1984 0 0.341 0.003 0.001 
1985 0 0 0.046 4.487 0.007 0.311 0.2 
1986 0 0' 0.108 2.675 0.008 0.004 0' 
1987 0 0.235 3.108 0.007' 0.101 
1988 0.002 0 0.316 5.804 0.101 0.631 0.058 
1989 0.001 0.004 0.467 6.452 0.012 0.651 0.Dl5 
1990 0 0 0.258 8.263 0 1.249 0.094 
1991 0.015 0. 11 0.332 8.888 0.085 2.584 0.169 
1992 0 0 0.108 3.825 0.302 2.869 0.243 
1993 0.003 0 0.327 4.66 0.125 5.78 0.251 
1994 0.013 0 0.885 0.416 0.84 22.556 0.133 
Notes: I: January-March; 2: January-June; 3: January-September; 4: January-October 
Guinea Ivory Kenya Bissau Coast 
1.039 
0 2.128 2.749 
0 1.847 4.161 
3.87 0.943 
0' 2.81 7' 0.769' 
0' I.I r 0.38· 
OJ 2.506' l.277' 
0 4.433 
0 3.868 
1.023 
0' 
0 8.934 0.909 
26.502 
0 21.795 2.765 
0 23.275 4.117 
0 22.931 4.024 
0 4.344 
0 
0 13.219 12.248 
0 23.582 5.213 
0' 54.798 
16.601 
0.011 27.382 13.453 
0.003 25 .395 19.571 
0.004 44.153 10.876 
0.137 49.801 17.578 
0.006 46.514 23.729 
0.038 58.9 30.758 
0.979 85.705 28.119 
Liberia Madagascar 
0 0.136 
0 0.134 
0 0.059' 
0' 0.114' 
W 0.072· 
0.001 ' 0.306' 
0.002 1.239 
0.001 0.985 
1.907 
1.497 
0.17 1.56 
1.414 
0.006 0.537 
0.006 1.766 
1.809 
0.127 0.998 
0.027 
0.012 1.136 
0.013 
0.002 0.239 
0.012 
0.546 
0.474 0.578 
0.226 0.412 
0.216 1.346 
0.127 2.729 
0.155 6.594 
0 4.088 
0.012 3.692 
Total 
Im..£!lrt 
1005 
1027 
1214 
1556 
1758 
1718 
1916 
1878 
2128 
2543 
2484 
2813 
3275 
4909 
5562 
5867 
5141 
6253 
9904 
14381 
18430 
18374 
16204 
22075 
22691 
26864 
28673 
39484 
44741 
44125 
48209 
52514 
59018 
79471 
~ 
~ 
~ 
o 
... 
o 
o 
Year Malawi Mali Mauritania Mauritius Mozambique Niger Nigeria 
1961 
1962 0 0.01 3 2.722 0 0.228 
1963 0 0.0041 1.3281 0 0.2 19 
1964 1.585 0 0.057 0.27 
1965 1.951 0.0023 03 1.4233 6.4093 03 0.0643 
1966 1.452 0' 0' 0.096 8.428 0 0.02' 
1967 0.982 03 03 1.58 8.748 03 0.073 
1968 1.604 0.001 0.046 9.694 0 0.074 
1969 1.583 0 0 .094 1.216 9.727 0 0 .181 
1970 1.823 1.427 10.856 
197 1 1.821 10.2 
1972 2.761 10.3 
1973 1.9223 2.102 14.4 
1974 5.855 0.011 9. 155 4.345 19.5 0 0.208 
1975 6.409 13.1 
1976 3.935 9.4 
1977 0.014 0 .006 5.859 0 
1978 0 0 5.416 7.221 0 0.042 
1979 7.204 0.042 0.007 1.278 5.83' 0 0.081 
1980 8.567 0.016 2.203 0 0.289 
1981 13.61 0.047 0 3.846 9.798 0.002 0.108 
1982 0.Q45 0 0 0.008 
1983 0.0253 0.07 1 1.481 0.001 0.012 
1984 0.032 0.001 0.002 0.116 
1985 33.6 0.397 0.01 7 3.7 7.97 0.153 0.441 
1986 2.567 0.005 0.038 0.053 
1987 0.1533 0.001 3 3.505 0.122 
1988 66.875 0.949 0.023 9.28 20.122 0.224 0.246 
1989 58.539 0.37 0.018 10.901 24.386 0.135 2.627 
1990 81.1 3 0.247 0.027 14.279 30.388 0.024 3.425 
1991 91.147 10.67 1 0.087 14.006 37.673 0.49 1.095 
1992 133.953 7.422 0.203 12.326 50.978 0.432 3.623 
1993 159.606 8.724 0.064 19.224 60.324 0.69 3.684 
1994 185.221 5.821 0.012 15.145 91.931 1.574 21.183 
Notes: 1: January-March; 2: January-June; 3: January-September; 4: January-October 
Reunion Rwanda Sao Tome & Principe 
0.002 0.004 0.02 
0.0011 01 0.0081 
0 .001 3 03 0.0033 
0 .07' 02 0.007' 
omz' 0.0283 0.031 3 
0.012 0 0.341 
0.004 0 0.043 
0.002 
0.024 
0.004 
0.001 
0.01 8 0.003 0.047 
0 .029 2.16 
0 0.255 0 
0.037 0.14 0 
0.016 1.407 0 
0.13 0.28 0 
0 0 
0.029 0.041 0 
0 0 
0.155 0.053 0 
0' 0.001 
0.34 0.0343 
0.644 0.163 0.166 
0.298 0.007 0.027 
0.39 0.891 0.023 
0.44 1.538 0.107 
0.631 0.134 0.148 
0.833 0.37 1.656 
0.904 0.155 0.366 
Senegal 
0.088 
0.183 
0.003 
0.4283 
0.763' 
0.7 193 
0.611 
0.038 
0.014 
01 
0.002 
0.007 
0 
0.01 7 
0.002' 
0.008 
0.1 55 
0.045 
0.03 3 
0.029 
0.2 
7.16 
0.7 12 
2.15 
2.9 
Total 
Im~rt 
1005 
1027 
1214 
1556 
1758 
171 8 
1916 
1878 
2128 
2543 
2484 
28 13 
3275 
4909 
5562 
5867 
5141 
6253 
9904 
14381 
18430 
18374 
16204 
22075 
22691 
26864 
28673 
39484 
44741 
44125 
48209 
52514 
59018 
79471 
~ 
~ 
>< 
(J 
~ 
Year Seychelles Sierra Leone Somalia Sudan Tanzania Togo 
196 1 
1962 0.03 0.009 0.001 0.192 4.321 0.059 
1963 0.0011 0.008 a 0.244 3.402 O.Q3i 
1964 0.054 a 0.189 2.025 
1965 0.0 14' 0.027' 0.0022 0.0852 0.57' a' 
1966 0.0 17' 0.042' 0' 0.041 ' 0.296' 0' 
1967 0.057' 0.055' a' 0.2422 0.429' 0.113' 
1968 0.114 0.414 a 
1969 0.062 0.111 0.3 a 
1970 0.052 0.003 1.284 
1971 0.018 
1972 
1973 
1974 0.101 0.081 0.232 0.619 0.051 0.003 
1975 0.023 
1976 
1977 0.05 0.104 0.014' 0.055 
1978 0.024 0.416 0.058 0.277 0.307 0.031 
1979 0.059 0.226 0 0.047 0.073 0.026 
1980 0.031 0.467 0.001 0.038 0.126 0.189 
1981 0.031 0.49 a 0.036' 0.097 0.105 
1982 0.076 0 0.054 0.301 0.022 
1983 0.064 0.262 a 0.794 0.363' 0.14 
1984 0.187 0 0.195 0.019 0.157' 
1985 0.249 0.472 0.028 0.587 0.194 0.375 
1986 0.024 0.001 0.705 0.441 ' 
1987 0.149 0.001 0.218 19.353 
1988 0.1 0.058 0.154 0.845 6.729 31.099 
1989 0.475 0.038 0.001 0.414 1.637 23.834 
1990 0.305 0.067 0.071 0.256 2.58 10.689 
1991 1.06 0.226 0.016 0.628 9.85 21.339 
1992 0.854 0.982 0.001 0.357 10.29 22.09 
1993 0.975 1.412 0.013 6.278 21.832 29.985 
1994 4.84 0.551 0.001 4.325 15.856 61.607 
Notes : I : January-March; 2: January-June; 3: January-September; 4: January-October 
Uganda Zaire Zambia 
1.221 22.603 
2.289 3.441 
0.323 24.146 
0.124' 22.922' 17.6222 
0.333' 8.71 ' 12.1 86' 
0.097' 21.403' 22.59' 
6.343 20.592 
1.791 5.538 
0.045 3.375 7.08 
1.778 
2.439 
4.859 1.733' 
0.016 9.804 3.61 
7.748 
5.199 
3.256 2.245 3.639 
1.316 3.115 
1.778 5.744 
0.003 6.016 
a 
0 4.535 
0 3.6 
0 7.855 19.242 
a 7.093 
0.001 8.323 
0.029 18.034 
0.317 48.147 45.803 
0.09 21.79 44.155 
0.158 12.977 47.212 
0.051 11.37 44.565 
1.101 262.188 76.159 
1.632 353.576 103.89 
Zimbabwe 
20.047' 
19.817' 
43.986' 
61.629 
73.3 17 
85. 148 
92.133' 
152.003 
218.729 
265.039 
395.342 
469.981 
452.263 
472 
762.332 
664.292 
1021.80 1 
Total 
Import 
1005 
1027 
1214 
1556 
1758 
1718 
1916 
1878 
2 128 
2543 
2484 
2813 
3275 
4909 
5562 
5867 
5141 
6253 
9904 
14381 
18430 
18374 
16204 
22075 
2269 1 
26864 
28673 
39484 
44741 
44125 
48209 
52514 
59018 
79471 
~ 
~ 
~ 
() 
13 
IV 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
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Appendix D. Government Expenditure for the Departments of Defence, 
Foreign Affairs and Information, 1961-94 (in thousand South African Rand) 
Department in % of Department in % of Department in % of Total 
of Defence Budget of Foreign Budget of Infor- Budget Budget Affairs mation 
43,596 6.37 2,735 0.40 950 0.14 684,710 
71 ,550 9.92 3,036 0.42 1,460 0.20 721,048 
119,695 14.97 3,273 0.41 2,361 0.30 799,755 
121,654 14.27 3,890 0.46 2,780 0.33 852,315 
232,830 22.23 4,140 0.40 3,180 0.30 1,047,365 
229,400 20.30 4,885 0.43 3,185 0.28 1,130,033 
255,850 20.06 5,580 0.44 3,345 0.26 1,275,357 
256,000 18.38 6,194 0.44 3,524 0.25 1,392,797 
252,900 16.28 6,985 0.45 4,159 0.27 1,553,274 
271 ,600 15.97 6,967 0.41 5,000 0.29 1,700,442 
257,100 13.13 8,250 0.42 5,725 0.29 1,958,455 
316,500 12.22 9,252 0.36 6,700 0.26 2,589,674 
335,336 11.65 11,818 0.41 7,049 0.24 2,878,189 
472,022 13.32 13,064 0.37 7,961 0.22 3,544,539 
692,025 15.77 13,849 0.32 10,651 0.24 4,388,674 
970,661 18.28 17,600 0.33 11,801 0.22 5,310,842 
1,350,000 16.34 20,500 0.25 13,800 0.17 8,260,833 
1,654,000 17.61 147,444 1.57 15,370 0.16 9,390,333 
1,554,375 15.17 183,766 1.79 15,812 0.15 10,247,305 
1,612,400 13.84 202,144 1.73 15,100 0.13 11 ,653,148 
1,890,000 13.93 294,971 2.17 13,564,734 
2,465,000 15.10 386,151 2.36 16,329,634 
2,668,000 14.25 646,090 3.45 18,717,290 
3,092,700 14.25 736,020 3.39 21 ,702,857 
3,754,667 14.52 772,144 2.99 25,850,613 
4,274,108 13 .59 1,165,541 3.70 31,459,981 
5,123 ,275 13.41 1,335,714 3.50 38,205,841 
6,683,469 14.25 2,176,202 4.64 46,909,447 
8,195,551 15.18 2,530,034 4.68 54,006,859 
9,937,450 15.52 3,255,213 5.08 64,016,924 
10,070,995 13.93 3,833,469 5.30 72,286,231 
9,187,096 11.09 5,025,703 6.07 82,821 ,115 
9,704,549 9.82 5,995,241 6.07 98,831,885 
9,335,331 8.26 7,060,490 6.25 113,043,764 
Source: Estimate of Expenditure to be Defrayed from the National Revenue Account During the Fi-
nancial Year Ending 31 March 19 .. . Pretoria: Republic of South Africa. (always the second and fmal 
print) The figures refer to the period from 1 April of 19 .. to 31 March of the following year. 
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Appendix E. Exchange Rate South African Rand / US Dollar, 1961-94 
Year 1 Rand = US Dollar 1 US Dollar = Rand 
1961 1.398 0.715 
1962 1.395 0.717 
1963 1.392 0.718 
1964 1.389 0.720 
1965 1.396 0.716 
1966 1.389 0.720 
1967 1.398 0.715 
1968 1.386 0.722 
1969 1.393 0.718 
1970 1.396 0.716 
1971 1.398 0.715 
1972 1.295 0.772 
1973 1.444 0.693 
1974 1.472 0.679 
1975 1.366 0.732 
1976 1.150 0.870 
1977 1.150 0.870 
1978 1.150 0.870 
1979 1.188 0.842 
1980 1.285 0.778 
1981 1.149 0.870 
1982 0.925 1.081 
1983 0.899 1.112 
1984 0.695 1.434 
1985 0.456 2.193 
1986 0.441 2.268 
1987 0.491 2.037 
1988 0.442 2.262 
1989 0.382 2.618 
1990 0.387 2.584 
1991 0.363 2.755 
1992 0.351 2.849 
1993 0.306 3.268 
1994 0.282 3.546 
Source: International Financial Statistics. Washington, DC: 
International Monetary Fund. 
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File S36(1) Department of Information, 1964-80 
Department of Defence 
Group 1: Ministers of Defence (F.e. Erasmus, 1948-59; J.J. Fouche, 1959-66) 
File Box Contents 
Constituency, Prime Minister, 1963-64 M.V/ l0/1 25 
M.V1l0/3 25 
M.V/27/12 1+2 86 
M.V127116 88 
M.V1l94 148 
M.V/200 149 
M.V/213 152 
Constituency, Department of Foreign Affairs, 1964-65 
Memos, Cabinet Meetings, Minister of Defence, 1965-66 
Cabinet meetings with Department of Foreign Affairs, 1956-63 
Defence of the sea-routes around Southern Africa 
Defence of Africa, 1954-60 
Exchange of officers with the French armed forces in Madagascar 
Group 2: Minister of Defence (P.W. Botha) 
File 
MVl41125 
Box Contents 
6 Information material by the Military Intelligence, 1970 
406 
MV/41 /25 6 
MVl48/5 1+2 14 
MVl48/53 15 
MV/56/ 16 26 
MVl5812 27 
VRl4/9 34 
VRl4/ 11 34 
MV/51 11 8 52 
MVl51 /22 52 
MV/53/1, 2, 3, 7 53 
MV/54/3 54 
MV/5111 69 
MV/23/5 122 
HVS/403/8 148 
MV/281l4 175 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Department of Foreign Affairs, information material, 1970 
Information material, Department of Foreign Affairs 
Information material, Department of Foreign Affairs 
Ivory Coast and Gabon, 3.11.1969-14.5.1971 
Programme CACTUS, 1967-69 
Chemical warfare, 1967 
Project Cricket, 1967 
Defence agreements with Angola, 1967-71 
Defence exchange with other countries: Africa, 1968-71 
Visitors from overseas, 1969-73 
Contacts with governmental organisations 
Defence exchange with other countries: general 
Correspondence with other departments: Ministry of the Interior, 1948-66 
Proj ect Cricket, 1967 
Politics, other departments: Department of Foreign Affairs 
Group 2, Vol. 1: Chief of Staff (H.V.S.) 
File Box 
HS/ ll/lIlO 30 
HS/ll / l /2/6 30 
HS/ l11l / 17 31 
HS/12/4/8 78 
HSI12/4/9 78 
HS/ 12/4110 78 
HS/4 113/6 116 
HS/4113/81+2 119 
HS/4 11311 0 119 
HS/4113/13 120 
HS/4 11311 4 120 
HVS/62/4/8 171 
HVS/62/4/9 171 
HVS/6214/ 13 176 
HVS/6215/8 182 
HVS/62/5/9 182 
HVS/6215/13 182 
HSI7l /3 184 
HVS/82/113 187 
HVS/821114 187 
HVS/821115 187 
Contents 
Forwarding of material and staff manuscripts, Malawi, 1974 
Top Secret 
Portuguese coup and consequences for South Africa, June/July 1974 
Relations with Rhodesia, 1977 
Relations with Mozambique, 1974175 
Relations with Angola, 1974 
Relations with Mozambique, 1975-77 
Relations with Angola, 1975-77 
Relations with Zambia, 1976-77 
Information reports, Botswana, 1976-77 
Information reports, Zaire 
Reports from the Consul-General, Mozambique, 1974 
Reports from the Vice-Consul, Angola, 1973174 
Reports from Malawi, 1974-77 
Relations with Mozambique, 1975 
Relations with Angola, 1973-74 
Relations with Malawi, 1974-76 
Project Geisha (Rhodesia), 1975-76 
Reports on terrorist activities in Angola by Intelligence, 1973 
Reports on terrorist activities in Rhodesia, 1973-77 
Reports on terrorist activities in Mozambique, 1973 
Group 4: Secretary of Defence 
File 
26/1 1+2 
64/ 1 
Box Contents 
1 Courses - Overseas; Permanent Force, 1964 
1 Overseas representatives and consuls of foreign countries 
7111711 1+2 8 Offer of stores to the Dept. of Defence by overseas governments and private fIrms 
Group 5: Commandant General 
File Box 
KG/ AOC/417 22 
KGIEXT/ l /1I3/6 139 
KGIEXTIl /1I317 142 
KGIEXT/ I/ I/4, v. I 142 
KGIEXT/1/1I4, v. 2+3 143 
CGS/EXT/2/81l 153 
Contents 
Interdepartmental Committee for African Affairs 
Reports from the Vice-Consul in Mozambique, 1963 
Reports from the Vice-Consul in Angola 
Letters for information from overseas military representatives 
Letters for information from overseas military representatives 
Prince Edward-Heard and Marion Islands, 1948-54 
407 
CGSIEXT/3/2, v. 1+2 157 
KG/EXT/4/3/2 159 
KG/EXT/5/ 111 160 
KGIEXT/6/6 175 
CGSlEXTIl2 178 
KG/GC/4, v. 1-3 194 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
NATO, early 1950s 
Disannament at the UN, 1951-57 
Visits of distinguished persons and high ranking officers 
External relations South Africa - African states, 1961-62 
Military infonnation on African states and colonies, 1951-56 
Defence co-operation with other governments and departments 
408 
KG/GC/4, v. 4+5 195 
KG/GC/4/2, v. I 197 
KG/GC/4/2, v. 2 198 
Defence co-operation with other governments and departments, 1962-64 
Defence co-operation with the Central African Federation, 1959-62 
Defence co-operation with the Central African Federation 
KG/GC/4/4 199 
KG/GC/5, v. 1 199 
KG/GC/5, v. 2+3 200 
KG/GPW/2151l 341 
KG/GPW /2/5/2, v. 1-4 342 
KG/GPW /2/5/3 342 
KG/GPW/2/5/6/1 344 
KG/GPW/2/5/6/2 344 
KG/GPWI7I51l 351 
KGIHV/12 393 
KG/AAK/22/2, v. 1+2 411 
KG/ADMl7/5 415 
KG/ADMl717 415 
KGIBEU 8/3 443 
KGIBESII /2/3, v. 1+2 445 
KGIBES/ 1I2/3, v. 3+4 445 
KGIKONF/5 469 
KG/OPS/ IO/3/1 482 
KG/OPS/12/2/3 483 
KG/OPSIl2/2/8 483 
KG/OPS/12/8/5 488 
KG/OPS/22/8/6 488 
KG/OPSIl9/2 495 
KG/OPS/19/6 495 
KG/SDIl71l0 522 
KG/SKI 112/5 554 
KG/SKlII2/8 555 
KG/SKI 1/219 555 
KG/SKI I /3/5 561 
KG/SKII /317 563 
KG/SKlII3/9 563 
SADF co-operation with the British protectorates 
Defence co-operation with civilian bodies and organisations 
Defence co-operation with civilian bodies and organisations 
African Defence, 1955-59 
African Defence Facilities Conference, Nairobi, August 1951 
African Defence Facilities Conference, Nairobi, August 1951 
Defence of Africa: help to CAF, 1960-61 
Defence of Africa: help to Angola and Mozambique, 1961-63 
Communism in Africa, 1951-52 
Central and Southern African Transport Conference, 1955 
Overseas and diplomatic post 
Circulars by the Department of Foreign Affairs 
Circulars by the Prime Minister's Office 
Reconnaissance: Mozambique, 1965 
Movements of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence 
Movements of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence 
International Conferences, 1964 
UKlUSA co-operation in the Indian Ocean, 1965/66 
Correspondence with the Department of Infonnation, 1966 
Correspondence with the Department of Trade and Industry, 1966 
Co-operation with Congo/Zaire, 1964-65 
Co-operation with Madagascar, 1964 
Treaty between Nigeria and Canada, 1965 
Agreement between Germany and Nigeria, 1966 
Military forces of the African states, 1965 
Military co-operation with Rhodesia, 1965 
Military advisors in Angola 
Military advisors in Mozambique 
Reports from the Military Attache, Rhodesia 
Reports from the Military Attache, Mozambique 
Reports from the Military Attache, Angola 
Department of Foreign Affairs 
Explanation on how to use the below list: 
1/13/3, IPL: Relations with (=3) Liberia (=13); PL = Pink Leer (Afrikaans: Pink File) = Top Secret 
1/203/4, AJ 1975: Technical assistance (=4) to the Comoros (=203); AJ = Attached Jacket 
22/3/26, 3A: P.W. Botha's (=26) visits (=22) abroad (=3 ); File 3A 
34/5/163,1: Trade with (=34/5) Sudan (=163); File I 
NOles: NA: held at the National Archives; NS: New Series (April 1980 - ), OS: Old Series (1940 -
March 1980). The italicised files were not consulted. 
1/13/3 
I 
IA 
Relations with Liberia 
30.1.1959-22.12.1970 
30.10.1974-15.11.1978 
25.2.1975-15.3.1985 
11.4.1986-11.4.1989 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 409 
2 24.9.1971 -26.3.1975 4 7.7.1978-26.3.1984 
AJ 1976 5 6.3.1984-6. 10.1987 
3 2.4.1975-9.6.1978 6 30.8.1988-22.11.1994 
1113/4 Technical assistance to Liberia 
3 16.4.1969 
1/62/3 Relations with Mauritius 
1 24.7.1966-12.2.1970 8 5.12.1973-12.6.1974 
IPL 1. 7.1966-18.6.1968 9 14.6.1974-17.3.1975 
2 13.2.1970-16.3.1970 10 1.4.1975-17.2.1977 
3 20.3.1970-30.4.1971 AJ 1977 
4 4.5.1971 -30.10.1972 11 2.2.1977-28.12.1978 
AJ 1972 AJ 1978 
5 3.11.1972-25.4.1973 12 13 .1.1979-17.10.1979 
6 10.5.1973-26.9.1973 AJ 1979 
7 2.10.1973-29.11.1973 13 22.10.1979-30.5.1980 (-1979) 
1/79/3 Relations with Ethiopia 
I 1.6.1956-30.6.1972 AJ 1986 
1PL 29.7.1983-10.9.1986 3 2.5.1983-31.12.1987 
2 24.7.1972-7.12.1982 4 18.1.1988-11.2.1993 
1199/13 Interdepartmental Committee on African Affairs 
1 (NA) 12.3.1955-20.2.1960 12 31.3.1961-20.1.1987 
1199/19 Relations with African states 
AJ 1974 
12 
1.3.1982-18.7.1984 (-1979) 
1 23.3.1965-31.12.1981 
1110113 Relations with Cameroon 
1 (NA) 1.1.1960-22.2.1961 3C 11.10.1989-14.12.1989 
2 12.5.1962-15.9.1 980 4 16.1.1990-30.5.1991 
AJ 1986 5 6.6.1991-2.11.1991 
3A 2.2.1981-30.12.1987 6 13.11.1991-10.7.1992 
3B 12.1.1988-9.1 0.1989 
11106/3 Relations with Ghana 
I 4.1.1957-7.6 .1960 5 6.7.1972-30.11.1981 
2 13 .6.1960-7.9.1960 6 2.12.1981-30.8 .1984 
2 2.6.1960-22.2.1961 AJ 1986 
PL 17.6.1961-20.9.1967 7 29.9 .1984-31 .12.1987 
3 13.6.1961-8.9.1965 9A 10.2.1988-14.11.1989 
AJ 1970 2PL 14.12.1987-19.2.1988 
4 2.12.1965-24.3.1972 10 15.2.1990-28.6.1990 
AJ 1976 11 2.1.1991-13.5.1991 
AJ 1977 12 21.5.1991-22.9.1992 
AJ 1979 
11106/4 Ghana: technical assistance and co-operation 
1 1.5.1980-1.6.1992 
11112/3 Relations with Zaire 
4 19.8.1960-15.8.1972 8 1.3.1976-24.12.1976 
AJ 1973 AJ 1976 
5 19.9.1972-25.3.1974 AJ 1977 
6 4.4.1974-31.7.1975 9 28.12.1976-5 .9.1978 
7 1.8.1975-28.2.1976 10 1.10.1978-31.3.1981 (-1979) 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 410 
11112/4 Zaire: technical assistance and co-operation 
1 20.7.1971-5.11.1976 12A 11.1.1977-27.1 J.J985 (-1979) 
AJ 1976 
111 12/5/1 Zaire: volunteers for Katanga 
1 (NA) 18. J.J 961-25.4.1961 8.2.1965-25.10.1965 
2 (NA) 3.4.1961-4.12.1961 13.11.1965-24.7.1968 
3 16.12.1961 -28.1.1965 
1/112/5/1 Zaire: volunteers 
1 2.8.1968-1.11.1977 
1/ 112/5/3 Medical expenses for South African mercenaries in the Congo 
1PL 14.12.1964-27.1.1967 12 25.1.1967-29.6.1967 
11115/3 Relations with Madagascar 
1PL 27. J.J 964-26.3 .1965 11 5.1.1978-22.9.1978 
2PL 25.2.1965-28.1 0.1965 12 2.10.1978-4.4.1979 
3PL 18.1 0.1965-3.12.1973 AJ 1982 
AJ 1964 13 12.4.1979-29.9.1981 
1 7.11.1944-13. 12.1967 14 7.10.1981-23.8.1983 
1A 4.7.1961-26.7.1967 15 14.9.1983-28.2.1984 
2 4.8.1967-1.1.1968 16 1.2.1984-30.4.1984 
3 16.1.1968-26.2.1969 AJ 1985 
AJ 1980 18 8.7.1975-9.11.1987 
1PL 11.4.1974-11.11.1983 19 13.1.1988-10.7.1990 
2PL 11.1.1984-30.3.1992 20 2.2.1990-12.3.1990 
4 3.3.1969-27 .9.1969 21 14. 8.1990-19. 9.1990 
5 4.7 .1969-26.9.1970 22 18. 8.1990-11.10.1990 
6 1.10.1970-28.6.1971 23 12.9.1990-21.3.1991 
AJ 1971 24 27.3.1991-7.5.1991 
7 29.6.1971-21.9.1972 25 8.5.1991-6.7.1991 
8 2.10.1972-28.2.1975 26 9. 7. 1991-29.10.1991 
9 1.5.1975-11.4.1977 27 23.10.1991-3.4.1992 
10 15.4.1977-30.12.1977 28 4.4.1992-16.10.1992 
AJ 1977 
111 15/311 Relations with Madagascar 
AJ 1966-70 
12 
19.1.1977 
1 6.2.1968-18.2.1971 
11115/4 Madagascar: technical assistance 
AJ 1966 3 13.3.1972-27.12.1972 
1 2.5.1967-16.6.1969 4 14.11.1972-14.7.1992 
2 3.10.1969-29.2.1972 
11115/4/ 1 Nossi-Be project 
AJ 1969 3 3.19.1970-12.3.1971 
1 11.7.1969-20.6.1970 4 19.3 .1971-23.1.1973 
2 22.6.1970-1.9.1970 5 3.1.1973-13.3.1973 
III 15/411/1 Nossi-Be project: disposal of loan 
1 25.11.1969-29.3.1971 AJ 1970 
2 31.3.1 971-21.12.1971 AJ 1979 
3 21.3.1973-4.1.1978 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 411 
11115/4/2 Narinda Bay project 
1 25.3.1970-26.8.1971 AJ 1970 
1PL 25.1.1971-2.2.1971 AJ 1971 
2 2.9.1971-13.12.1972 AJ 1971 
3 12.1.1973-12.2.1973 AJ 1971 
AJ 1970 AJ 1971 
AJ 1970 AJ 1971 
AJ 1970 AI 1971 
AI 1970 AJ 1971 
1/116/3 Relations with Tanganyika/Tanzania 
1 (NA) 3.2.1960-31.3.1961 11PL 8.6.1963-23.3.1964 
2 4.4.1961-31.7.1964 
11120/3 Relations with Uganda 
1PL 27.4.1978-28.7.1983 4 8.10.1982-31 .10.1986 
AI 1982 AI 1986 
AJ 1985 5 4.11.1986-23.12.1987 
1 9.10.1962-15.2.1973 2PL 15.5.1984-26.10.1987 
2 4.2.1974-26.9.1979 6 7.1.1988-14.1.1991 
AJ 1979 3PL 3.2.1989-12.5.1993 
AI 1981 7 22.1.1991-29.1.1992 
3 31.7.1979-31.8.1982 8 25.2.1992-8.4.1993 
AI 1982 
11120/4 Uganda: technical assistance 
AI 1980 
11126/3 Relations with Zanzibar 
1 1.3.1964-9.1.1986 
1/ 129/3 Relations with Nigeria 
1 (NA) 11.2.1959-13.3 .1961 9 9.9.1981-24.4.1983 
2 7.4.1961 -29.8.1969 10 1.5.1983-30.5.1984 
PL 28.1.1961-3.2.1967 11 1.6.1984-31.12.1984 
3 4.9.1969-29.10.1974 AJ 1984 
AI 1974 12 1.1.1985-31.10.1985 
AI 1975 13 1.11.1985-31.12.1986 
4 4.11.1974-26.8.1976 AJ 1986 
AI 1976 14A 13.1.1987-1.10.1987 
AI 1977 15 20.12.1988-29.5.1990 
5 5.10.1976-30.3.1978 16 29.6.1990-19.12.1990 
AJ 1978 AI 1990 
6 5.4.1978-28.8.1979 17 15.1.1991-20.1.1991 
AJ 1979 18 21.1.1991-24.4.1992 
7 29.8.1979-30.6.1980 19 26.4.1991-24.5.1991 
AJ 1976 20 17.1.1991-24.10.1991 
AI 1980 21 15.11.1991-16.4.1992 
AI 1980 22 21.4.1992-4.6.1992 
8 23.6.1980-18.9.1981 23 7.6 .1992-13.7.1992 
AI 1981 24 16.7.1992-29.9.1992 
11129/3 Relations with Nigeria 
AJPL 1980 2PL 8.6.1981-25.4.1984 
AJPL 1980 3PL 1.5.1984-27.10.1987 
1PL 21.7.1969-26.5.1981 4PL 27.11.1987-2.3.1992 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 412 
1/131 /3 Relations with Sierra Leone 
1 25.2.1961-27.11.1975 2 3.12.1975-31.12.1986 
AJ 1977 3 1.1.1987-5.5.1992 
AJ 1982 
11135/3 Relations with Kenya 
1 (NA) 15.5.1959-31.3.1961 AJ 1982 
2 14.4.1961-31.7.1963 6 1.4.1982-28.7.1983 
lPL 25.4.1961-3.4.1962 7 1.8.1983-25.2.1984 
lPL 9.9.1968-21.1 0.1983 8 1.6.1984-30.9.1985 
2PL 4.1.1962-21.6.1983 AJ 1985 
3PL 1.8 .1963-24.8.1964 AJ 1986 
4PL 2.8.1963-24.8.1964 9 1.10.1985-31.6.1987 
AJ 1964 AJ 1988 
1 1.8.1963-16.1.1965 10 1.7.1987-12.12.1989 
2 20.1.1965-30.3.1971 11 19.2.1990-15.12.1990 
PL 20.1.1965-30.3.1971 12 26.2.1991-20.3.1991 
3 5.4.1971-21.6.1974 13 8.2.1991-29.8.1991 
AJ 1975 14 30.8.1991-17.10.1991 
1 9.7.1974-16.11.1976 15 8.10.1991-28.11.1991 
2 7.12.1976-6.3.1979 16 10.12.1991-19.2.1992 
3 7.3.1979-19.12.1979 17 20.2.1992-23.3.1992 
AJ 1979 18 1.3.1992-20.5.1992 
4 3.10.1980-31.10.1980 19 21.5.1992-22.7.1992 
AJ 1981 20 9.7.1992-5.8.1992 
5 4.11.1980-31.3.1982 
11135/4 Kenya: technical assistance and co-operation 
AJ 1980 II 25.1.1972-5.4.1982 (-1979) 
11138/3 Relations with Reunion 
AJ 1971 5 12.9.1983-22.8.1984 
1 6.1.1969-15.8.1974 6 22.8.1984-31.1.1986 
AJ 1975 7 7.2.1986-25.11.1987 
2 4.9 .1974-13.5 .1976 8 5.6.1988-10.5.1990 
3 2.6.1976-18.4.1980 (-1979) 9 19.7.1990-29.5.1992 
4 29.4.1980-16.8.1983 
1/138/4 Reunion: technical assistance 
AJ 1975 AJ 1978 
1 30.3.1976-22.1.1978 3 4.10.1977-3 .1.1981 (-1979) 
AJ 1976 AJ 1986 
2 2.4.1976-29.8.1977 4 6.3.1981-22.9.1988 
11144/3 Relations with Somalia 
lPL 26.1.1978-22.9.1982 4PL 10.4.1986-6.12.1989 
2PL 11.10.1982-25.5.1984 5PL 23.1.1990-29.3.1990 
3PL 4.6.1984-31.3 .1986 6PL 30.3.1990-21.9.1994 
1/144/3 Relations with Somalia 
1 31.8.1962-22.12.1977 5 1.1 .1985-30.4.1985 
AJ 1974 AJ 2.1984 
AJ 1977 6 1.5.1985-17.11.1987 
1 25.1.1978-30.9.1983 8A 19.2.1988-21.1.1989 
2 28.10.1983-19.4.1984 9 21.6.1989-24.1.1990 
3 18.4.1984-29.9.1984 10 7.3 .1990-16.4.1 992 
4 15.10.1984-31 .12.1984 11 1.6.1992-28.10.1992 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 413 
11144/4 Somalia: technical assistance 
1 23.5.1984-19.1.1985 12 20.12.1989-20.3.1990 
1/149/3 Relations with Gambia 
1 27.1.1970-9.11.1988 
111 49/4 Gambia: technical assistance 
1 17.2.1984-30.9.1987 
1/158/3 Relations with Malawi 
1PL 6.11.1962-29.7.1 966 8 2.6.1975-30.12.1975 
2PL 1.8.1966-12.6.1 968 9 ? 
1 (NA) 14.4.1960-26.10.1961 10 5.1.1976-28.5 .1976 
2 18.5.1962-21.4.1967 II 5.1.1976-28.5.1976 
3 3.5.1967-29.9.1967 12 17.5.1976-25.1.1977 
4 2.10.1967-24.1.1969 AJ 1977 
1 4.2 .1969-2.12.1969 13 28.1.1977-25.8.1977 
2 5.12.1969-18.12.1970 AJ 1977 
3 6.1.1971-31.7. 1972 14 1.9.1977-27.1 0.1978 
4 2.8.1972-31.1.1974 AJ 1978 
5 1.2.1974-31.7.1 974 15 7.11.1978-26.6.1979 
6 2.8.1974-27.2.1975 AJ 1979 
7 7.3 .1975-30.5.1 975 
11163/3 Relations with Sudan 
IPL 10.11.1976-31.12.1984 
1
3PL 28.3.1990-18.9.1991 
2PL 13.2.1985-1.7.1989 
11163/3 Relations with Sudan 
1 31.12.1958-19.10.1960 5 6.6.1988-12.7.1991 
2 21.6.1963-2.11.1971 6 15.7.1991-22.8.1991 
PL 4.2.1963-24.11.1965 7 26.8.1991 -1 0.6.1992 
3 16.5.1972-31.3.1983 8 28.7.1992-15.3.1993 
4 5.1 0.1983-7.10.1987 9 30.3.1993-30.6.1993 
AJ 1980 10 9.7.1993-3.9.1993 
AJ 1985 
11168/3 Relations with Togo 
1PL 17.11.1978-29.12.1980 
1
3PL 22.2.1989 
2PL 6.1.1981-8.2.1989 
11168/3 Relations with Togo 
AJ 1978 4 25.3.1988-27.7. 1990 
1 23.7.1963-11.9 .1 979 5 28.9.1990-13.3.1991 
2 1.12.1979-1 4.12.1984 (-1979) 6 27.5.1991-7.7.1991 
3 17.9.1984-26.10.1987 
1/168/4 Togo: technical assistance 
1 13 .5.1972-28.6.1990 (-1979) 
1/170/3 Relations with Djibouti 
1 1.7.1975-7.10.1987 (-1979) 
111 74/3 Relations with Guinea 
1 4. 10.1958-3.9.1971 I; 2.10.1972-28.7 .1983 (-1979) PL 3.4.1969-30.1 2.1987 21.9.1983-31.12.1987 
11175/3 Relations with Guinea Bissau 
1 5.7.1972-7.12.1983 (-1979) 
1
3 16.2.1990-30.5.1991 
2 10. 7. 1984-24.1989 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 414 
1/178/3 Relations with Gabon 
1PL 30.4.1969-20.11.1978 6PL 4.7.1983-28.3.1984 
2PL 27.6.1974-15.5.1978 7PL 1.4.1984-13.12.1984 
3PL 16.5.1978-28.11.1980 8PL 4.2.1985-23.10.1987 
4PL 30.12.1980-23.12.1981 8APL 21.1.1988-26.10.1988 
5PL 13.1.1982-10.6.1983 9PL 27.8.1988-31.1.1989 
11178/3 Relations with Gabon 
1 29.7.1960-26.3.1970 16 1.11.1983-29.3.1984 
2 8.4. 1970-22.l 2.l 972 17 1.4.1984-31.8.1984 
3 3.1.1973-9.11.1973 AJ 1982 
AJ 1973 18 1.9.1984-30.11.1984 
4 3.1.1974-28.2.1975 AJ 1985 
5 6.3. 1975-31.7.l 975 19 1.12.1984-31.5.1985 
6 1.8 .1975-22.8.l975 20 1.4.1985-31.3.1986 
7 25.8.1975-27.4.1976 21 1.4.1986-13.8.1986 
AJ 1975 22 14.8.1986-31.12.1986 
AJ 1976 AJ 1986 
8 29.4.1976-31.3.l978 AJ 1987 
9 7.4.1978-30.7.l979 23 10.12.1986-4.12.1987 
10 24.8.1979-27.3.1981 (-1979) 23A 8.1.1988-27.5.1988 
11 1.4.1981-31.1.1982 24A 2.6.1988-19.9.1989 
12 1.2.1982-30.9.1982 25 26.9.1989-14.2.1990 
13 1.10.1982-31.12.1982 26 20.2.1990-4.3.1991 
13A 1.1.1983-10.3.1983 27 12.3.1991-4.7.1991 
14 11.3.1983-30.6.1983 28 5.7.1991-12.3.1992 
15 1.7.1983-22.11.1983 29 18.3.1992-29.10.1992 
1/178/4 Gabon: technical assistance 
1PL 9.1.1970-4.11.1983 13 13.11.1975-29.6.l976 
2PL 19.1.1984-20.11.1984 AJ 1976 
1 7.4.l970-30.l0.l970 14 1.7.l976-1.6.1977 
2 3.l1.1970-22.5.l971 AJ 1977 
3 26.5.1971-30.8.l971 15 3.6.1977-25.4.l978 
AJ 1972 16 3.5 .1978-30.4.1980 (-1979) 
4 1.9.l971-30.3.1972 AJ 1978 
5 7.4.1972-13.9.1972 AJ 1979 
6 14.9.l972-28.2.1973 AJ 1980 
7 2.3.1973-30.5.l973 17 6.5.1980-2.4.1981 
8 5.6.1973-9.11.1973 18 1.4.1981-1.12.1982 
9 15.11.1973-26.2.l974 19 1.1.1983-23.4.1983 
10 12.3 .1974-23.8.1974 20 1.4.1984-20.11.1984 
AJ 1974 21 1.12.1984-28.2.1985 
11 23 .8.1974-29.8.l974 AJ 2.1982 
12 1.4.1975-30.l0.1975 AJ 1984 
AJ 1975 22 11.3.1985-2.10.1986 
AJ 1975 
11178/4/1 Gabon: technical assistance in the health sector 
1 19.1.1970-23.6.1971 12 16.7.1971-26.3.1987 
11178/4/2 Gabon: loan for improvement of airport (13 September 1975) 
1 18.1.1978-30.12.1982 12 17.1.1983-7.5.1987 
AJ 1980 
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11178/4/3 Gabon: OGAPROV loan 
1 18.11.1976-26.3.1981 AJ 1984 
2 1.4.1981-29.4.1983 5 28.8.1984-14.4.1986 
3 25.5.1983-3.4.1984 6 6.5.1986-31.5.1987 
4 1.4.1984-28.8.1984 AJ 1986 
AJ 1980 AJ 1987 
AJ 1981 AJ 1988 
AJ 2.1983 7 27.5.1987-6.11.1987 
11178/414 Gabon: loan for infrastructure 
1 28.4.1984-28.11.1985 
11178/5/1 Gabon: loans for certain structures 
AJ 1985 i~PL 21.3.1985-5.6.1986 1 12.2.1985-23.7.1988 16.6.1986-17.9.1986 
1/ 179/3 Relations with the Ivory Coast 
1PL 14.3.1969-20.6.1979 
i
AJ 1986 
2PL 26.3.1980-31.1.? 3PL 31.5.1988-22.2.1989 
11179/3 Relations with the Ivory Coast 
1 (NA) 28.7.1960-23.12.1961 11 1.1.1982-8.11.1983 
2 5.3.1962-10.11.1971 12 6.7.1984-30.8.1984 
PL 19.2.1965-30.4.1968 13 11.9.1984-28.2.1985 
AJ 1971 14 1.3.1985-31.12.1986 
3 13 .1.1972-29.3 .1973 15 2.1.1987-30.12.1987 
AJ 1973 16 6.1.1988-19.7.1988 
AJ 1974 16A 1.8.1988-8.2.1989 
4 3.4.1973-9.4.1975 16B 12.4.1989-14.12.1989 
5 10.4.1975-14.10.1975 17 14.12.1989-15.5.1990 
AJ 1975 18 15.3.1990-6.10.1990 
6 2.1 0.1975-31.5.1976 19 11.10.1990-28.3.1991 
7 18.5.1976-26.10.1976 20 4.4.1991-28.8.1991 
AJ 1976 21 16.9.1991-1.12.1991 
AJ 1977 22 2.12.1991-13.3.1992 
8 2.11.1976-10.2.1978 23 16.3.1992-2.4.1992 
AJ 1978 24 3.4.1992-12.5.1992 
AJ 1979 25 14.5.1992-3.7.1992 
AJ 1980 26 7.7.1992-31.8.1992 
9 15.2.1978-31.3.1981 (-1979) 27 1.9.1992-26.10.1992 
10 2.4.1981-31.5.1982 28 27.10.1992-13.11.1992 
1/179/4 Ivory Coast: technical assistance 
AJ 1974 2A 18.11.1976-1.12.1987 (-1979) 
AJ 1976 AJ 1981 
1 15.3.1976-31.8.1977 2B 19.1.1988-24.10.1988 
AJ 1977 3A 24.11.1988-2.3.1989 
1PL 28.6.1989-21 .8.1989 3B 7.3.1989-17.8.1989 
AJ 1979 1 28.7.1989-7.5.1990 
1/17917 Ivory Coast: South African representation 
1 2.8.1989-4.11.1991 
11180/3 Relations with Upper Volta/Burkina Faso 
I 5.8.1960-14.7.1987 
1118113 Relations with Benin 
I 1.8.1960-13.1.1986 2 9.11.1992-30.5.1994 
AJ 1977 IPL 22.9.1975-25.2.1993 
1 6.12.1989-6.11.1992 
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11182/3 Relations with Niger 
1 12.7.1960-31.12.1986 12 6.1 0.1987-30.4.1998 
11182/4 Niger: technical assistance 
1 21.5.1971-6.5.1976 
11183/3 Relations with the Central African Republic 
AJ 1979 12PL 22.2.1989 
1PL 19.4.1972-1.12.1983 
11183/3 Relations with the Central African Republic 
I 27.9.1960-29.3.1974 AJ 1977 
2 3.4.1974-26.9.1974 10 24.9.1979-26.8.1981 (-1979) 
3 2.10.1974-31.1 0.1974 11 13.9.1981-30.10.1984 
4 1.11.1974-29.12.1974 AJ 1983 
AJ 1975 12 31.10.1984-31.1.1987 
5 2.1.1975-31.3.1975 AJ 1987 
6 11.4.1975-24.6. 1975 J3A 29.4.1987-20.7.1987 
7 25.6.1975-27.2.1976 J3B 8.6.1988-31.3.1989 
AJ 1976 J3C 11.4.1989-19.9.1989 
8 1.3.1976-27.10.1977 14 6.2.1989-28.11.1989 
9 1.11.1977-25.9.1979 15 8.1.1990-7.7.1992 
AJ 1977 
11183/4 Central African Republic: technical assistance 
AJ 1975 AJ 1977 
1 17.9.1974-30.1.1976 AJ 1978 
2 24.2.1976-15.10.1976 AJ 1979 
AJ 1976 4 5.4.1978-12.12.1984 
3 18.10.1976-15.3.1978 
11183/411 Central African Republic: loan for the hotel project 
1 30.10.1974-24.1.1975 4 4.1.1979-25.3.1980 
2 27.1.1975-5.2.1975 AJ 4.1977 
3 14.2.1975-19.9.1975 AJ 1979 
AJ 1975 AJ 2.1980 
4 3.10.1975-8.6.1976 5 1.4.1980-31 .3.1983 
AJ 1976 6 1.4.1982-29.2.1984 
AJ 2.1978 AJ 1982 
1 6.5.1976-12.1.1977 AJ 1983 
2 28.1.1977-30.11.1977 7 1.3.1984-20.11.1984 
3 4.1.1978-26.12.1978 AJ 1984 
11183/4/2 Central African Republic: loan agreement, state redemption fund 
1 13.5.1975-31.8.1978 12 Jl. 9. 1978-12. 8. 1987 
AJ 1975 3 14.3.1988-28.9.1989 
11184/3 Relations with Chad 
IPL 3.11.1963-3.12.1982 
1
2PL 2.1.1983-8.6.1984 
AJ 1971 
11184/3 Relations with Chad 
1 10.8.1960-22.12.1970 AJ 1976 
PL 22.12.1961-30.7 .1965 2 ? 
AJ 1971-72 3 15.1.1971-7.10.1987 
AJ 1973 4 20.1 0.1985-30.4.1995 
1/184/4 Chad: technical assistance 
lPL 15.11.1965-18.10.1967 
1
3PL 16.4.1969 
2PL 19.10.1967-10.4.1969 
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11184/4 Chad: teclmical assistance 
AJ 1966 11 25 .1.1967-28.2.1978 
11185/3 Relations with Congo 
1PL 5.6.1963-11.1.1978 
1
3PL 31.1989-10.11.1995 
2PL 11.5.1978-22.2.1989 
1/185/3 Relations with Congo 
1 15.8.1960-15.9. 1970 4 1.3.1988-7.3.1990 
PL 13.9.1963-29.2.1968 5 14.2.1990-22.3.1991 
AJ 1979 6 25.3.1991-21.11 .1991 
2 2.3.1972-9.11.1981 (-1979) 7 26.11.1991-21.2.1992 
3 9.6.1975-30.12.1987 (-1979) 8 27.2.1992-1 .7.1992 
AJ 1986-1987 9 2.7.1992-28.10.1992 
3A 12.1.1988-29.2.1988 
1/185/4 Congo: teclmical assistance 
AJ 1984 
1/ 185/4/2 Congo: teclmical assistance (agriculture) 
AJ 1979 I 
11186/3 Relations with Senegal 
AJ 1984 11A 29.7.1987-31.8.1988 
1PL 15.5.1975-25.6.1987 
1/186/3 Relations with Senegal 
1 21.8.1960-16.5.1975 AJ 2.1985 
2 16.5.1975-26.1.1978 6 1.1.1987-6.6.1988 
AJ 1977 6A 22.6.1988-3.10.1989 
AJ 1978 7 10.1.1989-1.7.1991 
3 2.3.1978-23.9.1981 (-1979) 8 8.7.1991-5.5.1992 
4 8.10.1981-21.5.1984 9 6.5.1992-5.6.1992 
5 1.6.1984-31.12.1986 10 8.7.1992-11.11.1992 
AJ 1984 
11187/3 Relations with Mali 
1 30.9 .1960-8.9.1987 I~ 7.9.1988-22.3. 1991 AJ 1977 25.3.1991-2.12.1993 
11188/3 Relations with Mauritania 
1 25.11.1960-31.12.1986 12 2.2. 1988-30.4.1988 1PL 26.1.1985-1.3.1985 
11192/3 Relations with Rwanda 
I 3.7.1962-2.9.1987 4 18.4.1991-9.7.1991 
1A 12.8.1988-24.10.1989 5 11.7.1991-27.4.1992 
2 11.10.1989-30.10.1990 6 28.4.1992-28.8.1992 
3 12.1.1990-16.4.1991 
11193/3 Relations with Burundi 
AJ 1981 2 1.1.1988-7.7.1989 
PLl 3.10.1990 3 25.10.1989-7.11.199 1 
1 1.7 .1962-31.12.1987 4 11.11.1991-23.10.1992 
11194/3 Relations with the Seychelles 
1PL 30.10.1974-27.12.1983 
1
3PL 12.11.1987 
2PL 25.2.1984-1.11.1986 
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11194/3 Relations with the Seychelles 
AJ 1976 7 12.1982-29.7.1983 
1 8.11.1973-17.1.1977 8 13.8.1983-31.12.1984 
2 20.1.1977-22.8.1978 AJ 1982 
AJ 1977 AJ 1986 
3 1.9.1978-21.11.1981 (-1979) 10 1.7.1985-31.5.1987 
3A 22.11.1981-6.12.1981 AJ 1985 
4 6.12.1981-3.1.1982 11 16.6.1987-2.11.1987 
4A 1.2.1982-31.3.1982 llA 3.2.1988-28.2.1989 
5 1.2.1982-31.3.1982 12 1.3.1988-12. 7.1992 
5A 1.4.1982-31.5.1982 13 29. 7. 1992-6.9.1993 
6 1.6.1982-?11.1982 
11194/4 Seychelles: technical assistance 
AJ 1985 11 27.4.l971-19.8.1980 
11199/3 Relations with Tanzania 
IPL 28.4.l 972-21.6.l 984 
11199/3 Relations with Tanzania 
1 19.3.l965-28 .12.1971 2 14.7.1978-28.2.l983 
PL 22.12.1964-20.5 .1968 3 1.3.l983-30.5.1984 
AJ 1964-1966 4 1.6.1984-30.5 .1985 
PL2 3.7.1984-21.6.l985 5 1.6.1985-31.6.1987 
1 22.2.1972-28.4.1978 6 19./2.1990-2.12.1992 
11203/3 Relations with the Comoros 
PLi 18.4.1978-30.8.1981 3 2.10.1985-16.10.1986 
1 1.9.1981-30.4.1984 4 6.1.1988-5.12.1988 
2 2.5.1984-30.8.1985 5 1.1.1989-8.2.1990 
AJ 1979 
11203/3 Relations with the Comoros 
1 29.5.1972-27.7.1974 14 1.1.1986-24.1.4.1986 
2 2.8.1974-27.9.1974 15 25.4.1986-19.6.1986 
3 4.10.1974-18.5 .1979 16 20.6.1986-31.1.1986 
2 15.6.l979-12.l0.1981 (-1979) AJ 1986 
AJ 1981 17 1.1.1987-31.5.1987 
3 11.1981-12.1982 18 1.6.1987-31.9.1987 
AJ 1982 19 1.10.1987-31.12.1987 
4 1.1.1983-21.4.1983 AJ 1987 
5 22.4.1983-31.7.1983 20 2.1.1988-30.6.1988 
AJ 1984 21 1. 7.1988-29.11.1988 
6 1.8.1983-19.10.1983 22 6.12.1988-26.7.1989 
7 20.10.1983-28.2.1984 23 10.7.1989-30.12.1989 
8 1.11.1983-30.4.1984 24 ? 
AJ 1983 25 13.3.1989-9.2.1990 
AJ 1983 26 9.2.1990-31.3.1990 
AJ 1983 2 7 2.4.1990-11.5.1990 
9 1.5.1984-31. 8.1984 28 1.5.1990-28.9.1990 
AJ 1984 29 29.9.1990-21.3.1991 
AJ 1985 30 26.3.1991-17.9.1991 
10 1.9.1984-11.4.1985 31 ? 
11 12.4.1985-30.9.1985 32 20.9.1991-12.2.1992 
12 1.7.1985-30.9.1985 33 14.2.1992-17.8.1992 
13 1.10.1985-31.12.1985 
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1/20314 Comoros: technical assistance 
IPL 18.4.1978-26.4.1985 AJ 1984 
AJ 1974 AJ 1985 
1 24.6.1974-31.1.1975 AJ 1985 
AJ 1975 9 23.9.1985-14.1.1985 
PL2 27.8.1985 10 15.1.1985-28.2.1985 
2 14.2.1975-31.5.1976 11 1.3.1985-30.6.1985 
3 25.6.1976-3.12.1982 12 1.7.1985-31.12.1985 
4 13.1.1983-31.1.1983 13 28.10.1985-18.12.1987 
5 1.9.1983-2.11.1983 J3A 8.2.1988-4.4.1988 
6 22.11.1983-4.1.1984 14 14.4.1988-27.8.1988 
7 22.11.1983-4.1.1984 15 ? 
AJ 1982 16 3.9.1988-26.5.1990 
8 14.8.1984-1.11.1984 17 8.11.1990-30.10.1991 
AJ 1983 
1/203/4/2 Comoros: technical assistance (agriculture) 
1 2.9.1983-30.12.1984 1 4.2.1985-12.6.1987 
AJ 2.1984 2A 28.7.1988-26.9.1988 
AJ 1985 3 10.1.1989-7.7.1989 
1/203/4/4 Comoros: technical assistance (health) 
1 12.8.1980-27.9.1984 4 14.4.1985-10.3.1987 
2 8.9.1988-28.2.1985 4A 7.8.1988-29.9.1988 
3 1.3.1985-30.6.1985 5 5.10.1988-30.1.1990 
AJ 1985 
11203/4/8 Comoros: finance loans 
1 28.9.1983-3.2.1987 
1/207/3 Relations with Equatorial Guinea 
1PL 29.6.1972-4.6.1987 5 1.7.1986-5.12.1986 
1 31.7.1979-29.2.1984 6 6.12.1986-28.2.1989 
2 22.7.1988 7 1.3.1987-30.6.1987 
AJ 1985 8 1.7.1987-31.9.1987 
AJ 1986 9 1.10.1982-29.12.1987 
AJ 1987 9A 5.1.1988-28.4.1988 
2 1.3.1984-28.2.1985 10 1.5.1988-26.10.1988 
3 1.3.1985-31.5.1985 11 1.5.1988-15.10.1993 
4 1.6.1985-30.6.1986 
11207/4 Equatorial Guinea: technical assistance 
1 1.1.1984-8.4.1984 6 1.5.1985-18.5.1986 
2 9.4.1984-187.1984 7 14.2.1986-14.8.1987 
3 19.7.1984-31.12.1984 7A 28.6.1989 
4 1.1.1985-20.2.1985 AJ 1991 
5 1.3.1985-30.4.1985 
11224/3 Relations with Cape Verde 
PLl 8.6.1978-22.2.1989 4 1.1.1988-16.5.1989 
1 22.6.1975-10.9.1983 (-1979) 5 9.3.1988-13.2.1990 
2 11.9.1983-30.3.1985 6 15.1.1990-30.5.1991 
PL2 5.10.1990 7 10.1.1991-18.5.1992 
3 1.4.1985-31.12.1987 8 25.5.1992-8.12.1992 
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11225/3 Relations with Sao Tome and Principe 
PLI 1.12.1987-19.9.1988 2A 4.1.1988-27.6.1988 
AJ 1987 PL2 28.4.1989 
1 26.4.1975-31.12.1986 (-1979) 3 2.8.1988-5.6.1990 
AJ 1975 4 20.3.1990-5.6.1991 
2 7.1.1987-14.12.1987 
22/311 2 Eric Hendrik Louw: visits abroad 
2 l3 .7 .1961-28.1 0.1970 IPL 1.5.1963-2.5.1963 
PL 28.8.1961-13.5.1963 PL 1.5.1963-2.5.1963 
22/3123 Balthazar Johannes Vorster: visits abroad 
PL 4.11.1969-24.3.1969 AJ 1975 
1 12.12.1963-29.5.1970 4 13 .8.1975-20.4.1976 
PL 21.6.1962-2.4.1968 5 20.4.1976-23.5.1977 
2 3.6.1970-4.3.1971 AJ 1977 
AJ 1970 (3 copies) 6 25.5.1977-22.10.1981 
3 18.2.1975-12.8.1975 
22/3/26 Pieter Willem Botha: visits abroad 
PL 17.11.1966-10.7.1984 AJ 1981 
1 14.5.1962-17.3 .1969 AJ 1984 
PL 14.1 0.1963-1.5.1967 4 22.10.1980-7.5.1984 
2 14.2.1969-9.11.1971 5 8.5.1984-18.5.1984 
3 10.1.1972-24.9.1980 6 20.5.1984-31.5.1984 
3A 19.1.1972-8.9.1980 7 4.6.1984-31.7.1984 
AJ 1980 8 1.8.1984-29.11.1984 
22/3/29 Hilgard Muller: visits abroad 
1 13.9.1965-16.8.1966 AJ 1965 
PL 2.11.1965-19.7.1967 4 18.9.1969-1.8.1973 
AJ (NA) 2.1964 AJ 1969 
PL 6.5.1964-4.9.1964 5 3.9.1973-31.7.1974 
2 2.8.1966-27.8.1968 6 l3.8.1974-9 .9.1975 
PL 15.8.1964-22.1.1965 7 16.9.1975-14.11.1978 
PL 28.7.1966-15.9.1966 AJ 1978 
3 1.9.1968-12.9.1 969 PL 8.12.1964-27.9.1966 
22/3/39 Cornelius Petrus Mulder: visits abroad 
1 6. 11.1969-22.11.1971 
1
3 9.7.1975-16.6.1978 
2 12.5.1972-27.6.1975 
22/3/55 Roe1ofFrederik Botha: visits abroad 
AJ 1977 3 5.9.1979-22.5.1981 
PL 15.10.1979-16.5 .1981 4 25 .5.1981-5.11.1981 
1 4.5.1977-29.5.1978 5 5.2.1982-30.10.1984 
2 2.6.1978-23.8.1979 AJ 1986 
AJ 1979 AJ 1993 
AJ 1981 
22/3/57 Frederik Willem de Klerk: visits abroad 
1 6.7 .1978-7.1.1983 12 12.7.1984-12.10.1986 
22112 Jan Smuts Airport Multiracial Hotel 
2 10.4.1961-5 .10.1972 13 1.1 0.1973-31.5.1983 
PL 29.11.1961-14.9.1967 AJ 1972 
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34/2 Export Trade Advisory Committee 
2 20.12.1960-1.6 .1966 5 12.3.1976-26.7.1984 
3 7.10.1966-24.12.1969 AJ 1978 
AJ 1969 AJ 1979-80 
AJ 1974 AJ 1983 
AJ 1975 AJ 1984 
4 8.5.1969-27.2.1976 AJ 1985 
34/3/4 Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut 
1 30.8.1961-14.9.1970 I ~J 1969 PL 18.11.1964-22.1.1965 27.7.1971-22.4.1985 
34/5/13 Commercial relations with Liberia 
1 27 .1.1967-30.9.1 986 12 1.12.1986 
34/5/62 Commercial relations with Mauritius 
I+PL 9.1958-14.6.1971 AJ 1983 
AJ 1969 7 14.10.1983-22.8.1 984 
AJ 1978 AJ 1984 
4 20.11.1978-23.5.1979 8 23.8 .1984-30.4.1985 
5 30.5.1979-28.2.1980 9 3.5.1985-12.1987 
6 6.3.1980-30.9 .1983 9A 8.1988 
34/5/79 Commercial relations with Ethiopia 
1 1.1.1979-13.2.1980 
34/5/101 Commercial relations with Cameroon 
1 20.1.1978-31 .12.1987 
34/5/106 Commercial relations with Ghana 
1 National Archives 
1
3 26.9.1988 
2 20.5.1962-8.12.1987 
34/51112 Commercial relations with Zaire 
IPL 27.6.1977-5.7 .1 977 AJ 1981 
4+PL 4.4.1961-19.9.1972 8 29.3.1979-9.4.1980 
5 1.11.1972-8.10.1976 9 17.4.1980-1 2.1987 
6 27.10.1976-31 .8.1978 9A 10.6.1988-4.4.1989 
7 7.9.1978-26.3.1979 10 29.9.1989-30.8.1990 
34/5/115 Commercial relations with Madagascar 
I+PL 14.7.1967-19.7.1972 II 7.1.1 974-9.1987 
AJ 1985 2 11.12.1987 
34/5/116 Commercial relations with Tanganyika 
l+PL 1952-1965 
34/5/120 Commercial relations with Uganda 
1 1.12.1978-1.12.1987 
34/51129 Commercial relations with Nigeria 
1 2.7.1958-12.1987 12 23 .5.1990-25.5.1990 
34/5/131 Commercial relations with Sierra Leone 
1 9.11.1979-31.6.1985 
34/5/135 Commercial relations with Kenya 
2PL 1962-1967 
14 
1.12.1987-31.12.1987 
3 18.5.1972-6.1987 
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34/5/ 138 Commercial relations with Liberia 
l+PI 1945-22.1.1968 4 1.4.1977-11.2.1982 
2 9.6.1972-19.8.1975 5 6.5 .1982-12.1987 
AJ 1975 6 6.12.1989 
3 9.9.1975-31.3.1977 
34/51144 Commercial relations with Somalia 
I 13.2.1986-31.12.1987 IAJ 1985 
34/5/149 Commercial relations with Gambia 
1 25.8.1971 -31.10.1985 
34/5/ 158 Commercia! relations with Malawi 
IPL 30.12.1966-11.3.1968 9 14.3 .1977-28.6.1978 
I 4.4.1967 II 3.7.1978-24.3.1980 
2 5.4.1967-6.1968 AJ 1980 
2PL 18.6.1968 AJ 1980 
3 7.1968-28.5 .1969 12 1.4.1980-29.9.1980 
4 5.6.1969-28 .10.1971 13 1.1 0.1980-5.8 .1983 
5 3.11.1971-24.5.1973 14 7.9.1983-14.8.1987 
6 16.6.1973-23.8.1974 14A 23 .10.1987 
7 1.9.1974-25.7.1975 15 28.1.1988-2.10.1990 
8 26.7 .1975-11.3.1977 
34/51163 Commercial relations with the Sudan 
I 21.5.1975-31.12.1987 
34/51168 Commercia! relations with Togo 
I 13.2.1980-31.12.1987 
34/5/170 Commercial relations with Dj ibouti 
I 13.2.1980-1.6.1985 
34/5/174 Commercia! relations with Guinea 
I 20.1.1978-31.10.1985 
34/51175 Commercial relations with Guinea Bissau 
I 31.10.1985 
34/5/178 Commercial relations with Gabon 
I 17.9.1971-29.7.1983 I ~ 1985 2 3.11.1983-12.1987 8.5.1990-5.8.1990 
34/5/179 Commercial relations with the Ivory Coast 
2 18.7.1963-31.12.1984 I AJ 1971 
3 11.9.1984-7.9.1989 4 28.11.1989 
34/5/181 Commercial relations with Benin 
I 29.1.1978-3 1.9.1981 
34/51183 Commercia! relations with the Central African Republic 
I 10.12.1974-23.6.1980 IAJ 1979 AJ 1980 2 8.1.1981 -31.10.1985 
34/51184 Commercia! relations with Chad 
I 14.12.1966-12.1986 12APL 3.3.1969 
IPL 11.3.1969-4.2.1969 2BPL 1.9.1987-31.9.1987 
34/5/185 Commercial relations with Congo 
I 25.6.1979-10.3.1980 
34/5/ 186 
1 
34/51187 
1 
34/51188 
1 
34/5/192 
1 
34/5/ 193 
1 
34/51194 
1 
34/5/203 
1 
IPL 
2 
34/5/207 
1 
34/5/224 
1 
34/5/225 
1 
34/ 18/2 
1 
2 
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Commercial relations with Senegal 
1.8.1983-12.1986 12 
Commercial relations with Mali 
13.2.1980-31 .1 0.1985 
Commercial relations with Mauritania 
13.2.1980-12.6.1986 
Commercial relations with Rwanda 
13.2.1980-1.6.1985 
Commercial relations with Bwundi 
13.2.1980-1.6.1985 
Commercial relations with the Seychelles 
4.5.1977-12.1987 12 
Commercial relations with the Comoros 
1.4.1975-19.12.1985 3 
3.11.1982 AJ 
11.1.1984-6.1987 
Commercial relations with Equatorial Guinea 
13.2.1980-24.9.1987 
Commercial relations with Cape Verde 
13.2.1979-31.11.1985 
Commercial relations with Sao Tome and Principe 
13.2.1980 
Boycott of South African products by African states 
1.6.1987 
9.1.1989 
16.8.1 988-14.6.1989 
1980 
4.9.1963-1.2.1972 I AJ 1983 
4.2.1972-8.2.1982 
National Archives 
Department of Foreign Affairs (Buitelandse Sake (BTS)) 
File Box Date Contents 
1122/3 1 6.5.1959-31.3.1961 Relations with Angola 
11112/5/1 1 18.1.1961-25.4.1961 Volunteers for the Katanga 
2 3.4.1961-4.12.1961 
11116/3 1 3.2.1960-31.3.1961 Relations with Tanganyika 
11129/3 1 11.2.1959-13.3.1961 Relations with Nigeria 
11135/3 1 16.5.1959-31.3.1961 Relations with Kenya 
2 5.4.1961-23.3.1962 
11158/3 1 14.4.1960-26.10.1961 Relations with Malawi 
11160/3 AJ 1961 Relations with Botswana 
11176/3 1 23.7.1960 Relations with Mali 
10/ 17/199 1 9.12.1961-18.1.1962 Relations with Tanzania 
4/211969 1 14.2.1951-31.3.1961 Consul General in Antananarivo 
4/2/54 2 15.8.1955-1.12.1960 Consul in Elizabethville (Congo) 
4/2/55 1 3.5 .1941-2.8.1952 Consulate-General in Leopoldville (Zaire) 
2 5.11.1952-31.12.1960 
4/2/64 1 26.1.1943-28.7.1949 Representation in Madagascar 
2 22.2.1952-20.11 .1958 
3 3.12.1958-22.10.1959 
4/2/80 1 27.12.1946-21.1 .1 959 Representation in Lobito Bay, Angola 
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4/2/81 1 23.1.1947-18.2.1959 Representation in Southern Rhodesia 
2 27.2.1959-8.3.1962 
14/7/3 1 14.1.1947-26.4.1963 Malawi govemment representative and 
2211 /51 1 28.8.1961-31.10.1961 Visits from East Africa 
22/1/58 PL 22.5.1962-22.3.1965 Visitors from the Central African Federation 
2211 /62 I 23.4.1937-7.8.1964 Visitors from Mauritius 
2211 /106 I 30.1 .1931-31.3.1960 Visitors from Ghana 
2211 /11211 l+PL 19.7.1961-12.7.1963 Visitors from the Katanga 
22/3/12 OS 23.7.1946-23.3.1948 Trade mission to African territories 
23/11 I 2.9.1934-26.4.1957 Proposed air route to Europe 
23/36 1 20.5.1941-26.7.1960 Air service to Angola and Belgian Congo 
2 9.8.1960-2.11.1962 
23173/1 1 17.2.1962-26.7.1962 Landing rights in Congo Brazzaville 
34/5179 1 7.12.1935-18.2.1961 Commercial relations with Ethiopia 
2 1.4.1961-16.8.1963 
34/51101 1 19.7.1963-20.7.1963 Commercial relations with Cameroon 
34/5/113 PL 1.3.1962-23.9.1965 Commercial relations with Mozambique 
34/51120 I 12.6.1963-13.6.1963 Commercial relations with Uganda 
34/5/ 163 1 2.9.1958-24.11.1964 Commercial relations with Sudan 
34/ 15 1 1.8.1939-25.7.1955 Trade representation on African territories 
Zambia labour officer in South Africa 
50G/29 January-December 1959 UN Economic Commission for Africa 
50G12911 1 June 1960-December 1962 UN Economic Commission for Africa 
72/15711 l+PL 14.1.1964-23.1.1964 Zambia diplomatic representation in South Africa 
78/29 l+PL 21.4.1961-11.1.1965 Congo-Brazzaville claims 
791103 I 26.7.1958-24.9.1960 Africa Conferences (General) 
2 8.10.1960-14.10.1963 
3 14.11.1963-30.12.1965 
90/411 1 January 1950-March 1959 CCTA, CSA, FAMA 
2 Sep. 1960-August 1962 
97110 1 February 1952-June 1955 Council on African Affairs 
98/1 1 January 1952-January 1959 Books dealing with Africa and South Africa 
102/20/27 3 4.2.1960-7.2.1963 CCT A: technical conferences, general file 
102128/211 1 30.7.1958-30.10.1961 F AMA: technical assistance to Angola 
102/28/212 1 27.1.1959-27.12.1961 F AMA: technical assistance to Nigeria 
PL 18.12.1961-12.1.1962 
102/28/2/3 I 22.1.1958-19.3.1960 F AMA: technical assistance to the Ivory Coast 
102128/2/4 1 14.11.1958-6.2.1963 F AMA: technical assistance to East Africa 
102/28/215 1 14.5.1959-25.8.1962 F AMA: technical assistance to the Central 
African Federation 
102/28/2/6 I 25.8.1958-4.2.1959 F AMA: technical assistance to Liberia 
102128/217 I 28.5.1958-12.1.1962 F AMA: technical assistance to Ghana 
102/28/2/8 I 24.6.1959-25.9.1962 F AMA: technical assistance to St. Helena 
102/28/2/9 1 27.8.1959-7.11.1961 F AMA: technical assistance to Mozambique 
102/28/2110 I 29.5.1959-21.3.1961 F AMA: technical assistance to Madagascar 
102128/2111 I 3.11.1959-6.6.1960 F AMA: technical assistance to Cameroon 
102/28/2112 I 16.7.1959-24.11.1959 F AMA: technical assistance to Guinea 
102/28/3 I 8.6.1957-10.3.1958 F AMA: inaugural meeting 
2 6.2.1958-6.7.1961 
102/28/3/ 1 1 1.1959 F AMA: 1 st meeting, Monrovia, February 1959 
102/28/3/2 I 10.12.1959-15.11.1960 FAMA: 2nd meeting, Antananarivo, March 1960 
102/28/3/3 1 8.10.1960-8.6.1961 FAMA: 3rd meeting, Lagos, February 1961 
102/28/3/4 1 29.7.1961-17.2.1962 FAMA: 4th meeting, Abidjan, February 1962 
102/28/4 1 5.2.1958-23.8.1965 F AMA Central Fund 
102/38 1 30.3.1961-23.9.1963 Technical assistance: other African countries 
S/F 1.4.1961-9.5.1964 
102/38/4 
I. 511 
I.511 /1 
I.5/2/1 
T/3(48) 
T/3(49) 
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2 5.8.1963-1.8.1964 
3 3.8.1963-26.2.1965 
SIF 10.4.1964-30.12.1965 
4 9.2.1965-29.10.1965 
5 2.11.1965-18.7.1966 
1 13.2.1962-5.1.1963 
2 7.1.1963-13.2.1963 
3 14.2.1963-19.1.1965 
4 3.2.1965-18.10.1965 
2 Jan. 56 - Nov. 61 
5 July 1957 - June 1962 
1 July 1955-May 1962 
1 Aug-Nov. 1948 
I Jan-Nov. 1949 
Technical assistance: other African countries 
CCTA: constitution, membership, foundation 
CCT A: Annual and Special Meetings 
CCT AlCSA: Secretariat Africa Base 
Ambassador Charles te Water 
Ambassador Charles te Water 
Private Secretary, Minister of Information (INL), 1966-78 
File Box Date Contents 
16/ 1121A 112/26 1962-63 Foreign visitors of the South Africa Foundation 
16/ 112/A 112/27/2 1963 Foreign visitors of the South Africa Foundation 
16/112/A 112/27/3 1963-64 Foreign visitors of the South Africa Foundation 
27/30 112/45 1962 Confidential correspondence: general 
Department ofInforrnation (INL), 1971-1980 
File Box Date Contents 
3114/59 Box 1538 29.7.1976-18.6.1980 General: Ivory Coast 
3114/13 18.1.1976 Transkei 
3114/89 23.10.1969-29.9.1970 Guests from overseas 
3114175 Box 1568 1980-1984 Guests from Malawi 
3114/98 Box 1628 1967-1978 Guests from Rhodesia 
3114 Boxes 1276-80 1964-1980 Guests from overseas 
Private Secretary of the Minister of Information (MNL), 1966-78 
File Box Date Contents 
INIOII 2 1966-68 Guests of the South Africa Foundation 
INIOI2 1 1966-67 Information programmes: publicity 
IN16 4 1966-68 Financial help to foreign visitors and publications 
INI7 4 1966-67 Organisations and persons that spread information 
CPl 5 1968-73 Personal affairs of the Minister 
CPI 5 1974 Personal affairs of the Minister 
CP50 35 1968-71 Africa 
CP78 42 1971 To the Point 
INL8 50 1968-73 Publications 
INL8 5113 1973-74 Publications 
INL8 5114 1973-75 Publications 
INL8 52/5 1975-76 Publications 
INL8 52/6 1976-78 Publications 
INL8 5317 1978 Publications 
INL20 68/2 1975-77 Foreign visitors and guests 
INL20 69/3 1977-78 Foreign visitors and guests 
INL21 70 1974-77 Organisations and persons offering help 
INL22/1+2 71 1968-70 Foreign visitors and guests 
INL22/3+4 72 1970-72 Foreign visitors and guests 
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INL22/5+6 73 1972-74 Foreign visitors and guests 
INL22 7417 1974-75 Foreign visitors and guests 
INL23 75/1 1975 Africa 
INL24 7511 1971-77 Overseas journeys 
INL24 76 1978 Overseas journeys 
INL26/1 76 1970-74 South Africa Foundation 
INL27 77/2 1977-78 South Africa Freedom Foundation 
INL29 7811 1968-71 Organisations and people offering help 
INL29 78/2 1972-74 Organisations and people offering help 
Interviews 
Auret, Derek: telephone, 20 March 2002; 8 January 2003 
See Appendix A 
Barber, James: Johannesburg, 16 February 1999 
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Prof., Department of Political Science, Open University, London (-1983); Master, Hatfield College 
and Prof., Department of Political Science, University of Durham (1983-93); Research Fellow, 
South African Institute of International Affairs; Member, Centre of International Studies, Cam-
bridge University 
Botha, RoelofFrederik 'Pik' : Pretoria, 20 April 1999 
See Appendix A 
Cornwell, Richard John: Pretoria, 19 February 1999 
MA (Hons) (History), University of Bristol (1969); Researcher, Africa Institute, and co-founder 
and Editor, Journal of Contemporary African Studies (1979-82); Lecturer in Development Admini-
stration and African Politics, University of South Africa (1982-87); Head, Current Affairs Section, 
and Editor, Africa Insight, Africa Institute (1987-97); Institute for Security Studies, Johannes-
burglPretoria (1997-) 
De Villiers, Caspar Francois ' Cas': telephone, 18 January 2003 
Editor, Africa Institute Bulletin (1969-75); Associate, To the Point (1972-76); Director, Foreign Af-
fairs Association (1975-78) 
Fourie, Deon S.: Pretoria, 22 April 1999 
Lecturer, University of South Africa, Pretoria; introduced the first degree in Strategic Studies to be 
taught in South Africa (1960-1997); Director, Citizen Force Liaison, on the staff of the Chief of the 
Army (1988-95); consultant for the Department of Defence, serving on various committees of en-
quiry on defence questions 
Geldenhuys, Deon Johannes: Johannesburg, I March 1999 
MA, University of Pretoria (1973); PhD, Cambridge University ("The Effects of South Africa's 
Racial Policy on Anglo-South African Relations, 1945-1960") (1977); Research Director, South 
African Institute of International Affairs (1979-81); Prof., Department of Political Studies, Rand 
Afrikaans University (1984-) 
Holtes, Willem Bernard ' Wim': Johannesburg, 31 March 1999 
Chief Executive, South African Foreign Trade Organisation (SAFTO) (1963-92); Board of Direc-
tors and Deputy Chairman, South African-Netherlands Chamber of Commerce (1995-) 
Landsberg, Stefan Adolf Waldemar: telephone, 4 December 2002 
Metal Studies Consultant, Anglo American Corporation (1980-94) 
Leistner, Gerhard Max Erich: telephone, 26 February 2003 
Professional Officer, Department of Finance (1957-60); Lecturer/Senior Lecturer, Department of 
Economics, University of South Africa (1960-64); Head of Economic Section, Africa Institute 
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(1964-70); Prof. in Development Economics, Department of Economics, University of South Af-
rica (1970-73); Deputy Director, Africa Institute (1973-77); Director, Africa Institute (1978-91) 
Mills, Gregory John Barrington 'Greg': Johannesburg, I March 1999 
MA, Lancaster University (1986); PhD, Lancaster University ("South Africa: The Total National 
Strategy and Regional Policy During the Botha Years, 1978-1989") (1990); Research Associate, 
Institute for Defence Policy, Johannesburg, and Centre for Defence and International Security 
Studies, Lancaster University (1991-93); Director of Studies, South African Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs (1994-96); Director, South African Institute of International Affairs (1996-) 
Runge, Paul: Johannesburg, 7 April 1999; telephone, 18 January 2003 
See Appendix A 
Shearar, Jeremy: telephone, 8 January 2003 
See Appendix A 
Spicer, Michael Wolseley: Johannesburg, 7 April 1999 
MA, Rhodes University, Grahamstown (1978); Royal Institute of International Affairs, London 
("South Africa in Conflict" Project) (1978-80); Assistant Director, South African Institute of Inter-
national Affairs (1981-84); Executive Director, Anglo American Corporation (1985-) 
Swarts, Frans: telephone, 7 December 2002 
Planning Manager, Commercial Manager, Deputy Chief Executive, South African Airways (SAA) 
(1945-81); Chief Executive, SAA (January 1982 - September 1983) 
Van Aardt, Maxi: Johannesburg, 1 March 1999 
PhD, University of Wales at Aberystwyth ("Building a Secure Community in Southern Africa: The 
Case of SA DC") (1998); Prof., Department of Political Studies, Rand Afrikaans University (1998-
2000); Prof. Department of Political Studies, University of Pretoria (2000-) 
Van Aswegen, Jacobus Pieter: Cape Town, 2 November 2001 
Prof. and Head, Department of Business Economics, Rand Afrikaans University (1978-80); Group 
Economist, South African Marine Corporation (Safmarine) (1981-87); Board of Directors, Trek 
Airways, Air Cape, Namib Air (1986); Director, Safair (1986-87); Chairman, Safair (1987-91); 
GrouplExecutive Manager, Safmarine (1987-99); Managing Director, Safair (1993-99) 
Van der Veer, Gerrit Dirk 'Gert': telephone, 7 December 2002 
South African Railways and Harbours (1959-77); Chief Superintendent, Railway Operating (1977-
79); Regional Manger Railways and Harbours, Natal (1979-81); Head, Railway Operating (1981-
83); Chief Executive, South African Airways, and Deputy Managing Director, Transnet (October 
1983 - June 1993) 
Van Heerden, Neil: Johannesburg, 7 April 1999 
See Appendix A 
Van Heerden, Trevor: telephone, 8 March 1999 
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service (1997-99) 
Van Tonder, Jacobus Cornelius 'Neels': telephone, 19 March 1999 
Second Secretary, Embassy, Paris (1969-70); Head, Special Tasks Directorate (Military Intelli-
gence) (1975-84); Brigadier (1983); Major General (1986) 
Venter, Denis: Pretoria, 10 March 1999 
D.Litt et Phil University of South Africa ("Van Nyasaland tot Malawi: politieke ontwikkeling en 
verandering in 'n koloniale same lewing, 1891-1964" (From Nyasaland to Malawi: Political Devel-
opment and Change in a Colonial Society, 1891-1964» (1988); Lecturer, Department of Political 
Science and International Politics, University of Pretoria (1970-74); Assistant Director, South Afri-
can Institute of International Affairs (1975-77); Senior Researcher/Chief ResearcherlDirector, Af-
rica Institute (1978-91); Executive Director, Africa Institute (1992-99) 
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Viljoen, Jan Hendrik 'Hennie': telephone, 26 January 2003 
Director, Coca-Cola South Africa (1975-95); President, Transvaal Chamber of Industries (1987-
88); President, Witwatersrand Chamber of Commerce and Industry (1989); Member, Executive 
Committee, South African Chamber of Business (SACOB) (1990-94); Deputy President, SACOB 
(1991); President, SACOB (1992) 
Correspondence 
Babb, Glenn: January 2003 
See Appendix A 
Barratt, John: October 2002; January 2003 
Cadet, Department of Foreign Affairs (1954-57); Third Secretary, Permanent Mission to the United 
Nations, New York (1958-65); Director, South African Institute of International Affairs (1967-94) 
Du Plessis, Adriaan Sarel 'Attie': January 2003 
Executive Director, Sankorp Ltd. and Sanlam (1986-2002); President, Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut 
(AHI) (1991-92) 
Dugard, Christopher John Robert: December 2002 
Professor of Law, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg (1969-98) 
Eglin, Colin Wells: January 2003 
Leader of the Progressive Party!Progressive Reform Party!Progressive Federal Party (1971 - Sep-
tember 1979; February 1986 - 1988); Member of Parliament for Sea Point, Cape Town (1974-) 
Hanekom, Hermann: January 2003 
See Appendix A 
Jaquet, Andre: December 2002 
See Appendix A 
Leisewitz, Christoph Theodor Lutz: May 1999 
Trainee Underwriter, Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation (CGIC) (1965-68); Branch Manager, 
Natal, CGIC (1968-69); Underwriting Manager, CGIC (1969-73); Assistant General Manager, 
CGIC (1973-78); Manager, Projects Department, CGIC (1978-82); Senior General Manager, CGIC 
(1982-86); Executive Director, CGIC (1986-88); Managing Director, CGIC (1988-2002) 
Leistner, Gerhard Max Erich: December 2002; January 2003 
See Interviews 
Luy!, Louis: February 2003 
Founder and Chairman, Triomf Fertilisers Ltd. (1965-86); Trustee, South Africa Foundation (1973-
95); PhD in Business Administration, University of Michigan ("A Critical Analysis of Arbitration 
through the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce") 
(1980); D.Com (honoris causa), University of the Orange Free State (1983); Honorary Professor of 
Law, University of Pretoria (1986-88); LLD, University of Pretoria (1988); President, South Afri-
can Rugby Football Union (1994-98); Candidate for the Federal Alliance in the Presidential elec-
tion (1999) 
Munger, Edwin Stanton 'Ned': February 2002 
Research Fellow, University of Stellenbosch (1955-56); Professor in Political Geography, Califor-
nia Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California (1961-88); Founder and President, Cape of Good 
Hope Foundation (1985-97); Board Member, United States-South African Leadership Exchange 
Program (USSALEP) (1958-) 
Oppenheimer, Klaus: March 2002 
General Manager, Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation (CGIC) (1956-65); Member, Export 
Trade Advisory Committee (1956-65); Managing Director, Imex (1966) 
Paterson, Colin: January 2003 
See Appendix A 
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Slabbert, Frederik van Zyl: February 2003 
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D.Phil., University of Stellenbosch ("Structural-functional Analysis in Theoretical Sociology") 
(1967); Lecturer, University of Stellenbosch (1964-68); Senior Lecturer (Rhodes University) 
(1969); Senior Lecturer, University of Stellenbosch (1969); Senior Lecturer, University of Cape 
Town (1970-71); Prof. and Head, Department of Sociology, University of the Witwatersrand 
(1972-74); Member of Parliament for the Progressive PartylProgressive Federal Party for Ronde-
bosch, Cape Town (1974-86); Leader of the Progressive Federal Party (September 1979 - February 
1986); Co-founder and Director, Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa (IDASA) 
(1986-); Co-founder and Director, Khula Consulting (1991-) 
Suzman, Helen: November 2002 
Member of Parliament for Houghton, Johannesburg, for the United Party (1953-58), Progressive 
Party (1959-74), Progressive Reform Party (1974-77), Progressive Federal Party (1977-89) 
Swarts, Frans: February 2003 
See Interviews 
Tyler, Geoffrey Winston: February 2002 
Economist, Association of Chambers of Commerce (ASSOCOM) (1977-82); Chief Executive, 
Durban Chamber of Commerce (1985-99) 
Van der Veer, Gerrit Dirk 'Gert' : January and February 2003 
See Interviews 
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